Climate Legislation Is Dead (For Now): Long Live Conventional Pollutants
Climate change legislation is dead for now. I won’t pretend it’s not depressing, even though I avoid the political channels and ignore the rhetoric. For those of us who haven’t refudiated climate change science, it’s a victory for the pessimists and evidence that Congress has a hard time addressing long-range problems, even if consequential.
With respect to regulation of GHG, it’s the worst of both worlds and no one should be happy (which is why I held out hope until the end that cooler heads would prevail). We’re still going to have regulation of GHG, the mechanism being EPA’s recently promulgated Tailoring Rule for GHG. One word. Ugh. Does this really make climate skeptics happy? Do they really think that they will somehow succeed in rolling back the Tailoring Rule? I don’t think so. On the other hand, we don’t have an economy-wide cap-and-trade or carbon tax regime. Are environmentalists happy? I still don’t think so.
I’m left feeling a little like Rodney King. 
Certainly, the issue isn’t going to go away before the next Congress is sworn in.
As I have noted before, however, problems with climate change legislation don’t mean that Congress can’t enact legislation further regulating traditional pollutants. The three-pollutant bill now before the Senate already has a Republic co-sponsor, Lamar Alexander. Now, according to a report in E&E Daily, even Senator Inhofe is stating that he’s interested in working with Democrats to move three-pollutant legislation. Given the failure to move GHG legislation, .jpg)
hell is likely to get hotter before freezing over, but if Inhofe can really be brought on board, there’s no reason why legislation couldn’t pass.
Three-pollutant legislation shares one significant feature with the GHG issue. Like GHG regulation, efficient regulation is hampered by limitations in existing law, as we saw with the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the trading regime in the CAIR regulations, and EPA’s much more limited trading program in the Transport Rule. Senator Voinovich, another Republican that three-pollutant legislation supporters would like to have with them, noted as much, saying that the transport rule would be a "stringent and inflexible regime." New legislation could provide for a more robust trading regime. We’ll see if that’s enough to bring Republicans on board.
I sure hope so. Right now, all we’ve got is a GHG regulatory program that won’t do much for climate change, but will cause my clients endless headaches, and a Transport Rule that’s probably the best EPA can do on traditional interstate pollution, but not nearly as cost-effective as it might be with new legislative authority. I remain an optimist, but sometimes it’s difficult.
Carbon Offset Credits Available Now
Despite the widespread publicity surrounding the actions being undertaken by EPA and in Congress to address greenhouse gas emissions and the potential for a cap and trade program at the federal level, few lawyers are aware that rigorously verified carbon offset credits are currently available for purchase by third parties. Generally, carbon offset credits are issued in exchange for a project proponent’s (e.g., a property owner or other participating entity) implementation of practices and programs which sequester carbon or otherwise reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
In some types of projects, CO2 (carbon dioxide) is sequestered in the leaves, trunks and roots of trees on the property, converted into carbon, and held in the vegetation and soil on the property. By growing a forest or managing a forest in such a way that it sequesters more carbon than would otherwise be held on the property, the project proponent becomes eligible for carbon offset credits, which can then be sold or optioned to third parties.
Carbon offset credits are issued not just for forest projects, but also for greenhouse gas reduction projects involving coal mine methane, landfill gases, livestock gases, and nitric oxide emissions. The carbon offset market incentivizes greenhouse gas sequestration and reduction, and provides a product to third parties looking for a way to offset their carbon emissions or otherwise satisfy regulatory requirements.
There are currently few organizations that issue any type of evaluation and registration for carbon offset credits. One of these organizations, the Climate Action Reserve is a non-profit based in Los Angeles, California which has registered a variety of types of greenhouse gas projects and is currently issuing carbon offset credits to project participants. The Chicago Climate Exchange also provides a cap and trade system for six greenhouse gases, with global affiliates and projects worldwide. There are other, regional and specialized programs that are much more narrow in their applicability and the types of emissions they verify.
The Climate Action Reserve’s carbon offset credits are the result of a rigorous, third-party verification process to quantify and verify the net greenhouse gas emissions sequestration on projects based upon hundreds of pages of protocols which address details ranging from the modeling of carbon stored in live trees, dead wood and wood products, to annual monitoring requirements to determine reversals of carbon sequestration. In the case of forest projects, covenants and contracts require that the project proponent (e.g. the property owner) abide by the protocols and sequester carbon for at least 100 years.
A variety of legal issues arise about how best to document a project proponent’s commitments over the 100 year period, whether that be through contracts, covenants, restrictive easements, conservation easements, mortgages or some combination thereof. While California’s statutory scheme is relatively clear about what types of recorded documents run with the land, other States provide less guidance. See, e.g., California Civil Code 1460 et seq. Likewise, legal documentation must address a variety of issues including subordination to future encumbrances; future transfers of any subject property; reversals or significant carbon loss in the event of natural disasters (e.g., forest fires, earthquakes, etc.); and remedies in the event of intentional acts in violation the project proponent’s commitments (e.g., failure to sequester adequate carbon stocks).
After a project proponent complies with the documentation requirements, registers its project with the applicable entity and been issued carbon offset credits, it is then available to sell or option such credits to third parties. The market for these credits is growing. Currently, corporations and entities who have made voluntary greenhouse gas reduction commitments have purchased these credits to help fulfill such commitments. Obviously, if a mandatory cap and trade system is implemented either in California or on a nationwide basis, then such carbon offset credits will become more valuable. Likewise, if federal, state and local authorities, courts or other jurisdictions require project developers to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, carbon offset credits are likely to become more expensive.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher provides pro bono representation to the Climate Action Reserve. Posting submitted by: Patrick W. Dennis, Charles H. Haake and Shireen B. Rahnema of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.
EPA Tries to Silence Employees Who (Weakly) Criticize Cap-And-Trade
Obama’s EPA finds itself embroiled in a controversy that recalls the Bush Administration: trying to control what the agency’s employees can say about climate change. Today’s controversy is more limited, and more nuanced, than earlier ones. EPA is no longer asking its employees to deny that climate change exists. Instead, EPA has asked two of its attorneys to stop identifying themselves as EPA experts when they publicly criticize a cap-and-trade system for regulating greenhouse gases. Still, I wonder why EPA cares.
EPA previously allowed the attorneys to criticize cap-and-trade as private citizens. The two wrote letters and opinion pieces claiming cap-and-trade doesn’t work, primarily because companies can buy “offsets” that allow them to continue operations without reducing their emissions. They claim a carbon tax would work better than cap-and-trade.
Their writings have not had much effect on the debate in Congress and elsewhere. So the two recently switched from the written word to YouTube, posting a carefully produced video in which they more assertively cite their EPA credentials and experience to justify their critique of cap-and-trade. And as Grist recently noted, EPA took the bait.
EPA should stop worrying about the two attorneys. The two fail to recognize that cap-and-trade works fine when it’s done right. In fact, EPA itself runs one of the most successful cap-and-trade programs in the world. Several years ago, EPA needed to reduce smog in the eastern US. Instead of using typical command-and-control regulations, EPA created the NOx Budget Trading Program. Just last month, EPA released a report on the results achieved by that program. According to EPA, “summertime NOx emissions from power plants and large industrial sources were down by 62 percent compared to year 2000 levels and 75 percent lower than in 1990.”
And the emitters were able to achieve these reductions at a lower cost by trading with other emitters who had cheaper options for compliance. Smithsonian magazine reported a recent estimate that businesses paid only $3 billion to achieve emission reductions that would have cost them $25 billion under traditional command-and-control regulation.
The two attorneys don’t even need to worry about companies finding ways to avoid compliance with the system. Last year, only two emitters failed to comply out of 2,568, even then by only a modest amount. This is not a system full of loopholes.
Finally, the two attorneys ignore the fact that their own agency, under the Obama administration, will get to write the rules for how companies comply with a carbon cap-and-trade system. Both the Waxman-Markey and Boxer-Kerry bills require EPA to write rules regulating how companies can use “offsets” to comply with the system. Surely the agency can write rules that make this cap-and-trade system work as well as the NOx system the agency already runs.
And one more thing: As Grist reports, many experts think that the alternative — a carbon tax — may not achieve the emission reductions we need. We can only guess what carbon price might lead to the right amount of emission reductions. We’ll get the tax revenues we predict, but not necessarily the carbon reductions.
So the two attorneys should lighten up on their criticisms. But even if they don’t, EPA should stop worrying about them so much.
Derivatives Trading in Climate Change Legislation
ACES & Eights? Swaps and Other Derivatives in Climate Change Legislation
By
Stephen M. Bruckner
On May 21, 2009, the House Energy and Commerce Committee approved H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy & Security Act (ACES), by a 33-25 vote. As the Committee touts its efforts on the much-examined markup of H.R. 2454 (aka, “Waxman-Markey discussion draft”), coalitions from each side of the ideological spectrum assail the legislation as toothless and watered-down, or a disaster for the American economy. The bill has a long way to go, including review by other House committees and, of course, the Senate, so it may be premature for Committee Chairman Henry Waxman to bestow the mantle of “decisive and historic action.”
Buried within ACES’ cap-and-trade emissions plan are a series of provisions that detail how big banks, hedge funds, and traders can use complex securities and derivatives to profit from the new carbon allowance market. We all watched aghast as “credit default swaps” and similar financial alchemy led to the melt down of Wall Street and the credit markets. Do these types of investments have a proper role in climate change and energy legislation? In a bill that already has plenty of political and policy hurdles, why add financial regulation?
Title III, Subtitle D of ACES, entitled “Carbon Market Assurance”, amends the Federal Power Act to create a financial instrument known as a “regulated allowance derivative”, which can include a “swap agreement”, and directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to establish regulations for these financial vehicles. Title III, Subtitle E of ACES, entitled "Additional Market Assurance", addresses transactions in derivatives involving energy commodities such as coal, gasoline, and natural gas. These provisions open the door for financial institutions to partake in the new market created by ACES’ emission allowances. It allows companies, funds, and traders to purchase and trade emission allowances, and to devise complex derivative instruments to sell and trade, picking up commissions and charging fees along the way. As a result, the theoretical value of the allowances and their derivatives will be determined, in large part, by the manipulation and speculation of financial parties with little or no concern for carbon emission standards or federal climate policy beyond immediate monetary gain.
Simply put, the emerging market for new carbon allowances created by the bill could be (at best) undermined or (at worst) commandeered by financial contrivances that are already partially responsible for the nation’s current financial instability. The fundamental value of the new cap-and-trade 'products' will necessarily fluctuate as the emissions market adjusts and stabilizes. If big banks and hedge funds can use puts, swaps, options and other speculative instruments, which the federal government has yet to capably regulate, the stability of emissions allowances and carbon trading could be placed at risk. The chaos visited upon the economy at large by these and other financial instruments should cause hesitation and serious consideration as to whether they belong in Congress' first attempt at comprehensive climate change legislation.
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act - A Useful Tool for Climate Change?
We are not going to have Congressional action on a regime for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by the time EPA will feel compelled to respond to the Supreme Court's direction in the Massachusetts case and announce whether CO2 emissions endanger public health or welfare. If endangerment is found under Section 109 or 202 of the Act, it appears to lead to ambient air quality standards for CO2 which are then to be met through state implementation plans. By controlling the sources of CO2 within its borders, no state is likely to be able to reduce CO2 to whatever ambient level is established. This is the practical result of the fact that greenhouse gases are a global problem not a local or regional problem. Moreover, the regulation of CO2 under other portions of the Act will likely follow. Perhaps the chaos likely to ensue from following this course will push Congress to pass legislation addressing greenhouse gases. But relying on Congress to do the sensible thing may well be an imprudent course.
Why not try an endangerment finding under Section 115 of the Act instead? It addresses international air pollution which is what GHG emissions are. It calls for a determination of endangerment in a foreign country from sources in the United States. The determination is deemed a finding under Sec.110(a)(2)(H)(ii) of the Act; that finding may be that the relevant SIP is substantially inadequate to comply with the requirements of the Act but need not be that it is inadequate to attain the NAAQS. The affected foreign country must be invited to appear at public hearings on appropriate revision of the SIP and the United States must be given reciprocal rights by the foreign country. Making the determination and establishing reciprocity would take EPA into comparatively unfamiliar territory; starting GHG reduction through state action would follow the path that the US has already started down.
The advantages of this approach that I see are, first, that it deals with the GHG issue as a global, or at least an international, problem rather than as a local or regional one. Second, it gives the states the opportunity to proceed with cap-and-trade regimes which I think will, in some form, be the Congressional solution. Third, it may be able to avoid introducing GHG regulation into other CAA programs such as New Source Review which may be hard to untangle if and when a cap-and-trade regime is established.
The disadvantages are that it is certainly not a perfect fit with a national cap-and-trade or GHG emission tax scheme which I view as the most rational approaches that Congress might enact (though the rationality of a tax scheme is much greater than the likelihood that Congress would embrace it). If you favor command and control regulation and the complexity of New Source Review, this is not the solution for you. There are also risks in what the courts may do in interpreting Section 115 which has rarely been subjected to judicial scrutiny.
In sum, I suggest Section 115 as the best of the ill-fitting options which the Clean Air Act offers for a rational approach to reducing GHG emissions.
