The ACOEL blog has devoted several entries over the last two years to the question whether and how a plaintiff could recover, under CERCLA, costs it incurred for a cleanup performed under a consent decree or administrative settlement.  One of the more intriguing developments for CERCLA practitioners has been the tension between and radical differences to cost recovery or contribution claims under Sections 107 and 113 of CERCLA.  One of the more recent developments is the 11th Circuit decision in Solutia v. McWane (Full disclosure: I am counsel to several defendants in this case). 

"Boots" Gale previously blogged about the District Court decision. The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Section 113 claim on the basis that these Defendants had the benefit of CERCLA’s contribution protection obtained via their own administrative settlement with EPA.  Initially, the District Court denied summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Section 107 claim, but then reconsidered and reversed that decision. 

The 11th Circuit noted that the Supreme Court's Atlantic Research decision declined to decide the issue of whether a party may bring a 107(a) claim for direct cleanup costs incurred via a consent decree entered as past of CERCLA Section 106/107  litigation.  The 11th Circuit confirmed, however, the conclusion of the District Court that numerous federal Circuit Courts had reached that issue since that time, each one concluding Section 113 to be the party’s exclusive remedy, and denying the Section 107 claim.  Relying in part on the conclusions reached by these other Circuit Courts, the 11th Circuit rejected Plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation arguments, and concluded that a party who has a CERCLA Section 113(f) claim cannot also maintain a CERCLA Section 107 claim.  To find otherwise, the 11th Circuit concluded, would “thwart the contribution protection afforded to parties that settle their liability with the EPA…”, “destroy CERCLA’s statutorily-created settlement initiative…”, would allow a plaintiff to impose joint and several liability on defendants, and would prevent those defendants from asserting any Section 113(f) counterclaim since the plaintiffs would have their own CERCLA contribution protection via their consent decree. 

The time has not run yet for the Plaintiffs in this case to seek certiorari from the Supreme Court.  In light of the unanimity of the federal Circuit Courts on this issue, it seems unlikely that the Court would accept the case for decision, despite the importance of the issue and the Court’s decision not to reach the issue in its 2007 decision in Atlantic Research.

A Superfund cleanup project is, of course, an exercise in "greening" the environment, in that the remediation project is designed to remove contamination from the environment and return the affected property to beneficial use. With the February 2012 publication of EPA's "Methodology for Understanding and Reducing a Project's Environmental Footprint" report, EPA has begun to formalize a process for ensuring that the remediation itself is done as greenly as possible.

The methodology describes a total of 21 metrics by which the greenness of a cleanup can be measured across five core elements: air, water, energy, materials and waste, and land/ecosystems. The report contains planning checklists (warranted to be "user-friendly") and a series of spreadsheets (which are assuredly not user-friendly) illustrating formats for organizing raw data and quantifying impact estimates.

While the methodology will primarily be applied to future remediation projects, the techniques are already being tested at a few ongoing remediation sites that have "volunteered" to pilot the methodology. For example, at one site in the Midwest that is in the middle of long-term groundwater pump-and-treat, an EPA consultant examined the project to determine whether the carbon emissions associated with the electricity (generated by the local utility at a coal-burning power plant) needed to run the pumps and associated air strippers could be reduced.

No word yet on whether the next level of meta-analysis will require investigating how to minimize the resources used to analyze the footprint “greenity” of the underlying project itself.

According to a report in February 15’s Greenwire, President Obama’s proposed budget would reduce Superfund spending by 6%, from $565 million to $532 million.  I still don’t understand why Obama, particularly with Cass Sunstein still at OMB, hasn’t turned this problem into an opportunity.

I know I’ve flogged this one before, but a significant part of the explanation for the size of the Superfund budget is related to CERCLA’s status as the last bastion of command and control regulation.  Everyone who practices in this area could provide endless examples of the almost unbelievable extent of micromanaging indulged in by EPA and its consultants.  Even where EPA is recovering oversight costs, such an approach taxes the system. 

(And don’t we care about those unreasonable costs being passed on to PRPs?  Oops.  I forgot.  They’re the bad guys.  Don’t care if they incur needless costs.)

Several states have now successfully privatized their state superfund programs, saving both private and public sector funds, without any decrease in environmental protection.  Now’s the time for feds to seize the opportunity presented by the budget cuts to change the way federal cleanups get done.

Phase I report “reliance letters” issued by an Environmental Professional (EP) may be misunderstood and misused in the context of conducting CERCLA All Appropriate Inquiry (AAI). The term “reliance letter,” in fact, is nowhere to be found in either the Federal All Appropriate Inquiry Regulations or the related ASTM Standard E 1527-05.

Consider the following common AAI situation: A client has contracted to buy property for which a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (Phase I ESA) report was recently prepared for the seller. To avoid the costs of obtaining a new Phase I report, the client asks whether it can use the Phase I provided by the seller to satisfy its environmental diligence obligations. The Phase I report explicitly states that it can be used and relied upon only by the contracting user for which it was prepared. The EP may be willing to issue a reliance letter to the client for a fee or occasionally at no cost. But what exactly is a reliance letter and how does it relate to the objective of compliance with AAI requirements?

Unauthorized use prohibitions and reliance letters are intended to protect EPs from potential claims by third-parties who may rely on a Phase I report prepared for another. Nevertheless, an unsophisticated third-party recipient of a reliance letter may construe such a letter as documentation of compliance with AAI requirements. A reliance letter establishes the recipient’s status as an authorized “user” primarily for purposes of the party’s legal relationship with the EP. Requesting a reliance letter to establish authorized user status is only one of several AAI issues that should be considered by third-party users of Phase I reports.

Other important questions to be considered include whether the one year/180 day regulatory shelf-life of the report has expired. Also, what independent inquiries must a third-party undertake to satisfy the AAI regulations? Third-party recipients of reliance letters may easily overlook conducting the “user” inquiries required by the AAI regulations.

The ASTM Standard further contemplates that the results of the user’s separate inquiries be provided to the EP prior to completion of the EP’s Phase I tasks (the AAI regulations are less clear). How do those provisions of the ASTM Standard apply to the third-party reliance situation? Is the third-party user obligated to accumulate the necessary user information and provide it to the EP after-the-fact? If so, how should the EP deal with any new substantive information? Also, if the results of the user inquiry are not referenced in the Phase I report, how does the third-party document that it has satisfied those obligations?

Of course, the EP may decline to issue a reliance letter or may impose costs or terms that are unacceptable. The EP may even suggest that, absent such use and reliance authorization, a new Phase I ESA must be conducted. But is that correct? The regulations set out conditions for third-party use of information contained in a Phase I report prepared for another. No requirement that the EP preparing the report issue a reliance letter is included among those conditions. The ASTM Standard specifically provides that no particular legal relationship between the EP and the user is necessary for the user to satisfy AAI obligations. With or without a reliance letter, the AAI regulations and ASTM Standard contemplate that the third-party may use the results of a report prepared for another person to partially satisfy its AAI obligations.

These questions, and perhaps others, suggest that a third-party user of a Phase I report prepared for another should be aware of the limitations of a reliance letter, if issued, and carefully consider all pertinent regulations in conducting its AAI.

To encourage Brownfields development, Congress amended Superfund to add three transactional defenses to potentially responsible party liability: (1) innocent purchaser (IP); (2) bona fide prospective purchaser (BFPP); and (3) contiguous property owner (CPO).  These defenses have shared prerequisites that include: (1) that all appropriate inquiry (AAI) have been performed pre-closing; (2) that specified continuing obligation be performed post-closing; and (3) that, in the case of BFPP and CPO, there be no “affiliation” between the purchaser and a potentially responsible party and, in the case of IP, that the act or omission of the third party giving rise to the contamination not have occurred in connection with a contractual relationship with the IP. 

The purpose of this posting is: (1) to provide context as to how the transactional defenses and their prerequisites relate to each other, as well as to the third party defense; (2) to identify some recent guidance regarding two of those prerequisites--an ASTM standard relating to "continuing obligations" and an EPA memorandum relating to "no affiliation"; and (3) to critique the “no affiliation” discussion of Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 692 (D.S.C. 2010), a recent case that has garnered much attention.

To read the full article, please click here.

Sophisticated buyers of contaminated and potentially contaminated property (and their counsel) typically take pains to satisfy the Superfund (CERCLA) defenses for Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers (BFPPs) and Contiguous Property Owners (CPOs).  In 2011, buyers readily understand and conduct due diligence (including the now-ubiquitous ASTM Phase I reports) and, when necessary, comply with “continuing obligations” attendant to owning contaminated property (the subject of other recent entries in this blog). 

A sometimes-overlooked element of these CERCLA defenses requires that buyers not have an “affiliation with any other person that is potentially liable” under CERLCA.  EPA has weighed in with a publicly released memo issued on September 21st, Enforcement Discretion Guidance Regarding the Affiliation Language of CERCLA's Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser and Contiguous Property Owner Liability Protection.  This new guidance covers the two exceptions to the “no affiliations” requirement expressly added to CERCLA, and also addresses four common scenarios where the affiliation issue can arise.

The memo is to assist EPA personnel in exercising their enforcement discretion—on a site-specific basis. Why now?  In this blog on March 22, 2011, ACOEL Fellow Linda C. Martin reported on the troubling case known as “Ashley II”, in which a U.S. District court rejected the BFPP defense, in part, because a liability release between the seller and buyer created a disqualifying “affiliation.”   The decision is troubling because sellers and buyers often indemnify and release each other from environmental liabilities.  The case, involving private parties, is now on appeal.

In this guidance, EPA disagrees with the general notion that indemnifications will create a disqualifying relationship, although the Agency could have directly taken issue with the Ashley II decision.  To its credit, the United States has not been aggressive in finding disqualifying “affiliations” to date (at least as reflected in published judicial decisions).  The public statement of the Agency’s views should not only confirm the government’s litigation posture, but also assist courts taking up the issue in private cost-recovery actions.   

Every Superfund allocation action involves a “settle or try” decision at some point.  Occasionally, I find an allocation decision where the outcome did not seem to justify the investment in litigation costs and fees and ask, “why didn’t this case settle?”

State of New York v. Solvent Chemical Co., Inc. et al., 685 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) is such a case.   There were three parties involved in the allocation: Solvent Chemical Co., Inc. (Solvent), E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (DuPont), and Olin Corporation (Olin).  Costs associated with four separate media were allocated: soils; the A-Zone shallow groundwater; the B-Zone bedrock groundwater; and the “hot spot” groundwater contamination.

The total response costs were $9,124,328.  This chart breaks down the response costs for each of these four media and shows the proposed allocation of Solvent’s expert and the resulting dollars that Solvent would recover:

The parties had a one-day settlement conference with a magistrate judge.  They could not reach agreement.  The case was then tried with the following outcome:

A comparison of the dollars claimed against the final judgment is shown below:

Between the settlement conference and the final judgment was a 19-day trial.  The district court heard from 10 witnesses live and 24 witnesses through their depositions.  There were 1,200 trial exhibits.  The parties made post-trial submissions followed by oral summations over three days in November 2008.  The district court judge took 15 months to issue its decision.

Viewed solely from an economic perspective, Olin was in a no-win situation.  I assume that its litigation fees and costs were much greater than its final allocation.  Why didn’t Solvent and Olin reach a settlement?  One has to believe that if the parties could have gamed out long before the trial the judgment against Olin less Solvent’s Olin-related litigation costs, they would have found a basis to settle.

In DuPont’s case, I will guess that Solvent put more faith in its allocation expert than it turns out, the judge did.  Parties have to remember than judges are instructed by CERCLA to do equity.   Advocacy rarely equals equity. 

The district court refused to allocate DuPont or Olin any future costs in part because a state regulatory official testified that such costs related to a contaminant linked only to Solvent’s operations.  Hence, I assume that, after litigation fees and costs, Solvent lost money.

As a mediator, I always tell parties, “I don’t care if you don’t settle, but I do care if you don’t settle and at the courthouse you wish you could turn back the clock to settle when you had the chance.”   Only the parties and the magistrate judge know why settlement did not occur, but unless the parties had taken extreme positions during settlement effectively forcing the trial, this seems like a case where a lack of foresight was costly.

This fall, the United States Supreme Court will decide whether to revisit a question it left open in United States v. Atlantic Research:  Whether a party who has incurred cleanup costs following an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) lawsuit may recover its costs under § 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), or instead is limited to a contribution action under CERCLA § 113.  The distinction between these cost recovery provisions has divided lower courts for much of the last decade, and forms the basis for the July 2011 certiorari petition in Morrison Enterprises v. Dravo Corp. 

In 2004, the Supreme Court ruled that contribution under CERCLA § 113(f) is only available while or after a plaintiff had been sued under CERCLA – and thus could not be used to recover “voluntary” cleanup costs when a Potentially Responsible Party (“PRP”) remediates a Superfund site prior to litigation.  Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services.  Three years later, the Court clarified in Atlantic Research that voluntarily-incurred response costs were instead recoverable under § 107(a), which “reimburses other parties for costs that those parties incurred.”

Atlantic Research, however, did not resolve whether Section 107 could ever apply during or following CERCLA litigation.  In a footnote, the Supreme Court “recognize[d] that a PRP may sustain expenses pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under” CERCLA without “reimbur[sing] the costs of another party.”  The Court declined to decide “whether these compelled costs of response are recoverable under §113(f), §107(a), or both.” 

That question recently arose in Morrison Enterprises v. Dravo Corp.  After being separately sued by EPA for their contributions to groundwater contamination, Morrison and Dravo entered consent decrees governing the cleanup of their respective “sub-sites”.  Morrison then sued Dravo under CERCLA 107, seeking to recover costs incurred in treating trichloroethylene (“TCE”) that Morrison alleged had originated from Dravo’s upgradient site.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Morrison’s suit, stating as a bright line rule: “§ 113(f) provides the exclusive remedy for a liable party compelled to incur response costs pursuant to an administrative or judicially approved settlement under §106 or §107.”  Other circuits courts have held that parties who incur costs under a administrative order with the state, W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Intern., Inc., or who contributed money to a cleanup fund under a private settlement agreement, Agere Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Environmental Technology Corp., could maintain cost recovery actions under CERCLA § 107.

The distinction is critical to Superfund plaintiffs and defendants.  For contribution actions under CERCLA § 113, the parties must share “common liability,” recovery is subject to equitable allocation and may be barred by prior settlements, and the statute of limitations is three years.  Under § 107, on the other hand, there is no settlement bar or common liability requirement, recovery is joint and several, and the statute of limitations is six years after the initiation of on-site construction of the remedy.

The Supreme Court is scheduled to consider the Morrison certiorari petition during its September 26, 2011 conference.

Phase I Environmental Site Assessments (Phase I ESAs) are conducted: (1) to assess environmental and health risks related to the acquisition and development of real property and (2) as a critical component of establishing the Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser (BFPP) or related defenses to “owner” liability under CERCLA. A recent ACOEL posting discussed the importance of compliance with post-closing BFPP obligations. What about the adequacy of the Phase I ESA process itself?

A Phase I ESA must satisfy the requirements of “All Appropriate Inquiry” (AAI), which have been incorporated in the ASTM E 1527-05 Standard. Phase I ESAs are not, however, typically examined by environmental agencies and there is a dearth of judicial interpretation of the AAI requirements. To date, the determination of AAI compliance and BFPP status has been the province of the regulated and not the regulators.

The scenario is familiar. A transaction includes the acquisition of commercial property. The client has a general notion of AAI and the importance of the Phase I ESA to achieve BFPP status. The client usually does not know, or care to know, the specific elements of AAI. The Phase I ESA often becomes a transactional commodity to be purchased from the lowest bidder. Lawyers are content to accept the results of the bidding war, relying on the self-certification of the Environmental Professional (EP) that the assessment is compliant with the ASTM Standard. The ESA is conducted, the report issued and the transaction closed with everyone satisfied that environmental risk management has been adequately addressed. This process appears appropriate, at least when agencies or courts are not called upon to perform a more rigorous evaluation.

A February 14, 2011 report issued by the EPA Office of Inspector General (OIG) may serve as the impetus for a more cautious approach to selecting the EP in transactional and Brownfield grant matters and for more carefully evaluating Phase I reports. The OIG report documents the results of its evaluation of 35 AAI/Phase I reports generated by EPs for Brownfields Program grantees. The OIG concluded that none of the Phase I reports satisfied all of EPA’s AAI rule requirements. OIG criticized EPA for its complete reliance on EP self-certifications of compliance, its failure to establish accountability for compliant reports and the lack of procedures for reviewing reports to determine compliance with AAI requirements.

Although many of the AAI deficiencies cited by OIG were arguably very minor, the message sent was clear: Noncompliant Phase I ESAs introduce risk that the environmental conditions of a property have not been adequately assessed for the purpose of making informed property use and redevelopment decisions or for identifying risks to human health and the environment. OIG’s recommendations were equally clear - stop relying on EP self-certifications and develop a process for more careful scrutiny of AAI reports to determine actual compliance. The issues raised by the OIG report can, of course, be easily transformed into legal arguments in court where BFPP status may be in issue.

I suspect that many of us have been lulled to sleep by the self-certifications of the EP. Has the time arrived to more carefully assess the assessor and treat the Phase I ESA as a site-specific professional evaluation and not a low-bidder commodity required simply to seal the deal?

Since the passage of CERCLA, practitioners have been keenly aware of the necessity to negotiate contractual provisions allocating responsibility for environmental liabilities in the purchase and sale of industrial facilities. Such agreements typically include provisions aimed at protecting the buyer from liability for pre-purchase environmental claims and limiting the length of time that the seller may be obligated to indemnify the buyer for such claims.

A recent federal district court decision, Stimson Lumber Co. v. Int'l Paper Co., CV 10-79-M-DWM-JCL (D. Mont. 2011), illustrates the importance of not only including provisions in purchase and sale agreements for indemnity as to pre-closing conditions, but ensuring that such provisions unambiguously reflect the parties’ intentions regarding CERCLA statutory liability. On April 22, the court in Stimson Lumber held that the buyer of a lumber mill could sue the seller of the mill for costs incurred under CERCLA even though the period of seller's contractual indemnity for environmental claims had expired under the terms of the sale contract.

A 1993 asset purchase agreement (the "APA") pursuant to which Stimson Lumber Company bought a lumber mill from Champion International provided an indemnity for environmental claims relating to pre-closing conditions for a period of ten years. In 2008, after the indemnity had expired, Stimson filed suit against Champion's successor, International Paper, for costs incurred to clean up contamination at the mill. International Paper argued that the lawsuit was barred under the terms of the APA because the contractual period for indemnity for environmental claims had run. The court disagreed, finding that a provision setting forth the purchase price could have signaled the parties' intention that statutory CERCLA liability remains with the seller. The court found that the wording of the provision created an ambiguity regarding whether the parties intended for the buyer to assume the seller's statutory liabilities after the contractual indemnification obligations expired.

The court distinguished Armotek Industries, Inc. v. Freedman, 790 F. Supp. 383 (D. Conn. 1992), in which the purchase agreement had included a proviso that after the expiration of the indemnity period, "no claim for indemnification for losses . . . shall be made against Seller." The court in Aromtek found that this provision reflected the parties' unambiguous agreement that the seller's CERCLA liability had shifted to the buyer after the indemnity period expired. In reviewing the Stimson Lumber agreement, the court found no similar bar to claims after the expiry of the indemnity period, and held that the ambiguity in the terms of the APA precluded summary judgment for the seller.

The Stimson Lumber decision serves as a useful reminder that in drafting environmental provisions, the words must be either very broad and quite absolute in the allocation of future liabilities or very specific and complete in reflecting sometimes subtle distinctions between indemnity for and assumption of liability. Years after the fact, when the participants in the initial transaction are long gone and the cold words on a sheet of paper are the only guide to the parties’ intentions, only truly unambiguous language will protect against the revival of old liabilities thought extinguished long ago.

In his July 8, 2010 ACOEL blog entry, Fournier “Boots” Gale of this firm reported on the then-most recent court decision dealing with whether and how a plaintiff could recover, under CERCLA, costs it incurred for a cleanup performed under a consent decree or administrative settlement. One of the more intriguing developments for CERCLA practitioners has been the tension between and radical changes to cost recovery or contribution claims under 107 and 113 of CERCLA. Boots reported on the July 2, 2010 decision by a federal judge here in Alabama to grant complete summary judgment to defendants, finding that a party compelled to incur such costs can only proceed under Section 113, and not 107. Because the defendants in that case had also entered into an administrative settlement with EPA for the same site, thus obtaining Section 113 contribution protection, all of plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed. That case is still on appeal to the 11th Circuit. The issue decided by the Alabama federal court--whether compelled costs were recoverable under Section 107, 113, or both—had been left unanswered by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007). Courts have been struggling with this issue ever since.

The latest opinion on this issue is from the 8th Circuit, in Morrison Enterprises, LLC v. Dravo Corp., 2011 WL 1237526 (8th Circuit, April 5, 2011). The 8th Circuit was the federal circuit court whose decision was affirmed in the Atlantic Research case, so the result in this case is not surprising. Noting the question unanswered by the United States Supreme Court in Atlantic Research, the Morrison Court, as did the federal court in Alabama, concluded that Section 113 was the appellants’ exclusive remedy, confirming the summary judgment granted by the district court below on the Section 107 claim. One of the Morrison appellants argued to the district court that one of the contaminants it cleaned up was totally unrelated to its operations and, thus, the costs it incurred related to that contaminant were “voluntary” and thus recoverable under Section 107. Interestingly, the plaintiffs in the Alabama case made the same argument. Both the Alabama and 8th Circuit Courts rejected the argument because all of the work was performed under and pursuant to a consent decree, which was broad enough to encompass the costs for cleaning up the contaminant sought to be carved out as voluntary. In effect, even if one wishes to argue later that some costs incurred were for a contaminant for which one had no responsibility, if the costs incurred are pursuant to that consent decree, or administrative settlement, then the costs are not incurred voluntarily and a Section 107 claim is still barred. In a final blow to the cost recovery efforts in this case, the appellant attempted to amend its complaint to assert a Section 113 claim after summary judgment had been entered on its 107 claim, but the district court denied it as untimely (and the Morrison court affirmed on this issue, too).

In 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin rendered a widely reported and discussed decision in Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., No. 2:08-cv-16-WCG (E.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 2009) (Appleton I) that many remember as being unique. This is because rather than considering the usual so-called “equitable factors” to determine proportionate financial responsibility in a CERCLA contribution action such as waste-in volume or relative contaminant toxicity, the District Court focused entirely on a single marker of relative culpability i.e., Appleton Paper’s knowledge that their actions would cause environmental harm.

In February of 2011, the District Court issued an equally intriguing opinion in Appleton Papers Inc., v. Whiting Paper Co., No. 08-C-16, 41 ELR 2011 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 28, 2011) (Appleton II). Relying in large measure on the District Court’s 2009 decision, multiple defendants argued that the response costs already contributed to cleanup effort should be borne by NCR Corp. and Appleton Papers Inc. (collectively “the Appleton Plaintiffs”). All of the Defendant’s arguments highlighted the same equitable factor that barred the Appleton Plaintiffs from obtaining contribution it, e.g, knowledge that a generated waste might cause environmental harm. The District Court agreed, and determined that the Appleton Plaintiffs were liable to the Defendants for response cost of remediating four of the five operable units along the Lower Fox River. However, the Appleton Plaintiffs were determined not to liable for costs associated with Operable Unit No. One (“OU1”) because the OU1 defendants were unable to prove that the Appleton Plaintiffs contributed to the contamination of OU1 (OU1 is located upstream of the Appleton Plaintiffs’ facility) or that the Appleton Plaintiffs were arranges under CERCLA §107).

These cases warrant practitioners’ review as they clearly express the notion that contribution liability should rest upon satisfaction of the ultimate objective of the CERCLA liability scheme i.e., that the polluter pays the costs of resolving the pollution it causes. This objective should never be far from mind, as the fact based focus of inquiry utilized by the District Court in these cases may well be the undoing of practitioner’s efforts to rely upon supposed technical and legal attributes of relative responsibility. Instead, the focus should be directed to the essential inquiry at the root of the CERCLA legislative cost recovery scheme e.g., the polluter who causes pollution to occur should pay for its cleanup.

CERCLA liability under section 107 is often characterized as strict, joint and several unmitigated by considerations of causation, fault or fairness. Contribution is different, however. Congress, in section 113(f)(1), specifically authorized the courts to allocate costs “using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.” Illustrative of this fundamental difference is the fight over who shall pay what for the massive PCB cleanup of the Lower Fox River.

NCR is incurring the bulk of the costs based on discharges of PCBs incident to the manufacture of carbonless paper at a facility on the River. It sued numerous paper mills along the River based on their discharges of PCB containing wastewater incident to the recycling of trim and waste carbonless paper. In late December 2009, Judge Griesbach of the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed NCR’s suit for contribution against the paper mills based on NCR's knowledge of the content and risks associated with PCB-containing carbonless paper as manufacturer/developer of the product compared to the recycling paper mills.

Framed thus — in old fashioned terms about knowledge of dangers and avoidance of risk—it was no contest. NCR was denied contribution because of its knowledge, learned gradually over time, about the toxic nature of PCBs as against those who merely, and without access to NCR’s superior knowledge of the product, processed it for recycling. The Court’s analysis, it said, “is governed by traditional principles of equity, such as the relative fault of the parties, any contracts between the parties bearing on the allocation of cleanup costs, and the so called ‘Gore factors.’” The lengthy recitation of the largely undisputed facts was nothing less than a moral indictment of NCR’s actions and reactions as the knowledge about PCB toxicity and its threat to the environment came to be documented and disseminated; in short, nothing less than a fault-based conclusion.

The flip side of this case came down in February 2011. Judge Griesbach decided that the paper mills, which had incurred expenses related to various EPA and Wisconsin DNR orders and settlements, monitoring and investigation, were entitled to contribution from NCR for those portions of the River where both recycling and manufacturing PCB contamination occurred. This time around the Court was satisfied that its singular use of NCR’s “fault” as the sole determinant to deny NCR contribution in 2009 was likewise sufficient to grant the paper mills a right of contribution against NCR. In other words, fault or culpability can become the overriding factor and permit the court to eschew consideration of any other equitable factors, including Gore factors. One sees in the Court’s emphasis on charging the financial cost on those “responsible” for creating the hazardous conditions a tone and direction quite at variance with the rather automatic analysis of liability under section 107. Hence, although approximately half of the PCBs originated with the paper mills and not NCR’s manufacturing, the Court, on culpability grounds, was prepared to impose the entire cost on NCR exclusive only of amounts reimbursed to the defendants by insurance.

A few months ago, a significant anniversary passed without much fanfare: the 30th anniversary of the passage of CERCLA. Interestingly, 30 years has another meaning today in the Superfund world as many of the CERCLA sites have passed through the active cleanup phase and into the long-term operation and maintenance phase. When practitioners began working with the Superfund statute in the early days, the question of when would a Superfund cleanup “end” was considered. Many of us thought that 30 years of monitoring at a site after completion of the active remediation stage was a reasonable expectation. This expectation, while not expressly stated in CERCLA or the National Contingency Plan, was based on the approach used in RCRA closures which generally require 30 years of post-closure monitoring.

But 30 years of working with the Superfund statute has made it clear that 30 years is not a meaningful benchmark for long-term O&M, at least not to EPA. The critical documents in the Superfund process, the Records of Decision, the Consent Decrees and the EPA Guidance documents usually do not specify when long-term operation and maintenance may cease. As a result, because groundwater contamination at many Superfund sites has proven to be so difficult to remediate to drinking water or some other agreed upon standards, many PRP Groups are faced with the possibility that their Superfund site may require perpetual monitoring. In addition, since the Consent Decrees require a five year review process by EPA for all active sites, the possibility of enhanced monitoring or additional remediation always looms on the horizon.
The uncertainties in knowing when a Superfund site will “end” creates many challenges for performing parties and their counsel. Among those difficulties:

• Continual disclosure on company financials and SEC filings;
• Time and expense of keeping PRP Groups functioning over many years and paying for government internal and contracted oversight costs;
• Lack of certainty or predictability in budgeting long-term costs for Superfund liabilities; and
• Loss of institutional memory and familiarity at sites where, over time, companies and their divisions are sold and counsel, consultants and EPA personnel move on and/or retire.
   

These risks and costs, of course, are spared for de minimis parties and other PRPs who structure their settlements as cash-outs either to EPA or to other PRPs. For those performing parties left behind, however, the ability to determine a reasonable end point to the commitment they entered into years, if not decades earlier, often remains a largely unresolved and perhaps undeterminable question under present regulation and practice.

Many of us are working in PRP Groups where active remediation has been completed yet the groundwater remains substantially above the Performance Standards. In many of these sites, the groundwater plume is controlled and presents no risk to human and other environmental receptors yet reasonable predictions about when the monitoring program and the Superfund “machine” can be turned off remains a mystery. With the 30th anniversary of Superfund now passed, it is time for more discussion and coordination between EPA and the PRP community about how and when Superfund sites, especially those with long-term groundwater monitoring requirements, may “end.”

We all know that the bona fide prospective purchaser (BFPP) provision provides a defense to CERCLA liability for contaminated sites and allows a knowing purchase of contaminated property. It encourages brownfields and voluntary cleanup programs across the country.

Judicial interpretations of the BFPP defense are scarce. In October 2010, a federal district court in South Carolina issued its opinion which was a nasty turn of events for BFPP’s. (Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc. (“Ashley II”), Case No. 2:05-cv-02782-MBS). The case was for recovery of cleanup costs associated with a former fertilizer manufacturing plant in Charleston, South Carolina.

The court decided that Ashley was not a BFPP, as it claimed, and was responsible for five percent of the clean-up costs based on the following facts: (1) Ashley had torn down some structures in 2008, which allowed rainwater to contact cracked sumps containing hazardous substances. As a result, disposal of hazardous substances had occurred after Ashley took possession of the property; (2) Ashley was “affiliated” with other PRPs because Ashley had indemnified them and, more significantly, attempted “to discourage EPA from recovering response costs covered by the indemnification”; and (3) Ashley had not exercised appropriate care because it failed to address recognized environmental conditions (RECs) that were identified in the environmental site assessment as well as other potential site hazards.

The lesson here is that Purchasers should consider the effect of indemnity provisions and any interactions they may have with government agencies regarding other PRPs. In addition, because “disposal” may be defined very broadly, purchasers should thoroughly evaluate construction, demolition, and other site activities to determine if such activities could cause a release of hazardous substances. Finally, it is critical that all RECs be addressed, beginning no later than the time the purchaser acquires the property and continuing for the duration of its ownership.

As we all know by now, in Burlington Northern and Sante Fe Railway Co. v. United States, decided in May, 2009 (BNSF I), the Supreme Court surprised us yet again by interpreting CERCLA differently than the lower courts and Superfund practitioners had come to understand the statute to mean. The Court held (a) that “arranger” liability under Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA is triggered only if there is an intent to dispose of hazardous substances, and (b) that joint and several liability under CERCLA may be avoided if there is a reasonable basis for apportioning harm among the “covered persons,” affirming divisibility on facts that most practitioners would not have expected to prevent joint and several liability. Since then, the lower courts have been wrestling with the application of these rulings under CERCLA. Meanwhile, however, the state courts have begun to address these issues under state law counterparts to CERCLA. Recently, the Supreme Court of Montana did just that. State of Montana v. BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF II)

Montana, like many other states, has its own version of CERCLA, called the Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act (“CECRA”). CECRA has its own categories of liable parties, including a broad class of “arrangers,” but unlike CERCLA, explicitly provides for joint and several liability. These differences result in greater potential exposure for defendants in hazardous waste cases.
 

BNSF II involved three adjoining properties north of Kalispell, MT, all of which had been listed as state Superfund sites. One of the sites, called the Reliance site, was a former crude oil refinery. BNSF transported petroleum products into and out of the Reliance site, using railroad cars that sometimes leaked badly. The trial court found that “[r]efinery workers occasionally ‘got a soaking’ when unloading crude oil” from BNSF railcars and that “when shipments of crude oil arrived and the holding tanks were full, the crude oil was dumped onto the ground in pools on BNSF property in the area.” The trial court found that BNSF “had been involved in dumping petroleum products onto the surface of the earth.”

The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) sued seven parties, six of whom settled, with the result that a Final Unified Abatement Order was entered, holding BNSF jointly and severally liable for the Reliance site, as an “arranger” under CECRA, even though the trial court made no finding that BNSF intended to release a hazardous substance at the site.

Arranger Liability

Like CERCLA, CECRA contains no definition of an “arranger.” Instead, Section 75-10-715(1)(c) of CECRA includes among the list of liable parties “a person who generated, possessed, or was otherwise responsible for a hazardous or deleterious substance and who, by contract, agreement, or otherwise, arranged for disposal or treatment of the substance or arranged with a transporter for transport of the substance for disposal or treatment,” language that differs somewhat from Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA.

The trial court held BNSF liable as an “arranger” under CECRA because of its “involvement” with Reliance in the dumping of petroleum on the Reliance site. The trial court relied on the Ninth Circuit decision in BNSF I, adopting a broad form of “arranger” liability, and refused to reconsider its ruling when the Ninth Circuit was reversed by the Supreme Court.

The Montana Supreme Court began its review of the trial court decision by noting that Section 114(a) of CERCLA provides that nothing prevents a State from imposing additional liability beyond those imposed by CERCLA. The Court then held that “an entity need not specifically ‘intend’ to dispose of a hazardous substance for imposition of ‘arranger’ liability ” It was enough that BNSF “possessed or was otherwise responsible for the materials it shipped” and that “[a] necessary and foreseeable consequence of shipping the material was unloading the material.” Since BNSF employees moved full tank cars of crude oil to the Reliance site so Reliance employees could dump the crude oil on the ground, “BNSF participated in the unloading process which resulted in the release of the materials it possessed.” In holding that the trial court did not err in holding BNSF liable as an “arranger,” the Court set a low bar for “arranger” liability under CECRA.

Apportionment

Unlike CERCLA, which is silent as to whether or not “covered persons” are jointly and severally liable under the statute, CECRA provides, in relevant part, that “notwithstanding any other provision of law,*** the following persons are jointly and severally liable for a release or threatened release of a hazardous or deleterious substance***” .

Notwithstanding this statutory language, the trial court entered a pretrial order that once the state proved that BNSF is a liable party, “BNSF must come forward with evidence to show it was only responsible for a portion of the contamination at the site to avoid the possibility of joint and several liability for all the surface contamination.” When BNSF failed to make such a showing, the trial court held BNSF jointly and severally liable. Because BNSF had failed to prove the factual basis for apportionment, the Supreme Court declined to rule on whether apportionment would ever be possible under the statutory language. Thus, BNSF II leaves unanswered the question of whether liability can ever be apportioned under a statute that explicitly provides for joint and several liability, no matter how distinct the harms may have been.

Conclusion

As the United States Supreme Court continues to read CERCLA narrowly, state statutes, like CECRA, may become more important in the development of hazardous waste law. BNSF II may very well represent the beginning of a trend.

Over the past three decades, EPA has issued more than 1,700 CERCLA UAOs to roughly 5,400 PRPs ordering the performance of response actions at CERCLA sites costing in aggregate in excess of $5 billion. Only a small handful of those orders, however, have ever been challenged in court, and vanishingly few have been subject to any independent third party review whatsoever.
 

Why is that? Well, as even EPA might agree, it is not because the Agency is infallible. No, the reason for EPA’s essentially unreviewed exercise of its UAO authority is the CERCLA statute itself, which (a) by operation of Section 113(h), precludes any challenge to a UAO order until the ordered response action has been completed (typically many years later at an average cost of $4 million dollars) and (b) by operation of Sections 106 and 107, subjects any PRP who elects to defy a UAO to treble punitive damages and additional penalties of $37,500 per day, which accumulate until EPA, at its sole discretion, brings an enforcement action.
 

In this regard, CERCLA is an outlier in administrative law. Though instances are common where federal statutes give agencies the power to issue administrative orders, virtually every other comparable scheme affords recipients of such orders either a prior hearing or the prompt opportunity for independent review after the order is issued. CERCLA, of course, provides neither.

So what justifies this unusual approach? It has been suggested on occasion that due process must be dispensed with because UAOs are needed to address emergency conditions. They can only be issued, after all, where an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or the environment is shown. There are two problems with that rationale, however. First, the courts have largely upheld EPA’s position that “imminent and substantial endangerment” doesn’t really mean “imminent” or “substantial” – there really is no site involving a hazardous substance and a release (actual or threatened) that doesn’t meet the statutory criteria for UAO issuance. Second, as EPA has conceded in litigation, the fact is that EPA doesn’t issue UAOs in true emergencies; in those circumstances, it does the work itself and seeks to recover its costs later.

Okay, so even if true emergencies are not implicated, it’s still the case that EPA has a need to act quickly and that allowing pre- (or prompt post-) issuance review would unduly impede cleanup of hazardous sites, right? Well, as it turns out, that’s not true, either. Analysis of EPA’s CERCLIS database reveals an average 8-year lag-time between identification of a site and issuance of a UAO and a 4-year lag between remedy selection and UAO issuance. Obviously, there’s plenty of time in the system for a little due process.

So why haven’t past procedural due process challenges to this UAO scheme (and there have been a number of them) succeeded? The courts that have rejected those challenges have commonly concluded that the challenging PRPs couldn’t show a pre-hearing deprivation of property, as is required to trigger Fifth Amendment protections. Those courts reasoned that a PRP could simply refuse to comply with and wait for EPA to sue to enforce the UAO, and in that event would suffer no pre-hearing deprivation of property since penalties and damages could only be awarded following a court hearing.

Though the conclusion is facially appealing, its fallacy is demonstrated by the record of the most recent constitutional challenge brought by GE. There, following extensive discovery from EPA and expert testimony on both sides, GE was able to demonstrate empirically that a PRP that elected to defy a UAO would be immediately punished by the equity and capital markets, which would recognize the massive contingent liability such defiance would create and account for it by lowering the PRP’s stock value and increasing its cost of financing, with consequent impacts on its ability to bid for new projects or to hire additional employees, among other things. Indeed, although he took issue with GE’s assessment of the magnitude of the impact, even EPA’s economic expert agreed that defiance would occasion such harmful effects and that they would be significant. And the District Court agreed, as well, that defiance would not avoid a deprivation of property, though it ultimately ruled against GE on the basis that the burden to EPA of providing hearings outweighed the private party interests favoring such hearings.

On appeal the D.C. Circuit rejected the district court’s finding of a pre-hearing property deprivation, however, and ruled instead that such harmful impacts did not involve constitutionally protected property rights and so dismissed GE’s constitutional challenge on that predicate ground without reaching the District Court’s balancing analysis. The potential implications of that holding – which GE believes is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent – extend well beyond CERCLA confines, and so GE has sought certiorari review.  The government’s response to GE’s petition is due February 4.

Stay tuned.

Last week, in City of Pittsfield v. EPA, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a petition by the City of Pittsfield seeking review of an NPDES permit issued by EPA. The case makes no new law and, by itself, is not particularly remarkable.  Cases on NPDES permit appeals have held for some time that a permittee appealing an NPDES permit must set forth in detail in its petition basically every conceivable claim or argument that they might want to assert. Pretty much no detail is too small. The City of Pittsfield failed to do this, instead relying on their prior comments on the draft permit. Not good enough, said the Court. 

For some reason, reading the decision brought to mind another recent appellate decision, General Electric v. Jackson, in which the D.C. Circuit laid to rest arguments that EPA’s unilateral order authority under § 106 of CERCLA is unconstitutional. As I noted in commenting on that decision, it too was unremarkable by itself and fully consistent with prior case law on the subject.

What do these two cases have in common? To me, they are evidence that, while the government can over-reach and does lose some cases, the deck remains stacked overwhelmingly in the government’s favor. The power of the government as regulator is awesome to behold. Looking at the GE case first, does anyone really deny that EPA’s § 106 order authority is extremely coercive? Looking at the Pittsfield case, doesn’t it seem odd that a party appealing a permit has to identify with particularity every single nit that they might want to pick with the permit? Even after the Supreme Court’s recent decisions tightening pleading standards, the pleading burden on a permit appellant remains much more substantial than on any other type of litigant.

Why should this be so? Why is it that the government doesn’t lose when it’s wrong, but only when it’s crazy wrong? 

Just askin’.

On July 2, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama published a must read opinion regarding cost recovery claims under CERCLA.  See Solutia, Inc., et al. v. McWane, Inc., et al., Case No. 03-1345, Document No. 622 (N.D. Ala. July 2, 2010).The case was originally filed by plaintiffs in 2003 as a CERCLA cost recovery and contribution action against several industrial defendants located in Anniston, Alabama related to plaintiffs' cleanup of historic PCB contamination throughout the Anniston area. In June 2008, the Court had previously granted defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' CERCLA Section 113 claims for contribution but had allowed plaintiffs to proceed with their CERCLA Section 107 cost recovery claims. However upon motion for reconsideration, the Court on July 2 issued a detailed opinion also dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ cost recovery claims under Section 107.

Of interest to CERCLA practitioners, the dismissal opinion provides a lengthy analysis, based on recent Circuit Court decisions, as to whether a plaintiff who seeks to recover costs of a cleanup performed pursuant to obligations under a consent decree or administrative settlement (aka “compelled” cleanup costs) can bring a claim under Section 107(a)(4)(B).  Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court did not decide the appropriate route for recovering “compelled” costs (under Section 107(a), 113(f), or both) in its most recent opinion addressing CERCLA Sections 107 and 113. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007). Nevertheless, the Northern District of Alabama agreed to reconsider defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 107 claims in light of Circuit Court decisions issued subsequent to Atlantic Research as well as new evidence.  Indeed, the Court agreed with the defendants' assessment that the majority of Circuit Court decisions decided after the Northern District’s previous denial of defendants’ motions for summary judgment have held that a party who incurred “compelled” cleanup has a viable Section 113 claim for contribution and not a Section 107 claim for cost recovery.

Ultimately the Court concluded that the recent Circuit Court decisions were correct in their assessment that Congress had intended for Section 113(f) to be the exclusive remedy to recover costs incurred pursuant to a judgment, consent decree, or settlement.  Because the Court agreed withdefendants' argument that plaintiffs’ costs related to its PCB cleanup were incurred by virtue of a prior consent decree, the plaintiffs only had a potential right to a Section 113 claim for contribution (which was previously dismissed) – not a Section 107 claim for recovery.

Again, the opinion is a helpful summary of evolving jurisprudence under CERCLA regarding Section 107 and Section 113 claims.  

Sometimes, the practice of environmental law just takes my breath away. A decision issued earlier last month in United States v. Washington DOT was about as stunning as it gets. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Robert Bryan held that the Washington State Department of Transportation had “arranged” for the disposal of hazardous substances within the meaning of CERCLA by designing state highways with stormwater collection and drainage structures, where those drainage structures ultimately deposited stormwater containing hazardous substances into Commencement Bay -- now, a Superfund site -- in Tacoma, Washington.  

I’m sorry, but if that doesn’t make you sit up and take notice, then you’re just too jaded. Under this logic, isn’t everyone who constructs a parking lot potentially liable for the hazardous substances that run off in stormwater sheet flow? 

For those who aren’t aware, phosphorus, the stormwater contaminant du jour, is a listed hazardous substance under Superfund. Maybe EPA doesn’t need to bother with new stormwater regulatory programs. Instead, it can just issue notices of responsibility to everyone whose discharge of phosphorus has contributed to contamination of a river or lake.

The Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment regarding whether the discharges of contaminated stormwater were federally permitted releases. Since the Washington DOT had an NPDES permit, it argued that it was not liable under § 107(j) of CERCLA. However, as the Court noted, even if the DOT might otherwise have a defense, if any of the releases occurred before the permit issued – almost certain, except in the case of newer roads – or if any discharges violated the permit, then the Washington DOT would still be liable and would have the burden of establishing a divisibility defense. 

If one were a conspiracy theorist, one might wonder if EPA were using this case to gently encourage the regulated community to support its recent efforts to expand its stormwater regulatory program. Certainly, few members of the regulated community would rather defend Superfund litigation than comply with a stormwater permit.

You can’t make this stuff up.

Last week, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response announced release of its Community Engagement Implementation Plan. Who could be against community engagement? It’s as American as apple pie. It’s environmental justice. It’s community input into decisions that affect the community. It’s transparency and open decision-making.

Call me a curmudgeon, but I’m against it. Study after study shows that, in terms of the actual risks posed by Superfund sites, we devote too many of our environmental protection dollars to Superfund sites, when we should be focusing on air and water. Why do we keep doing this? Because the community demands it. As Peter Sandman has noted, perceptions of risk are driven only partly by the actual hazard posed. To a significant degree, those perceptions are more driven by outrage over the situation. In some circumstances, what Sandman calls outrage management makes sense, but I’m skeptical that EPA’s community engagement initiative is really about outrage management.

In any case, here’s the public policy question of the day. Does it really make sense to spend scarce environmental protection resources, not to reduce risk, but to reduce outrage?

The U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of California has denied reconsideration of its pre-BNSF order finding defendants jointly and severally liable under CERCLA. U. S. v. Iron Mountain Mines. Defendants had argued that the Supreme Court in the BNSF case mandated the district courts to consider grounds for reasonable apportionment. They had earlier argued for apportionment before BNSF and then cited the Supreme Court’s decision as an intervening change of law that entitles it to reconsideration.

The court disagreed, finding that BNSF did not change the law, rather it simply reaffirmed existing law and applied it to a specific set of facts. It seems strange that the Supreme Court would grant cert in a case where the law is settled just to apply the facts. In fact, the working presumption in CERCLA litigation had been that joint and several liability is the rule and apportionment is rare, even though CERCLA doesn’t say that. Most practitioners saw BNSF as a game changer, reopening the possibility of a hard look given to reasonable bases for apportionment in mediated allocations and in court. But the District Court followed the lead of the Justice Department, which has consistently said BNSF marks no departure from standard CERCLA jurisprudence.

It sure would be great if the Supreme Court would provide some clarity in its environmental decisions. Few would think Rapanos helped much with our understanding of the Clean Water Act, and now we need to muddle through a certain lack of precision in representing clients in Superfund matters. While BNSF opens the window, it remains to be seen whether the opening is just a crack or will really let some fresh air in.

It has been nearly nine months since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States (BNSF),[1] a case some called a landmark decision that would change the Superfund practice.[2] In some respects that has turned out to be the case, in others it has not. There have been several reported cases citing BNSF, and all of them confirm that the decision requires both the EPA and potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) to engage in a more fact-intensive inquiry into “arranger” liability. Less clear, however, is how the apportionment of liability among liable parties in private contribution cases will be affected, given the relatively small number of reported decisions.

Readers will recall that the BNSF decision had two elements: (1) it addressed the scope of arranger liability under CERCLA, and (2) it affirmed the view of several circuit courts that PRPs can avoid joint and several liability if a “reasonable basis” to apportion liability exists. This article reviews how lower court decisions issued subsequent to BNSF have applied those two components.

A Review of the BNSF Facts

BNSF was issued on May 4, 2009. The 8-1 decision written by Justice Stevens arose out of a fairly common fact pattern for CERCLA cases: a small chemical distributor Brown & Bryant, Inc. (“B&B”) owned and operated a facility that repackaged agricultural chemicals. B&B’s operation was on a 3.8-acre parcel, a portion of which was leased from predecessors to BNSF and the Union Pacific Railroad. Neither railroad played any part in B&B’s operations. The other PRP, Shell Oil, sold a soil fumigant to B&B which was shipped via commercial carrier FOB destination, meaning that the buyer was responsible for the product once it arrived at the facility.

After the State of California ordered B&B to clean up soil and groundwater contamination, B&B went out of business and then EPA listed the site on the National Priorities List. Both railroads and Shell were named as PRPs. The railroads were ordered to clean up the entire site, even though the portion of the site that they owned did not require remediation. Shell was named a PRP for having delivered chemicals to the site which it knew or should have foreseen would be spilled by B&B. In 1996, the United States and the State of California filed a cost recovery action against the railroads and Shell, seeking to recover over $8 million in response costs.

The Supreme Court’s Opinion

1. Arranger Liability

In affirming that “arranger liability” under CERCLA must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the Court set up a continuum. At one end are cases where an entity entered into a transaction “for the sole purpose of discarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substance.”[3] In such cases, there is a clear intent to discard the product, and therefore liability under section 107(a)(3). On the other end are situations where a company sells a useful product and “the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination.”[4] The Court acknowledged that there were “many permutations of ‘arrangements’ that fall between these two extremes.” In these cases, based on a “plain reading” of the CERCLA statute, the Court held that “an entity may qualify as an arranger when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.”[5] Applying this statement of the law to the facts, the Court held that Shell’s mere knowledge of the spills did not amount to an “intent” that they be spilled or otherwise disposed of and that Shell was therefore not liable as an arranger.

2. Apportionment

BNSF highlighted that the CERCLA statute does not contain joint and several liability language. Instead, the notion that PRPs should be held jointly and severally liable is a judicial doctrine grounded in Section 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Applying the Restatement, the Court held – as had several circuit courts previously– that “apportionment is proper when there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.”[6]

Where multiple parties cause a single harm, “CERCLA defendants seeking to avoid joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a reasonable basis for apportionment exists.”[7] In BNSF, while both the district court and the Ninth Circuit had found that apportionment of the harm was possible, they disagreed on how to allocate responsibility. The district court came up with a nine percent allocation to the railroads. The Ninth Circuit criticized the evidence on which the district court had relied, finding that it was insufficient to establish the “precise proportion” of the Railroads’ responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s approach, holding that the evidence supporting apportionment need not be precise. There must simply be “facts contained in the record reasonably support[ing] the apportionment of liability.”[8]

Lower Court Decisions Applying BNSF

Cases Applying the Court’s Arranger Liability Ruling

Of the four published cases that have substantively applied BNSF in the context of arranger liability, all suggest that lower courts are taking seriously the Supreme Court’s instruction to conduct a factually-intensive review of the parties’ intent. Prior to BNSF, the view prevalent among at least some government attorneys, and even some private party attorneys, was that every party who somehow came into contact with a hazardous substance was liable as having “arranged for disposal.” That view has been shattered.

Two cases, in particular, illustrate this point. The first is Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.[9] Plaintiffs in that case were companies who had manufactured and sold carbonless paper. The emulsion used in the paper contained microscopic capsules that burst when pressure was applied, releasing a dye, and allowing the words on a page to be transferred from one sheet to another. The microcapsules were dissolved in a solvent which contained PCBs. The PCBs were released into the Fox River from manufacturing plants which produced the paper. An even greater proportion of PCBs were released by companies that recycled carbonless paper and by municipal wastewater utilities that discharged PCB-contaminated wastewater.

Plaintiff manufacturers filed a contribution action under CERCLA §113 against the recyclers and municipalities (their §107 claim was previously dismissed by the court). The court bifurcated the case into a liability and apportionment phase. In the liability phase, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court considered whether the defendants knew they were disposing of hazardous chemicals, and concluded that they did not. The analysis – while not explicitly using the word “intent” – focused on what the defendants knew when they recycled the carbonless paper or discharged wastewater from the plants that did. After reviewing a record that included roughly 900 exhibits – including expert reports, government reports, corporate records, laboratory records and deposition transcripts – the court sided with the defendants, finding that they had little or no knowledge that they were disposing of PCBs into the river.[10]

Defendants are recyclers of paper and municipal sewerage entities who simply processed paper and water, and they would have had little reason or ability to inspect or investigate the chemical makeup of anything that came in the door…[t]he recyclers were the ‘innocent victims’ of the circumstances [citation to record omitted]. This is even more true for Defendants who merely received and released wastewater containing invisible PCBs in it.[11]

Similarly, in a case in Washington state, the district court made clear that the issue of arranger liability after BNSF turns squarely on the facts. United States v. Wash. State Department of Transp.[12] In that case, EPA sued the Washington State Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) to recover cleanup costs at a contaminated site that the state had acquired to build a bridge. During construction of the bridge, a contractor discovered three open-bottom tanks containing tar, which appeared to have been placed there by a coal gasification plant. The State counterclaimed, arguing that the United States was also liable, because the US Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) had dredged a portion of the waterway that the coal gassification plant was located on, thereby moving hazardous substances released by others and causing additional releases to the environment. The United States moved for summary judgment. Judge Bryan denied the motion, holding that the United States’ liability, if any, turned on a fact-intensive inquiry that the parties had yet to conduct.

At this point, the facts are insufficiently developed to determine what level of control USACE exerted over the dredging process and what responsibility it may have had regarding disposal of the dredged materials.… As the Supreme Court stated in Burlington Northern, “the determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a ‘disposal’ or ‘sale’ and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions.” 129 S. Ct. at 1879. Considering the USACE’s involvement with dredging the contaminated waterways in light of CERCLA’s strict liability standard, the court cannot say as a matter of law that upon further discovery, the facts will fail to show that the USACE “qualif[ies] as an arranger under [§107(a)(3) when taking] intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance” through the granting of permits to dredge the waterway.[13]

Meanwhile, across the country in Maine, a district court applied BNSF in the context of a cleanup of the Penobscot River.See Frontier Communications Corp. v. Barrett Paving Materials.[14] We previously reported on this case. See District Court in Maine Applies Supreme Court’s BNSF Decision on “Arranger” Liability, Marten Law Environmental News (July 22, 2009). The court in the Maine case reiterated that the question of arranger liability is “fact-intensive,” but it found that the record contained sufficient facts to conclude that the defendant had intended to dispose of wastes through a sewer into the river.[15]

Finally, in New Hampshire, General Electric asked a judge to reverse a prior ruling holding GE liable as having “arranged for disposal” of PCB-containing “scrap Pyranol” when it sold the material to a paint manufacturing company. GE relied on BNSF to argue that the phrase “arranged for disposal” required “an intentional action toward achieving the purpose: disposal.”[16] The court did not dispute GE’s reading of the law, but held that there was sufficient evidence of intent to hold GE liable as an arranger.

Cases Applying BNSF’s Apportionment Ruling

We have located two reported decisions expressly dealing with the “apportionment” arm of the BNSF decision. In the first case, the court essentially punted, holding that the best way to apportion liability was to let the case go to trial. See Evansville Greenway and Remediation Trust v. Southern IN Gas and Elec. Co., Inc.[17]

In Evansville, the BNSF decision was handed down while cross-motions for summary judgment were being briefed. The defendants claimed that BNSF “effected a dramatic change that will make it easier for PRPs to avoid the burden of joint and several liability,” while the plaintiffs argued that “BNSF amounts to nothing new.”[18] Noting that “the Supreme Court’s new decision has presented what might be called genuine questions of material law,”[19] the court declined to commit to a particular interpretation of the BNSF decision, based on the fact that the timing of the decision meant that the record before the court was sparse. Instead, the court granted the motion as to liability under 107(a), but reserved the question of apportionment for trial, so that “each side [can] present evidence relevant to its own and its opponents’ different interpretations of BNSF.”[20]

More interesting is the court’s decision in Appleton Papers, discussed above. In that case, the court engaged in an extended discussion of whether BNSF was applicable to a §113 contribution action (having previously dismissed the plaintiff’s §107 claims). The court concluded that, while “Burlington Northern changed the applicable standards for ‘arranger liability’ … there is nothing within Burlington Northern that requires courts to make some sort of threshold determination regarding joint and several liability or allow plaintiffs in a contribution action to make an apportionment argument.”[21]

One question not answered by BNSF is the quantum of proof necessary to establish a reasonable basis for apportionment. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin addressed that question in a non-CERCLA case involving environmental torts, holding that: (1) a fact finder may rely on the “available evidence” in apportioning liability among joint tortfeasors; and (2) the burden of production necessary to support a showing of divisibility is “low.” In re MTBE, S.D.N.Y. Case No. 00 MDL 1898, Docket No. 352 (July 14, 2009). See Applying BNSF, District Court in New York Finds “Best Available Evidence” Is Sufficient to Apportion Liability, Marten Law Environmental News (July 22, 2009). It remains to be seen whether this approach will be extended in a CERCLA context.

Conclusion

It is still too early to get a good sense of whether BNSF will be the watershed case some had predicted. The first few cases have reinforced the Supreme Court’s holding that the inquiry into arranger liability is “fact-intensive.” Only two reported cases have addressed the apportionment arm of the decision, and neither reached the question of how apportionment is to be conducted.

[1] 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).

[2] See, e.g., J. Barkett, The Burlington Northern Decision, American College of Environmental Lawyers Blog (May 19, 2009).

[3] 129 S. Ct. at 1878.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 1879.

[6] Id. at 1881.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 1882.

[9] Slip Op., 2009 WL 5064049 (E.D. Wis., December 16, 2009).

[10] Id. at *15.

[11] Id. at *17.

[12] , ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 2985474 (W.D. Wa., September 15, 2009).

[13] Id. at *8.

[14] District of Maine, Case No. 07-00133.

[15] 2009 WL 1941920, *3

[16] General Electric Company’s Supplemental Memorandum on the Evidence of Intent or Knowledge Required to Prove that a CERCLA Defendant has “Arranged for” Disposal or Treatment of Hazardous Waste at 2, United States v. General Electric Co., 06-354, Doc. No. 89 (D.N.H. Nov. 5, 2008).

[17] ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 3163180 (S.D. Ind., September 29, 2009),

[18] Id. at * 21.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., Slip Op., 2009 WL 3921036 (E.D. Wis. 2009), **4, 5.

To many Superfund practitioners, United States v. Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company, __ U.S. __, 129, S. Ct. 1870 (2009) represents the latest in a series of surprises from the Supreme Court. The decision follows Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc, 543 U.S. 157 (2004), from which we learned that the statutory words “during or following” really mean just what they say and contribution claims under the Comprehensive Response Compensation and Liability Act (also referred to as CERCLA or the Superfund statute) are only available in those limited circumstances. A few years later, in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007), we learned that “covered persons” (also referred to as potentially responsible parties or PRPs) under the statute may, in certain procedural circumstances, have cost recovery claims in the event they do not meet the criteria for contribution claims.   In Burlington Northern, we learned that “arranger” liability may not be as broad as we had thought it was, and that joint and several liability may not be the automatic we thought it was. It is probably fair to say that the outcome in Burlington Northern, like the outcomes in Aviall and Atlantic Research, was not intuitive to Superfund practitioners.

            A Superfund practitioner might have expected the Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern to look more like the Ninth Circuit opinion it reversed (found at 502 F.3d 781), endorsing a broad reading of “arranger” liability under the statute and applying joint and several liability to all the defendants, the latter being the norm for more than 25 years since the seminal decision in United States v. ChemDyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).

As with Aviall and Atlantic Research, it will probably take many years, and many decisions by the lower courts, before we fully appreciate the implications of Burlington Northern, but one thing is already clear. Defendants in multi-party Superfund sites will be contending for apportionment as the alternative to joint and several liability, if for no other reason than to avoid funding the orphan share represented by “covered persons” who can’t be found, no longer exist, or, as is more recently the case, are bankrupt. On the other hand, governments asserting cost recovery claims can be expected to continue to advocate aggressively for joint and several liability, so as to avoid having to absorb the orphan share themselves. The question is what practical impacts this battleground will have on Superfund practice at multi-party sites.

            Burlington Northern raises several practical questions which will have to resolved as the law and practice develop. Here are some of them.

Whether a defendant is entitled to apportioned liability is a fact-intensive inquiry, resolved in Burlington Northern only after a six week bench trial, and only after the district judge took four years to render a decision. Will governments be able to obtain liability judgments at the beginning of cost recovery actions, as they have typically tried to do in the past? Will Burlington Northern force more cases to go to trial? 

Whether liability is subject to apportionment is not likely to be decided until the end of a case, as it was in Burlington Northern. How will cost recovery defendants evaluate their chances of success in the early stages of a case? Will they feel compelled to develop a detailed record to support arguments that liability for a single harm is subject to apportionment, unlike the defendants in Burlington Northern, who limited their arguments to general denials of liability?

Governmental plaintiffs can be expected to insist that liability at multi-party sites is still joint and several, even after Burlington Northern. Will those governmental plaintiffs be willing to consider the litigation risk that liability may be subject to apportionment in negotiating settlements? If so, how will that litigation risk be taken into consideration?

If liability is apportioned, how will any resulting orphan shares be funded? Will EPA’s historic limitations on orphan share funding be adequate? If not, where will the funding come from? Is the Superfund tax more likely to be reinstated because of Burlington Northern?

 Will the organization of multiple “covered persons” into PRP groups be more difficult if the defendants believe they can escape liability through apportionment? How will defendants balance that possibility against the potential benefit in the form of reduced costs that might be gained by performing cleanup work themselves?

Will ADR emerge as the norm for dividing responsibility among defendants who believe their liability is subject to apportionment, as it has in allocating joint and several liability? What evidence will be used to apportion liability? Burlington Northern endorsed many of the same causation-related considerations as the equitable factors historically used to allocate joint and several liability; will some or all of the Gore factors still be relevant? Burlington Northern also endorsed estimations and compromises, considerations not normally found in legal determinations; how will the lower courts react to imprecise calculations of apportioned liability?

How will defendants argue for an orphan share? Will they seek to establish an orphan share from the bottom up (by quantifying the share of missing PRPs), or from the top down (by quantifying their own individual shares)? Whichever way defendants decide to approach the issue, they can be expected to develop the record the district judge found lacking in Burlington Northern.

Finally, in states whose statutes make joint and several liability explicit (e.g, the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(c)(1)), how will apportionment decisions be made? Will the scope of liability be different to EPA and to such states?   Under such statutes, is there no instance in which liability will be subject to apportionment, even for distinct harms?

Like Aviall and Atlantic Research before it, Burlington Northern promises to be a fertile source of future litigation. 

The 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, over a “pattern and practice” claim by a company that complied with an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) unilateral administrative order (UAO) to conduct a remedial investigation. City of Rialto v. W. Coast Loading Corp., 581 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2009).  While acknowledging that CERCLA's judicial review provisions contain "some pitfalls and difficult decisions for a PRP that faces a UAO," the court stated that the pattern and practice claim was not an “automatic shortcut” to federal court jurisdiction. 

The case arose as a result of a unilateral administrative order (UAO) issued by EPA in July 2003 directing Goodrich to conduct a remedial investigation at a 160-acre site in Rialto, California. Goodrich elected to comply with the order. However, in late 2006 Goodrich filed a complaint against EPA alleging, inter alia, that the CERCLA review provisions on their face constitute a coercive regime violating due process. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Goodrich’s “as-applied” challenge to the UAO because such pre-enforcement judicial review is foreclosed by §9613(h) of CERCLA. Goodrich then filed an amended “pattern and practice” claim alleging that EPA issues orders where no emergency exists, obstructs judicial review by delaying its discretionary certificates of completion, and controls and manipulates the record of decision. The district court granted EPA’s motion to dismiss, and Goodrich appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that Goodrich’s allegation that EPA routinely issues orders beyond its statutory authority was substantive because it necessarily depended on the facts of the particular UAO, and that meaningful judicial review of Goodrich’s substantive challenge is available under §9613(h). A claim that a UAO is unlawful can be addressed, the court stated, either by not complying with the UAO and defending an enforcement action, or by complying with a UAO and seeking reimbursement from the government. With respect to Goodrich’s claim that EPA routinely delays certifications of completion in order to thwart judicial review, the Ninth Circuit held that Goodrich’s claim is not ripe because the work required by the UAO has not been completed. Once Goodrich completes the work, it may bring a claim for reimbursement under §9606(b)(2). Finally, with respect to Goodrich’s allegation that EPA controls and manipulates the administrative record supporting the selected cleanup plan, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Goodrich allegations were not a “pattern and practice” claim , but rather were a challenge to the judicial review provisions of the statute itself, which were rejected by the District Court and not appealed by Goodrich. 

The Ninth Circuit noted that in General Electric v. Whitman, 360 F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the D.C. Circuit remanded GE’s suit to the district court to address the merits of GE’s facial due process claim, and on remand the district court ruled on merits and rejected GE’s pattern and practice claim. General Electric v. Jackson, 595 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009). This ruling on the merits contrasts with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit, however, commented that its decision was “consistent” with the District Court’s decision in GE, noting that the District Court there held that it had jurisdiction not because of any independent analysis but because of its interpretation of the D.C. Circuit’s decision remanding the case for further proceedings. 

Companies receiving a UAO and facing the statutory pitfalls and difficult decisions will likely not find much solace in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. The district court’s opinion in the GE case is being appealed.

“Thus, the Plaintiffs’ present claim that they never knew about the dangers of PCBs until after 1971 rings roughly as hollow as Captain Renault’s feigned outrage upon being ‘shocked, shocked’ to discover gambling at Rick’s Casablanca café.” 

Appleton Papers Inc. and NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., et al. (slip op. at 25, US District Court, Eastern District of WI, Case No. 08-C-16)

With those words, on December 16, 2009 Judge William C. Griesbach, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed CERCLA §107 contribution claims brought by Plaintiffs Appleton Papers, Inc. (API) and NCR Corp. against all Defendants.   NCR and API sought contribution from 23 other paper mills, cities, utilities, and sewerage districts, and industrial dischargers to allocate the multi-million dollar costs of remediating the polychlorinated byphenyl (PCB) contamination in the Lower Fox River in northeastern Wisconsin. Defendants’ Summary Judgment motions asserted that Plaintiffs were not entitled to contribution because the Defendants are “essentially innocent parties who had no knowledge that recycling NCR paper or processing wastewater could lead to environmental damage.” Slip op. at 4. The Judge agreed.

Beginning in 1954, NCR developed a carbonless copy paper that relied on an emulsion based on Aroclor 1242, a PCB solvent manufactured by Monsanto Corporation. NCR created the emulsion and developed and sold the carbonless paper product. API’s predecessor manufactured the paper and coated it with the NCR emulsion. API’s wastewater was discharged to the Fox River, taking the PCBs with it. API also sold its waste paper to other mills to be recycled into paper products, resulting in PCB-containing wastewater discharges from those facilities. The result: significant PCB-contamination in the sediments of the Lower Fox River from the mouth at Green Bay to Lake Winnebago and what has been called the largest contaminated sediment cleanup in the world..

The decision turns on what the Plaintiffs knew about the potential harm of the PCBs in their carbonless copy paper and when they knew it. It includes an instructive recital of internal communications within and among NCR and API, Monsanto, and Wiggins Teape, NCR’s exclusive European-licensee, leading to the Court’s conclusion that “I am satisfied that by the late 1960’s Plaintiffs had access to the vanguard of data suggesting an appreciable risk of serious and long-lasting environmental damage resulting from the production and recycling of NCR paper.” (emphasis in original) Slip op. at 26.

Readers will find the case of interest on both the legal analysis -- application of the “Gore factors” in determining equitable allocation, consideration of successor liability, and the Court’s evaluation and weighing of the overall equities – and the factual history. On this latter point, the case may well serve as a primer on how a business’ historical records and risk management decisions can come back to haunt it with respect to future determinations of knowledge and liability: 

“In the face of increasing red flags, Plaintiffs’ approach in the late 1960s was to worry about publicity and wait for the ‘second shoe’ to drop. At its essence, Plaintiffs’ approach was a risk management strategy to accept the risk of potential environmental harm in exchange for the financial benefits of continued (and increasing) sales of carbonless paper containing Aroclor 1242.” Slip op. at 26.

Appeal decisions are still pending. For those who want to know more about the Fox River, PCB-contamination, and the clean-up, both the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and the United States Environmental Protection Agency maintain extensive websites:

Click here for WDNR’s Fox River website

Click here for EPA Region 5’s website

Arguably the most significant moderation of CERCLA’s harsh “owner” liability scheme occurred in 2002 through the enactment of the “Brownfields Amendments.” Included in those amendments was the creation of new liability protection for “Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers” (“BFPP”) who acquire ownership of a facility after January 11, 2002.

A relatively straightforward roadmap for prospective purchasers to achieve BFPP status is set out in the Brownfields Amendments and the subsequently-promulgated All Appropriate Inquiry rule. The extent to which tenants might obtain protection from possible “owner” liability has, however, always been far less certain.

The potential applicability of this liability defense to tenants is currently limited to a short parenthetical in CERCLA §101(40). Specifically, a “tenant of a person” that achieves BFPP status shares the liability protections of the property purchaser. Although this “derivative” BFPP status established by the Brownfields Amendments helped clarify the reach of the liability defense with respect to tenants, a number of questions remained unanswered. For example, what happens if the property owner loses its BFPP status through non-compliance with the statutory requirements? Also, does the language of the amendment as it relates to tenants preclude a tenant from independently achieving BFPP status?

Earlier this year, EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance issued an Enforcement Discretion Guidance (“Guidance”) that addresses the applicability of the BFPP definition to tenants. That Guidance clarifies how EPA intends to exercise its enforcement discretion with respect to tenants “on a site-by-site” basis. In essence, the Guidance provides:

• Tenants with “derivative” BFPP status will lose that status if the property owner ceases to be a BFPP for non-compliance with one or more of the statutory requirements. Nevertheless, EPA may exercise its enforcement discretion and not pursue the tenant under an owner liability theory if the tenant satisfies certain conditions, including not having disposed of hazardous substances on the property and fully cooperating with EPA in its response actions.
• Tenants whose lease documents establish sufficient “indicia of ownership” and who satisfy all requirements of CERCLA §101(40)(A)-(H) and 107(r) may be deemed to have independently achieved BFPP status and thus possibly avoid an enforcement action under CERCLA’s owner liability provisions. Indicia of ownership include the term of the lease, the range of permitted property uses by the tenant, reserved rights on the property by the owner, etc.

EPA’s Guidance is a welcome clarification of how the agency intends to enforce CERCLA’s owner liability provisions in these situations. However, the Guidance goes beyond the derivative status language in the Brownfields Amendments in its discussion of potential limitations on tenant “owner” liability. The problem is that a guidance is just that. It offers none of the statutory certainty that prospective purchasers now enjoy under CERCLA.

Because of the importance of tenant-operated properties to the economy in general and to the development of Brownfields property in particular, I would submit that tenants should be afforded the same clarity and certainty with respect to potential liability under CERCLA as those who acquire title to the property. As the Brownfield Amendments are largely self-implementing, that clarity and certainty is likely to be achieved only through further amendments to the liability provisions of CERCLA.

Late last week, Elliott Gilberg, Acting Director of EPA’s Office of Site Remediation Enforcement (OSRE) issued an Interim Policy on Managing the Duration of Remedial Design/Remedial Action Negotiations. Members of the regulated community may not be surprised by the contents of the memo, but they certainly will not be pleased. In brief, the memorandum fundamentally makes two points:

EPA wants to shorten the duration of RD/RA negotiation

EPA is going to use the heavy hammer of unilateral administrative orders, or UAOs, to keep PRPs’ feet to the fire and ensure that negotiations move quickly.

PRPs will likely agree that shortening the duration of negotiations would be a good outcome in the abstract – but achieving it by greater use of UAOs? I don’t think so.

I can only wonder if EPA has even considered the impact of the Burlington Northern decision here. Is this a perverse reaction from EPA? A metaphorical throwing down the gauntlet to PRPs? It certainly feels that way.

I have a different suggestion, if EPA truly wants to shorten negotiations. First, acknowledge Burlington Northern and compromise on the merits in those great majority of cases where there are legitimate divisibility arguments. Second, stop acting like the last bastion of command and control regulation. Set cleanup standards and then, to the maximum extent permitted by existing law, let PRPs clean up to those standards, without micromanaging every detail of the cleanup process.

Overview       

There are three avenues of recovery under CERCLA - a contribution action and two types of cost recovery actions. These cost recovery actions are based on either the plaintiff’s “removal” of the hazardous substances or “remediation” efforts at the site. Each of these avenues has an independent statute of limitations provision.  Thus, whether the statute of limitations period has been triggered will depend on how an action is characterized, i.e. whether the action constitutes a contribution action, a cost recovery removal action, or a cost recovery remedial action. While there are various state-specific causes of action related to environmental contamination in Connecticut, this article is confined to the statute of limitations for CERCLA cost recovery and contribution claims. 

Analysis         

            Contribution Claim

            The statute of limitations analysis related to contribution claims is thankfully quite straight forward. Under CERCLA Section 113, these claims must be brought within three years of a civil action under Section 106 or 107, a CERCLA administrative order, or a judicially approved settlement with respect to costs or damages.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3). While questions may arise as to what may constitute a CERCLA “administrative order” or whether a “judicially approved settlement” must reference Section 106 or 107, we leave those discussions for another article.

            Cost Recovery Claim

            The analysis of what constitutes a viable cost recovery claim, whether it is removal or remedial, and when the statute of limitations is first triggered is more intricate. First, it is important to note that certain actions performed on a site may not trigger the statute of limitations period.   “[T]here are some cases in which work on a site is neither a remedial nor a removal action, but rather constitutes ‘preliminary’ or ‘interim’ measures that do not trigger the statute of limitations . . ..” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44282, *117 (D. Conn. May 22, 2009). While caselaw on what constitutes a preliminary remedy, as opposed to a permanent remedy, is limited, at least one court has determined that “evaluation, sampling, surveying and measuring” do not constitute the initiation of physical on-site construction because “these activities [do] not constitute ‘construction.’” Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)(quoting United States v. Findett Corp., 220 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2000)).

            Beyond this, the characterization of a cost recovery action as either removal or remedial is crucial to determining whether an action to recover response costs is time-barred because there are different statute of limitations periods for a removal action and a remedial action. The statute of limitations for recovery of costs related to removal actions is three years after the completion of the removal action, whereas the limitations period for recovery of costs related to remedial actions is six years after the initiation of physical on-site construction of the remediation. Although there is a lack of clarity as to what constitutes a removal verses a remedial action, removal actions have generally been construed as “time-sensitive responses to public health threats . . ..”[1] Remedial actions, in contrast, are often described as “permanent remedies to threats for which an urgent response is not warranted.”[2]

             Assuming for this discussion that the efforts undertaken at a site are beyond preliminary, there is inconsistency as to whether the statute of limitations for remedial actions would only run after a final Remedial Action Plan (RAP) has been approved for the site. One court in the Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded that initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action “can only occur after the final remedial action plan is adopted, and that . . . the statute of limitations, therefore, could not have begun to run until the final remedial action was approved . . ..” Cal. v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2004).  The Second Circuit, however, has rejected such a bright line rule and determined that the statute of limitations can be triggered without a final RAP, if the action is “consistent with a permanent remedy.” Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 205 (2d Cir. 2006). 

            Compounding the important distinction between removal and remedial actions is variability within the courts in determining the initial trigger for the statute of limitations period. Some courts apply a statute of limitations to an entire site after remediation commences on one portion of the site, while others look to multiple statute of limitations at a single property. See Colorado v. Sunoco, 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003) contra U.S. v. Manzo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70860 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006). While the Second Circuit has not spoken on this issue, a recent District of Connecticut case has adopted the opinion that “there can be only one removal and one remedial action per facility, regardless of the number of phases in which the clean-up occurs.” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44282 (D. Conn. May 22, 2009)(emphasis added).  Should a court adopt a one site, one action approach, the statute of limitations would be triggered by the first removal or remedial action at the site.  Id.; see also Colorado v. Sunoco   Thus, it is important to evaluate what actions have occurred at your facility and whether those actions would be considered “removal” or “remedial” to ensure the statute of limitations for a cost recovery action does not run., 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003).

At Robinson & Cole, we have environmental attorneys who have broad experience representing clients in CERCLA actions and the prosecution or defense of other environmental claims. We stand ready to apply this experience and insight to your specific needs. If you would like to discuss statute of limitations concerns, or broader environmental issues, please contact any of the attorneys in our Environmental and Utilities Practice Group. 

Earl Phillips                                           W. Richard Smith                                 Lauren Vinokur

(860) 275-8220                                   (860) 275- 8218                                  (860) 275-8341

ephillips@rc.com                                  wrsmith@rc.com                                  lvinokur@rc.com

The Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern was not unexpected from my vantage point especially given the literal interpretation of CERCLA by the Court in Aviall and Atlantic Research and the flow of the oral argument. 

I was a little surprised that Justice Stevens was assigned the task of writing the opinion since Justice Thomas wrote Aviall and Atlantic Research.  But with 7-2 (Justices Ginsburg and Stevens dissented in Aviall because the Court would not decide the issue of entitlement to sue under Section 107), 9-0 (Atlantic Research decided the Section 107 private of action question left unresolved in Aviall), and 8-1 (Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter in Burlington Northern) votes in these three opinions, the Court is not going out of its way to fix CERCLA’s language. Section 113(f)(1) means what it says. Section 107 means what it says. An arranger must have an intent to dispose. And joint and several…

Wait a second. The statute says nothing about “joint and several liability.” It does not set a liability standard at all. In fact in 2007, in note 7 of Atlantic Research, the Court wrote, “We assume without deciding that §107(a) provides for joint and several liability.”

Two years later, the Court appears to have deftly answered this question, albeit indirectly. It called the holding in Chem-Dyne the “seminal opinion on the subject of apportionment in CERCLA actions …written in 1983 by Chief Judge Carl Rubin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.” Quoting Judge Rubin, the Court said that joint and several liability is not mandated in every CERCLA cost recovery action and that Congress intended the scope of liability to “’be determined from traditional and evolving principles of common law[.]’”

As the entire environmental world now knows, the Court held that the district court’s findings should not be disturbed: “The District Court’s detailed findings make it abundantly clear that the primary pollution at the Arvin facility was contained in an unlined sump and an unlined pond in the southeastern portion of the facility most distant from the Railroads’ parcel and that the spills of hazardous chemicals that occurred on the Railroad parcel contributed to no more than 10% of the total site contamination, some of which did not require remediation.”

Going forward, the facts will dictate the outcome. The Court blessed the use of basic allocation or apportionment principles that have been applied in numerous CERCLA cases and numerous consent decree approval orders over the past 25 years. Indeed, it was mildly critical of the Ninth Circuit for talking out of both sides of its mouth: “Although the Court of Appeals faulted the District Court for relying on the ‘simplest of considerations: percentages of land area, time of ownership, and types of hazardous products,’ 520 F. 3d, at 943, these were the same factors the court had earlier acknowledged were relevant to the apportionment analysis. See id., at 936, n.18 (‘We of course agree with our sister circuits that, if adequate information is available, divisibility may be established by ‘volumetric, chronological, or other types of evidence,’ including appropriate geographic considerations’ (citations omitted)).”

In cases where there is no orphan share and multiple parties, it will behoove EPA and the parties to work on apportionment issues up front to save litigation costs. Yes, I relate “apportionment” to “allocation” in saying this, but after Burlington Northern, it will be the rare case that will lack the facts to make a reasonable basis for apportionment. Volumetric waste-in information may be controlling. Or varying toxicities of released hazardous substances may be. Or geography or time of ownership or operation. There may be equitable factors as between or among jointly and severally liable parties, e.g., cooperation, that may not relate to apportionment, but not that many cases have utilized this allocation factor, and most judges engage in an allocation exercise that is indistinguishable from an apportionment exercise, as was the case in Burlington Northern. Cf. Restatement of the Law (Third) Torts, §1, cmt. a., §26 cmt. a. (focusing on the role that comparative responsibility now plays in tort law).

Where there is an orphan share, the stakes are much higher after Burlington Northern. Cf. United States v. Newmont USA Limited, 2008 WL 4612566 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2008) (after a six day trial, submission of dozen depositions or deposition excerpts and 1,600 exhibits, finding the two defendants—one of which was alleged to be an orphan--jointly and severally liable but then finding for the defendants on their counterclaim in contribution against the United States, and then equitably allocating response costs 1/3 to the United States and 1/3 each to the two defendants).

It will still behoove the regulator and the regulated to work things out. If EPA becomes the “bank” (funds the work) at a site, post Burlington Northern, it may find itself absorbing the orphan share or at least not knowing whether it will until after a trial on the merits. (Time will tell but presumably summary judgments will become rare on apportionment issues given the fact-intensive nature of the exercise.) A PRP may be reluctant to become the bank where there is a large orphan share if it does not receive assurance that the orphan share will be addressed fairly, and that may mean more than what EPA is currently offering in its orphan share policy. See, generally, Barkett, Orphan Shares, 23 N.R.E. 46  (2008). Consent order and decree negotiations should become less one-sided in the future. But budget constraints may result in more contention (trials), especially in cases where the orphan share potentially is quite large.

Arrangers of used but useful products can take comfort in Burlington Northern. The entity that recycles solvents or used oil, for example, will embrace the decision especially if reclamation wastes are disposed of at a location other than the recycler’s facility. Sellers of used but useful products will as well. Again, the facts will dictate the outcome.

As some of my clients know all too well, I’ve been spending a lot of time on some Superfund matters recently. Although I can’t remember a period when I didn’t have at least one moderately active Superfund case, significant immersion in complex remedial decision-making and negotiations provides an unwelcome reminder just how flawed CERCLA is. Almost 20 years after the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act ushered in wide-spread acceptance of the use of market mechanisms to achieve environmental protection goals and the state of Massachusetts successfully privatized its state Superfund program, the federal Superfund program, like some obscure former Russian republic which remains devoted to Stalinism, is one of the last bastions of pure command and control regulation.

Can anyone tell me why the remedy selection process takes years and costs millions of dollars – before any cleanup has occurred or risk reduction been achieved? Can anyone tell me why, after the remedy has been selected, EPA has to spend millions of dollars – charged back to the PRPs, of course – to oversee the cleanup? Oversight costs can easily exceed 10% of cleanup costs, while oversight during the remedial design and feasibility study process sometimes seem to be barely less than the cost of actually performing the RI/FS.

While there are certainly a multiplicity of causes, there are two factors which greatly contribute to the problem. One was, coincidentally, highlighted in a post today by my friend Rob Stavins. As Rob noted, unlike the acid rain program, which was new at the time, the Superfund bureaucracy is well entrenched and there are a number of actors with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. 

The second issue relates to the genesis of the Superfund program, as well as its continuing raison d’être. Whenever EPA has ranked relative risks from different environmental hazards, Superfund sites come in at the bottom. However, if you think back to Superfund’s origins, what comes to mind? Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums – and some concerned near-by residents who rallied around a cause to ensure that the problem would be addressed. As renowned risk communications expert Dr. Peter Sandman has noted, there is not necessarily a significant correlation between actual risk levels and public outrage, and it’s not possible to decrease outrage simply by providing accurate information about risks.

In short, the public is outraged by hazardous waste sites and does not trust PRPs to clean them properly. All of those EPA oversight costs are, in large part, intended not to decrease risk, but to lower outrage.  Outrage is understandable in some circumstances, and efforts to reduce it are laudable, but is it really an appropriate use of scarce environmental protection resources to spend the money that gets poured into Superfund sites?

There has to be a better way. Indeed, there is a better way. It’s called a privatized system in which PRPs have to meet well-defined cleanup standards, but are allowed to do so on their own, in whatever manner is most cost-effective, subject to audits by regulators. Privatized programs such as the one in Massachusetts are not perfect. However, their flaws – which largely stem from a failure to fully support privatization -- pale in comparison to the waste that is the federal program under CERCLA.

In other contexts, I’ve called on the Obama administration to embrace regulatory reform. Why not start with Superfund? Notwithstanding Rob Stavins’ point about the difficulty of overturning an entrenched status quo, if the states could do it, why not the federal government?

Besides, I have an entrenched personal reason for seeking Superfund reform. This stuff drives me nuts.

Although the Superfund statute is now 28 years old, basic issues of liability and apportionment of liability remain unresolved. This term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide a case with broad implications for CERCLA liability, Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607, Burlington Northern v. United States. These consolidated cases, which will be argued early in 2009, raise important issues concerning the circumstances under liability is divisible and the scope of “arranger” liability under CERCLA.  If the Ninth Circuit’s approach is upheld, the heightened evidentiary standards may impose a difficult hurdle on parties to prove reasonable apportionment of liability. The Ninth Circuit’s approach to “arranger” liability is of concern to entities that sell chemicals or other products in the ordinary course of business. The allocation of risk and provisions for insurance and best practices to avoid spills in contracts between suppliers and common carriers may need to be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case. 

Although the Superfund statute is now 28 years old, basic issues of liability and apportionment of liability remain unresolved. This term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide a case with broad implications for CERCLA liability, Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607, Burlington Northern v. United States. These consolidated cases, which will be argued early in 2009, raise important issues concerning the circumstances under liability is divisible and the scope of “arranger” liability under CERCLA.  If the Ninth Circuit’s approach is upheld, the heightened evidentiary standards may impose a difficult hurdle on parties to prove reasonable apportionment of liability. The Ninth Circuit’s approach to “arranger” liability is of concern to entities that sell chemicals or other products in the ordinary course of business. The allocation of risk and provisions for insurance and best practices to avoid spills in contracts between suppliers and common carriers may need to be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case. 

                                    Background

A now-defunct company, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B), owned and operated a facility at which chemicals were stored and distributed. The B&B operations were conducted in part on land owned by two railroad companies. Some of the chemicals used by B&B were supplied and delivered by Shell Oil Company. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) brought suit under CERCLA to recover their response costs.

In 1996, the EPA and the State filed CERCLA actions against B&B, the Railroads, and Shell for reimbursement of their investigation and cleanup costs.   The district court, after a twenty-seven day bench trial, issued a detailed, 191-page decision holding the Railroads liable under CERCLA § 9607(a) as owners of the facility and as persons who “at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.”  Shell was held liable under CERCLA § 9607(a)(3)as a “person who ... arranged for disposal ... of hazardous substances.”  

The district court found that the harm to the site was capable of apportionment.  The parties had not provided arguments concerning apportionment, leaving the district court to independently perform the equitable apportionment analysis. For the Railroads, the district court multiplied three proportions: (1) the percentage of the overall site that was owned by the Railroads, 19.1%; (2) the percentage of time that the Railroads leased the parcel in relation to B&B’s total operations, 45%; and (3) the fraction of hazardous products attributable to the Railroad parcel, 66%. This calculation resulted in a determination of 6% liability.  To account for any “calculation errors,” the district court assumed 50% error and raised the Railroads’ proportion of the total liability to 9%. For Shell, the district court approximated the volume of spills of Shell’s product attributable to Shell, and set Shell’s proportion of the total liability at 6%. 

The State and EPA appealed the district court’s judgment.  Shell cross-appealed the finding that it was liable as an “arranger” under CERCLA. The federal district court held the Railroads and Shell liable for a minor portion of the total cleanup costs. The agencies appealed. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the portion of the judgment that imposed liability on Shell as an arranger and reversed the portion of the judgment that declined to impose joint and several liability on the Railroads and Shell. 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The questions presented are whether the 9th Circuit correctly (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling that Shell is liable as an arranger and (2) reversed the district court’s apportionment of liability. The case is scheduled to be argued early in 2009.

                                    The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the portion of the judgment that imposed liability on Shell as an arranger and reversed the portion of the judgment that declined to impose joint and several liability on the Railroads and Shell, holding that petitioners did not satisfy their burden of proof on apportionment. United States v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway, 502 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2007), as amended 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008). The amended opinion was issued to accompany a denial of en banc review, which prompted an unusual dissent by eight Ninth Circuit judges including the Chief Judge.

Apportionment of Liability. The Ninth Circuit notes that § 433A(1) of the Restatement allows for apportionment of damages where “(a) there are distinct harms or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.” 520 F.3d at 934-35.  

On the facts presented, the court found no dispute on the first, purely legal question -- whether the harm is capable of apportionment, but held that the district court erred in finding that there was a “reasonable basis” apportioning the harm based on percentages of land area, time of ownership, and types of hazardous products.  The Ninth Circuit held that there was no evidence linking these factors to the proportion of leakage, contamination, or cleanup costs. 520 F.3d at 945-46. With respect to Shell, the Ninth Circuit similarly found that the evidence relied on by the district court was too speculative to determine the amount of leakage of Shell’s chemicals.  520 F.3d at 946-47.

“Arranger” Liability. The Ninth Circuit rejected Shell’s arguments that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether Shell was an “arranger.”  The Ninth Circuit held that the useful product cases do not apply in this case because “Shell arranged for delivery of the substances to the site by its subcontractors; was aware of, and to some degree dictated, the transfer arrangements; knew that some leakage was likely in the transfer process….” 520 F.3d at 950. The Ninth Circuit cited evidence that spills occurred every time the deliveries were made; that Shell arranged for delivery and chose the common carrier that transported its product to the site; that Shell changed its delivery process so as to require the use of large storage tanks, that Shell reduced the purchase price of the chemicals to reflect loss from leakage; and that Shell distributed a manual and created a checklist to ensure that the chemical tanks were operated in accordance with Shell’s safety instructions. 520 F.3d at 950-51.

The Dissent. The order denying the petition for rehearing en banc provoked a strong dissent by Judge Bea, joined in by seven judges including the Chief Judge. The dissent cites the detailed factual findings made by the district court and states: “If this evidence does not provide a ‘reasonable estimate’ for apportionment of liability, I do not see how -- short of ‘perfect information’ sufficient to trace every molecule of pollution to the landlord’s parcel -- apportionment could ever be possible under CERCLA.”  520 F.3d 953. The dissent was equally critical of the panel’s imposition of “arranger” liability on Shell, stating: “The panel’s imposition of arranger liability on a mere seller, which relinquished control over its products upon delivery and before spillage occurred, goes far beyond the statutory language and creates inter-and intra-circuit splits.” 520 F.3d 954.

Issues Before The Supreme Court

1. Apportionment of Liability.  Petitioner Burlington Northern argues that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of apportionment departs from common-law principles, which allow for rough apportionment based on reasonable assumptions. The Ninth Circuit has pushed the “polluter pays” principle in CERCLA beyond all rational limits. Burlington argues that imposing joint and several liability in all but extraordinary cases, as the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning would dictate, would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, citing Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).

The United States counters petitioners failed to even attempt to identify and prove a reasonable basis for apportionment and the Supreme Court should not relieve petitioners of the consequences of their litigation strategy. Further, the United States argues that a district court does not have the same “broad discretion” in determining whether and how liability should be apportioned. 

2. “Arranger” Liability.  Shell Oil Company argues that “arranger” liability may not be imposed on a manufacturer who merely sells and ships, by common carrier, a commercially useful product, transferring ownership and control to a purchaser who causes contamination involving that product.  Any inadvertent spillage that occurred was the result of the transfer of a useful product, thus Shell cannot be said to have arranged for the discard of waste. Shell did not own the chemicals at the time of any disposal. Shell also argues that a company should not be penalized for providing its customers with a safety manual and other information for the safe handling of its products.

The United States argues that Shell is liable because it entered into transactions that it knew would directly result in disposals of hazardous substances. The government’s brief emphasizes that Shell inserted itself over the transfer process by hiring the common carriers used for delivery and because the common carriers used equipment required by Shell. Lack of intent to dispose of a hazardous substance does not preclude arranger liability, the United States argues, where the arranger has advance knowledge of the disposal. 

                                    Conclusion

In cases where there is a significant orphan share, the failure to apportion liability may result in the imposition of liability for the entire cleanup cost on parties with minimal responsibility.  If the Ninth Circuit’s approach is upheld, the heightened evidentiary standards may impose a difficult hurdle on parties to prove reasonable apportionment. Alternatively, the Supreme Court might decide the issue on narrow grounds suggested by the United States, namely that petitioners failed to offer evidence concerning apportionment and thus did not meet their burden of proof.

The Ninth Circuit’s approach to “arranger” liability is of concern to entities that sell chemicals or other products in the ordinary course of business. Does every sale and delivery of a useful product potentially subject the supplier to CERCLA liability if leakage or spills occur? If not, how does one draw the line?  Should arranger liability attach only when the sole purpose of a transaction is for disposing a hazardous substance?  The allocation of risk and provisions for insurance and best practices to avoid spills in contracts between suppliers and common carriers may need to be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case. 

Theodore Garrett is a partner in the law firm Covington & Burling LLP in Washington, D.C. and is Co-Chair of the firm's environmental practice group. His practice involves major regulatory and enforcement issues and transactions, particularly involving air quality, water quality, hazardous waste, and natural resource damages. He has been lead industry counsel in numerous cases seeking judicial review of EPA air and water regulations and has represented clients in numerous Superfund matters. Mr. Garrett advises clients on compliance and related business issues and has been extensively involved in administrative proceedings and litigation, including Supreme Court cases. Mr. Garrett has spoken and written widely in the environmental area. He is the editor and principal author of The Environmental Law Manual and the RCRA Compliance Manual, and is a contributing author to Environmental Litigation and The Clean Water Act Handbook. Mr. Garrett served as a U.S. Supreme Court law clerk to Chief Justice Warren Burger.  He is past Chair of the ABA Section of Environment, Energy and Resources. Mr. Garrett was honored as the Environmental Lawyer of the Year 2008 by Who’s Who International.

Contact Information: tgarrett@cov.com or (202) 662-5398