April 22, 2012 was the 42nd Earth Day, an event that passed with limited notice by most Americans and the news media. For all but a few of us who work in the field, the environment is no longer a “top 10” issue. Yet objectively, the planet is in materially worse shape than it was on the first Earth Day in 1970. As a species, we are collectively destroying the earth’s natural systems, plundering its resources and squandering its natural capital at an accelerating and unsustainable rate. The “Tragedy of the Commons” that Garrett Hardin wrote so eloquently about in advance of the first Earth Day is rapidly unfolding just as he predicted.  

On a global scale, the earth’s ecosystems are under siege.  With a human population of 7 billion, and headed for at least 10 billion fairly soon, growing greenhouse gas emissions and resultant climate change, increasing regional water scarcity, and growing global competition for dwindling resources, the trends are to put it mildly, not looking good.  It has been estimated that we are now consuming the planet’s resources, emitting pollutants and generating waste at about 1.5 times the earth’s carrying capacity. The “externalities” of our ever growing global economy are overwhelming the earth’s ability to assimilate them.
[For a fairly comprehensive and sobering account of the causes, effects and trends of global environmental degradation, I recommend Paul Gilding’s recent book, The Great Disruption.]

If we continue on our present course, our environmental, social and economic systems appear to be headed for collapse, or at least some very rough sledding with unacceptably high (and of course, inequitably distributed) human and ecological casualties.  Catastrophic and irreversible climate change is a growing possibility, if not a probability, without fundamental changes in how we use energy.  After more than 40 years of effort, and a proliferation of “green” policies and initiatives, we are clearly losing the war of environmental protection and conservation.  This is particularly disquieting for those of us who work in the environmental profession, supposedly understand these issues, and presumably care about the real world outcomes.

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Although even casual observers will have noted the fanfare surrounding the U. S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)'s release last year of guidance to public companies on disclosures regarding climate change and its consequences under federal securities laws and regulations, far less attention has been given to other developments in the carbon disclosure milieu that should inform corporate strategy. While the debate over regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remains a hot topic in the courts, stakeholder pressure for greater transparency regarding GHG emissions management continues unabated, as illustrated by the evolving agendas of key stakeholders in the U.S. and abroad, two of which are highlighted briefly below.


Carbon Disclosure Project

The Carbon Disclosure Project (“CDP”) is a non-profit initiative launched in London in 2000 “to collect and distribute high quality information that motivates investors, corporations and governments to take action to prevent dangerous climate change.” Approximately 2,500 organizations in over 60 countries now measure and disclose GHG emissions and climate change strategies through CDP. Data is made available for use by institutional investors, corporations, policymakers and their advisors, public sector organizations, government bodies, academics and the public, including via channels on both Bloomberg and Google Finance. Investor CDP requests information on GHG emissions and climate change strategies on behalf of 534 institutional investors with a combined $64 trillion in assets under management and provides climate change data from thousands of the world’s largest corporations. Other notable initiatives include CDP Supply Chain, through which 60 corporate members encourage suppliers to measure and disclose climate change information. CDP's Public Procurement initiative, through which national and local governments can question suppliers about energy use, GHG emissions and related risks, is a beginning to have an impact, including at the US General Services Administration, where work is underway on a project analyzing the costs and benefits of disclosing through CDP. CDP has launched a new product for investors with FTSE and ENDS Carbon called the FTSE CDP Carbon Strategy Index. It has launched initially with two UK indices; the FTSE CDP Carbon Strategy All-Share Index and the FTSE CDP Carbon Strategy 350 Index. Both indices have been designed in response to growing awareness of the significant potential impact of climate change on investment returns. Post Copenhagen, governments across the globe have been working towards holding emissions below levels that would increase global temperatures by 2ºC. Achieving these levels will require increased costs for carbon emissions. The FTSE CDP Carbon Strategy Index Series reflects this carbon risk in its initial offering of ‘carbon-tilted’ versions of the UK’s FTSE All-Share and FTSE 350 indices. The indices feature the same constituents with a variation of weightings based on their exposure to carbon risk, relative to their sector peers. The index series is based on future-oriented criteria rather than past emissions data. It is the first index series to offer a long term forward-looking investment tool that closely tracks established UK benchmarks while supporting the reduction of climate change risks across investment portfolios. This means retail and institutional investors, such as pension funds, can achieve broad and diversified market exposure as well as manage the impact of climate change on their investment. One can gain considerable insight into the state of the art of carbon disclosure from a review of responses to CDP, as well as the cross-cutting analyses compiled by the organization and its partners. To access the most current and archived reports, click here.  

Climate Disclosure Standards Board

The Climate Disclosure Standards Board ("CDSB") is an initiative convened by the World Economic Forum at its annual meeting in 2007 and hosted by the CDP as Secretariat in response to increasing demands for standardized reporting of climate change information in “mainstream” reports. The term "mainstream reports“ is used to describe annual reports in which corporations are required to deliver audited financial results under the corporate, compliance or securities laws. CDSB released a Reporting Framework in September of 2010.  In connection with its work, CDSB has also compiled a database of global developments on legislation that directly or indirectly affects the way in which GHG emissions are calculated and/or the way in which risks are disclosed in corporate and securities filings. CDSB is in the process of upgrading the format to a new platform called “Interactive Standards” where the public and others will be able to see and contribute to the database. Other plans for 2011 center around engagement with corporations, investors and regulators through structured programs designed to align further the needs of preparers and users of climate change-related information.

In his July 8, 2010 ACOEL blog entry, Fournier “Boots” Gale of this firm reported on the then-most recent court decision dealing with whether and how a plaintiff could recover, under CERCLA, costs it incurred for a cleanup performed under a consent decree or administrative settlement. One of the more intriguing developments for CERCLA practitioners has been the tension between and radical changes to cost recovery or contribution claims under 107 and 113 of CERCLA. Boots reported on the July 2, 2010 decision by a federal judge here in Alabama to grant complete summary judgment to defendants, finding that a party compelled to incur such costs can only proceed under Section 113, and not 107. Because the defendants in that case had also entered into an administrative settlement with EPA for the same site, thus obtaining Section 113 contribution protection, all of plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed. That case is still on appeal to the 11th Circuit. The issue decided by the Alabama federal court--whether compelled costs were recoverable under Section 107, 113, or both—had been left unanswered by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007). Courts have been struggling with this issue ever since.

The latest opinion on this issue is from the 8th Circuit, in Morrison Enterprises, LLC v. Dravo Corp., 2011 WL 1237526 (8th Circuit, April 5, 2011). The 8th Circuit was the federal circuit court whose decision was affirmed in the Atlantic Research case, so the result in this case is not surprising. Noting the question unanswered by the United States Supreme Court in Atlantic Research, the Morrison Court, as did the federal court in Alabama, concluded that Section 113 was the appellants’ exclusive remedy, confirming the summary judgment granted by the district court below on the Section 107 claim. One of the Morrison appellants argued to the district court that one of the contaminants it cleaned up was totally unrelated to its operations and, thus, the costs it incurred related to that contaminant were “voluntary” and thus recoverable under Section 107. Interestingly, the plaintiffs in the Alabama case made the same argument. Both the Alabama and 8th Circuit Courts rejected the argument because all of the work was performed under and pursuant to a consent decree, which was broad enough to encompass the costs for cleaning up the contaminant sought to be carved out as voluntary. In effect, even if one wishes to argue later that some costs incurred were for a contaminant for which one had no responsibility, if the costs incurred are pursuant to that consent decree, or administrative settlement, then the costs are not incurred voluntarily and a Section 107 claim is still barred. In a final blow to the cost recovery efforts in this case, the appellant attempted to amend its complaint to assert a Section 113 claim after summary judgment had been entered on its 107 claim, but the district court denied it as untimely (and the Morrison court affirmed on this issue, too).

In 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin rendered a widely reported and discussed decision in Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., No. 2:08-cv-16-WCG (E.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 2009) (Appleton I) that many remember as being unique. This is because rather than considering the usual so-called “equitable factors” to determine proportionate financial responsibility in a CERCLA contribution action such as waste-in volume or relative contaminant toxicity, the District Court focused entirely on a single marker of relative culpability i.e., Appleton Paper’s knowledge that their actions would cause environmental harm.

In February of 2011, the District Court issued an equally intriguing opinion in Appleton Papers Inc., v. Whiting Paper Co., No. 08-C-16, 41 ELR 2011 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 28, 2011) (Appleton II). Relying in large measure on the District Court’s 2009 decision, multiple defendants argued that the response costs already contributed to cleanup effort should be borne by NCR Corp. and Appleton Papers Inc. (collectively “the Appleton Plaintiffs”). All of the Defendant’s arguments highlighted the same equitable factor that barred the Appleton Plaintiffs from obtaining contribution it, e.g, knowledge that a generated waste might cause environmental harm. The District Court agreed, and determined that the Appleton Plaintiffs were liable to the Defendants for response cost of remediating four of the five operable units along the Lower Fox River. However, the Appleton Plaintiffs were determined not to liable for costs associated with Operable Unit No. One (“OU1”) because the OU1 defendants were unable to prove that the Appleton Plaintiffs contributed to the contamination of OU1 (OU1 is located upstream of the Appleton Plaintiffs’ facility) or that the Appleton Plaintiffs were arranges under CERCLA §107).

These cases warrant practitioners’ review as they clearly express the notion that contribution liability should rest upon satisfaction of the ultimate objective of the CERCLA liability scheme i.e., that the polluter pays the costs of resolving the pollution it causes. This objective should never be far from mind, as the fact based focus of inquiry utilized by the District Court in these cases may well be the undoing of practitioner’s efforts to rely upon supposed technical and legal attributes of relative responsibility. Instead, the focus should be directed to the essential inquiry at the root of the CERCLA legislative cost recovery scheme e.g., the polluter who causes pollution to occur should pay for its cleanup.

CERCLA liability under section 107 is often characterized as strict, joint and several unmitigated by considerations of causation, fault or fairness. Contribution is different, however. Congress, in section 113(f)(1), specifically authorized the courts to allocate costs “using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.” Illustrative of this fundamental difference is the fight over who shall pay what for the massive PCB cleanup of the Lower Fox River.

NCR is incurring the bulk of the costs based on discharges of PCBs incident to the manufacture of carbonless paper at a facility on the River. It sued numerous paper mills along the River based on their discharges of PCB containing wastewater incident to the recycling of trim and waste carbonless paper. In late December 2009, Judge Griesbach of the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed NCR’s suit for contribution against the paper mills based on NCR's knowledge of the content and risks associated with PCB-containing carbonless paper as manufacturer/developer of the product compared to the recycling paper mills.

Framed thus — in old fashioned terms about knowledge of dangers and avoidance of risk—it was no contest. NCR was denied contribution because of its knowledge, learned gradually over time, about the toxic nature of PCBs as against those who merely, and without access to NCR’s superior knowledge of the product, processed it for recycling. The Court’s analysis, it said, “is governed by traditional principles of equity, such as the relative fault of the parties, any contracts between the parties bearing on the allocation of cleanup costs, and the so called ‘Gore factors.’” The lengthy recitation of the largely undisputed facts was nothing less than a moral indictment of NCR’s actions and reactions as the knowledge about PCB toxicity and its threat to the environment came to be documented and disseminated; in short, nothing less than a fault-based conclusion.

The flip side of this case came down in February 2011. Judge Griesbach decided that the paper mills, which had incurred expenses related to various EPA and Wisconsin DNR orders and settlements, monitoring and investigation, were entitled to contribution from NCR for those portions of the River where both recycling and manufacturing PCB contamination occurred. This time around the Court was satisfied that its singular use of NCR’s “fault” as the sole determinant to deny NCR contribution in 2009 was likewise sufficient to grant the paper mills a right of contribution against NCR. In other words, fault or culpability can become the overriding factor and permit the court to eschew consideration of any other equitable factors, including Gore factors. One sees in the Court’s emphasis on charging the financial cost on those “responsible” for creating the hazardous conditions a tone and direction quite at variance with the rather automatic analysis of liability under section 107. Hence, although approximately half of the PCBs originated with the paper mills and not NCR’s manufacturing, the Court, on culpability grounds, was prepared to impose the entire cost on NCR exclusive only of amounts reimbursed to the defendants by insurance.

A few months ago, a significant anniversary passed without much fanfare: the 30th anniversary of the passage of CERCLA. Interestingly, 30 years has another meaning today in the Superfund world as many of the CERCLA sites have passed through the active cleanup phase and into the long-term operation and maintenance phase. When practitioners began working with the Superfund statute in the early days, the question of when would a Superfund cleanup “end” was considered. Many of us thought that 30 years of monitoring at a site after completion of the active remediation stage was a reasonable expectation. This expectation, while not expressly stated in CERCLA or the National Contingency Plan, was based on the approach used in RCRA closures which generally require 30 years of post-closure monitoring.

But 30 years of working with the Superfund statute has made it clear that 30 years is not a meaningful benchmark for long-term O&M, at least not to EPA. The critical documents in the Superfund process, the Records of Decision, the Consent Decrees and the EPA Guidance documents usually do not specify when long-term operation and maintenance may cease. As a result, because groundwater contamination at many Superfund sites has proven to be so difficult to remediate to drinking water or some other agreed upon standards, many PRP Groups are faced with the possibility that their Superfund site may require perpetual monitoring. In addition, since the Consent Decrees require a five year review process by EPA for all active sites, the possibility of enhanced monitoring or additional remediation always looms on the horizon.
The uncertainties in knowing when a Superfund site will “end” creates many challenges for performing parties and their counsel. Among those difficulties:

• Continual disclosure on company financials and SEC filings;
• Time and expense of keeping PRP Groups functioning over many years and paying for government internal and contracted oversight costs;
• Lack of certainty or predictability in budgeting long-term costs for Superfund liabilities; and
• Loss of institutional memory and familiarity at sites where, over time, companies and their divisions are sold and counsel, consultants and EPA personnel move on and/or retire.
   

These risks and costs, of course, are spared for de minimis parties and other PRPs who structure their settlements as cash-outs either to EPA or to other PRPs. For those performing parties left behind, however, the ability to determine a reasonable end point to the commitment they entered into years, if not decades earlier, often remains a largely unresolved and perhaps undeterminable question under present regulation and practice.

Many of us are working in PRP Groups where active remediation has been completed yet the groundwater remains substantially above the Performance Standards. In many of these sites, the groundwater plume is controlled and presents no risk to human and other environmental receptors yet reasonable predictions about when the monitoring program and the Superfund “machine” can be turned off remains a mystery. With the 30th anniversary of Superfund now passed, it is time for more discussion and coordination between EPA and the PRP community about how and when Superfund sites, especially those with long-term groundwater monitoring requirements, may “end.”

Despite a House Republican agenda to eviscerate EPA’s GHG authority, EPA is pushing forward with workable greenhouse gas reduction solutions.  EPA’s gradual phasing in of GHG permitting requirements for new facilities has provoked a vicious response from both heavy industry and political partisans, despite the requirements’ limited scope on only the largest pollution sources in the country – those that emit the equivalent of a burning railroad car of coal a day – and the common-sense requirements that these new facilities install the most efficient cost-effective technology available.

EPA has moved cautiously in deployingpotentially more important regulatory tool: New Source Performance Standards (NSPS).  Starting with the two largest sectors of emitters in the U.S., electricity generators and refineries, NSPS can create a “floor” of minimum standards for new and modified facilities, as well as create a flexible, state-based system to drive steady reductions from existing sources.  Importantly, reinvented NSPSstandards can capture the benefits of and build upon existing state GHG reduction programs, encourage other states to pursue or join in broader clean energy solutions, and produce greater environmental benefits (GHG reductions) than traditional NSPS.

In part to exploreand flesh out its new approach to NSPS, EPA held several “listening sessions” to hear from industry, air pollution control agencies, NGOs, and others in February and March of this year.  A recurring theme throughout these sessions was flexibility.  The most common stakeholder response has been thatEPA should set reasonably stringent 111(b) standards for new and modified sources.  At the same time, EPA should build upon its experience in allowing state emissions averaging and trading to propose guidelines for states to regulate existing sources.  These guidelines should include astraightforward method for states to show that alternative existing or proposed programs – whether or not they include individual numeric standards for individual NSPS sources– would achieve equivalent or greater emission reductions to traditional NSPS, individually applied.

Several states, including California, were quite vocal in these listening sessions, and for good reason.  As Seth Jaffe pointed out in his blog, emissions trading programs such as California’s cap-and-trade program under Assembly Bill 32 clearly provide the most cost-effective emission reductions.  Other states could propose clean energy programs, that achieve local economic development and energy security objectives, as well as emissions reductions, or they could be attracted to join existing regional initiatives.  Rather than adopt a one-size fits all NSPS, EPA can establish a stringent NSPS that allows states, their industries, and other stakeholders to work together to innovate and create unique solutions that serve multiple goals.

We all know that the bona fide prospective purchaser (BFPP) provision provides a defense to CERCLA liability for contaminated sites and allows a knowing purchase of contaminated property. It encourages brownfields and voluntary cleanup programs across the country.

Judicial interpretations of the BFPP defense are scarce. In October 2010, a federal district court in South Carolina issued its opinion which was a nasty turn of events for BFPP’s. (Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc. (“Ashley II”), Case No. 2:05-cv-02782-MBS). The case was for recovery of cleanup costs associated with a former fertilizer manufacturing plant in Charleston, South Carolina.

The court decided that Ashley was not a BFPP, as it claimed, and was responsible for five percent of the clean-up costs based on the following facts: (1) Ashley had torn down some structures in 2008, which allowed rainwater to contact cracked sumps containing hazardous substances. As a result, disposal of hazardous substances had occurred after Ashley took possession of the property; (2) Ashley was “affiliated” with other PRPs because Ashley had indemnified them and, more significantly, attempted “to discourage EPA from recovering response costs covered by the indemnification”; and (3) Ashley had not exercised appropriate care because it failed to address recognized environmental conditions (RECs) that were identified in the environmental site assessment as well as other potential site hazards.

The lesson here is that Purchasers should consider the effect of indemnity provisions and any interactions they may have with government agencies regarding other PRPs. In addition, because “disposal” may be defined very broadly, purchasers should thoroughly evaluate construction, demolition, and other site activities to determine if such activities could cause a release of hazardous substances. Finally, it is critical that all RECs be addressed, beginning no later than the time the purchaser acquires the property and continuing for the duration of its ownership.

In cases of first and second impression, federal district courts in South Carolina and California have now ruled on the bona fide prospective purchase (“BFPP”) defense following its enactment in 2002 and EPA’s subsequent “all appropriate inquiries” (“AAI”) implementing regulations in 2006. In Ashley II of Charleston, L.L.C. v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., Judge Seymour of the District of South Carolina undertook an exhaustive 55-page examination of the facts surrounding the purchase by Ashley II of several parcels from various owners. In the more succinct decision of 3000 E. Imperial, LLC, v. Robertshaw Controls Co., et al., Judge Anderson of the Central District of California addressed the divisibility of harm in connection with a purchaser’s cost recovery action against the seller under CERCLA §107(a) and also addressed the plaintiff’s BFPP status.

Ashley II

In a lengthy discussion of the history of the site, the Court examined the involvement of each of the prior owners as well as the actions of Ashley II in determining whether the harm was divisible. Ultimately, the Court determined that the harm was not divisible; however, the Court did construct a basis for allocating liability. Of particular note was the Court’s extensive analysis of the bona fide prospective purchaser status of Ashley II; but also of interest were the Court’s holdings on the issue of contractual indemnifications and release agreements.

One thing that the Court failed to give any attention to was the Consent Agreement entered into between the State of South Carolina and Ashley II. This document bears some resemblance to the State’s Brownfield non-responsible party contracts. This document attempted to establish Ashley II as a non-responsible party and afforded it contribution protection.  

Ultimately, the Court set forth an allocation of the response costs by percentage attributable to each party, with Ashley II bearing its allocation along with those for which it had indemnified.

3000 E. Imperial

The California District Court’s decision came on the heels of the Ashley II decision. Obviously, the history of the 3000 E. Imperial site was less complex. There, the Court discussed at some length the testimony of two competing experts on when the USTs in questions were likely to have resulted in a release. The Court then examined divisibility of harm in conjunction with the Burlington decision and considering the elements of § 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the defendant’s claim for divisibility was insufficient. The Court then turned to the defendant’s counterclaim for § 107 cost recovery as a PRP. Obviously, the plaintiff had claimed that it was not a PRP by virtue of its status as a BFPP. Following a brief examination of the plaintiff’s actions following closing and a fleeting reference to “appropriate care,” the Court concluded that the plaintiff did take “reasonable steps” to prevent further releases and was entitled to BFPP status. 

The Los Alamos Study Group (the “Study Group”) is presently challenging the United States Department of Energy (“DOE”) and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (“NNSA”) efforts to construct the new Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (“CMRR-NF”) at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

The Study Group’s complaint, in federal district court in Albuquerque, asserts that the project has changed so dramatically that an eight-year old environmental impact statement (“EIS”) does not begin to adequately analyze the environmental impacts of the present iteration of the CMRR-NF, and that defendants’ offer to conduct a supplemental environmental impact statement (“SEIS”) is merely a fait accompli to continue with the detailed planning and initial construction of the massive venture.

In considering the original Nuclear Facility, the federal defendants issued an EIS in 2003, and followed it with a Record of Decision (“ROD”) in 2004. The 2003 EIS addressed a Nuclear Facility to be built no deeper than 50-75 feet below grade. In the years that followed, however, seismic conditions underlying Los Alamos became better understood, and the federal defendants were faced with a project that arguably did not take into account those conditions. There was no discussion in the 2003 EIS of deeper excavation and no reference to a layer of volcanic ash known to underlie the site that would greatly complicate plans to construct at a greater depth, or meet then-known seismic safety criteria. The ROD stated that: “[B]ased on the CMRR EIS, the environmental impacts of the preferred alternative” (built 50 feet or less deep) would be “minimal” and “small.”
 

Moreover, since 2004, the project has seen further fundamental changes. The original budget for the Nuclear Facility was estimated at $350-$500 million. In 2003, the estimate, as reported to Congress, was $600 million. The EIS stated that construction would be completed in 2009; now, it is estimated to conclude in 2022, at a cost approaching $6 billion.

In 2003, NNSA reported that the Nuclear Facility would have 60,000 square feet of Hazard Category 2 space within 200,000 square feet of gross area. The CMRR-NF has now changed from a structure to be built to a depth of 50 feet, to a structure requiring an excavation to 125 feet, with the bottom 50-60 feet of the hole filled with concrete. As a result, the total volume of excavation for the CMRR-NF has increased from about 167,000 cubic yards in 2003, to 579,000-704,000 cubic yards in 2010, a three-to-four fold increase in construction equipment, spoilage, and disposal needs. The volume of soil now remaining to be excavated has increased six-fold.

Additionally, changes in the basic concept of the Nuclear Facility have expanded to include the introduction of the so-called “hotel concept” that would accommodate various unknown future missions, but would require large open floor areas and significant increases in concrete and steel. The concrete now needed is 371,000 cubic yards, up from 3,194 cubic yards. This is more concrete than was used for the Big-I Interchange in Albuquerque, or for the Elephant Butte Dam in southern New Mexico. The steel needed is now 18,539 tons, up from 242 tons. That is roughly the equivalent of the Eifel Tower. In short, the Nuclear Facility dwarfs the Manhattan Project and would be the largest construction project in the history of the State of New Mexico.

The Los Alamos Study Group case is one of first impression, as it is the first to contest the federal defendants’ decision to perform a SEIS as opposed to a new EIS altogether. Unlike a SEIS, an EIS must consider all available alternatives, including refurbishment of existing, under-utilized buildings at Los Alamos, and any other alternative besides the construction of the present iteration of the $6 billion CMRR-NF. Many of those alternatives, rejected in the original 2004 Record of Decision, may now be viable given the significant cost increases in the present version of the Nuclear Facility.

The federal defendants have filed a motion to dismiss based on prudential mootness and other grounds. All pleadings and other filings in the case may be obtained on the Study Group’s website.

As we all know by now, in Burlington Northern and Sante Fe Railway Co. v. United States, decided in May, 2009 (BNSF I), the Supreme Court surprised us yet again by interpreting CERCLA differently than the lower courts and Superfund practitioners had come to understand the statute to mean. The Court held (a) that “arranger” liability under Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA is triggered only if there is an intent to dispose of hazardous substances, and (b) that joint and several liability under CERCLA may be avoided if there is a reasonable basis for apportioning harm among the “covered persons,” affirming divisibility on facts that most practitioners would not have expected to prevent joint and several liability. Since then, the lower courts have been wrestling with the application of these rulings under CERCLA. Meanwhile, however, the state courts have begun to address these issues under state law counterparts to CERCLA. Recently, the Supreme Court of Montana did just that. State of Montana v. BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF II)

Montana, like many other states, has its own version of CERCLA, called the Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act (“CECRA”). CECRA has its own categories of liable parties, including a broad class of “arrangers,” but unlike CERCLA, explicitly provides for joint and several liability. These differences result in greater potential exposure for defendants in hazardous waste cases.
 

BNSF II involved three adjoining properties north of Kalispell, MT, all of which had been listed as state Superfund sites. One of the sites, called the Reliance site, was a former crude oil refinery. BNSF transported petroleum products into and out of the Reliance site, using railroad cars that sometimes leaked badly. The trial court found that “[r]efinery workers occasionally ‘got a soaking’ when unloading crude oil” from BNSF railcars and that “when shipments of crude oil arrived and the holding tanks were full, the crude oil was dumped onto the ground in pools on BNSF property in the area.” The trial court found that BNSF “had been involved in dumping petroleum products onto the surface of the earth.”

The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) sued seven parties, six of whom settled, with the result that a Final Unified Abatement Order was entered, holding BNSF jointly and severally liable for the Reliance site, as an “arranger” under CECRA, even though the trial court made no finding that BNSF intended to release a hazardous substance at the site.

Arranger Liability

Like CERCLA, CECRA contains no definition of an “arranger.” Instead, Section 75-10-715(1)(c) of CECRA includes among the list of liable parties “a person who generated, possessed, or was otherwise responsible for a hazardous or deleterious substance and who, by contract, agreement, or otherwise, arranged for disposal or treatment of the substance or arranged with a transporter for transport of the substance for disposal or treatment,” language that differs somewhat from Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA.

The trial court held BNSF liable as an “arranger” under CECRA because of its “involvement” with Reliance in the dumping of petroleum on the Reliance site. The trial court relied on the Ninth Circuit decision in BNSF I, adopting a broad form of “arranger” liability, and refused to reconsider its ruling when the Ninth Circuit was reversed by the Supreme Court.

The Montana Supreme Court began its review of the trial court decision by noting that Section 114(a) of CERCLA provides that nothing prevents a State from imposing additional liability beyond those imposed by CERCLA. The Court then held that “an entity need not specifically ‘intend’ to dispose of a hazardous substance for imposition of ‘arranger’ liability ” It was enough that BNSF “possessed or was otherwise responsible for the materials it shipped” and that “[a] necessary and foreseeable consequence of shipping the material was unloading the material.” Since BNSF employees moved full tank cars of crude oil to the Reliance site so Reliance employees could dump the crude oil on the ground, “BNSF participated in the unloading process which resulted in the release of the materials it possessed.” In holding that the trial court did not err in holding BNSF liable as an “arranger,” the Court set a low bar for “arranger” liability under CECRA.

Apportionment

Unlike CERCLA, which is silent as to whether or not “covered persons” are jointly and severally liable under the statute, CECRA provides, in relevant part, that “notwithstanding any other provision of law,*** the following persons are jointly and severally liable for a release or threatened release of a hazardous or deleterious substance***” .

Notwithstanding this statutory language, the trial court entered a pretrial order that once the state proved that BNSF is a liable party, “BNSF must come forward with evidence to show it was only responsible for a portion of the contamination at the site to avoid the possibility of joint and several liability for all the surface contamination.” When BNSF failed to make such a showing, the trial court held BNSF jointly and severally liable. Because BNSF had failed to prove the factual basis for apportionment, the Supreme Court declined to rule on whether apportionment would ever be possible under the statutory language. Thus, BNSF II leaves unanswered the question of whether liability can ever be apportioned under a statute that explicitly provides for joint and several liability, no matter how distinct the harms may have been.

Conclusion

As the United States Supreme Court continues to read CERCLA narrowly, state statutes, like CECRA, may become more important in the development of hazardous waste law. BNSF II may very well represent the beginning of a trend.

There is nothing new about transboundary water quality disputes under the Clean Water Act. Introductory classes on environmental law commonly trace the history of Supreme Court decisions arising from Milwaukee’s battles with Illinois over sewer discharges into Lake Michigan, the challenge Vermonters’ raised against New York paper mill discharges into Lake Champlain, and Oklahoma’s objections to a permit EPA issued to a sewage treatment plant in Arkansas. Given the length of time that the Clean Water Act program has been in place and the large number of instances in which upstream discharges drain into and therefore arguably affect water quality in downstream states, one would expect that most of the relevant legal questions would be well-settled. Recently, however, transboundary water quality disputes have arisen with increasing frequency.

Coal bed methane development in Wyoming has given rise to disputes with Montana over salinity impacts in the Powder and Tongue Rivers. Efforts by the state of Washington to protect dissolved oxygen levels in Spokane Lake have prompted a dispute over Washington’s attempt to impose wasteload allocations that would limit nutrient discharges by upstream sources in Idaho. Oklahoma’s efforts to restore the Illinois River to pristine scenic river conditions have resulted in recurrent and steadily intensifying disputes with agricultural interests on both sides of the border and point sources located predominantly in the headwaters on the Arkansas side. EPA’s imposition of nutrient water quality standards in Florida could have direct effects on discharges originating in Georgia; and the agency’s showcase multi-state TMDL for the Chesapeake Bay has recently precipitated challenges by state and national agricultural interests. In what undoubtedly is the most dramatic transboundary claim under the Clean Water Act, environmental groups have filed a petition with EPA asking the Agency to impose nutrient water quality standards and adopt TMDLs for the main stem of the Mississippi River, all of its tributaries, and certain related coastal waters in the Gulf of Mexico.
 

These recent disputes have recurring themes that arise out of weaknesses or unresolved questions regarding the Clean Water Act program. The statute empowers each state to exercise sovereign independence in adopting water quality standards that apply within the state’s own borders (so long as minimum federal standards are met), but the statute does little to address or even give consideration to the interests of other states that may be directly affected by those standards. Transboundary disputes frequently involve situations in which the regulatory burdens fall disproportionately on interests in one state while the resulting environmental benefits are realized largely or entirely in another state, but the Clean Water Act does nothing to address questions of transboundary fairness. Transboundary disputes frequently involve regulatory decisions that have enormous financial and long term planning consequences, but the decisions are often based upon limited factual data, imperfect scientific analysis, and less than comprehensive computer modeling. The Clean Water Act offers no process for seeking to assure that the quality of the decision making will be commensurate with the gravity of the consequences at stake. Indeed, the program largely makes the magnitude of financial consequences simply irrelevant. Disparities between the magnitude of the consequences and the limited quality of analysis and data supporting the regulatory decision are particularly problematic when the regulatory decision is being made by one jurisdiction that has no political accountability to the other.

It is perhaps no surprise that most of the recent transboundary water quality disputes are arising out of efforts to regulate the discharge of nutrients. Nutrient pollution is the largest unresolved water quality issue nationally; and the adverse effects of excess nutrients frequently occur at locations far downstream from the original source. The fact that most of the current transboundary water quality disputes involve nutrient pollution probably makes the disputes even more difficult than normal to resolve. Nutrient pollution has no simple, universally accepted means of measurement. It is costly and time consuming to establish a clear causal link between a given discharge of nutrients and an observed adverse effect; and many of the most important sources of nutrient pollution are non-point sources which are beyond direct control under the Clean Water Act. Unfortunately, this appears to be a recipe for increased frustration and controversy.
Transboundary water quality disputes may not be a new phenomenon, but it does not appear that we are any closer to finding a good way to resolve them.
 

Over the past three decades, EPA has issued more than 1,700 CERCLA UAOs to roughly 5,400 PRPs ordering the performance of response actions at CERCLA sites costing in aggregate in excess of $5 billion. Only a small handful of those orders, however, have ever been challenged in court, and vanishingly few have been subject to any independent third party review whatsoever.
 

Why is that? Well, as even EPA might agree, it is not because the Agency is infallible. No, the reason for EPA’s essentially unreviewed exercise of its UAO authority is the CERCLA statute itself, which (a) by operation of Section 113(h), precludes any challenge to a UAO order until the ordered response action has been completed (typically many years later at an average cost of $4 million dollars) and (b) by operation of Sections 106 and 107, subjects any PRP who elects to defy a UAO to treble punitive damages and additional penalties of $37,500 per day, which accumulate until EPA, at its sole discretion, brings an enforcement action.
 

In this regard, CERCLA is an outlier in administrative law. Though instances are common where federal statutes give agencies the power to issue administrative orders, virtually every other comparable scheme affords recipients of such orders either a prior hearing or the prompt opportunity for independent review after the order is issued. CERCLA, of course, provides neither.

So what justifies this unusual approach? It has been suggested on occasion that due process must be dispensed with because UAOs are needed to address emergency conditions. They can only be issued, after all, where an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or the environment is shown. There are two problems with that rationale, however. First, the courts have largely upheld EPA’s position that “imminent and substantial endangerment” doesn’t really mean “imminent” or “substantial” – there really is no site involving a hazardous substance and a release (actual or threatened) that doesn’t meet the statutory criteria for UAO issuance. Second, as EPA has conceded in litigation, the fact is that EPA doesn’t issue UAOs in true emergencies; in those circumstances, it does the work itself and seeks to recover its costs later.

Okay, so even if true emergencies are not implicated, it’s still the case that EPA has a need to act quickly and that allowing pre- (or prompt post-) issuance review would unduly impede cleanup of hazardous sites, right? Well, as it turns out, that’s not true, either. Analysis of EPA’s CERCLIS database reveals an average 8-year lag-time between identification of a site and issuance of a UAO and a 4-year lag between remedy selection and UAO issuance. Obviously, there’s plenty of time in the system for a little due process.

So why haven’t past procedural due process challenges to this UAO scheme (and there have been a number of them) succeeded? The courts that have rejected those challenges have commonly concluded that the challenging PRPs couldn’t show a pre-hearing deprivation of property, as is required to trigger Fifth Amendment protections. Those courts reasoned that a PRP could simply refuse to comply with and wait for EPA to sue to enforce the UAO, and in that event would suffer no pre-hearing deprivation of property since penalties and damages could only be awarded following a court hearing.

Though the conclusion is facially appealing, its fallacy is demonstrated by the record of the most recent constitutional challenge brought by GE. There, following extensive discovery from EPA and expert testimony on both sides, GE was able to demonstrate empirically that a PRP that elected to defy a UAO would be immediately punished by the equity and capital markets, which would recognize the massive contingent liability such defiance would create and account for it by lowering the PRP’s stock value and increasing its cost of financing, with consequent impacts on its ability to bid for new projects or to hire additional employees, among other things. Indeed, although he took issue with GE’s assessment of the magnitude of the impact, even EPA’s economic expert agreed that defiance would occasion such harmful effects and that they would be significant. And the District Court agreed, as well, that defiance would not avoid a deprivation of property, though it ultimately ruled against GE on the basis that the burden to EPA of providing hearings outweighed the private party interests favoring such hearings.

On appeal the D.C. Circuit rejected the district court’s finding of a pre-hearing property deprivation, however, and ruled instead that such harmful impacts did not involve constitutionally protected property rights and so dismissed GE’s constitutional challenge on that predicate ground without reaching the District Court’s balancing analysis. The potential implications of that holding – which GE believes is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent – extend well beyond CERCLA confines, and so GE has sought certiorari review.  The government’s response to GE’s petition is due February 4.

Stay tuned.

Since passage of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in 1972, environmental statutes and regulations have sought to balance legislative mandates seeking disclosure of chemical identities and properties against trade secret protection concerns. This tension can be seen in the labeling of cosmetics, the submittal of test data under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), and the disclosure of chemical additives to fluids used for hydraulic fracturing. In all three situations, efforts to increase access to chemical identity information are likely to create further challenges to trade secret protection.

            On the cosmetics labeling and TSCA front, a bill introduced in the House of Representatives this past July, entitled the Safe Cosmetics Act of 2010, would have required cosmetics labels to identify the name of each ingredient in descending order of its “predominance”, with the same information provided for internet sales. Regardless of the type of sale, the ingredients would not be afforded trade secret protection. While the bill was not enacted, the concerns that kept it alive even in the waning days of the Congressional session may be a harbinger of a new version in the upcoming session.

            A bill to amend TSCA also filed in the House last July would have required a manufacturer to provide an upfront justification for any trade secret claim made in an information submittal under TSCA, with EPA required to evaluate the submittal within 60 days thereafter. While this bill did not pass either, EPA had previously announced its intention toreview chemical identity CBI claims in health and safety studies submitted under TSCA, and it subsequently proposed amendments to its TSCA regulations that would require upfront justification of a chemical identity claim. In addition, EPA has substantially increased the chemical information available on its Envirofacts database, and is now providing free access to its TSCA inventory of chemicals.

            Additives to hydraulic fracturing fluids have likewise been the subject of much attention, and have sparked initiatives in a number of states to require their disclosure. Beginning next year, Arkansas will require disclosure hydraulic fracturing fluids on a well by well basis, although allowing more generic disclosure of proprietary chemicals. The information will be publicly available for review on the website of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission. In Wyoming, the additives are reported to the staff of the state’s Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, rather than to the public, and the Commission has granted a number of requests for trade secret protection, although the requests themselves are matters of public record. 

            Colorado requires oil and gas drillers to keep an inventory of the chemical additives at the site of each well, with state regulators getting a copy of the inventory upon request. Pennsylvania requires material safety data sheets covering the fracing fluid materials to be included with each drilling plan submitted for approval, with the MSDS sheets made available to the landowner and to local government and emergency responders. Both Colorado and Pennsylvania are considering expansion of those requirements.

            In September EPA issued letters to nine companies engaged in hydraulic fracturing related activities seeking the identity of the fracing fluid additives and copies of studies about their health and environmental effects. All of the companies have now responded to the EPA request, with Halliburton establishing a public website to disclose information about those additives. In addition, a number of trade associations, including the American Petroleum Institute, have lent their support to a voluntary disclosure registry under development by the Groundwater Protection Council, which includes a number of state officials responsible for groundwater protection, and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, with data to be disclosed on a well-by-well basis. 

            How efforts such as those just described will address trade secret issues remains to be seen, particularly given the concerns raised about potential contamination of drinking water supplies by fracing fluids. However, it appears that the day has passed when one could claim trade secret protection and provide support for that claim only when the information was actually requested. And the new riff on that old refrain sung by Johnny Mathis and Doris Day appears more likely to be that “my secret name’s no secret any more”.

On October 6, 2010, and at the direction of Governor Joe Manchin (D-WV), the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) filed a complaint against EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The complaint alleges that two actions by EPA, requiring surface mine permit applications to undergo enhanced scrutiny and setting a new water quality standard based on conductivity, are unlawful and have brought the permitting process to a standstill. WVDEP is seeking a court order declaring EPA’s actions to be unlawful and enjoining their implementation.

WVDEP argues that EPA’s actions 1) are substantive rule changes that did not go through formal rulemaking required by the APA; 2) require the Corps to apply illegal presumptions during environmental assessments of new surface mine permits; 3) usurp West Virginia’s authority to implement its own water quality standards and effectively issue NPDES and SMCRA permits; 4) impose new water quality standards that are not based on sound science; and 5) have caused undue delays in the issuance of surface mining permits and threaten the supply of coal available for the nation’s energy needs.

Governor Manchin is in a hotly contested race for the US Senate in which his opponent is accusing him of being a "rubber stamp" for President Obama. Undoubtedly this action will be offered as a response to that criticism.

EPA has issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that broadly re-opens the question whether to authorize PCBs in caulk and under what conditions. EPA did not propose any new rules on the issue, but sought comments on what to do.   This balance of this post reviews EPA’s regulatory efforts on this issue and the comments on the ANPRM, and then summarizes some options for building owners while the agency ponders.

            Last year EPA announced that in “recent years” it had learned that many 1950 to 1978 buildings may contain caulking with PCB concentrations higher than 50 ppm, indeed often quite a bit higher. Linda Bochert’s post of November 3, 2009 linked to the EPA’s PCBs-in-caulk website, which the agency established to provide guidance for preventing exposures and conducting safe building renovations. 

            Last year’s guidance conspicuously avoided a central issue: EPA’s position on the legal status of PCB-containing caulk. EPA’s position actually is clear: PCBs at levels above 50 ppm in caulking are not authorized, hence are illegal to maintain. Yet EPA has never mounted a program to identify and remedy PCB-containing caulk, and last year’s guidance tacitly condones leaving PCBs in place indefinitely. So EPA de-emphasizes its legal interpretation. Quite possibly that is because EPA managers have not viewed PCB-containing caulking as causing actual health impacts whereas remediation certainly poses high costs and raises its own health risks.   

            The bottom line?  Clear-cut and sensible regulatory answers remain far in the future. Meanwhile EPA is sending mixed messages – PCBs in caulk are unauthorized but don’t overreact while we ponder. Building owners, prospective purchasers and contractors must sort out their own answers about what to do or not do.

Regulatory Background

            In truth, EPA long has had general awareness of PCBs in old caulk. If the concentrations are below 50 ppm, the caulk qualifies as an excluded PCB product and is not regulated by EPA. If the concentrations are higher, EPA considers the use to be illegal to maintain because EPA has never issued a use authorization for PCBs in building materials. 

            When over-50 ppm PCBs in caulk are reported to EPA, generally EPA has required remediation under TSCA’s rules. EPA New England (Region 1) has had a number of such matters. The Region also insists that cleanups must meet the requirements of the PCB spill regulations, which generally require cleanup in occupied buildings to levels well below 50 ppm.

            Yet there is no obligation under TSCA for building owners to test for PCBs in caulk or to report exceedances to EPA. Many building owners ignore the issue, even if they are aware of the general possibility. So unauthorized caulk persists in many buildings, or goes away during renovations or demolition, awaiting potential discovery in unplanned circumstances. 

            That has led to a number of mini-crises, particularly for public school systems facing growing parental and school staff awareness.   PCBs in schools have been much discussed in New York and elsewhere. In January 2010 the New York City schools and EPA entered into an extensive consent order to evaluate school buildings and study ways to encapsulate or treat PCBs over a period of several years. 

            In practice then, EPA has sent mixed messages. It has commendably - albeit tacitly -recognized that immediate and costly removal of unauthorized PCBs in caulk usually is not warranted. Yet the use remains unauthorized.  Given the strictures of TSCA and the ill repute of PCBs, that remains unsettling for many building owners and prospective purchasers.

            Efforts to authorize PCBs in caulk: the 1994 NOPR

            The mixed messages from EPA and the issues of cost and health risks call out for clear cut regulatory answers, but also hamper EPA from issuing definitive regulations.   It has already tried and retreated before. 

            Specifically, in 1994 as part of unrelated PCB rule changes, EPA proposed to authorize PCBs in pre-TSCA building materials, with conditions, similarly to intact asbestos containing materials.   The NOPR included EPA’s conclusion that continued use at concentrations above 50 ppm did not pose a significant risk as long as the materials were in good condition. 59 Fed. Reg. 62788, 62810 (12/6/94).

The proposed conditions had many downsides from a building owner’s perspective, because leaving the materials in place, once discovered, would have then required:

·        Notice within 30 days to EPA and potentially exposed individuals;

·        Marking in a prominent location;

·        Quarterly air monitoring and wipe sampling for one year and annually thereafter until removal of the material;

·        Removal or containment (by encapsulation with a sealant) if wipe sampling or air monitoring showed exceedances of workplace standards;

·        24-hour notice to EPA of such exceedances;

·        Record-keeping.

EPA’s final rule issued deferred the issue while indicating EPA intended to issue a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking and asking for further information on how much of a problem this is or not.  63 Fed. Reg. 35383, 35386 (6/29/98)

            The 2010 ANPRM and Comments

            Over a decade later, EPA has issued an ANRPM on unrelated PCB rule changes, and used it to request comments on whether EPA should reconsider the 50 ppm level for excluded PCB products. That request also specifically called for comment on whether EPA should issue a use authorization for PCBs in caulk.  ANRPM, 75 Fed. Reg. 17645, 17664 (April 7, 2010). The ANPRM did not, however, describe any revised levels or conditions that EPA might propose for PCBs in caulk. 

             Many of the comments on the APNRM on this issue call for more study, but otherwise reflect an unsurprising range of recommendations. Comments from the Children’s Environmental Health Network urged EPA to cease any thought of authorizing an increase in the 50 ppm level. Comments from the American Federation of Teachers recommended a “suspension” of the allowance of PCB-containing caulk below 50 ppm while research is done. Massachusetts DPH comments tracked EPA’s position of 1994 by recommending leaving intact caulk alone, and included its own recent guidance to that effect. MIT’s comments proposed a facility-specific and detailed risk management approach. Comments from the National Association of College and University Business Officials recommended issuance of a use authorization for intact materials, perhaps conditioned on an I&M program.

            Overall, the ANPRM attracted relatively few comments on this issue, by contrast with voluminous comments from the utility sector on other issues. The paucity of attention may mean that PCBs in caulk still have not reached a widespread awareness in the commercial real estate community, which provided exactly no comments. Or building owners just may prefer the status quo.

Continued Regulatory Uncertainty: Working Out Own Answers

                It seems likely that EPA will not be providing any new rules on this issue in the foreseeable future.  That leaves the regulated community to work out its own answers as best it can. 

                It appears that many building owners have determined not to look for PCBs in caulk, even in buildings where they might be expected.  There is no requirement to do so and there have been no reports of actual health impacts due to PCBs in caulk. 

                Other building owners have chosen to test for PCBs in caulk in order to reduce regulatory risk, but only when renovations or demolition are undertaken for other reasons.  Only if unauthorized PCBs are found then do they conduct remediation under the health and safety and disposal restrictions under the PCB rules. 

                Some prospective purchasers are including this issue in their due diligence, particularly if renovations are planned, and building attendant costs into the pricing.  But some do not, relying on the absence to date of regulatory requirements, regulatory pressure or health impacts.

                Some owners are writing requirements into construction contracts to make sure that contractors identify and handle any such caulking appropriately, similarly to contractual provisions for asbestos-containing materials. 

                Given EPA’s mixed message – PCBs in caulk are unauthorized but don’t overreact – each of those practices may be sensible. Building owners and prospective purchasers must choose their own paths based on their own policies and risk tolerance.

The most recent Supreme Court examination of the validity of solid waste flow control ordinances under the dormant Commerce Clause occurred in United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007). In United Haulers, the Court held that flow control ordinances which favor a state-created solid waste authority, but treat in-state and out-of-state private entities the same, ‘do not “discriminate against interstate commerce” for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause.’ Id. at 345. In such case, the validity of a nondiscriminatory ordinance with an incidental effect on interstate commerce is analyzed under balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). Id. at 346.   However, if the flow control ordinance favors a single private entity over other private entities, the holding in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), controls. Id. at 341.   

United Haulers has been the linchpin for local governments to launch flow control ordinances. However, although the United Haulers decision upheld the validity of a flow control ordinance against a commerce clause challenge, the decision was based on an ordinance that was expressly authorized by the New York legislature and which required the disposal of solid waste at a landfill operated by a solid waste authority created by the New York legislature.   In United Haulers, the New York legislature enacted specific legislation which allowed Oneida and Herkimer Counties to “impose ‘appropriate and reasonable limitations on competition’ by, for instance, adopting ‘local laws requiring that all solid waste . . . be delivered to a specified solid waste management-resource recovery facility.’”   Id. at 335. Additionally, the flow control ordinance in United Haulers directed that all waste in Oneida and Herkimer Counties be disposed of at the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority (“Oneida-Herkimer Authority”), which was created by the New York legislature and was therefore a political subdivision of the state. Id. at 335. As such, under United Haulers, it is clear that a local flow control ordinance authorized by state legislation and directing solid waste to a public waste authority created by state legislation does not violate the commerce clause if it satisfies the Pike balancing test. It is likewise clear that a flow control ordinance which directs all solid waste generated within the boundaries of a local government to be directed to a privately-owned facility is still controlled by the holding in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown and invalid. 511 U.S. at 391. However, the United Haulers decision does not specifically address the significance of the authorization for the flow control ordinance by the New York legislature. 

According to a 1995 EPA report to Congress, state legislatures in 35 states have expressly authorized the enactment of flow control ordinances by local governments. For those states in which flow control is not expressly authorized by the state legislature, it is unclear whether a flow control ordinance enacted by a subdivision of the state would withstand a commerce clause challenge. At the very least, the absence of state authorization for flow control measures may affect the analysis of certain elements under the Pike balancing test.  Additionally, in states in which the state legislature has not expressly authorized the enactment of flow control ordinances by local governments, a local flow control ordinance could be preempted by state solid waste laws and therefore invalid even if it does not violate the commerce clause; thus, leaving open the question of whether or not United Haulers has opened the door forever on local flow control.

At least one frontal challenge to local flow control is pending in S.C. In Sandlands, LLC, et al. vs. Horry County, et al., Case No. 4:09-cv-01363-TLW-TER (currently pending in United States District Court in the District of South Carolina), a landfill and affiliated hauling company are challenging a county’s ability to restrict the exportation of waste to out-of-county landfills on commerce clause and preemption claims. The plaintiffs are attempting to distinguish United Haulers as well as arguing that the ordinance is preempted by State law. The impacts of the ordinance are being felt on disposal facilities in the region as the State has implemented a regional planning approach for siting disposal facilities. While the defendants removed the commerce clause question to federal court, the federal court has certified and the State Supreme Court has accepted the preemption question.

Last week, in City of Pittsfield v. EPA, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a petition by the City of Pittsfield seeking review of an NPDES permit issued by EPA. The case makes no new law and, by itself, is not particularly remarkable.  Cases on NPDES permit appeals have held for some time that a permittee appealing an NPDES permit must set forth in detail in its petition basically every conceivable claim or argument that they might want to assert. Pretty much no detail is too small. The City of Pittsfield failed to do this, instead relying on their prior comments on the draft permit. Not good enough, said the Court. 

For some reason, reading the decision brought to mind another recent appellate decision, General Electric v. Jackson, in which the D.C. Circuit laid to rest arguments that EPA’s unilateral order authority under § 106 of CERCLA is unconstitutional. As I noted in commenting on that decision, it too was unremarkable by itself and fully consistent with prior case law on the subject.

What do these two cases have in common? To me, they are evidence that, while the government can over-reach and does lose some cases, the deck remains stacked overwhelmingly in the government’s favor. The power of the government as regulator is awesome to behold. Looking at the GE case first, does anyone really deny that EPA’s § 106 order authority is extremely coercive? Looking at the Pittsfield case, doesn’t it seem odd that a party appealing a permit has to identify with particularity every single nit that they might want to pick with the permit? Even after the Supreme Court’s recent decisions tightening pleading standards, the pleading burden on a permit appellant remains much more substantial than on any other type of litigant.

Why should this be so? Why is it that the government doesn’t lose when it’s wrong, but only when it’s crazy wrong? 

Just askin’.

On July 2, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama published a must read opinion regarding cost recovery claims under CERCLA.  See Solutia, Inc., et al. v. McWane, Inc., et al., Case No. 03-1345, Document No. 622 (N.D. Ala. July 2, 2010).The case was originally filed by plaintiffs in 2003 as a CERCLA cost recovery and contribution action against several industrial defendants located in Anniston, Alabama related to plaintiffs' cleanup of historic PCB contamination throughout the Anniston area. In June 2008, the Court had previously granted defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs' CERCLA Section 113 claims for contribution but had allowed plaintiffs to proceed with their CERCLA Section 107 cost recovery claims. However upon motion for reconsideration, the Court on July 2 issued a detailed opinion also dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs’ cost recovery claims under Section 107.

Of interest to CERCLA practitioners, the dismissal opinion provides a lengthy analysis, based on recent Circuit Court decisions, as to whether a plaintiff who seeks to recover costs of a cleanup performed pursuant to obligations under a consent decree or administrative settlement (aka “compelled” cleanup costs) can bring a claim under Section 107(a)(4)(B).  Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court did not decide the appropriate route for recovering “compelled” costs (under Section 107(a), 113(f), or both) in its most recent opinion addressing CERCLA Sections 107 and 113. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007). Nevertheless, the Northern District of Alabama agreed to reconsider defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 107 claims in light of Circuit Court decisions issued subsequent to Atlantic Research as well as new evidence.  Indeed, the Court agreed with the defendants' assessment that the majority of Circuit Court decisions decided after the Northern District’s previous denial of defendants’ motions for summary judgment have held that a party who incurred “compelled” cleanup has a viable Section 113 claim for contribution and not a Section 107 claim for cost recovery.

Ultimately the Court concluded that the recent Circuit Court decisions were correct in their assessment that Congress had intended for Section 113(f) to be the exclusive remedy to recover costs incurred pursuant to a judgment, consent decree, or settlement.  Because the Court agreed withdefendants' argument that plaintiffs’ costs related to its PCB cleanup were incurred by virtue of a prior consent decree, the plaintiffs only had a potential right to a Section 113 claim for contribution (which was previously dismissed) – not a Section 107 claim for recovery.

Again, the opinion is a helpful summary of evolving jurisprudence under CERCLA regarding Section 107 and Section 113 claims.  

Sometimes, the practice of environmental law just takes my breath away. A decision issued earlier last month in United States v. Washington DOT was about as stunning as it gets. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Robert Bryan held that the Washington State Department of Transportation had “arranged” for the disposal of hazardous substances within the meaning of CERCLA by designing state highways with stormwater collection and drainage structures, where those drainage structures ultimately deposited stormwater containing hazardous substances into Commencement Bay -- now, a Superfund site -- in Tacoma, Washington.  

I’m sorry, but if that doesn’t make you sit up and take notice, then you’re just too jaded. Under this logic, isn’t everyone who constructs a parking lot potentially liable for the hazardous substances that run off in stormwater sheet flow? 

For those who aren’t aware, phosphorus, the stormwater contaminant du jour, is a listed hazardous substance under Superfund. Maybe EPA doesn’t need to bother with new stormwater regulatory programs. Instead, it can just issue notices of responsibility to everyone whose discharge of phosphorus has contributed to contamination of a river or lake.

The Court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment regarding whether the discharges of contaminated stormwater were federally permitted releases. Since the Washington DOT had an NPDES permit, it argued that it was not liable under § 107(j) of CERCLA. However, as the Court noted, even if the DOT might otherwise have a defense, if any of the releases occurred before the permit issued – almost certain, except in the case of newer roads – or if any discharges violated the permit, then the Washington DOT would still be liable and would have the burden of establishing a divisibility defense. 

If one were a conspiracy theorist, one might wonder if EPA were using this case to gently encourage the regulated community to support its recent efforts to expand its stormwater regulatory program. Certainly, few members of the regulated community would rather defend Superfund litigation than comply with a stormwater permit.

You can’t make this stuff up.

No one doubts that EPA’s war on lead-based paint serves the cause of mitigating an established health threat. With children being particularly at risk, the regulations to date have focused on lead-based paint in older homes and other “child-occupied facilities.” On May 6, 2010, however, EPA gave notice of its intent to take the battle to an undefined set of commercial and public buildings. Can a full-scale assault on commercial facilities, which will involve a more complex set of regulatory variables and which will venture farther from the core health risk concerns, succeed in achieving a proper balance of competing factors?

EPA’s May 6, 2010 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking announcing the next step in the lead-based paint campaign was published only days after the April 22, 2010 effective date of the controversial Renovation, Repair and Painting Rule (“RRP Rule”). That rule regulates renovation and repair activities disturbing lead-based paint in older homes and child-occupied facilities. The RRP Rule affects contractors, landlords and others who perform RRP work for compensation.

The RRP Rule includes provisions for the required certification (for a fee) of firms performing covered RRP work, the training and certification (at a significant cost) of “Certified Renovators” through EPA-accredited classes, the required use of detailed RRP work practices when performing covered activities, the retention of compliance records, and the verification of compliance with work practice obligations. Even though the RRP Rule has a relatively narrow focus - residences and other child-occupied facilities - its requirements have generated substantial controversy.

Because the RRP Rule applies to numerous trades and contractors, as well as to certain landlords and other persons, issues related to obtaining the required training, safe implementation of the work practice requirements, costs of compliance and the possibility of a $37,500 per day, per violation penalty are only now being confronted by the regulated community as well as the regulators. Small contractors may be forced out of business, impacting competition. Needed RRP work may not be performed due to cost. Lead-contaminated waste disposal will create new environmental/health problems partially offsetting the benefits of the RRP Rule. Suffice it to say, EPA has not yet solved the numerous problems and complexities of implementing even these regulations focused on older homes and child-occupied facilities.

With this background, and setting aside for the moment legal mandates, one can reasonably question whether EPA is prepared to set its sights on a significantly more complex regulatory challenge- the renovation and repair of an estimated two to three million commercial and public facilities constructed prior to 1980. The ANPR includes no proposed language. Rather, the public is invited to respond to over 100 detailed questions and data requests.

At this time, the scope of EPA’s assault on the renovation and repair of commercial and public buildings is unknown. No current limitations on covered “commercial” and “public” buildings exist and both exterior and interior renovation and repair work are included in the ANPR. Unresolved questions include: What renovation and repair work should be covered? What activities create the most risk? Should exposure pathways be broadened to include nearby properties? How should the substantial amount of lead-contaminated waste be handled to avoid creating a different health and environmental hazard?

This much is known. The regulatory variables associated with extending the war on lead-based paint to commercial and public buildings are more numerous and the targeted health risks have expanded. I suggest that there is a real possibility that the regulations could fail to appropriately balance the legitimate interests of contractors, building owners and the public with the known and perceived health risks. Let us hope that the regulated community weighs-in on these issues and that the EPA gives careful thought to this next step in its campaign against lead-based paint.

The public comment period for this proposal ends July 6, 2010.

Last week, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response announced release of its Community Engagement Implementation Plan. Who could be against community engagement? It’s as American as apple pie. It’s environmental justice. It’s community input into decisions that affect the community. It’s transparency and open decision-making.

Call me a curmudgeon, but I’m against it. Study after study shows that, in terms of the actual risks posed by Superfund sites, we devote too many of our environmental protection dollars to Superfund sites, when we should be focusing on air and water. Why do we keep doing this? Because the community demands it. As Peter Sandman has noted, perceptions of risk are driven only partly by the actual hazard posed. To a significant degree, those perceptions are more driven by outrage over the situation. In some circumstances, what Sandman calls outrage management makes sense, but I’m skeptical that EPA’s community engagement initiative is really about outrage management.

In any case, here’s the public policy question of the day. Does it really make sense to spend scarce environmental protection resources, not to reduce risk, but to reduce outrage?

The U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of California has denied reconsideration of its pre-BNSF order finding defendants jointly and severally liable under CERCLA. U. S. v. Iron Mountain Mines. Defendants had argued that the Supreme Court in the BNSF case mandated the district courts to consider grounds for reasonable apportionment. They had earlier argued for apportionment before BNSF and then cited the Supreme Court’s decision as an intervening change of law that entitles it to reconsideration.

The court disagreed, finding that BNSF did not change the law, rather it simply reaffirmed existing law and applied it to a specific set of facts. It seems strange that the Supreme Court would grant cert in a case where the law is settled just to apply the facts. In fact, the working presumption in CERCLA litigation had been that joint and several liability is the rule and apportionment is rare, even though CERCLA doesn’t say that. Most practitioners saw BNSF as a game changer, reopening the possibility of a hard look given to reasonable bases for apportionment in mediated allocations and in court. But the District Court followed the lead of the Justice Department, which has consistently said BNSF marks no departure from standard CERCLA jurisprudence.

It sure would be great if the Supreme Court would provide some clarity in its environmental decisions. Few would think Rapanos helped much with our understanding of the Clean Water Act, and now we need to muddle through a certain lack of precision in representing clients in Superfund matters. While BNSF opens the window, it remains to be seen whether the opening is just a crack or will really let some fresh air in.

A number of us in the Pacific Northwest can remember the phone call that came in the spring of 1989 telling us to come to Alaska. There had been an oil spill, the caller said, and we had better get up there right away. We packed up and left, sometimes with just a couple of sets of clothes, and ended up staying for months, or years. We were lawyers, not scientists, and we could neither contain the spill nor predict its impacts. What we could do – or thought we could do – was assess blame and assign damages. That turned out to be harder than any of us imagined.

Nearly twenty years of litigation followed the Exxon Valdez spill, and there was not a single case, but many. By understanding some of the history of the Exxon Valdez cases, one can appreciate what the lawyers working on the Deepwater Horizon case have in front of them. At the same time, the many differences between the two spills suggest that history will not repeat itself. The legal response to the Deepwater Horizon case, like the cleanup response being carried out in the Gulf at this time, is likely to be far more complex, involve even more parties, and possibly even more time. By way of example:

• The federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA 90"), one of the principal laws likely to be invoked in response to the Deepwater Horizon, was enacted after (indeed, in response to) the Exxon Valdez. While the elements of the liability case against responsible parties under OPA 90 are similar to those asserted under the Clean Water Act in the Exxon case, OPA 90 allows plaintiffs to potentially recover a broader range of compensatory damages, including: damages to real or personal property; subsistence use; federal, state, and local tax revenues; lost profits and earning capacity; and the cost of providing additional public services resulting from the spill. In that sense, the law is more complex now than it was at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill, involves more parties and more and different potential claims. There is also very little case law decided under it;
• The causation issues in the Exxon Valdez case were far simpler than in the present spill. There was no question as to the cause of the 1989 spill into Prince William Sound – a tanker hit a reef. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon, on the other hand, press reports and briefings by BP point to a chain of events, each of which may have contributed to the explosion and to the still mounting damages;
• Unlike the Clean Water Act, OPA 90 expressly allows for contribution claims among responsible parties that were not available under the Clean Water Act. Therefore, the party that initially responds to the spill (BP) may have statutory claims that they choose to assert against other responsible parties at some future time;
• The Exxon case involved a single state (Alaska) and the federal government (and Alaska Native corporations). By comparison, several states have already become involved in the Deepwater Horizon spill (including Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama), raising potential jurisdictional questions and possible conflicting claims among the governmental plaintiffs;
• In oil spill cases, one of the potentially largest claims the government can bring is for natural resource damages. In order to do so, however, the government has to establish a "baseline" of pre-spill conditions. This is much more difficult to do in some of the ports and commercial areas along the Gulf Coast that are already impacted by hydrocarbons, as opposed to the relatively pristine waters of Alaska's Prince William Sound.
   

II. The Exxon Valdez Litigation

Against this backdrop, it may be helpful to review the history of the litigation that began in March, 1989 with the grounding of the oil tanker Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. Estimates of the quantity of oil spilled range from 10.8 million to 30 million gallons. More than 1,200 miles of coastline were contaminated, 250,000 birds were killed, and 330 civil lawsuits were filed.

• Criminal Prosecution

The state of Alaska criminally prosecuted the Exxon Valdez’s captain, Joe Hazelwood. The United States prosecuted Exxon for various environmental crimes, including criminal violations of the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Exxon Corporation pled guilty to one count of violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and Exxon Shipping pled guilty to one count each of violating the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The corporations were jointly fined $25 million and were ordered to pay restitution of $100 million.

• Civil Litigation: The Natural Resource Damage Claims

The United States and the state of Alaska sued Exxon for natural resource damages. That litigation was settled by entry of a consent decree under which Exxon agreed to pay $900 million over a period of ten years. The money was used at the direction of the Oil Spill Trustee Council for species and habitat restoration and recovery. The consent decree contain a reopener provision that allowed the governments to make additional claims of up to $100 million for natural resource damages not known when the settlements were reached.

In 2006 the Department of Justice and the State of Alaska asserted a claim against Exxon under the reopener provision, seeking payment of $92 million clean up oil the governments contend remains in the environment from the 1989 spill. Exxon responded that the nearly 350 studies that have been conducted demonstrate that the spill has left no lingering damages in Prince William Sound, and that the governments’ demands do not satisfy the requirements of the settlement agreement. No case has yet been filed.

• The Private Party Claims

Most of the private civil lawsuits were consolidated before Judge H. Russell Holland in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The damages trial proceeded in phases: Phase I determined whether Exxon was liable for punitive damages, and held that it was. Phase II determined the amount of compensatory damages owed to the plaintiffs. Phase III determined the amount of punitive damages to award to the plaintiffs. Subsequent proceedings adjudicated the claims of members of the fifty classes of claimants in the consolidated class action lawsuit.
On August 11, 1994, following the second phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of compensatory damages against Exxon of nearly $287 million. On September 16, 1994, following the third phase of the trial, the jury returned a $5 billion punitive damages verdict against Exxon. Exxon appealed, marking the start of an additional fifteen years of litigation and three appeals to the Ninth Circuit and, ultimately, the Supreme Court.

In the first appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded the punitive damage award to the district court to be reconsidered in light of intervening decisions by the United States Supreme Court addressing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards. In BMW v. Gore and Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tools, the Supreme Court articulated factors a court must consider when reviewing a punitive damage award: the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; the ration of the award to the harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and the difference between the award and civil and criminal penalties in comparable cases. The district court conducted an extensive analysis of those factors, and concluded the actual harm to plaintiffs was more than $500 million and a ratio of punitive damages to harm was 10 to 1, supporting the original $5 billion award. Nonetheless, the court reduced the punitive damages to $4 billion, to conform to what it viewed as the Ninth Circuit’s mandate. Exxon appealed.

While the second appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued another punitive damages opinion, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell. State Farm instructed courts to weigh five specific considerations in calculating punitive damages, and “strongly indicated the proportion of punitive damages to harm could generally not exceed a ration of 9 to 1.” Those five factors are (1) whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; (2) whether the conduct causing the plaintiff’s harm showed “indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;” (3) whether the “target of the conduct” was financially vulnerable; (4) whether the defendant’s conduct involved repeated actions as opposed to an isolated incident; and (5) whether the harm caused was the result of “intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.” The Ninth Circuit summarily remanded the second appeal of the punitive damage award to the district court for recalculation in light of State Farm. On remand, the district court again determined actual harm to be $513.1 million and increased the punitive damage award to $4.5 billion, a ratio of just under 9:1. Exxon appealed again, and this time, the plaintiffs cross-appealed, seeking reinstatement of the $5 billion award.

In the third appeal, Exxon argued that all of its settlement and other pre-judgment compensatory payments to the plaintiffs, which totaled approximately $493 million, had to be subtracted from the more than $500 million in actual harm before calculating the ratio of punitive damages to actual harm. As a result, Exxon argued, the measure of damages would be reduced to $20.3 million. Applying what it contended was the appropriate ratio, 1:1, Exxon argued that a punitive damage award should be capped at $25 million. This time, the Ninth Circuit accepted the District Court’s approximation of $500 million as the amount of actual harm, but in determining the appropriate ratio of punitive damages to actual damages, took into account the fact that while Exxon’s conduct (its “reckless decision to risk the livelihood of thousands by placing a relapsed alcoholic in command of a supertanker”) was particularly egregious and the economic damages significant, it was not intentional. And, as a mitigating factor, Exxon promptly took steps to ameliorate the harm. Thus, Exxon’s conduct, “though inexcusable,” warranted a ratio of 5:1 rather than 9:1, resulting in a punitive damage award of $2.5 billion dollars.

The parties then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In 2008, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and limited the punitive damage claim to a 1:1 ratio, or roughly $507 million. However, the high court declined to decide whether Exxon was required to pay interest on the amount of the award, and sent the issue back to the Ninth Circuit. Two months later, the appeals court held that Exxon was required to pay the interest, dating back to 1996, roughly doubling the amount of the final award. The average award to the 33,000 claimants came to about $15,000 -- roughly 20% of the amount that was awarded by the jury in 1994.

III. What Happens Next

Press reports indicate that a number of economic damage cases have already been filed against BP, Halliburton and Transocean over the Deepwater Horizon spill, and there are almost certain to be many more, depending on the impact of the spill. The government has yet to file litigation, but it can be expected to do so, under a variety of federal laws including OPA, the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, among others. There will be a lengthy and expensive natural resource damage assessment that the defendants will be expected to pay for. There are potential insurance claims, potential shareholder claims, and possibly contractual and statutory contribution claims between the responsible parties, among others. And if the sum of these were not enough to challenge even the most battle-tested lawyers on all sides, there is the reputational and political overlay which can dominate the legal and scientific issues at play, including Congressional hearings. A spill the size of this one not only impacts BP and its partners, but the entire industry. It also will test the legal system and the brightest minds in it.

For more information regarding the legal impacts of the Gulf spill, please contact Brad Marten or any other member of Marten Law’s Energy, Climate Change or Waste Cleanup practices.

It has always amused me how many people are involved with Brownfields work as compared to how few projects have been completed. It is tough to make the economics work on a Brownfield development in the best of times. Thanks to clean energy rules and incentives this may be changing.

Brownfields and clean energy have several synergies. Brownfields are often in industrial corridors, with great infrastructure and proximity to electrical grids. Biomass projects in particular need access to efficient transportation networks in order to move large volumes of material. Clean energy projects such as solar, wind and biomass plants work well with risk based remediation and institutional controls required for cost effective risk management at a Brownfields sites.

Add to these synergies a vast array of incentives, mandatory quotas and grants for clean energy and we just may have a path to economic viability for some Brownfields projects. EPA has a task force known as ER3 to help facilitate such projects. Keep your eye on a project in Charlotte, North Carolina known as ReVenture Park which seems destined to put wind energy, wastewater treatment and a biomass plant on a large, complex CERCLA/RCRA site.

In June last year insurance giant Zurich issued a report of the work of its Emerging Risks Group study begun in 2006. The report stated that the risks with the greatest potential to affect Zurich and its customers are those associated with nanotechnology.

Similarly, an alphabet soup of regulators—foreign and domestic—is wrestling with largely unknown and largely theoretical risks. The human health and environmental alarms have been sounded by numerous commentators, without yet meaningful, documented empirical observation or controlled studies of human health and safety issues or environmental concerns. Regulation in a factual vacuum is potentially counterproductive and can stifle one of the 21^st century’s most promising new technologies. But no one wants “another asbestos” or to have stood by silent in the spring while nanobots consume an ecosystem. This blog will skim the surface of an increasingly deeper and broader pond.

What is Nanotechnology?

Nanotechnology involves the manipulation of matter at the near atomic or nanometer scale--a nanometer is one billionth of a meter; a standard sheet of paper is 100,000 nanometers thick. Materials composed of or including devices and systems with components at the nanometer scale represent fundamentally new molecular organizations with highly different and potentially unpredictable properties and functions compared to their macromolecular cousins. The technology has found uses in a wide variety of commercial products including wound dressings, pregnancy tests, toothpastes, lubricants, paints, nonstick coatings, tennis racquets, air filters and many other products. In each of these products, the nano scale materials exhibit dramatically different characteristics than would be true of those materials at normal scale.  For example, gold is an excellent conductor of heat and electricity but simply reflects ordinary light. Properly structured gold nano particles absorb light and can actually convert light into heat (which, in turn, can be used for cutting purposes in thermal scalpels).  Nano sized particles of titanium dioxide provide UV protection while remaining transparent. Nano scale materials in thin films applied to eyeglasses, computer displays and cameras make them water repellant, anti-reflective or give them other useful physical characteristics.

Potential Health Issues

The primary human health concern for the extremely small size of nano materials is that they may be introduced into and affect the body in ways completely different than their bulkier macro cousins. See, e.g., Special Report, Nanotechnology: Benefits vs Toxic Risks, Functional Foods And Nutraceuticals (Feb. 2007) ("nanosized particles were found to traverse through lung tissue in unexpected ways, gaining access to blood and lymphatic systems"). 

The potential for different human health related characteristics such as enhanced adhesion, reactivity and absorption means that current methodologies for risk assessment simply are not applicable and safety data drawn from non-nano counterpart materials may be irrelevant.  See, Fischer Nanotechnology -- Scientific and Regulatory Challenges, 19 Villanova Envt. L. J. 315 (2008). For example, when inhaled, nano particles are deposited more efficiently and deeply into the respiratory tract than non-nano materials, and these nano materials may evade human body defense mechanisms that trap larger particles. In addition, nano materials themselves have sometimes been the subject of problematic animal studies. See Lynn, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 349 (2007).

Moreover, ordinary risk management tools may also simply “not work” in the presence of nano materials. For example, the use of facial masks designed for non-nano aerosols may not be effective for nano sized particles.

Nanotechnology concerns have been heightened by an article published in the European Respiratory Journal in which researchers reported that seven (7) young women suffered permanent lung damage following months of unprotected exposures to fumes and smoke containing nano particles in spray painting operations in China. The researchers concluded that the patients' illnesses appeared to be a "nanomaterial -- related disease.” While the results of this study have been questioned, the legitimacy of concerns with respect to high level environmental exposures to these materials remains. 

Regulatory Focus

An intense regulatory focus on developing an appropriate scientific basis for ensuring that nano materials do not present unreasonable human health concerns is underway. See e.g., Dept. of Health and Human Services, Approaches To Safe Nanotechnology - Managing The Health And Safety Concerns Associated With Engineered Nanomaterials (March 2009).  Giving further impetus to these concerns is the fact that there is a high concentration of nanotechnology applications in pharmaceutical, food and cosmetics applications, industry segments with direct and immediate human interactions. Every agency with jurisdiction over human and environmental health and safety has found or certainly will find reason to explore regulation. The USEPA has begun to issue rules about handling of and exposure to nano forms of alumina, silica and silver; the California Department of Toxic Substances is considering controls on carbon nanotubes. We can expect initiatives over time from the FDA and OSHA.

Insurance Company Reaction

For its part, the insurance industry has focused on product liability concerns. Insurance industry studies have expressed significant reservations about liability issues associated with nano materials. See Lloyd's of London Emerging Risks Team Report, Nanotechnology - Recent Developments, Risks and Opportunities (2007).  Indeed, one insurance carrier (Continental Western Insurance Group) has gone so far as to impose nano-technology exclusions in their standard CGL policies - notwithstanding the fact that no such claims have yet been presented. 

Conclusion

It is clear that nanotechnology offers tremendous scientific and commercial opportunities in the future. These opportunities, however, are likely to be accompanied by health and safety based product liability and environmental risks, and those risks need to be taken into account in the development and exploitation of these products.

This blog is based in part on a more expansive article: Michael Dore, Nanotechnology - Evaluate The Products Liability Risks, 198 N.J.L.J. 866 (December 14, 2009)

It has been nearly nine months since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States (BNSF),[1] a case some called a landmark decision that would change the Superfund practice.[2] In some respects that has turned out to be the case, in others it has not. There have been several reported cases citing BNSF, and all of them confirm that the decision requires both the EPA and potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) to engage in a more fact-intensive inquiry into “arranger” liability. Less clear, however, is how the apportionment of liability among liable parties in private contribution cases will be affected, given the relatively small number of reported decisions.

Readers will recall that the BNSF decision had two elements: (1) it addressed the scope of arranger liability under CERCLA, and (2) it affirmed the view of several circuit courts that PRPs can avoid joint and several liability if a “reasonable basis” to apportion liability exists. This article reviews how lower court decisions issued subsequent to BNSF have applied those two components.

A Review of the BNSF Facts

BNSF was issued on May 4, 2009. The 8-1 decision written by Justice Stevens arose out of a fairly common fact pattern for CERCLA cases: a small chemical distributor Brown & Bryant, Inc. (“B&B”) owned and operated a facility that repackaged agricultural chemicals. B&B’s operation was on a 3.8-acre parcel, a portion of which was leased from predecessors to BNSF and the Union Pacific Railroad. Neither railroad played any part in B&B’s operations. The other PRP, Shell Oil, sold a soil fumigant to B&B which was shipped via commercial carrier FOB destination, meaning that the buyer was responsible for the product once it arrived at the facility.

After the State of California ordered B&B to clean up soil and groundwater contamination, B&B went out of business and then EPA listed the site on the National Priorities List. Both railroads and Shell were named as PRPs. The railroads were ordered to clean up the entire site, even though the portion of the site that they owned did not require remediation. Shell was named a PRP for having delivered chemicals to the site which it knew or should have foreseen would be spilled by B&B. In 1996, the United States and the State of California filed a cost recovery action against the railroads and Shell, seeking to recover over $8 million in response costs.

The Supreme Court’s Opinion

1. Arranger Liability

In affirming that “arranger liability” under CERCLA must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the Court set up a continuum. At one end are cases where an entity entered into a transaction “for the sole purpose of discarding a used and no longer useful hazardous substance.”[3] In such cases, there is a clear intent to discard the product, and therefore liability under section 107(a)(3). On the other end are situations where a company sells a useful product and “the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination.”[4] The Court acknowledged that there were “many permutations of ‘arrangements’ that fall between these two extremes.” In these cases, based on a “plain reading” of the CERCLA statute, the Court held that “an entity may qualify as an arranger when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.”[5] Applying this statement of the law to the facts, the Court held that Shell’s mere knowledge of the spills did not amount to an “intent” that they be spilled or otherwise disposed of and that Shell was therefore not liable as an arranger.

2. Apportionment

BNSF highlighted that the CERCLA statute does not contain joint and several liability language. Instead, the notion that PRPs should be held jointly and severally liable is a judicial doctrine grounded in Section 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Applying the Restatement, the Court held – as had several circuit courts previously– that “apportionment is proper when there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.”[6]

Where multiple parties cause a single harm, “CERCLA defendants seeking to avoid joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a reasonable basis for apportionment exists.”[7] In BNSF, while both the district court and the Ninth Circuit had found that apportionment of the harm was possible, they disagreed on how to allocate responsibility. The district court came up with a nine percent allocation to the railroads. The Ninth Circuit criticized the evidence on which the district court had relied, finding that it was insufficient to establish the “precise proportion” of the Railroads’ responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s approach, holding that the evidence supporting apportionment need not be precise. There must simply be “facts contained in the record reasonably support[ing] the apportionment of liability.”[8]

Lower Court Decisions Applying BNSF

Cases Applying the Court’s Arranger Liability Ruling

Of the four published cases that have substantively applied BNSF in the context of arranger liability, all suggest that lower courts are taking seriously the Supreme Court’s instruction to conduct a factually-intensive review of the parties’ intent. Prior to BNSF, the view prevalent among at least some government attorneys, and even some private party attorneys, was that every party who somehow came into contact with a hazardous substance was liable as having “arranged for disposal.” That view has been shattered.

Two cases, in particular, illustrate this point. The first is Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.[9] Plaintiffs in that case were companies who had manufactured and sold carbonless paper. The emulsion used in the paper contained microscopic capsules that burst when pressure was applied, releasing a dye, and allowing the words on a page to be transferred from one sheet to another. The microcapsules were dissolved in a solvent which contained PCBs. The PCBs were released into the Fox River from manufacturing plants which produced the paper. An even greater proportion of PCBs were released by companies that recycled carbonless paper and by municipal wastewater utilities that discharged PCB-contaminated wastewater.

Plaintiff manufacturers filed a contribution action under CERCLA §113 against the recyclers and municipalities (their §107 claim was previously dismissed by the court). The court bifurcated the case into a liability and apportionment phase. In the liability phase, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court considered whether the defendants knew they were disposing of hazardous chemicals, and concluded that they did not. The analysis – while not explicitly using the word “intent” – focused on what the defendants knew when they recycled the carbonless paper or discharged wastewater from the plants that did. After reviewing a record that included roughly 900 exhibits – including expert reports, government reports, corporate records, laboratory records and deposition transcripts – the court sided with the defendants, finding that they had little or no knowledge that they were disposing of PCBs into the river.[10]

Defendants are recyclers of paper and municipal sewerage entities who simply processed paper and water, and they would have had little reason or ability to inspect or investigate the chemical makeup of anything that came in the door…[t]he recyclers were the ‘innocent victims’ of the circumstances [citation to record omitted]. This is even more true for Defendants who merely received and released wastewater containing invisible PCBs in it.[11]

Similarly, in a case in Washington state, the district court made clear that the issue of arranger liability after BNSF turns squarely on the facts. United States v. Wash. State Department of Transp.[12] In that case, EPA sued the Washington State Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) to recover cleanup costs at a contaminated site that the state had acquired to build a bridge. During construction of the bridge, a contractor discovered three open-bottom tanks containing tar, which appeared to have been placed there by a coal gasification plant. The State counterclaimed, arguing that the United States was also liable, because the US Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE”) had dredged a portion of the waterway that the coal gassification plant was located on, thereby moving hazardous substances released by others and causing additional releases to the environment. The United States moved for summary judgment. Judge Bryan denied the motion, holding that the United States’ liability, if any, turned on a fact-intensive inquiry that the parties had yet to conduct.

At this point, the facts are insufficiently developed to determine what level of control USACE exerted over the dredging process and what responsibility it may have had regarding disposal of the dredged materials.… As the Supreme Court stated in Burlington Northern, “the determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction as a ‘disposal’ or ‘sale’ and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions.” 129 S. Ct. at 1879. Considering the USACE’s involvement with dredging the contaminated waterways in light of CERCLA’s strict liability standard, the court cannot say as a matter of law that upon further discovery, the facts will fail to show that the USACE “qualif[ies] as an arranger under [§107(a)(3) when taking] intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance” through the granting of permits to dredge the waterway.[13]

Meanwhile, across the country in Maine, a district court applied BNSF in the context of a cleanup of the Penobscot River.See Frontier Communications Corp. v. Barrett Paving Materials.[14] We previously reported on this case. See District Court in Maine Applies Supreme Court’s BNSF Decision on “Arranger” Liability, Marten Law Environmental News (July 22, 2009). The court in the Maine case reiterated that the question of arranger liability is “fact-intensive,” but it found that the record contained sufficient facts to conclude that the defendant had intended to dispose of wastes through a sewer into the river.[15]

Finally, in New Hampshire, General Electric asked a judge to reverse a prior ruling holding GE liable as having “arranged for disposal” of PCB-containing “scrap Pyranol” when it sold the material to a paint manufacturing company. GE relied on BNSF to argue that the phrase “arranged for disposal” required “an intentional action toward achieving the purpose: disposal.”[16] The court did not dispute GE’s reading of the law, but held that there was sufficient evidence of intent to hold GE liable as an arranger.

Cases Applying BNSF’s Apportionment Ruling

We have located two reported decisions expressly dealing with the “apportionment” arm of the BNSF decision. In the first case, the court essentially punted, holding that the best way to apportion liability was to let the case go to trial. See Evansville Greenway and Remediation Trust v. Southern IN Gas and Elec. Co., Inc.[17]

In Evansville, the BNSF decision was handed down while cross-motions for summary judgment were being briefed. The defendants claimed that BNSF “effected a dramatic change that will make it easier for PRPs to avoid the burden of joint and several liability,” while the plaintiffs argued that “BNSF amounts to nothing new.”[18] Noting that “the Supreme Court’s new decision has presented what might be called genuine questions of material law,”[19] the court declined to commit to a particular interpretation of the BNSF decision, based on the fact that the timing of the decision meant that the record before the court was sparse. Instead, the court granted the motion as to liability under 107(a), but reserved the question of apportionment for trial, so that “each side [can] present evidence relevant to its own and its opponents’ different interpretations of BNSF.”[20]

More interesting is the court’s decision in Appleton Papers, discussed above. In that case, the court engaged in an extended discussion of whether BNSF was applicable to a §113 contribution action (having previously dismissed the plaintiff’s §107 claims). The court concluded that, while “Burlington Northern changed the applicable standards for ‘arranger liability’ … there is nothing within Burlington Northern that requires courts to make some sort of threshold determination regarding joint and several liability or allow plaintiffs in a contribution action to make an apportionment argument.”[21]

One question not answered by BNSF is the quantum of proof necessary to establish a reasonable basis for apportionment. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin addressed that question in a non-CERCLA case involving environmental torts, holding that: (1) a fact finder may rely on the “available evidence” in apportioning liability among joint tortfeasors; and (2) the burden of production necessary to support a showing of divisibility is “low.” In re MTBE, S.D.N.Y. Case No. 00 MDL 1898, Docket No. 352 (July 14, 2009). See Applying BNSF, District Court in New York Finds “Best Available Evidence” Is Sufficient to Apportion Liability, Marten Law Environmental News (July 22, 2009). It remains to be seen whether this approach will be extended in a CERCLA context.

Conclusion

It is still too early to get a good sense of whether BNSF will be the watershed case some had predicted. The first few cases have reinforced the Supreme Court’s holding that the inquiry into arranger liability is “fact-intensive.” Only two reported cases have addressed the apportionment arm of the decision, and neither reached the question of how apportionment is to be conducted.

[1] 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).

[2] See, e.g., J. Barkett, The Burlington Northern Decision, American College of Environmental Lawyers Blog (May 19, 2009).

[3] 129 S. Ct. at 1878.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 1879.

[6] Id. at 1881.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 1882.

[9] Slip Op., 2009 WL 5064049 (E.D. Wis., December 16, 2009).

[10] Id. at *15.

[11] Id. at *17.

[12] , ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 2985474 (W.D. Wa., September 15, 2009).

[13] Id. at *8.

[14] District of Maine, Case No. 07-00133.

[15] 2009 WL 1941920, *3

[16] General Electric Company’s Supplemental Memorandum on the Evidence of Intent or Knowledge Required to Prove that a CERCLA Defendant has “Arranged for” Disposal or Treatment of Hazardous Waste at 2, United States v. General Electric Co., 06-354, Doc. No. 89 (D.N.H. Nov. 5, 2008).

[17] ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 3163180 (S.D. Ind., September 29, 2009),

[18] Id. at * 21.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., Slip Op., 2009 WL 3921036 (E.D. Wis. 2009), **4, 5.

To many Superfund practitioners, United States v. Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company, __ U.S. __, 129, S. Ct. 1870 (2009) represents the latest in a series of surprises from the Supreme Court. The decision follows Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc, 543 U.S. 157 (2004), from which we learned that the statutory words “during or following” really mean just what they say and contribution claims under the Comprehensive Response Compensation and Liability Act (also referred to as CERCLA or the Superfund statute) are only available in those limited circumstances. A few years later, in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007), we learned that “covered persons” (also referred to as potentially responsible parties or PRPs) under the statute may, in certain procedural circumstances, have cost recovery claims in the event they do not meet the criteria for contribution claims.   In Burlington Northern, we learned that “arranger” liability may not be as broad as we had thought it was, and that joint and several liability may not be the automatic we thought it was. It is probably fair to say that the outcome in Burlington Northern, like the outcomes in Aviall and Atlantic Research, was not intuitive to Superfund practitioners.

            A Superfund practitioner might have expected the Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern to look more like the Ninth Circuit opinion it reversed (found at 502 F.3d 781), endorsing a broad reading of “arranger” liability under the statute and applying joint and several liability to all the defendants, the latter being the norm for more than 25 years since the seminal decision in United States v. ChemDyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).

As with Aviall and Atlantic Research, it will probably take many years, and many decisions by the lower courts, before we fully appreciate the implications of Burlington Northern, but one thing is already clear. Defendants in multi-party Superfund sites will be contending for apportionment as the alternative to joint and several liability, if for no other reason than to avoid funding the orphan share represented by “covered persons” who can’t be found, no longer exist, or, as is more recently the case, are bankrupt. On the other hand, governments asserting cost recovery claims can be expected to continue to advocate aggressively for joint and several liability, so as to avoid having to absorb the orphan share themselves. The question is what practical impacts this battleground will have on Superfund practice at multi-party sites.

            Burlington Northern raises several practical questions which will have to resolved as the law and practice develop. Here are some of them.

Whether a defendant is entitled to apportioned liability is a fact-intensive inquiry, resolved in Burlington Northern only after a six week bench trial, and only after the district judge took four years to render a decision. Will governments be able to obtain liability judgments at the beginning of cost recovery actions, as they have typically tried to do in the past? Will Burlington Northern force more cases to go to trial? 

Whether liability is subject to apportionment is not likely to be decided until the end of a case, as it was in Burlington Northern. How will cost recovery defendants evaluate their chances of success in the early stages of a case? Will they feel compelled to develop a detailed record to support arguments that liability for a single harm is subject to apportionment, unlike the defendants in Burlington Northern, who limited their arguments to general denials of liability?

Governmental plaintiffs can be expected to insist that liability at multi-party sites is still joint and several, even after Burlington Northern. Will those governmental plaintiffs be willing to consider the litigation risk that liability may be subject to apportionment in negotiating settlements? If so, how will that litigation risk be taken into consideration?

If liability is apportioned, how will any resulting orphan shares be funded? Will EPA’s historic limitations on orphan share funding be adequate? If not, where will the funding come from? Is the Superfund tax more likely to be reinstated because of Burlington Northern?

 Will the organization of multiple “covered persons” into PRP groups be more difficult if the defendants believe they can escape liability through apportionment? How will defendants balance that possibility against the potential benefit in the form of reduced costs that might be gained by performing cleanup work themselves?

Will ADR emerge as the norm for dividing responsibility among defendants who believe their liability is subject to apportionment, as it has in allocating joint and several liability? What evidence will be used to apportion liability? Burlington Northern endorsed many of the same causation-related considerations as the equitable factors historically used to allocate joint and several liability; will some or all of the Gore factors still be relevant? Burlington Northern also endorsed estimations and compromises, considerations not normally found in legal determinations; how will the lower courts react to imprecise calculations of apportioned liability?

How will defendants argue for an orphan share? Will they seek to establish an orphan share from the bottom up (by quantifying the share of missing PRPs), or from the top down (by quantifying their own individual shares)? Whichever way defendants decide to approach the issue, they can be expected to develop the record the district judge found lacking in Burlington Northern.

Finally, in states whose statutes make joint and several liability explicit (e.g, the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(c)(1)), how will apportionment decisions be made? Will the scope of liability be different to EPA and to such states?   Under such statutes, is there no instance in which liability will be subject to apportionment, even for distinct harms?

Like Aviall and Atlantic Research before it, Burlington Northern promises to be a fertile source of future litigation. 

The 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, over a “pattern and practice” claim by a company that complied with an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) unilateral administrative order (UAO) to conduct a remedial investigation. City of Rialto v. W. Coast Loading Corp., 581 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2009).  While acknowledging that CERCLA's judicial review provisions contain "some pitfalls and difficult decisions for a PRP that faces a UAO," the court stated that the pattern and practice claim was not an “automatic shortcut” to federal court jurisdiction. 

The case arose as a result of a unilateral administrative order (UAO) issued by EPA in July 2003 directing Goodrich to conduct a remedial investigation at a 160-acre site in Rialto, California. Goodrich elected to comply with the order. However, in late 2006 Goodrich filed a complaint against EPA alleging, inter alia, that the CERCLA review provisions on their face constitute a coercive regime violating due process. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Goodrich’s “as-applied” challenge to the UAO because such pre-enforcement judicial review is foreclosed by §9613(h) of CERCLA. Goodrich then filed an amended “pattern and practice” claim alleging that EPA issues orders where no emergency exists, obstructs judicial review by delaying its discretionary certificates of completion, and controls and manipulates the record of decision. The district court granted EPA’s motion to dismiss, and Goodrich appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that Goodrich’s allegation that EPA routinely issues orders beyond its statutory authority was substantive because it necessarily depended on the facts of the particular UAO, and that meaningful judicial review of Goodrich’s substantive challenge is available under §9613(h). A claim that a UAO is unlawful can be addressed, the court stated, either by not complying with the UAO and defending an enforcement action, or by complying with a UAO and seeking reimbursement from the government. With respect to Goodrich’s claim that EPA routinely delays certifications of completion in order to thwart judicial review, the Ninth Circuit held that Goodrich’s claim is not ripe because the work required by the UAO has not been completed. Once Goodrich completes the work, it may bring a claim for reimbursement under §9606(b)(2). Finally, with respect to Goodrich’s allegation that EPA controls and manipulates the administrative record supporting the selected cleanup plan, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Goodrich allegations were not a “pattern and practice” claim , but rather were a challenge to the judicial review provisions of the statute itself, which were rejected by the District Court and not appealed by Goodrich. 

The Ninth Circuit noted that in General Electric v. Whitman, 360 F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the D.C. Circuit remanded GE’s suit to the district court to address the merits of GE’s facial due process claim, and on remand the district court ruled on merits and rejected GE’s pattern and practice claim. General Electric v. Jackson, 595 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009). This ruling on the merits contrasts with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit, however, commented that its decision was “consistent” with the District Court’s decision in GE, noting that the District Court there held that it had jurisdiction not because of any independent analysis but because of its interpretation of the D.C. Circuit’s decision remanding the case for further proceedings. 

Companies receiving a UAO and facing the statutory pitfalls and difficult decisions will likely not find much solace in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. The district court’s opinion in the GE case is being appealed.

“Thus, the Plaintiffs’ present claim that they never knew about the dangers of PCBs until after 1971 rings roughly as hollow as Captain Renault’s feigned outrage upon being ‘shocked, shocked’ to discover gambling at Rick’s Casablanca café.” 

Appleton Papers Inc. and NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., et al. (slip op. at 25, US District Court, Eastern District of WI, Case No. 08-C-16)

With those words, on December 16, 2009 Judge William C. Griesbach, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed CERCLA §107 contribution claims brought by Plaintiffs Appleton Papers, Inc. (API) and NCR Corp. against all Defendants.   NCR and API sought contribution from 23 other paper mills, cities, utilities, and sewerage districts, and industrial dischargers to allocate the multi-million dollar costs of remediating the polychlorinated byphenyl (PCB) contamination in the Lower Fox River in northeastern Wisconsin. Defendants’ Summary Judgment motions asserted that Plaintiffs were not entitled to contribution because the Defendants are “essentially innocent parties who had no knowledge that recycling NCR paper or processing wastewater could lead to environmental damage.” Slip op. at 4. The Judge agreed.

Beginning in 1954, NCR developed a carbonless copy paper that relied on an emulsion based on Aroclor 1242, a PCB solvent manufactured by Monsanto Corporation. NCR created the emulsion and developed and sold the carbonless paper product. API’s predecessor manufactured the paper and coated it with the NCR emulsion. API’s wastewater was discharged to the Fox River, taking the PCBs with it. API also sold its waste paper to other mills to be recycled into paper products, resulting in PCB-containing wastewater discharges from those facilities. The result: significant PCB-contamination in the sediments of the Lower Fox River from the mouth at Green Bay to Lake Winnebago and what has been called the largest contaminated sediment cleanup in the world..

The decision turns on what the Plaintiffs knew about the potential harm of the PCBs in their carbonless copy paper and when they knew it. It includes an instructive recital of internal communications within and among NCR and API, Monsanto, and Wiggins Teape, NCR’s exclusive European-licensee, leading to the Court’s conclusion that “I am satisfied that by the late 1960’s Plaintiffs had access to the vanguard of data suggesting an appreciable risk of serious and long-lasting environmental damage resulting from the production and recycling of NCR paper.” (emphasis in original) Slip op. at 26.

Readers will find the case of interest on both the legal analysis -- application of the “Gore factors” in determining equitable allocation, consideration of successor liability, and the Court’s evaluation and weighing of the overall equities – and the factual history. On this latter point, the case may well serve as a primer on how a business’ historical records and risk management decisions can come back to haunt it with respect to future determinations of knowledge and liability: 

“In the face of increasing red flags, Plaintiffs’ approach in the late 1960s was to worry about publicity and wait for the ‘second shoe’ to drop. At its essence, Plaintiffs’ approach was a risk management strategy to accept the risk of potential environmental harm in exchange for the financial benefits of continued (and increasing) sales of carbonless paper containing Aroclor 1242.” Slip op. at 26.

Appeal decisions are still pending. For those who want to know more about the Fox River, PCB-contamination, and the clean-up, both the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and the United States Environmental Protection Agency maintain extensive websites:

Click here for WDNR’s Fox River website

Click here for EPA Region 5’s website

Arguably the most significant moderation of CERCLA’s harsh “owner” liability scheme occurred in 2002 through the enactment of the “Brownfields Amendments.” Included in those amendments was the creation of new liability protection for “Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers” (“BFPP”) who acquire ownership of a facility after January 11, 2002.

A relatively straightforward roadmap for prospective purchasers to achieve BFPP status is set out in the Brownfields Amendments and the subsequently-promulgated All Appropriate Inquiry rule. The extent to which tenants might obtain protection from possible “owner” liability has, however, always been far less certain.

The potential applicability of this liability defense to tenants is currently limited to a short parenthetical in CERCLA §101(40). Specifically, a “tenant of a person” that achieves BFPP status shares the liability protections of the property purchaser. Although this “derivative” BFPP status established by the Brownfields Amendments helped clarify the reach of the liability defense with respect to tenants, a number of questions remained unanswered. For example, what happens if the property owner loses its BFPP status through non-compliance with the statutory requirements? Also, does the language of the amendment as it relates to tenants preclude a tenant from independently achieving BFPP status?

Earlier this year, EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance issued an Enforcement Discretion Guidance (“Guidance”) that addresses the applicability of the BFPP definition to tenants. That Guidance clarifies how EPA intends to exercise its enforcement discretion with respect to tenants “on a site-by-site” basis. In essence, the Guidance provides:

• Tenants with “derivative” BFPP status will lose that status if the property owner ceases to be a BFPP for non-compliance with one or more of the statutory requirements. Nevertheless, EPA may exercise its enforcement discretion and not pursue the tenant under an owner liability theory if the tenant satisfies certain conditions, including not having disposed of hazardous substances on the property and fully cooperating with EPA in its response actions.
• Tenants whose lease documents establish sufficient “indicia of ownership” and who satisfy all requirements of CERCLA §101(40)(A)-(H) and 107(r) may be deemed to have independently achieved BFPP status and thus possibly avoid an enforcement action under CERCLA’s owner liability provisions. Indicia of ownership include the term of the lease, the range of permitted property uses by the tenant, reserved rights on the property by the owner, etc.

EPA’s Guidance is a welcome clarification of how the agency intends to enforce CERCLA’s owner liability provisions in these situations. However, the Guidance goes beyond the derivative status language in the Brownfields Amendments in its discussion of potential limitations on tenant “owner” liability. The problem is that a guidance is just that. It offers none of the statutory certainty that prospective purchasers now enjoy under CERCLA.

Because of the importance of tenant-operated properties to the economy in general and to the development of Brownfields property in particular, I would submit that tenants should be afforded the same clarity and certainty with respect to potential liability under CERCLA as those who acquire title to the property. As the Brownfield Amendments are largely self-implementing, that clarity and certainty is likely to be achieved only through further amendments to the liability provisions of CERCLA.

Late last week, Elliott Gilberg, Acting Director of EPA’s Office of Site Remediation Enforcement (OSRE) issued an Interim Policy on Managing the Duration of Remedial Design/Remedial Action Negotiations. Members of the regulated community may not be surprised by the contents of the memo, but they certainly will not be pleased. In brief, the memorandum fundamentally makes two points:

EPA wants to shorten the duration of RD/RA negotiation

EPA is going to use the heavy hammer of unilateral administrative orders, or UAOs, to keep PRPs’ feet to the fire and ensure that negotiations move quickly.

PRPs will likely agree that shortening the duration of negotiations would be a good outcome in the abstract – but achieving it by greater use of UAOs? I don’t think so.

I can only wonder if EPA has even considered the impact of the Burlington Northern decision here. Is this a perverse reaction from EPA? A metaphorical throwing down the gauntlet to PRPs? It certainly feels that way.

I have a different suggestion, if EPA truly wants to shorten negotiations. First, acknowledge Burlington Northern and compromise on the merits in those great majority of cases where there are legitimate divisibility arguments. Second, stop acting like the last bastion of command and control regulation. Set cleanup standards and then, to the maximum extent permitted by existing law, let PRPs clean up to those standards, without micromanaging every detail of the cleanup process.

Overview       

There are three avenues of recovery under CERCLA - a contribution action and two types of cost recovery actions. These cost recovery actions are based on either the plaintiff’s “removal” of the hazardous substances or “remediation” efforts at the site. Each of these avenues has an independent statute of limitations provision.  Thus, whether the statute of limitations period has been triggered will depend on how an action is characterized, i.e. whether the action constitutes a contribution action, a cost recovery removal action, or a cost recovery remedial action. While there are various state-specific causes of action related to environmental contamination in Connecticut, this article is confined to the statute of limitations for CERCLA cost recovery and contribution claims. 

Analysis         

            Contribution Claim

            The statute of limitations analysis related to contribution claims is thankfully quite straight forward. Under CERCLA Section 113, these claims must be brought within three years of a civil action under Section 106 or 107, a CERCLA administrative order, or a judicially approved settlement with respect to costs or damages.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3). While questions may arise as to what may constitute a CERCLA “administrative order” or whether a “judicially approved settlement” must reference Section 106 or 107, we leave those discussions for another article.

            Cost Recovery Claim

            The analysis of what constitutes a viable cost recovery claim, whether it is removal or remedial, and when the statute of limitations is first triggered is more intricate. First, it is important to note that certain actions performed on a site may not trigger the statute of limitations period.   “[T]here are some cases in which work on a site is neither a remedial nor a removal action, but rather constitutes ‘preliminary’ or ‘interim’ measures that do not trigger the statute of limitations . . ..” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44282, *117 (D. Conn. May 22, 2009). While caselaw on what constitutes a preliminary remedy, as opposed to a permanent remedy, is limited, at least one court has determined that “evaluation, sampling, surveying and measuring” do not constitute the initiation of physical on-site construction because “these activities [do] not constitute ‘construction.’” Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)(quoting United States v. Findett Corp., 220 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2000)).

            Beyond this, the characterization of a cost recovery action as either removal or remedial is crucial to determining whether an action to recover response costs is time-barred because there are different statute of limitations periods for a removal action and a remedial action. The statute of limitations for recovery of costs related to removal actions is three years after the completion of the removal action, whereas the limitations period for recovery of costs related to remedial actions is six years after the initiation of physical on-site construction of the remediation. Although there is a lack of clarity as to what constitutes a removal verses a remedial action, removal actions have generally been construed as “time-sensitive responses to public health threats . . ..”[1] Remedial actions, in contrast, are often described as “permanent remedies to threats for which an urgent response is not warranted.”[2]

             Assuming for this discussion that the efforts undertaken at a site are beyond preliminary, there is inconsistency as to whether the statute of limitations for remedial actions would only run after a final Remedial Action Plan (RAP) has been approved for the site. One court in the Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded that initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action “can only occur after the final remedial action plan is adopted, and that . . . the statute of limitations, therefore, could not have begun to run until the final remedial action was approved . . ..” Cal. v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2004).  The Second Circuit, however, has rejected such a bright line rule and determined that the statute of limitations can be triggered without a final RAP, if the action is “consistent with a permanent remedy.” Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 205 (2d Cir. 2006). 

            Compounding the important distinction between removal and remedial actions is variability within the courts in determining the initial trigger for the statute of limitations period. Some courts apply a statute of limitations to an entire site after remediation commences on one portion of the site, while others look to multiple statute of limitations at a single property. See Colorado v. Sunoco, 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003) contra U.S. v. Manzo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70860 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006). While the Second Circuit has not spoken on this issue, a recent District of Connecticut case has adopted the opinion that “there can be only one removal and one remedial action per facility, regardless of the number of phases in which the clean-up occurs.” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44282 (D. Conn. May 22, 2009)(emphasis added).  Should a court adopt a one site, one action approach, the statute of limitations would be triggered by the first removal or remedial action at the site.  Id.; see also Colorado v. Sunoco   Thus, it is important to evaluate what actions have occurred at your facility and whether those actions would be considered “removal” or “remedial” to ensure the statute of limitations for a cost recovery action does not run., 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003).

At Robinson & Cole, we have environmental attorneys who have broad experience representing clients in CERCLA actions and the prosecution or defense of other environmental claims. We stand ready to apply this experience and insight to your specific needs. If you would like to discuss statute of limitations concerns, or broader environmental issues, please contact any of the attorneys in our Environmental and Utilities Practice Group. 

Earl Phillips                                           W. Richard Smith                                 Lauren Vinokur

(860) 275-8220                                   (860) 275- 8218                                  (860) 275-8341

ephillips@rc.com                                  wrsmith@rc.com                                  lvinokur@rc.com

Construction and development companies praying for an economic recovery next year have something else to worry about: pending new EPA regulations regarding stormwater discharges from construction activities – and claims from environmental groups that EPA’s proposal isn’t stringent enough.

EPA issued a proposal on November 28, 2008. That proposal is complex, but the aspect of it that has received the most attention is the requirement that certain construction sites greater than 30 acres meet numerical turbidity limits (specifically, 13 nephelometric turbidity units (NTUs), which I had to include in this post just because it sounds so cool). Developers have opposed the numeric limits; the National Association of Home Builders estimates that the cost to comply would be $15,000 to $45,000 per acre.

On the other hand, the NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have threatened to sue EPA if EPA does not revise the propose rule to include post-construction controls as part of the rule. EPA has stated that it is not planning to do so. It’s not obvious that NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have the better of this specific debate, but the argument regarding post-construction controls is similar to the ongoing discussion in Massachusetts and elsewhere regarding the need for ongoing stormwater controls at properties other than industrial facilities that are already regulated.

The issue is not going to go away.  EPA is under a deadline to issue the rule by December 1, 2009.

The Eleventh Circuit has waded, again, into the ongoing debates over restoration of the Everglades. In addressing yet another lawsuit filed by the Miccosukee Tribe, the Court largely upheld the Fish & Wildlife Service’s delicate balance between the competing and inconsistent habitat needs of the Cape Sable seaside sparrow and the Everglade Snail kite, both endangered species. The seaside sparrow needs stable low water levels below a certain water control structure; the kite’s habitat is destroyed by the resulting rising water levels in the impoundment. The FWS issued a biological opinion allowing the Corps of Engineers to operate the structure to avoid extinction of the sparrow and to conduct an incidental take of the kite. While largely affirming the agency, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the issue of the trigger that would require initiation of consultation under Section 7 and, along the way, made new law in this circuit on several important issues.

First, the court rejected the tribe’s argument, often advanced by conservation groups in ESA litigation, that the ESA requires that FWS “give the benefit of the doubt to the species.” The court held that this language, taken from a conference committee report, does not mean that the FWS is required to issue a jeopardy opinion if the evidence is evenly balanced between likely jeopardy and likely no jeopardy. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit explained, the language was intended to prevent FWS from shirking its consultation duties by relying on scientific uncertainty, but did not require any substantive result. The court held that “the need to give a species the benefit of the doubt cannot stand alone as a challenge to a biological opinion.”

Second, the court held that the FWS Consultation Handbook, which is not a formal rule, is nevertheless entitled to Chevron deference because it was adopted after notice and comment, citing Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 475 F.3d 1136, 1142-43 (9^th Cir. 2007).

Third, the court rejected the argument that negative impacts on a species’ critical habitat must be permanent to amount to “adverse modification” under the ESA. Writing for the court, Judge Carnes noted: “It is not enough that the habitat will recover in the future if there is a serious risk that when that future arrives the species will be history.”

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated the incidental take statement because it used a habitat indicator -- specific water levels-- as a proxy to establish the trigger that would require the agency to reinitiate the Section 7 consultation process. The court held that the FWS’ use of a habitat indicator as a proxy, as provided for in the Consultation Handbook, fails Chevron step one, based on its conclusion that the legislative history of the ESA clearly indicates Congressional intent that actual population data must be used as the trigger for re-consultation, unless the agency demonstrates that it is impracticable to do so. Further, even if the agency can demonstrate the need to use a habitat proxy, the habitat proxy trigger must be addressed to the specific habitat needs of the species.

This decision, reviewing the FWS’ attempt to manage challenging species protection problems and breaking new ground on ESA legal issues, is sure to be much-cited and widely debated.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern was not unexpected from my vantage point especially given the literal interpretation of CERCLA by the Court in Aviall and Atlantic Research and the flow of the oral argument. 

I was a little surprised that Justice Stevens was assigned the task of writing the opinion since Justice Thomas wrote Aviall and Atlantic Research.  But with 7-2 (Justices Ginsburg and Stevens dissented in Aviall because the Court would not decide the issue of entitlement to sue under Section 107), 9-0 (Atlantic Research decided the Section 107 private of action question left unresolved in Aviall), and 8-1 (Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter in Burlington Northern) votes in these three opinions, the Court is not going out of its way to fix CERCLA’s language. Section 113(f)(1) means what it says. Section 107 means what it says. An arranger must have an intent to dispose. And joint and several…

Wait a second. The statute says nothing about “joint and several liability.” It does not set a liability standard at all. In fact in 2007, in note 7 of Atlantic Research, the Court wrote, “We assume without deciding that §107(a) provides for joint and several liability.”

Two years later, the Court appears to have deftly answered this question, albeit indirectly. It called the holding in Chem-Dyne the “seminal opinion on the subject of apportionment in CERCLA actions …written in 1983 by Chief Judge Carl Rubin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.” Quoting Judge Rubin, the Court said that joint and several liability is not mandated in every CERCLA cost recovery action and that Congress intended the scope of liability to “’be determined from traditional and evolving principles of common law[.]’”

As the entire environmental world now knows, the Court held that the district court’s findings should not be disturbed: “The District Court’s detailed findings make it abundantly clear that the primary pollution at the Arvin facility was contained in an unlined sump and an unlined pond in the southeastern portion of the facility most distant from the Railroads’ parcel and that the spills of hazardous chemicals that occurred on the Railroad parcel contributed to no more than 10% of the total site contamination, some of which did not require remediation.”

Going forward, the facts will dictate the outcome. The Court blessed the use of basic allocation or apportionment principles that have been applied in numerous CERCLA cases and numerous consent decree approval orders over the past 25 years. Indeed, it was mildly critical of the Ninth Circuit for talking out of both sides of its mouth: “Although the Court of Appeals faulted the District Court for relying on the ‘simplest of considerations: percentages of land area, time of ownership, and types of hazardous products,’ 520 F. 3d, at 943, these were the same factors the court had earlier acknowledged were relevant to the apportionment analysis. See id., at 936, n.18 (‘We of course agree with our sister circuits that, if adequate information is available, divisibility may be established by ‘volumetric, chronological, or other types of evidence,’ including appropriate geographic considerations’ (citations omitted)).”

In cases where there is no orphan share and multiple parties, it will behoove EPA and the parties to work on apportionment issues up front to save litigation costs. Yes, I relate “apportionment” to “allocation” in saying this, but after Burlington Northern, it will be the rare case that will lack the facts to make a reasonable basis for apportionment. Volumetric waste-in information may be controlling. Or varying toxicities of released hazardous substances may be. Or geography or time of ownership or operation. There may be equitable factors as between or among jointly and severally liable parties, e.g., cooperation, that may not relate to apportionment, but not that many cases have utilized this allocation factor, and most judges engage in an allocation exercise that is indistinguishable from an apportionment exercise, as was the case in Burlington Northern. Cf. Restatement of the Law (Third) Torts, §1, cmt. a., §26 cmt. a. (focusing on the role that comparative responsibility now plays in tort law).

Where there is an orphan share, the stakes are much higher after Burlington Northern. Cf. United States v. Newmont USA Limited, 2008 WL 4612566 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2008) (after a six day trial, submission of dozen depositions or deposition excerpts and 1,600 exhibits, finding the two defendants—one of which was alleged to be an orphan--jointly and severally liable but then finding for the defendants on their counterclaim in contribution against the United States, and then equitably allocating response costs 1/3 to the United States and 1/3 each to the two defendants).

It will still behoove the regulator and the regulated to work things out. If EPA becomes the “bank” (funds the work) at a site, post Burlington Northern, it may find itself absorbing the orphan share or at least not knowing whether it will until after a trial on the merits. (Time will tell but presumably summary judgments will become rare on apportionment issues given the fact-intensive nature of the exercise.) A PRP may be reluctant to become the bank where there is a large orphan share if it does not receive assurance that the orphan share will be addressed fairly, and that may mean more than what EPA is currently offering in its orphan share policy. See, generally, Barkett, Orphan Shares, 23 N.R.E. 46  (2008). Consent order and decree negotiations should become less one-sided in the future. But budget constraints may result in more contention (trials), especially in cases where the orphan share potentially is quite large.

Arrangers of used but useful products can take comfort in Burlington Northern. The entity that recycles solvents or used oil, for example, will embrace the decision especially if reclamation wastes are disposed of at a location other than the recycler’s facility. Sellers of used but useful products will as well. Again, the facts will dictate the outcome.

As some of my clients know all too well, I’ve been spending a lot of time on some Superfund matters recently. Although I can’t remember a period when I didn’t have at least one moderately active Superfund case, significant immersion in complex remedial decision-making and negotiations provides an unwelcome reminder just how flawed CERCLA is. Almost 20 years after the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act ushered in wide-spread acceptance of the use of market mechanisms to achieve environmental protection goals and the state of Massachusetts successfully privatized its state Superfund program, the federal Superfund program, like some obscure former Russian republic which remains devoted to Stalinism, is one of the last bastions of pure command and control regulation.

Can anyone tell me why the remedy selection process takes years and costs millions of dollars – before any cleanup has occurred or risk reduction been achieved? Can anyone tell me why, after the remedy has been selected, EPA has to spend millions of dollars – charged back to the PRPs, of course – to oversee the cleanup? Oversight costs can easily exceed 10% of cleanup costs, while oversight during the remedial design and feasibility study process sometimes seem to be barely less than the cost of actually performing the RI/FS.

While there are certainly a multiplicity of causes, there are two factors which greatly contribute to the problem. One was, coincidentally, highlighted in a post today by my friend Rob Stavins. As Rob noted, unlike the acid rain program, which was new at the time, the Superfund bureaucracy is well entrenched and there are a number of actors with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. 

The second issue relates to the genesis of the Superfund program, as well as its continuing raison d’être. Whenever EPA has ranked relative risks from different environmental hazards, Superfund sites come in at the bottom. However, if you think back to Superfund’s origins, what comes to mind? Love Canal and the Valley of the Drums – and some concerned near-by residents who rallied around a cause to ensure that the problem would be addressed. As renowned risk communications expert Dr. Peter Sandman has noted, there is not necessarily a significant correlation between actual risk levels and public outrage, and it’s not possible to decrease outrage simply by providing accurate information about risks.

In short, the public is outraged by hazardous waste sites and does not trust PRPs to clean them properly. All of those EPA oversight costs are, in large part, intended not to decrease risk, but to lower outrage.  Outrage is understandable in some circumstances, and efforts to reduce it are laudable, but is it really an appropriate use of scarce environmental protection resources to spend the money that gets poured into Superfund sites?

There has to be a better way. Indeed, there is a better way. It’s called a privatized system in which PRPs have to meet well-defined cleanup standards, but are allowed to do so on their own, in whatever manner is most cost-effective, subject to audits by regulators. Privatized programs such as the one in Massachusetts are not perfect. However, their flaws – which largely stem from a failure to fully support privatization -- pale in comparison to the waste that is the federal program under CERCLA.

In other contexts, I’ve called on the Obama administration to embrace regulatory reform. Why not start with Superfund? Notwithstanding Rob Stavins’ point about the difficulty of overturning an entrenched status quo, if the states could do it, why not the federal government?

Besides, I have an entrenched personal reason for seeking Superfund reform. This stuff drives me nuts.

Among the priorities under the $787.5 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is repairing, rebuilding, and constructing the nation’s water infrastructure. Approximately $6 billion will augment the EPA’s clean water and drinking water state revolving funds, of which approximately $221 million will be disbursed to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Infrastructure Investment Authority (PennVest). The governing board of PennVest is appointed by Governor Rendell, and I have been serving as its chair for the past six years.

PennVest administers the approximately $300 million annual allotment of Clean Water and Drinking Water funds previously supplied by EPA on a matching basis with Pennsylvania. These funds will now be augmented by the $212 million in stimulus funds. The Clean Water Fund addresses waste water infrastructure. The fund also addresses brownfields (with its protection of water quality) and storm water, whereas the Drinking Water Fund is strictly for water supply and distribution. At least 50 percent of the funding must be in the form of grants.

With the current emphasis on sustainability, alternative energy, greenhouse gas emission reduction and the need for more stringent control over stormwater run-off, the allocation of stimulus funds by PennVest will focus on innovative green technology, including particularly, controlling stormwater and remediating brownfields (at least 20 percent of the stimulus funding must be used for “green infrastructure”.)

Although the final disbursement of the economic stimulus funding will be affected by various regulations, the awarding of grants and loans will likely be on the same timetable as in the past with an emphasis on “shovel ready” projects. Funding agreements must be entered into and contracts for the full amount signed within a year.  The ultimate goal is to immediately increase the amount of jobs needed to construct the infrastructural repair, rebuilding and construction. 

Among the priorities under the $787.5 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is repairing, rebuilding, and constructing the nation’s water infrastructure. Approximately $6 billion will augment the EPA’s clean water and drinking water state revolving funds, of which approximately $221 million will be disbursed to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Infrastructure Investment Authority (PennVest). The governing board of PennVest is appointed by Governor Rendell, and I have been serving as its chair for the past six years.

PennVest administers the approximately $300 million annual allotment of Clean Water and Drinking Water funds previously supplied by EPA on a matching basis with Pennsylvania. These funds will now be augmented by the $212 million in stimulus funds. The Clean Water Fund addresses waste water infrastructure. The fund also addresses brownfields (with its protection of water quality) and storm water, whereas the Drinking Water Fund is strictly for water supply and distribution. At least 50 percent of the funding must be in the form of grants.

With the current emphasis on sustainability, alternative energy, greenhouse gas emission reduction and the need for more stringent control over stormwater run-off, the allocation of stimulus funds by PennVest will focus on innovative green technology, including particularly, controlling stormwater and remediating brownfields (at least 20 percent of the stimulus funding must be used for “green infrastructure”.)

Although the final disbursement of the economic stimulus funding will be affected by various regulations, the awarding of grants and loans will likely be on the same timetable as in the past with an emphasis on “shovel ready” projects. Funding agreements must be entered into and contracts for the full amount signed within a year.  The ultimate goal is to immediately increase the amount of jobs needed to construct the infrastructural repair, rebuilding and construction. 

Although the Superfund statute is now 28 years old, basic issues of liability and apportionment of liability remain unresolved. This term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide a case with broad implications for CERCLA liability, Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607, Burlington Northern v. United States. These consolidated cases, which will be argued early in 2009, raise important issues concerning the circumstances under liability is divisible and the scope of “arranger” liability under CERCLA.  If the Ninth Circuit’s approach is upheld, the heightened evidentiary standards may impose a difficult hurdle on parties to prove reasonable apportionment of liability. The Ninth Circuit’s approach to “arranger” liability is of concern to entities that sell chemicals or other products in the ordinary course of business. The allocation of risk and provisions for insurance and best practices to avoid spills in contracts between suppliers and common carriers may need to be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case. 

Although the Superfund statute is now 28 years old, basic issues of liability and apportionment of liability remain unresolved. This term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide a case with broad implications for CERCLA liability, Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607, Burlington Northern v. United States. These consolidated cases, which will be argued early in 2009, raise important issues concerning the circumstances under liability is divisible and the scope of “arranger” liability under CERCLA.  If the Ninth Circuit’s approach is upheld, the heightened evidentiary standards may impose a difficult hurdle on parties to prove reasonable apportionment of liability. The Ninth Circuit’s approach to “arranger” liability is of concern to entities that sell chemicals or other products in the ordinary course of business. The allocation of risk and provisions for insurance and best practices to avoid spills in contracts between suppliers and common carriers may need to be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case. 

                                    Background

A now-defunct company, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B), owned and operated a facility at which chemicals were stored and distributed. The B&B operations were conducted in part on land owned by two railroad companies. Some of the chemicals used by B&B were supplied and delivered by Shell Oil Company. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) brought suit under CERCLA to recover their response costs.

In 1996, the EPA and the State filed CERCLA actions against B&B, the Railroads, and Shell for reimbursement of their investigation and cleanup costs.   The district court, after a twenty-seven day bench trial, issued a detailed, 191-page decision holding the Railroads liable under CERCLA § 9607(a) as owners of the facility and as persons who “at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.”  Shell was held liable under CERCLA § 9607(a)(3)as a “person who ... arranged for disposal ... of hazardous substances.”  

The district court found that the harm to the site was capable of apportionment.  The parties had not provided arguments concerning apportionment, leaving the district court to independently perform the equitable apportionment analysis. For the Railroads, the district court multiplied three proportions: (1) the percentage of the overall site that was owned by the Railroads, 19.1%; (2) the percentage of time that the Railroads leased the parcel in relation to B&B’s total operations, 45%; and (3) the fraction of hazardous products attributable to the Railroad parcel, 66%. This calculation resulted in a determination of 6% liability.  To account for any “calculation errors,” the district court assumed 50% error and raised the Railroads’ proportion of the total liability to 9%. For Shell, the district court approximated the volume of spills of Shell’s product attributable to Shell, and set Shell’s proportion of the total liability at 6%. 

The State and EPA appealed the district court’s judgment.  Shell cross-appealed the finding that it was liable as an “arranger” under CERCLA. The federal district court held the Railroads and Shell liable for a minor portion of the total cleanup costs. The agencies appealed. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the portion of the judgment that imposed liability on Shell as an arranger and reversed the portion of the judgment that declined to impose joint and several liability on the Railroads and Shell. 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The questions presented are whether the 9th Circuit correctly (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling that Shell is liable as an arranger and (2) reversed the district court’s apportionment of liability. The case is scheduled to be argued early in 2009.

                                    The Ninth Circuit’s Decision

A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the portion of the judgment that imposed liability on Shell as an arranger and reversed the portion of the judgment that declined to impose joint and several liability on the Railroads and Shell, holding that petitioners did not satisfy their burden of proof on apportionment. United States v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway, 502 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2007), as amended 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008). The amended opinion was issued to accompany a denial of en banc review, which prompted an unusual dissent by eight Ninth Circuit judges including the Chief Judge.

Apportionment of Liability. The Ninth Circuit notes that § 433A(1) of the Restatement allows for apportionment of damages where “(a) there are distinct harms or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.” 520 F.3d at 934-35.  

On the facts presented, the court found no dispute on the first, purely legal question -- whether the harm is capable of apportionment, but held that the district court erred in finding that there was a “reasonable basis” apportioning the harm based on percentages of land area, time of ownership, and types of hazardous products.  The Ninth Circuit held that there was no evidence linking these factors to the proportion of leakage, contamination, or cleanup costs. 520 F.3d at 945-46. With respect to Shell, the Ninth Circuit similarly found that the evidence relied on by the district court was too speculative to determine the amount of leakage of Shell’s chemicals.  520 F.3d at 946-47.

“Arranger” Liability. The Ninth Circuit rejected Shell’s arguments that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether Shell was an “arranger.”  The Ninth Circuit held that the useful product cases do not apply in this case because “Shell arranged for delivery of the substances to the site by its subcontractors; was aware of, and to some degree dictated, the transfer arrangements; knew that some leakage was likely in the transfer process….” 520 F.3d at 950. The Ninth Circuit cited evidence that spills occurred every time the deliveries were made; that Shell arranged for delivery and chose the common carrier that transported its product to the site; that Shell changed its delivery process so as to require the use of large storage tanks, that Shell reduced the purchase price of the chemicals to reflect loss from leakage; and that Shell distributed a manual and created a checklist to ensure that the chemical tanks were operated in accordance with Shell’s safety instructions. 520 F.3d at 950-51.

The Dissent. The order denying the petition for rehearing en banc provoked a strong dissent by Judge Bea, joined in by seven judges including the Chief Judge. The dissent cites the detailed factual findings made by the district court and states: “If this evidence does not provide a ‘reasonable estimate’ for apportionment of liability, I do not see how -- short of ‘perfect information’ sufficient to trace every molecule of pollution to the landlord’s parcel -- apportionment could ever be possible under CERCLA.”  520 F.3d 953. The dissent was equally critical of the panel’s imposition of “arranger” liability on Shell, stating: “The panel’s imposition of arranger liability on a mere seller, which relinquished control over its products upon delivery and before spillage occurred, goes far beyond the statutory language and creates inter-and intra-circuit splits.” 520 F.3d 954.

Issues Before The Supreme Court

1. Apportionment of Liability.  Petitioner Burlington Northern argues that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of apportionment departs from common-law principles, which allow for rough apportionment based on reasonable assumptions. The Ninth Circuit has pushed the “polluter pays” principle in CERCLA beyond all rational limits. Burlington argues that imposing joint and several liability in all but extraordinary cases, as the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning would dictate, would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, citing Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).

The United States counters petitioners failed to even attempt to identify and prove a reasonable basis for apportionment and the Supreme Court should not relieve petitioners of the consequences of their litigation strategy. Further, the United States argues that a district court does not have the same “broad discretion” in determining whether and how liability should be apportioned. 

2. “Arranger” Liability.  Shell Oil Company argues that “arranger” liability may not be imposed on a manufacturer who merely sells and ships, by common carrier, a commercially useful product, transferring ownership and control to a purchaser who causes contamination involving that product.  Any inadvertent spillage that occurred was the result of the transfer of a useful product, thus Shell cannot be said to have arranged for the discard of waste. Shell did not own the chemicals at the time of any disposal. Shell also argues that a company should not be penalized for providing its customers with a safety manual and other information for the safe handling of its products.

The United States argues that Shell is liable because it entered into transactions that it knew would directly result in disposals of hazardous substances. The government’s brief emphasizes that Shell inserted itself over the transfer process by hiring the common carriers used for delivery and because the common carriers used equipment required by Shell. Lack of intent to dispose of a hazardous substance does not preclude arranger liability, the United States argues, where the arranger has advance knowledge of the disposal. 

                                    Conclusion

In cases where there is a significant orphan share, the failure to apportion liability may result in the imposition of liability for the entire cleanup cost on parties with minimal responsibility.  If the Ninth Circuit’s approach is upheld, the heightened evidentiary standards may impose a difficult hurdle on parties to prove reasonable apportionment. Alternatively, the Supreme Court might decide the issue on narrow grounds suggested by the United States, namely that petitioners failed to offer evidence concerning apportionment and thus did not meet their burden of proof.

The Ninth Circuit’s approach to “arranger” liability is of concern to entities that sell chemicals or other products in the ordinary course of business. Does every sale and delivery of a useful product potentially subject the supplier to CERCLA liability if leakage or spills occur? If not, how does one draw the line?  Should arranger liability attach only when the sole purpose of a transaction is for disposing a hazardous substance?  The allocation of risk and provisions for insurance and best practices to avoid spills in contracts between suppliers and common carriers may need to be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case. 

Theodore Garrett is a partner in the law firm Covington & Burling LLP in Washington, D.C. and is Co-Chair of the firm's environmental practice group. His practice involves major regulatory and enforcement issues and transactions, particularly involving air quality, water quality, hazardous waste, and natural resource damages. He has been lead industry counsel in numerous cases seeking judicial review of EPA air and water regulations and has represented clients in numerous Superfund matters. Mr. Garrett advises clients on compliance and related business issues and has been extensively involved in administrative proceedings and litigation, including Supreme Court cases. Mr. Garrett has spoken and written widely in the environmental area. He is the editor and principal author of The Environmental Law Manual and the RCRA Compliance Manual, and is a contributing author to Environmental Litigation and The Clean Water Act Handbook. Mr. Garrett served as a U.S. Supreme Court law clerk to Chief Justice Warren Burger.  He is past Chair of the ABA Section of Environment, Energy and Resources. Mr. Garrett was honored as the Environmental Lawyer of the Year 2008 by Who’s Who International.

Contact Information: tgarrett@cov.com or (202) 662-5398

Each year thousands of salmon and steelhead protected under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) migrate up and down the Columbia River and its tributaries and into the Pacific Ocean as part of the species’ cycle of life. Seemingly, each year armies of lawyers migrate to federal court to argue whether the federal government is carrying out its obligations to protect these species under the ESA. “As part of the modern cycle of life in the Columbia River system, each year brings litigation to the federal courts of the Northwest over the operation of the Federal Columbia River System (“FRCPS”) and, in particular, the effects of system operation on the anadromous salmon and steelhead protected by the Endangered Species Act.” National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 422 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2005).

            2008 is no exception as the National Wildlife Federation, the state of Oregon and the Nez Perce Tribe have again filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of Oregon against the federal government for allegedly failing to carry out their obligations under the ESA in the operation of the FRCPS. The precipitating event for the 2008 lawsuit, is a 2008 Biological Opinion authored by NOAA Fisheries pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA opining that if the action agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“COE”) and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) carry out a comprehensive reasonable and prudent alternative (“RPA”) then jeopardy to the listed species and adverse modification to critical habitat will be avoided.

The portion of the FRCPS that is at issue in the 2008 litigation is a series of fourteen (14) federal hydropower dams authorized by Congress on the Columbia and Lower Snake Rivers which are operated by the COE and BOR. Congress has directed that the dams are for multiple uses including providing power to the Northwest, irrigation, transportation, recreation, flood control and protection of fish. The stakes are high in the litigation, if some of the dams are substantially modified, or breached as some Plaintiffs are advocating, industries, rate-payers and communities reliant upon the multiple uses of the FRCPS will be significantly affected. Thirteen separate salmon and steelhead species that live out a portion of their life cycle in the Columbia River and its tributaries have been listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA.

            The federal government’s attempt to operate the FRCPS in compliance with ESA has been mired in litigation for some 15 years. The science and the law surrounding the FRCPS’ compliance with the ESA is complex. Like 2008, the precipitating event for past litigation has been a § 7 consultation between NOAA fisheries and the COE and BOR and a Biological Opinion (BiOp) and Incidental Take Statement. In recent litigation the federal government has not fared well. For example the 2000 BiOp found that the FRCPS operation did jeopardize certain listed species but that jeopardy could be avoided if off-site mitigation and hatchery initiatives were implemented. The court found the 2000 BiOp was invalid as NOAA could not rely upon off-site and non-federal actions that were not reasonably certain to occur as an RPA. See NWF v. NMFS, 254 F.Supp. 2d 1196 (D.Or 2003).

            The federal government tried again with a 2004 BiOP which found no jeopardy to listed species and no adverse modification to critical habitat. The 2004 BiOp was different from prior BiOps in so far as NOAA Fisheries attempted to segregate the effects of the existence of the 14 dams from the operation of the dams claiming that only the operation of the dams was discretionary and subject to Section 7 consultation. The lower Court struck down the 2004 BiOp on a variety of grounds finding that NOAA improperly separated the existence and operation of the dams in their § 7 consultation, NOAA did not properly take into consideration how the operation of the dams would affect recovery of the listed species and their critical habitat and that the actions relied upon were too uncertain to occur. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower Court decision in its entirety. See National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit did note that in considering the affect of the agency action on the potential recovery of the species in connection with a Section 7 consultation, NOAA Fisheries did not have to first develop a recovery plan consistent with the requirements of Section 4(f) of the ESA.

            While the appeal was pending before the Ninth Circuit, NOAA Fisheries under some prodding from the lower Court embarked upon an unprecedented collaboration with the four affected states (Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Montana) and eight Indian tribes to reach consensus on the appropriate methodologies to evaluate the effects of the FRCPS on listed species, operational modifications focusing on each of the listed species and hundreds of millions of dollars in funding commitments to the Tribes to carry out mitigation. In developing the 2008 BiOp and RPA, NOAA Fisheries also adopted a “trending to recovery standard” in order to fulfill the directive from the Court concerning the evaluation of survival and “recovery” in a Section 7 consultation. The 2008 BiOp finds that operation of the FRCPS for the next ten (10) years with implementation of the comprehensive RPA will avoid jeopardy to the thirteen species, avoid adverse modification to critical habitat and future recovery of the protected species will not be compromised by implementation of the RPA.

            The Plaintiffs quickly challenged the 2008 BiOp arguing it is legally and technically flawed and more of the same. The federal defendants, a trade association, three states (Washington, Idaho and Montana) and one Tribe argue that based on Court directives the 2008 BiOp got it right this time. The Defendants argue that Plaintiffs challenge is nothing more than a disagreement on the science and that the court should defer to NOAA Fisheries on these issues. Of interest to Clean Water Act attorneys, one of the Plaintiffs (“NWF”) argues that the incidental take statement (“ITS”) issued as part of the 2008 BiOp is equivalent to a “permit” under § 401 of the Clean Water Act and therefore requires water quality certification from the states. If the Plaintiff prevails on this novel theory, it means that potentially four states and three Tribes would need to issue a 401 certification that the ITS will comply with state and tribal water quality standards before the ITS would go into effect.

            A preliminary injunction and summary judgment hearings are set in January 2009. If the Court finds that the disputes surrounding 2008 BiOp are basically scientific disputes a recent Ninth Circuit case could be beneficial to the federal defendants. See, Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 2008). In Lands Council, the court noted that federal courts should defer to the scientific judgments of a federal agency when reviewing agency action under the Administrative Act Procedures. Stay tuned to the outcome of this litigation to see if the “cycle of life” of litigation in FRCPS continues or takes a breather to give the federal government, the states and tribes a breather to implement the 2008 BiOp.

I.          Introduction

On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955; 167 L.Ed. 2d 929, announced a new standard for testing the sufficiency of pleadings in the face of a motion to dismiss. The Court set aside the rule in Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 41; 78 S.Ct. 99; 2 L.Ed. 80 (1957), which held that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it could be shown that it was not possible, pursuant to the pleadings, to demonstrate any set of facts which would support recovery; instead, the Court said that the appropriate test was whether the allegations of the complaint, if taken as true, would support the conclusion that recovery was “plausible.” In overruling Conley, the Court said, of the “possible” standard, “*** after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard ****.” 

Bell Atlantic was an anti-trust case based on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Many commentators suggested that the Bell Atlantic standard would only apply to matters (such as anti-trust) where the requirements of a statute dictated specific pleading requirements, that the Court had not intended to completely change the standards for testing the sufficiency of complaints.

Shortly after the Bell Atlantic decision, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama was faced with the question in Evans v. Walter Industries, case no. 1:05-CV-01017-KOB. The Alabama court held the “plausible” standard applicable to a putative class action toxic tort case and it dismissed the case, with prejudice, against one of the Defendants.

As noted below, this decision could have significant implications in other Superfund cases if the federal courts, generally, reach the same conclusion.

II          BACKGROUND FACTS

This case arises from the extensive environmental concerns in Anniston, Alabama, a city of approximately 27,000 in northeastern Alabama. Anniston was the site where PCBs were first produced in 1927, and continued to be manufactured until 1972. In addition, in the first half of the 20^th century the city was home to numerous iron pipe foundries; indeed, it was once known as the “sewer pipe capitol” of the world. The foundries produced thousands of tons, per day, of waste foundry sand allegedly contaminated with lead and a variety of other heavy metals, solvents, and PCBs. 

Much of Anniston is low lying and swampy, traversed by numerous creeks and open drains, many of which have become contaminated with PCBs. Foundry sand has been extensively used as fill material and top soil in residential yards throughout the city and adjoining communities. This has all led to Anniston becoming the location of two Superfund sites, one for remediation of PCBs and the other a removal action to clean lead from residential yards, extensive contribution actions, and a series of class actions by local residents who claim a variety of injuries as a result of local contamination. 

The concern of the local residents has been exacerbated by the fact that Anniston is immediately adjacent to Fort McClellan, an Army post which was for many decades the headquarters of the Army’s Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare Corps and the Army is now in the process of destroying various toxins stored at the post which have become unstable with the passage of time.

III.        PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs, reportedly representing a plaintiff class of 12,000 to 14,000 people, filed a complaint in state court in 2005 asserting very broad, vague claims of personal injury, trespass, nuisance, and diminution of property value against foundry operators and a number of other, non-foundry companies. The case was removed to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act and remains there.

Considerable skirmishing, involving Defendants’ motions attacking what were styled as “shotgun” allegations, and subsequent dismissals without prejudice eventually resulted in the filing of a second amended revised complaint in 2007. Defendants again attacked the complaint as the type of “shotgun” pleading which had attracted much negative comment by the Eleventh Circuit. A few days before argument on those motions, the Supreme Court released the Bell Atlantic decision. Defendants cited that decision as supplemental authority, arguing that the Court now had authority to dismiss the “shotgun” pleading with prejudice.

The Plaintiffs had alleged, and argued, that the foundries had produced thousands of tons of contaminated sand which ended up in Plaintiffs’ yards; further, that all of the Defendants may have released sand, PCBs, and other contaminants in sand that was used to clean up spills, stormwater, and air emissions. The Court was critical of these allegations because they did not specify what each Defendant had allegedly done, but, rather, seemed to treat all releases as a group action. The Plaintiffs argued that they could not be required to specify what each Defendant had done until they were permitted to pursue discovery. They argued that the Conley standard should apply and that their allegations should be found to be sufficient because it was “possible” that, in discovery, they could find specific facts to support their allegations. The Plaintiffs also argued that Bell Atlantic did not apply because the allegations were not made pursuant to a statute which required the averment of specific facts.

The Court rejected the Plaintiffs’ arguments and applied the Bell Atlantic standards. Its decision was based on three considerations. First, it noted that Conley was not an anti-trust case; therefore, even though the Supreme Court struck down the Conley test in an anti-trust case, its ruling was not limited to specific statutory actions.

Next, the Court held that adequate pleadings were necessary to advise not only the Defendants, but also the courts, of the allegations of the case so that discovery could be administered and could proceed in an appropriate manner. The Court styled this as a requirement to advise Defendants and the court of “*** who, what, when, where ***” the actions resulting in the damage complained of occurred. 

Next, the Court focused on the Supreme Court’s discussion, in Bell Atlantic, of the high cost of discovery and the increasing practice of plaintiffs in putative class actions to file suit with vague allegations and then use the high cost of discovery to pressure defendants into settling. 

Based on all these considerations, the Court dismissed the complaints as to all parties, but agreed to give Plaintiffs “one last chance” to file an adequate complaint against the foundry defendants. With respect to the non-foundry defendants, the Court observed that the allegations that there “may” have been discharges of contaminants in sand used to clean up spills and in stormwater and air emissions were entirely too vague and that, if the Plaintiffs could not produce much more specific allegations, those claims would be dismissed with prejudice.

Subsequently, Huron Valley Steel Corporation, a Defendant which is a recycler of non-ferrous scrap metals, moved for dismissal with prejudice and for entry of an immediate final judgment. The Court agreed that, from the face of the complaint, it appeared that this was a foundry sand case, that Huron Valley Steel Corporation had never produced or disposed of foundry sand, and that there were no other allegations against it that were not impermissibly vague. Therefore, the court dismissed the matter with prejudice as to Huron Valley Steel Corporation and entered final judgment for that Defendant. 

The court has yet to rule on the motions to dismiss of the remaining Defendants.

IV.       POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION

If other federal courts follow the line of reasoning of the Alabama court it could remove a number of complications in the future in Superfund matters. Most important, it may do away with, or at least significantly reduce, the practice of filing vague, broadly worded complaints against PRPs by groups of residents who live in the vicinity of Superfund sites, then seeking to pressure defendants to quickly settle. It could also simplify the task of planning and sequencing remediation activities and documenting Administrative Records to protect against such lawsuits. This could provide an important cost saving for PRPs in many cases.

For further information, contact Jack D. Shumate at shumate@butzel.com or (248) 258-1405.

Jack Shumate is Senior Environmental Counsel in the law firm Butzel Long, Professional Corporation. Mr. Shumate holds a BS degree in Chemical Engineering from Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology and received his JD from the Salmon P. Chase College of Law of Northern Kentucky University in 1962. He is listed in the Best Lawyers in America and is a Founding Regent and Charter Fellow of the American College of Environmental Lawyers.

Butzel Long is a full-service law firm headquartered in Detroit, Michigan with offices throughout Michigan and in Florida, New York City, and Washington DC and alliance offices in China and Mexico.

 With some exceptions and common law developed standards, Arkansas has traditionally followed the reasonable use theory of the riparian doctrine. A riparian user must use water in a manner that is reasonable compared to others’ rights  (including as to ground water). 

            As a mid-south state, Arkansas receives a moderate amount of rain per year (approximately 49.19 inches on average since 1895 compiled from the Arkansas Natural Resource Commission’s Arkansas Ground Water Protection and Management Report for 2006). Stress on the amount, use of and quality of its underground aquifers, primarily in east and southeast Arkansas, have  resulted in increased scrutiny and planning for alternate water sources, including from conservation, recovery and surface water.        

            Arkansas has no current active system in operation for regulating water usage.  The Arkansas Natural Resources Commission, however, is directed to monitor our state’s water resources and can set minimum streamflows by rulemaking (but this step requires consultation with other state agencies). Water needs to be considered are domestic and municipal water supplies; agricultural and industrial; navigation; recreational; fish and wildlife and other ecological needs. The regulations and laws describe preferences and priorities, but are untested in practice.

            Minimum streamflows are to be set on a case by case basis, defining such stream flows as the “quantity of water required to meet the largest of the following instream flow needs as determined on a case-by-case basis:” (1) interstate compacts, (2) navigation, (3) fish and wildlife, (4) water quality, and (5) aquifer recharge. 

            After minimum flows are established, non-riparian permits may be applied for from “excess surface water.” Excess surface water means twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount of water available on an average annual basis from any watershed basin above that amount required to satisfy all of the following:

                        1.         Existing riparian rights as of June 28, 1985

                        2.         The water needs of federal water projects existing on June 28, 1985

                        3.         The firm yield of all reservoirs in existence on June 28, 1985

                        4.         Maintenance of instream flows for wish and wildlife, water quality, aquifer recharge requirements, and navigation

                        5.         Future water needs of the basis of origin as projected in the State’s Water Plan

                        6.         Additionally, in the White River Basin, permitted transfers may not exceed on a monthly basis an amount that is 50% of the monthly average.

Minimum streamflow is important because of its relevance to the Commission’s planning in the case of a possible shortage. Separate and apart from its use in this way, minimum streamflows are also used to determine when excess surface water is available for transfers to nonriparians.

            These standards may be reviewed in the near future to begin establishing minimum streamflows and potentially, associated protected levels, which the Commission may attempt to implement by rule under shortage conditions. The White River is scheduled as the first river to be reviewed in conjunction with the Memphis District Corps of Engineers’ Grand Prairie Area Demonstration Project.  While such irrigation projects were unusual in eastern states, another such project is on the horizon with the Corps’ November 2007 Record of Decision issued for the Bayou Meto Basin of Arkansas.    

            Thus, Arkansas’s riparian rights doctrines are yielding to state systems of oversight based on depleted aquifers and increased demands. For more information on Arkansas’s water resources and rules, click here.