Posted on February 1, 2016
New York participates in the cap-and-trade system operated by 9 northeastern and mid-atlantic states known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative that limits carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil-fuel burning power plants. These plants must purchase allowances at auction for each ton of CO2 they emit. An efficient gas-fired plant that produces 225 MWs of electricity emits approximately 1.2 million tons of CO2 a year.
During the adoption process for New York’s final RGGI rule in 2008, power generators predicted serious adverse consequences. These included increased electricity costs for consumers, added operating costs for generators who would never recoup all CO2 allowance costs from the sale of electricity, and concerns about longer term energy transactions due to the uncertainty of allowance prices.
In comments on a draft RGGI rule, generators requested the State to establish a price cap of $0.75 on the cost of a CO2 allowance to protect consumers from significant price increases and a sunset provision in the event a federal cap-and-trade program were established. The generators also expressed concern about the lack of available control technology for CO2 emissions.
Fast forward: at the last allowance auction in December 2015, the cost of a CO2 allowance was $7.50. New York generators purchased almost 6 million allowances reaping revenue of more than $44 million for the New York RGGI fund. At the previous auction in September, almost 10 million allowances were purchased at a cost of $59 million. Despite these high allowance costs, the lights are still on in New York. According to data published by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, updated as of January 16, the monthly average retail prices of electricity in the residential, commercial and industrial sectors have decreased between 2008 and 2015, attributable to the success of energy conservation and efficiency programs, the availability of more renewable energy, and the low price of natural gas and oil.
CO2 emissions from the power sector have decreased by more than 40% in the RGGI states since 2009 due to reductions in the regional CO2 cap. New York has been a significant contributor to those reductions. Revenue from the program of over $1 billion has been invested by the RGGI states in energy conservation and efficiency efforts, clean and renewable energy, direct bill assistance to households and greenhouse gas abatement. Importantly, RGGI also has the potential to assist states in meeting the CO2 reduction goals in EPA’s Climate Action Plan.
However, a report issued on January 20, 2016 by Synapse Energy Economics and the Sierra Club, entitled The RGGI Opportunity, states that RGGI's current requirements are not enough to get the RGGI states to their climate goals in 2030 and beyond (40% reduction in carbon pollution from 1990 levels) and it encourages more energy efficiency programs, increased levels of wind and solar projects, and adding 10 million battery electric vehicles, all of which will result in job creation.
The RGGI program has been a clear revenue and greenhouse gas reduction success, but there is potential in New York for RGGI funds to be diverted to the general fund. This last occurred in 2015 when the legislature approved a budget that moved $41 million of RGGI revenue to the general fund to be used for other environmental programs. Environmentalists considered this action a threat to the program. Since RGGI was adopted by executive action, not by statute as was the case in the other RGGI states, the environmentalists’ view is that RGGI funds can only be used for program purposes. The 2015 transfer of RGGI funds to the general fund could subject the program to challenge as a tax on electricity levied without the legislature’s approval. In contrast, the State’s 2016 budget does not include a raid on RGGI funds.
Would similar cap-and-trade programs work as well in other regions of the country? Yes, but the political will to establish such programs will depend in part on a region’s fuel mix. Since coal-fired power plants emit almost twice as much CO2 as gas-fired plants, the allowance costs for coal plants will be higher, thereby increasing the cost of the electricity they produce and making such facilities less competitive in regions that also have more efficient facilities. That said, if the programs’ revenues are pumped into energy conservation and efficiency programs, consumers could use and pay for less electricity.
Posted on January 28, 2016
Our friend Seth Jaffe wrote a very interesting blog on January 20, “Does the Paris Agreement Provide EPA With Authority Under the CAA to Impose Economy-Wide GHG Controls? Count Me Skeptical.” It took issue with a paper that I co-authored with several other colleagues in academia in which we argue that Section 115 of the Clean Air Act provides the EPA with broad authority to implement a multi-state, multi-source, multi-gas regulatory system to reduce greenhouse gases.
The blog post agreed with our paper that it would be great if Section 115 provided this authority because it means EPA could implement an efficient, flexible, cross-sectoral approach to reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs).
However, Seth questioned our conclusion that Section 115 provides such authority because, in his view, courts are likely to conclude the “reciprocity” requirement in Section 115 could not be satisfied by the nonbinding emissions reduction commitments countries made in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) they submitted for the Paris agreement concluded at the United Nations climate conference in December. In the words of blog post, “I think most judges would interpret the word ‘reciprocity’ in a statute to mean something that is legally-binding; otherwise, it doesn’t mean anything.” For several reasons, we disagree.
First, a reviewing court does not need to interpret what the word “reciprocity” means in Section 115, because Congress has explicitly defined it. Reciprocity is the title of Section 115(c), which provides:
"This section shall apply only to a foreign country which the Administrator determines has given the United States essentially the same rights with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by this section."
The only right given to a foreign country by Section 115 is a provision in Section 115(b) that states a foreign country affected by air pollution originating in the U.S. “shall be invited to appear at any public hearing” associated with the revision of a relevant portion of the state implementation plan to address the pollutant. In short, Section 115 specifies that reciprocity means the foreign countries in question need to have given the U.S. “essentially the same rights” as are given by Section 115, and the only right provided in Section 115 is the procedural right to appear at a hearing.
Understanding the legislative history helps explain why the focus of the reciprocity requirement is on a procedural right. As we explain in detail in the paper, Section 115 was a procedural provision when it was first enacted in 1965: if pollution from the U.S. was endangering other countries, the other countries had a right to participate in abatement conferences where potential responses would be discussed, not a right to insist on actual emission reductions. Although Congress amended the provision in the 1977 Clean Air Amendments to replace the abatement conference with federal and state action through the Section 110 state implementation plan process, the reciprocity language in Section 115(c) was not changed, leaving it with its procedural test.
Second, we note in our paper that the Paris agreement contains a new set of procedures through which countries that join the agreement will be able to review and provide input on each other’s respective emissions reductions plans. To the extent a court might conclude that such procedural rights must be "legally binding," then the Paris agreement satisfies that test because although the emission reduction targets themselves that were submitted in the INDCs will not be legally enforceable by other countries, the procedural elements of the Paris agreement will be binding international law.
We note in the paper that although Paris provides a strong basis to satisfy Section 115 reciprocity, that reciprocity could also be satisfied by other international arrangements that the United States has with a variety of countries, particularly Mexico and Canada, the EU, and China.
Third, the blog post does not engage the issue of procedural reciprocity; rather it focuses on a substantive view of reciprocity (i.e. that reciprocity requires that other countries are actually reducing emissions of GHGs) and asserts that substantive reciprocity requirement could not be met by the internationally non-binding commitments made in the INDCs. Although we believe that the correct reading of Section 115 is that it only requires procedural reciprocity, we recognize that a court could conclude that Section 115 also implicitly includes a substantive reciprocity requirement. In the first instance, we noted that this requirement might be met by the international law principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus, which directs nations to avoid causing significant injuries to the environment of other nations, most recently explained in the International Court of Justice’s Pulp Mills case.
The author skips over this element to focus his skepticism that the reciprocity requirement could be satisfied by non-binding commitments in the INDCs. But actually the U.S. and other countries have made reciprocally non-binding commitments in their INDCs. That is, the U.S. has made an international political commitment to reduce emissions a certain amount, and has received essentially the same rights in the non-binding international commitments from other countries to reduce emissions.
Someone could argue that the U.S. INDC may be non-binding, but Section 115 is domestic law in the U.S. and substantive reciprocity cannot exist unless other countries also have domestic laws requiring emission reductions. If this is the test, however, it can also be met. In fact, the INDCs submitted by other countries identified the binding domestic laws through which the INDCs would be implemented. We did not focus on this aspect in our paper, but some examples are: (1) the United States identified the Clean Air Act and other laws and regulations “relevant to implementation” of the U.S. commitment; (2) China identified the measures that had been incorporated into domestic law and regulation through previous five-year plans, and outlined a variety of policies and strategies that would be incorporated into subsequent five-year plans to implement their emissions commitment; and (3) the EU noted that the necessary legislation to implement its target was being introduced to the EU parliament in 2015 and 2016. Therefore, if “legally binding” domestic laws are required to find reciprocity under Section 115, EPA could reasonably examine the legally binding provisions in other countries’ domestic systems to find that reciprocity.
To summarize, our view is that Section 115 likely requires only procedural reciprocity. If a court concluded Section 115 required substantive reciprocity, then EPA could reasonably find that requirement met through the reciprocal political commitments that the U.S. and other countries made in Paris as well as through the binding domestic laws and regulations in the U.S. and other countries that will implement the commitments.
We look forward to further dialog on this topic, which we think is an important part of unlocking this powerful, untapped tool that the EPA possesses to design an efficient and flexible system to reduce GHGs.
Posted on January 20, 2016
In a very interesting article, Michael Burger of the Sabin Center and his co-authors suggest that, following the Paris climate agreement, § 115 of the Clean Air Act provides authority for EPA to develop economy-wide GHG emissions reduction regulations that would be more comprehensive and efficient than EPA’s current industry-specific approach. And what, you may ask, is § 115? Even the most dedicated “airhead” has probably never worked with it.
Section 115 provides that, where EPA determines that emissions from the US are endangering public health or welfare in a foreign country, it may require SIP revisions sufficient to eliminate the endangerment – but only so long as there is “reciprocity”, i.e., the foreign country:
"has given the United States essentially the same rights with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by this section."
I love the idea. An economy-wide regime would be much more efficient. I wish that the argument made sense to me, but it does not.
The authors state that a global treaty could provide reciprocity, but then argue that “less binding commitments, including political commitments, should also suffice.” Thus, they conclude, the “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions”, or INDCs, which are the basis of the Paris Agreement, can provide reciprocity. Can you say “ipse dixit“?
They provide no precedent for this, because, as they acknowledge, § 115 has never been used. EPA started to use it once, and the authors provide two letters from then-Administrator Costle, suggesting that legally binding reciprocity is not required. However, EPA dropped the plan and the two letters were not finally agency action and were never subject to judicial review. Otherwise, the arguments simply seems to be that EPA can cloak itself in Chevron deference and that that is the end of the story.
Sorry, I don’t buy it. We’re talking about the law here. I think most judges would interpret the word “reciprocity” in a statute to mean something that is legally-binding; otherwise, it doesn’t mean anything. I don’t think it’s even a close enough question that Chevron deference will get EPA over the finish line.
The illogic of the authors’ argument seems to me to be demonstrated by their own words, when they argue reciprocity can’t mean a legally binding agreement, because that would mean that the foreign nations would be able to go to court to ensure that the US also meets its commitments under the Paris agreement, and the US would never allow that. But that’s precisely the point! Because there is no treaty, and the US would not let other nations try to enforce the US commitments under Paris, we cannot enforce theirs, and there is no reciprocity.
I wish it were otherwise.
Posted on January 7, 2016
The Paris Agreement on climate change reached on December 12, 2015 has a heavily negotiated sentence that, when closely read, seems to call for the virtual end of fossil fuel use in this century unless there are major advances in carbon sequestration or air capture technology. That, in turn, has important legal implications.
Article 4 Par. 1 says, “In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal … Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible … and to achieve rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.”
In other words, what goes up should be taken back down: for every ton of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted from a smokestack, tailpipe or chopped tree, a ton should be removed.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report (2014), fossil fuel use emits about 32 gigatons of carbon dioxide per year. Other sources, such as methane leakage, cement manufacture, and other industrial processes add another 5-7 gigatons carbon dioxide equivalent. Deforestation and other agriculture, forestry and other land use changes (but subtracting emissions sequestered by forest growth) add yet another 10-12 gigatons a year. This all adds up to about 49 gigatons. However, global carbon sinks remove only about 18 gigatons per year (8.8 to the oceans, 9.2 to land, not including land use changes).
Thus the sinks take up about the equivalent of the non-fossil sources. In order to achieve a “balance” between emissions and sinks, we need to just about end the release of GHGs from fossil fuels, though a radical increase in sinks or reduction on non-fossil fuel emissions would provide some slack.
Assuming that some kind of balance between emissions and sinks can be achieved, would we actually have until 2099 to decarbonize the economy, as these numbers imply is needed? Not really. Kelly Levin, Jennifer Morgan and Jiawei Song at the World Resources Institute provide here an illuminating overview of what is required to achieve the long-term temperature goal in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement (“holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2° C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit temperature increase to 1.5° C”). As the WRI post notes, a recent paper in Nature Climate Change suggests that carbon dioxide from electricity would have to be brought close to zero by 2050, and by then around 25 per cent of energy required for transportation would also need to come from electricity (up from less than one per cent now).
There seem to be only three ways to continue to use fossil fuels for electricity in the second half of the century (and for transport by the end of the century) and still meet the temperature goal:
- Capture the carbon before it escapes into the air, and sequester it
- Devise, and deploy on a massive scale, technologies to remove the carbon from the air, and sequester it
- Create new sinks, such as through the immediate halt to deforestation and a worldwide program of tree planting
All three of these raise a question of how long the carbon will be stored; we do not know how long carbon will stay in reservoirs, and we do know that trees do not live forever, and when they burn or die they release their carbon. Moreover, the technologies of carbon capture and sequestration, and of removing carbon from the ambient air, are developing slowly and are nowhere near large scale deployment. (A price on carbon would create an economic incentive to develop and use these technologies, but politicians in most places are unwilling to impose such a price. A large-scale government-funded research effort, such as the ones that put human beings on the moon, could also produce the necessary innovation, but there has been little visible support for such an effort.) Most of the industrial carbon sequestration that now occurs goes toward “enhanced oil recovery” – squeezing oil out of depleted reservoirs – but extracting more oil is not compatible with stopping fossil fuel use.
Finding the land for large scale tree planting would face its own challenges in a world where sea level rise, persistent drought, and extreme heat will be rendering much land unsuitable for growing food.
So meeting the demands of society for energy means a combination of aggressive energy efficiency and conservation programs, the installation of renewable energy (and, perhaps, nuclear), and the substitution of electric or hydrogen vehicles for those using petroleum at an unprecedented pace. The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project has set forth the colossal amount of new facility construction that would be required worldwide to achieve this.
The Paris Agreement calls on all countries to strengthen their pledges to reduce GHG emissions, and to monitor their progress and report it to the world. It also says that “all parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.” (Article 4 Par. 19) That looks like strategies under which every country must show how it is controlling its fossil fuel use.
These provisions are not legally enforceable. However, many domestic laws are, and they will become a powerful tool to force early planning, or at least disclosures. One key example is the securities disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies. On January 27, 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued guidance for the disclosure of climate-related risks. It specifically calls on companies to “consider, and disclose when material, the impact on their business of treaties or international accords relating to climate change.” The Paris Agreement is clearly such an accord, and (if it is vigorously implemented) it will have material impact on many companies in the business of extracting, processing and using fossil fuels, or making things that rely on fossil fuels (such as motor vehicles, ships and airplanes). The SEC’s guidance makes clear that management’s discussion and analysis should explore known trends and uncertainties concerning climate regulation. This includes regulation outside the U.S. that can affect the operations abroad of U.S. companies. Therefore, disclosure can be expected of the effect of severe restrictions here or in other countries on fossil fuel use, including the possibility that most fossil fuel reserves will need to stay in the ground.
Climate disclosures have received increased attention since it was reported in November that New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman is investigating ExxonMobil under the New York securities law, the Martin Act, over its statements about climate change, and had reached a settlement with Peabody Energy.
This is not necessarily limited to U.S.-registered companies. For example, in April 2015 the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors asked the U.K. Financial Stability Board for advice on the financial stability implications of climate change. In November 2015 this Board proposed the establishment of a disclosure task force to develop voluntary disclosures for several climate-related risks, including “the financial risks which could result from the process of adjustment towards a low-carbon economy.”
Going forward, impact review of energy projects under the National Environmental Policy Act and its counterparts in many states and most other developed countries should consider the phase-out of fossil fuels that is inherent in the Paris Agreement. For example, a proposal to build or finance a coal mine, a coal-fired power plant, or a coal port should consider whether the facility would need to be closed before the end of its otherwise useful life, and whether the project would be inconsistent with the Agreement.
Systematic analysis and disclosure of these risks will lead responsible boards of directors to undertake serious planning to effect an orderly transition to the low-carbon world that 188 countries agreed to in Paris. These disclosures will also help investors decide what companies will thrive in such a world (such as developers of technologies for renewable energy and efficiency), and what companies are failing to prepare for the transition and thus will themselves become fossils.
Posted on January 5, 2016
The Paris Agreement resulting from the COP21 Climate Conference was extraordinary, far better than any of the pundit “experts” expected (indeed most were predicting gloom and doom until the very last minute). That the conference organizers could get 190 countries that had been quarreling with each other through 20 prior unsuccessful conferences, and many of which have little mutual respect, to come together to unanimously support an agreement of substance on a subject as complex, huge, costly and politically difficult as tackling climate change, is nothing less than a miracle.
Christiana Figuerez and the French negotiating team were brilliant in asking only that countries submit voluntary Independently Nationally Determine Contributions (INDCs) rather than a repeat of conference mandated so-called “binding” carbon reductions as required in the unsuccessful Kyoto Protocol, binding only on developed countries that ratified (and even then signatory Canada simply withdrew). Their pre-conference preparatory work and skillful conference conduct was critical to its success.
The momentum that was built up as virtually all the countries, large and small, rich and poor, made meaningful submissions was such that it would have been very difficult for any of one nation to spoil the broth.
Indeed, the momentum was so great that even previously very reluctant China, India, S. Africa and Brazil agreed to mandatory verification provisions, extremely important to the effectiveness of the Agreement.
That the INDCs were not sufficient to meet the IPCC scientists’ assessment of need to reduce global temperature increases to no more than below a 2.5 Celsius degrees above pre-industrial revolution levels was to be expected. But that the parties agreed to meet every 5 years to make further contribution pledges, again despite powerful country reluctance, was a vital success.
One little touted success was a provision to have the Agreement recognize the climate mitigation contributions of non-national organizations, states, provinces, cities, businesses and NGOs, a provision on which I and a group from Yale dubbed The Yale Dialogue, worked very hard to get included. Their inclusion is very important since many of them have already achieved much more than their national governments have been able to pledge. Perhaps most importantly, it is they that ordinarily are the key actors in establishing energy efficiency standards and often renewable energy incentives. The Paris Agreement doesn’t call for ratification until 2020, and progress before then will fall largely on their shoulders.
While the task before all the countries of the world to achieve the goals sought through the Agreement is daunting, the Paris Agreement has gotten the world off to a wonderfully good start.
Posted on December 21, 2015
In his December 16 ACOEL post Professor Robert Percival concludes that President Obama’s Paris GHG reduction pledges are most likely “legally durable.” Two of his key points: (1) EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) – from which the bulk of the Obama pledges are comprised – will likely survive judicial review; and (2) any effort by a new President to undo the CPP would require a lengthy rulemaking process that could be rejected on judicial review.
The CPP may ultimately survive judicial review, and any attempt by a new President to undermine the CPP may ultimately fail. But with due respect to Professor Percival, I submit the GHG reduction pledges may be far less “legally durable” than he suggests.
Judicial Review Prospects.
Professor Percival notes that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly upheld EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions.” But EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions is not at issue in the challenges now pending in the D.C. Circuit. (Consolidated under the lead case West Virginia v. EPA.)
Rather, the issues relate to how far can EPA go with the words of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate GHG emissions. I think most would agree that EPA seeks to go pretty far with a few words in CAA 111. One key issue is whether the words authorizing imposition of “best system” emission limits upon “stationary sources” confer authority to require owners of coal-fired stationary sources to replace their plants with solar and wind energy sources.
In my view, whether the CPP will survive in the D.C. Circuit may well depend upon the composition of the 3-judge panel selected by lot. The 17 active and senior judges on that Court represent an amazingly wide spectrum of philosophies. But the cases will probably then go to the Supreme Court – and there, I think EPA will have a pretty tough (but maybe not impossible) time. Last year, the Court rejected parts of EPA’s GHG regulatory scheme in its UARG opinion. The Court expressed strong distaste for EPA regulations with questionable grounding in the CAA’s words – particularly “where an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy.”
A New President’s Prospects.
Virtually every Republican Presidential candidate has vowed to undo most or all of the CPP (assuming it has not been rejected on judicial review). I take no position on whether he or she should do this. But I do believe it could be done fairly quickly and in a manner likely to survive judicial review.
I direct your attention to Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA. Writing for a unanimous panel in an EPA case, Chief Judge Garland (an Obama appointee – joined by Judge Rodgers, a Clinton appointee) quoted extensively from recent Supreme Court opinions. In Part II(A) of Judge Garland’s opinion (pages 1036-38) and Part IV (page 1043), the following points come through strong and clear:
a. A new administration is free to reverse rules issued by a prior administration based entirely upon policy preferences, even where there are no new facts or information, so long as the new administration adequately explains the basis for the reversal;
b. There is no heightened standard of judicial review when an agency reverses course; and an agency need not convince the court that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the rejected one.
Thus the “lengthy rulemaking process” envisioned by Professor Percival need not be so lengthy. A new administration would not need to develop a new factual record – it would merely have to carefully explain in its rulemaking the legal and policy reasons why it was undoing parts or all of the CPP. There is no reason this could not be accomplished within a year or two, and reductions required under the CPP do not begin kicking in until 2022.
Posted on December 16, 2015
As part of a global agreement on climate change, the US has pledged, among other things, to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 26%-28% compared to 2005 levels by the year 2025. But opponents of President Obama argue that he cannot keep his promises made at the Paris climate summit.
The Obama administration is confident that the US can meet its promise based on the regulatory actions already taken by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies to reduce GHG emissions, part of a broad Climate Action Plan announced by President Obama in June 2013.
In transportation, US fuel economy standards set by the EPA have been raised dramatically. And earlier this year the EPA issued regulations to control GHG emissions from power plants, which led to a final rule known as the Clean Power Plan.
The Clean Power Plan will require states to reduce GHG emissions from existing power plants by 32% by the year 2030. It is expected to accelerate the retirement of coal-fired power plants as electric utilities increasingly shift to natural gas and renewable sources of energy.
Yet even as US negotiators arrived in Paris for the climate summit, Obama's political foes were questioning his authority to sign an international agreement on climate change.
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell argued that the US cannot meet its promises to the global community because the Clean Power Plan is "likely illegal" and will either will be struck down in court or be revoked by a new Republican president.
So how strong is the legal defense of Obama's signature climate initiatives?
Going to the Supreme Court?
Having the Clean Power Plan struck down in court seems unlikely for a number of reasons. These include the fact that the US Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld EPA's authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act, beginning in 2007 with its decision in Massachusetts v EPA.
On the other hand, a new president working with congressional opponents of climate action could undermine the US commitment. Let's consider the legal possibilities.
The Congressional Review Act provides special fast-track procedures that allow Congress to veto regulations issued by federal agencies within 60 legislative days of their issuance. But before such a joint resolution of disapproval can take effect, it requires either presidential approval or the override of a presidential veto by a two-thirds majority in each house of Congress.
The signature policy of Obama's climate strategy is the EPA Clean Power Plan to regulate CO2 from power plants. Opponents are already challenging it in court. haglundc/flickr, CC BY-NC
As a result, the only time this procedure has been used successfully was shortly after a change of administration. In March 2001 new President George W Bush signed a disapproval resolution blocking regulations issued at the end of the Clinton administration to protect workers from repetitive motion injuries.
Congress is trying to use the Congressional Review Act to disapprove EPA's greenhouse gas regulations, but such a vote is entirely symbolic because President Obama has promised to veto the disapproval resolution and the 60 legislative day period will end long before the 2016 election. Thus, as long as a president committed to climate action remains in office, the Congressional Review Act is not a promising option.
Dramatic versus piecemeal attacks
A new president opposed to climate action could direct EPA to repeal its regulations, but this would require the agency to undertake a lengthy rulemaking process to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act that governs how agencies adopt regulations. Any agency decision to revoke the regulations would be challenged in court and could be overturned.
The courts have played a role before in attempts to reverse regulations. When President Reagan's Department of Transportation rescinded its air bag regulations, the Supreme Court held that it had acted arbitrarily and capriciously because the decision was not supported by the factual record showing that air bags save lives.
There will be legal challenges to the EPA Clean Power Plan, but the Obama administration thinks it's on solid legal ground. vagueonthehow/flickr, CC BY
And when the Supreme Court in 2011 rejected state efforts to hold electric utilities liable for climate change under the federal common law of nuisance, it pointedly noted that any future EPA decision not to regulate GHG emissions would be subject to judicial review.
Working with a new president sympathetic to opponents of environmental regulation, Congress could repeal or amend the Clean Air Act, the legal foundation for EPA's regulations of GHG emissions. However, the Clean Air Act has been remarkably resistant to past legislative onslaughts. It is, after all, thanks to the Clean Air Act that the "airpocalypses" choking major cities in China and India right now do not happen in the US.
Another option for a future Congress would be to adopt targeted amendments to deprive EPA of authority to implement the Clean Power Plan and other GHG regulations if there are enough votes in the Senate to overcome a filibuster. Congress also could use the power of the purse to withhold funds for actions necessary to implement any Paris agreement, including US promises of financial aid to help poor countries adapt to climate change.
The Paris climate conference is being conducted pursuant to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, a treaty signed by President George H W Bush in June 1992 and ratified unanimously by the US Senate on October 7 1992. President Obama believes he already has sufficient legal authority to implement any agreement made in Paris and thus he does need not to ask Congress for new approval.
There is precedent for this. In 2013 the US was able to accede to the Minimata Convention on Mercury without congressional approval because existing law already provides the president with sufficient legal authority to implement its requirements.
For decades, the principal argument by opponents of US climate action has been that the US should not act until developing countries agreed to control their GHG emissions. That argument was dramatically undermined in November 2014 when China agreed to control its emissions, in a joint announcement with the White House.
The claim that other countries will not control their emissions has now been laid to rest in Paris with a new global agreement requiring all countries to do so. Now that the entire world has recognized that all nations must act to combat climate change, it would be the height of folly for a new president and Congress to reverse course.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
Posted on December 15, 2015
Paris—In the run-up to the Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention, a short humorous video, “Earth to Paris,” was widely viewed. It was a call to delegates for take serious action on climate change at the conference.
The Paris Agreement is being hailed as an historic breakthrough by political leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and the business community. It represents the first time since the Framework Convention on Climate Change was opened for signature in 1992 that all 196 parties have agreed to take actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The only prior agreement even remotely comparable to the Paris Agreement—the Kyoto Protocol—limited only developed country emissions.
Not only was there unanimous approval of this agreement—a remarkable feat in itself—but its overall goal is ambitious. Countries agreed to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.” They also agreed to “to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.” The parties thus increased somewhat the level of ambition from limiting warming to 2 °C, which had been the consensus objective.
They also agreed to “aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter.” That, too, is new.
And unlike Kyoto, this agreement puts primary responsibility for what happens in particular countries where it has always been—with the countries themselves. This is through the mechanism of nationally determined contributions (NDCs)—public commitments that nearly all countries made prior to Paris to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to some extent. The Paris agreement affirmed those agreements and made them central to the global climate change effort.
But what also sets the Paris Agreement apart—and will ultimately determine whether humanity averts or limits the worst effects of climate change—are processes that the agreement puts in place to periodically increase national ambition, assist countries in meeting their objectives, share information, and ensure methodological consistency in accounting for emissions reductions. These processes should greatly enhance the likelihood that the Paris Agreement will actually work.
Processes in the Paris Agreement that embody this approach include the following:
- Beginning in 2020, and every five years afterwards, each country is to “communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve.” These, of course, are in addition to those that countries already submitted. Each “successive nationally determined contribution” is to “represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition.”
- While financial assistance to developing countries has always been part of the international framework to address climate change, developed countries agreed to increase their level of financial support from previous levels by a nonspecific amount. Developed countries also agreed to communicate “indicative quantitative and qualitative information” about their financial support to developing countries, including projected future levels of public finance.
- Beginning in 2023, and every five years afterwards, the conference of the parties is to “take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving” its purpose. The outcome of this “global stocktake” is to “inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner,” including enhanced “international cooperation for climate action.”
- The agreement creates “an enhanced transparency framework for action and support.” This framework is partly to understand what NDCs actually mean and achieve. NDCs from different countries use different assumptions and baselines, and enhancing their comparability is essential. This transparency framework is also to better understand what financial contributions developed countries are actually making to developing countries.
- Recognizing that “[a]ccelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable development,” the agreement creates a Technology Mechanism. The purpose of the mechanism is to facilitate technology development and the transfer of technology to developing countries. The “global stocktake” is to consider this and other efforts to support “technology development and transfer for developing country Parties.”
These processes are different from the kind of obligations we are used to in environmental law–obligations, for example, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a certain amount by a certain date. Rather, these processes may be understood in terms of reflexive law and governance. Reflexive approaches are not substantive rules: they improve the capacity of governmental institutions and other entities to learn about themselves and their actions. Reflexive approaches also stimulate them to use this information to make appropriate changes. They create spurs to action.
In the context of the Paris agreement, reflexive governance seems intended to perform at least four key tasks. First, it should encourage or prod governments to be more ambitious over time, without being prescriptive about what they should do. This is true not only of emissions reductions but also, for developed countries, of their efforts to provide financial and technological resources to developing countries. Second, it will provide information to governments and others about what other governments are actually doing, as well information about the effectiveness and impacts of particular laws and policies. This information can then be used to modify those laws and policies. Third, because this information will be public, it means that governments are more likely to honestly and openly share what they are doing, and be responsive to the views of nongovernmental organizations and businesses as well as the public in general.
Finally, there are few areas in law and policy in which the playing field is changing faster than in climate change. The changes are not just new agreements, but also the rapid upscaling of renewable energy as its price drops, the wide variety of international coalitions working to accelerate greenhouse gas emission reductions in particular areas or sectors, changes in the emissions profiles of China and India over the past decade, improvements in our understanding of the science, and the greater availability of private finance. The Kyoto Protocol, hailed as an advance when approved in 1997, looks like a relic less than 20 years later.
These and other processes in the Paris Agreement are more likely to survive, accommodate, and address this shifting landscape in the years ahead. One could wish for a stronger agreement, but these processes are likely to make the global partnership to address climate change stronger and more effective over time. And they are particularly likely to do so because every country agreed to the ambitious goals toward which they are aimed.
Orginially posted on www.johndernbach.com
Posted on December 2, 2015
Last week, the Boston Globe had an op-ed by Joshua Goldstein and Steven Pinker concerning some “Inconvenient truths for the environmental movement.” I’m sorry to say that I agree with pretty much every word of it. Why am I sorry? Because Goldstein and Pinker make clear – even though they don’t mention his name – that the Pope was completely wrong in his prescription for addressing climate change. How so? It’s really pretty straightforward.
People want more economic development, not less. They want more markets, not less. It may be that some wealthy societies could still have a relatively smooth transition to renewable fuels without sacrificing economic growth. Unfortunately, that’s not where we have to address the demand for fossil fuels. We have to do so in China and India and other developing countries. I’m sorry, but I’ve seen the projected demand for fossil fuels outside the US and Europe and it’s not pretty. Anyone who thinks that we can quickly and easily eliminate fossil fuel use in those countries and still allow them the economic growth that their citizens demand is delusional.
Which brings us to Goldstein’s and Pinker’s second inconvenient truth; nuclear power has to be a large part of the solution. And I’m afraid that’s probably the end of the conversation for many of my environmental friends, so I’ll cut this short.
I’m still an optimist. I believe that we can still solve climate change. We can do so however, with more use of markets, not less. And we must do so with more economic growth, not less, because the rest of the world won’t be satisfied with less.
Posted on October 23, 2015
So the Clean Power Plan has been published in the Federal Register. For those who cannot get enough, you can find all of the important materials, including EPA’s Technical Support Documents, on EPA’s web site for the CPP.
Not surprisingly, given the number of suits brought before the CPP was even finalized, opponents were literally lining up at the courthouse steps to be the first to sue. West Virginia apparently won the race and is the named plaintiff in the main petition filed so far.
Perhaps because Oklahoma has been one of the most persistent, and vocal, opponents of the CPP, this called to mind the origin of the Sooner State’s nickname – which seems particularly apt, since Oklahoma was one of the states that couldn’t wait for the rule to be promulgated to sue.
Oklahoma is not actually among the plaintiffs in the West Virginia suit. Oklahoma filed its own petition today. One wonders whether Oklahoma was banished from playing with the other states as a result of its impatience. Unlikely, since most of those in the West Virginia suit also filed early, but it did call to mind that other famous event in the history of the west, as recorded in Blazing Saddles.
Posted on October 14, 2015
Many organizations have announced voluntary greenhouse gas emission reduction goals by which they aim to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases despite the absence of any legal requirement to do so. Meeting these goals implicates the concept of additionality when the goals are to be met, in part, through off-site actions, such as the purchase of carbon offsets, retirement of renewable energy credits, or construction of off-site renewable energy projects. The concept of additionality seems simple: in principle, emission reductions attributable to an organization’s actions should only be recognized or “counted” if such reductions are more than what would have been achieved absent the action. Applying the concept of additionality in the real-world, however, is complicated. Perhaps unnecessarily so?
First, the “proof” of additionality required by many of the certifying bodies can be confusing and conflicting. For the faint of heart, the concern about proof discourages any action other than the purchase of “certified” paper offsets. A second, confounding problem results from the greening of the grid itself. Emissions have been falling for many organizations simply because the electricity they procure from the grid is becoming less carbon intensive. How to square these emission reductions with the concept of additionality leads one to question how the concept of additionality should be applied to voluntary emission reduction goals.
In the context of regulated organizations, the idea of additionality makes sense. Organizations that must comply with a regulatory scheme to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases should not be allowed to claim credit for off-site actions if such actions do not, in fact, lower emissions beyond what they would have been absent the organization’s actions. No organization (regulated or unregulated) wants to waste money paying for off-site actions that do not in fact lower emissions. Establishing that a particular organization’s action will, in fact, lower emissions more than would have occurred absent that organization’s action turns out to be much more difficult than it at first appears given the multiplicity of variables that come into play: who else might be inclined to take the same action? When? For what reason? Is the action occurring in an area governed by a renewable portfolio standard or not? Many different criteria are used by regulatory agencies and voluntary verification programs. Three examples are helpful.
The California Air Resources Board treats emission reductions as “additional” if they exceed what would be required by law or regulation and if they exceed what would “otherwise occur in a conservative business-as-usual scenario.” 17 CCR § 95802(a)(4). The American College & University Presidents' Climate Commitment (“ACUPCC”) replaces “conservative business-as-usual” with “reasonable and realistic business-as-usual.” The Verified Carbon Standard adds a requirement that the reductions are additional only if they would not have occurred “but for” the offsite organization’s investment. These different definitions have real consequences for the types of offset projects (i.e., emission reductions) qualifying as “additional.” Energy efficiency projects at a school in an economically disadvantaged city might count as additional under ACUPCC’s definition because the schools are unlikely to undertake the energy efficiency measures themselves. In contrast, such measures are unlikely to count as additional under the Verified Carbon Standard definition because the schools would save money from the efficiency measures if undertaken by themselves.
For unsophisticated organizations with limited resources, using the most conservative criteria for additionality that have been developed by other parties, whether regulatory agencies or voluntary verification programs, makes sense – emission reductions are assured and at minimal transactional cost to the organization. For more sophisticated organizations with resources to experiment and innovate, strict adherence to conservative additionality criteria can be counterproductive. Many large municipalities, large research universities and corporations have the in-house capacity to invest in bold and innovative experiments and to assess whether a given project or investment is in fact reducing emissions. Organizations such as these could use their in-house talent and money to develop creative, bold, innovative and novel projects that could reduce emissions, but will they do so if such projects might fail a strict additionality test? At a university, such projects have the added benefit of complementing the core mission to teach, research, and demonstrate ideas that others beyond the university could leverage. Should an organization abstain from pursuing such projects simply because they would fail a strict additionality test, which the organization is not legally obligated to apply? Should we re-think the circumstances in which strict observance with additionality is necessary to avoid a public relations nightmare (i.e. being accused of not really meeting the voluntary goal)?
The application of additionality in the context of voluntary goals is also complicated by the fact that the electric grid itself is becoming greener. Most organizations include in their greenhouse gas emission calculation the emissions resulting from their electricity consumption. Many organizations first announced their voluntary emission reduction goals five to ten years ago when few predicted that the electric grid would become significantly greener so fast. Here in Massachusetts, largely because of the increased use of natural gas, the electric grid now emits 20% less carbon dioxide per MWh consumed than it did ten years ago. That means that an organization in Massachusetts that has not taken any action designed to reduce its emissions will nevertheless have lowered its emissions by consuming electricity from the local grid. Crediting such emission reductions towards a voluntary goal is in tension with the concept of additionality because the reductions occurred without the need for the organization to take any action designed to reduce its emissions.
Hence, the greening of the grid should cause an organization to re-think the nature of its voluntary emission reduction goal: is the goal simply an accounting objective that can be met by actions external to the organization, such as the greening of the grid by electric utilities, or is it a a bigger, perhaps even moral, commitment to undertake a minimum level of effort to reduce emissions in addition to those resulting from the greening of the grid? If the former, an organization committed to a voluntary goal can celebrate that the utilities have made its commitment cheaper to attain. If the latter, perhaps an organization should make its goal even more stringent to avoid taking credit for emission reductions achieved by others. Is this second approach more consistent with the concept of additionality? Should we applaud an organization that is not required by law to make any emission reductions but that purchases some carbon offsets and declares it has accomplished its voluntary goal of emission reductions? Should we applaud an organization that designs, invests in or otherwise makes an effort to create a project that actually achieves emission reductions even though it is possible that someone somewhere might also have the same idea and be willing to make the same investment?
I do not pretend to have the answers to these questions. But, I do know that many organizations that have set voluntary goals are grappling with these questions now, and others will face them in the future. I welcome your comments.
Posted on September 10, 2015
On Wednesday, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the latest effort to stay EPA’s Clean Power Plan before it has even been promulgated in the Federal Register. The Court simply stated that “petitioners have not satisfied the stringent standards that apply to petitions for extraordinary writs that seek to stay agency action.”
Really? Tell me something I did not know.
I’m sorry. The CPP is a far-ranging rule. There are strong legal arguments against its validity. Those arguments may prevail. I see it as about a 50/50 bet. This I do know, however. The sky isn’t falling. The sky won’t fall, even for West Virginia, if the rule is affirmed and implemented. Those opposed to regulation have made these arguments from time immemorial – certainly no later than when Caesar tried to regulate the amount of lead in Roman goblets. And if I’ve got that one wrong, at least no later than Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, when opponents of EPA’s rulemaking on leaded gasoline thought that the rule would mean the end of western civilization.
I’m not naïve. I understand that these arguments are political as well as legal. I just think that opponents of EPA rulemaking undermine their own political position in the long run by repeatedly predicting catastrophe, even though catastrophe never arrives.
Posted on July 21, 2015
On June 25, 2015, The Hague District Court in the Netherlands issued an order and opinion requiring the Netherlands to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. This level is more ambitious than the 17 percent reduction goal to which the Dutch government has currently committed. The case, Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands suggests what courts may be willing to do when government policy lags behind what climate science indicates is needed.
Urgenda sued the government in tort under the Dutch Civil Code on behalf of itself and 886 individuals, claiming among other things that “the State is in breach of its duty of care for taking insufficient measures to prevent dangerous climate change.” For U.S. lawyers, accustomed to limited governmental tort liability under federal and state law, the breadth of this claim may be startling. But it was also novel, though less so, to the court, which explained that this legal issue “has never before been answered in Dutch proceedings.”
Although the state has considerable discretion in policy making for climate change, the court said, that discretion is constrained by both the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Objectives and principles of the Climate Change Convention and the TFEU that constrain Dutch discretion, the court said, include “protection of the climate system, for the benefit of current and future generations, based on fairness;” the precautionary principle, and consideration of “available scientific and technical information.”
Urgenda’s case was based on numerous scientific reports, including the 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which said that Annex I countries (including both the Netherlands and the United States), need to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, and 80-95 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, to limit the global temperature increase to 2.0 degrees Celsius. Parties to the Convention on Climate Change have agreed that a temperature increase above that level (equivalent to 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) would be dangerous.
After analyzing multiple factors relevant to the appropriate duty of care, the court concluded that the state “has acted negligently and therefore unlawfully towards Urgenda by starting from a reduction target for 2020 of less than 25% percent compared to the year 1990.” It ordered a 25 percent reduction, saying there are “insufficient grounds for the lower limit” of a 40% reduction from 1990 levels specified in the 2007 IPCC report.
Although the case was decided under Dutch legal rules that are quite different from our own, and may be appealed, it has significance to U.S. lawyers. First, it shows great respect for climate change science, describing IPCC and other scientific reports in considerable detail. The case therefore underscores the important role that courts can play in affirming the validity of climate change science.
Second, the court’s willingness to interpret domestic law in ways consistent with international commitments, including those in the Convention on Climate Change as well as the commitment to keep warming to 2.0 degrees Celsius, raises an interesting and important question about whether U.S. domestic laws related to climate change also should be interpreted in ways consistent with international commitments. U.S. courts have often held that statutes should be construed in a manner consistent with treaties and other international obligations.
Finally, the decision indicates the value of judicial intervention as a way of forcing governments and businesses to do more than they are doing. Additional legal support for such cases was provided, in March 2015, by the issuance of the Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations. These principles were developed by a group of legal experts from around the world. The central idea is that “[s]tates and enterprises must take measures, based on” the precautionary principle, “to ensure that the global average surface temperature increase never exceeds pre-industrial temperature by more than 2 degrees Celsius.” Many sources of local, national, and international law support these principles, the experts said, including “international human rights law, environmental law and tort law.”
According to a report issued on July 16, 2015 by the American Meteorological Society, 2014 was the warmest year on record. As the effects of climate change intensify, there may be more such litigation, and decisions like this could become more common.
Posted on June 29, 2015
Recent events have me pondering this question.
Most notably, in two court decisions last week, courts ordered the State of Washington and the government of the Netherlands to take more aggressive action against climate change. In the Washington case, in response to a complaint from eight teenagers, a trial court judge has ordered the Washington Department of Ecology to reconsider a petition filed by the teenagers requesting reductions in GHG emissions. Similarly, in the Netherlands, a court ordered the government to reduce GHG emissions by 25% within five years. The Dutch case was brought under human rights and tort law, not under existing Dutch environmental laws.
I have been very skeptical of the use of nuisance-type litigation to require more aggressive government regulatory efforts. I still think comprehensive market-based regulation is the best approach. However, in the absence of aggressive action in the United States and world-wide, these suits are going to increase in number.
So, how are they similar to the same-sex marriage issue? First, as noted in Obergefell, courts were initially – and for some time – not just unfriendly to litigation efforts in support of same-sex marriage, they were positively dismissive. Second, there is the gradual increase over time in the litigation.
Next, there is also the change over time in the scientific understanding of the issues. While same-sex marriage has always been, on both sides, primarily a moral issue, it would be wrong to ignore the role that an increasing understanding of the genetics of sexual preference has played in the debate. Similarly, the move towards an overwhelming weight of evidence, not just that climate change is occurring, but that it is anthropogenic, has obviously been important to the climate change debate.
Finally, while the moral issues in same sex marriage may seem to distinguish it from the climate issue, the recent papal encyclical makes clear that there are moral aspects to the climate change debate as well.
I have no crystal ball. I do not know whether we are going to see a groundswell, and then, perhaps, a tidal wave that will somehow overcome the gridlock in United States and world politics on climate change. There are differences in the two issues, most obviously in the short-run economic costs of addressing climate change. Nonetheless, I do know that it wouldn’t surprise me if the tidal wave comes, and relatively soon.
Posted on May 7, 2015
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals just reversed and remanded EPA’s rule allowing backup generators to operate for up to 100 hours per year as necessary for demand response. It’s an important decision that could have lessons for EPA and the regulated community across a wide range of circumstances, including eventual challenges to EPA’s proposed GHG rule.
EPA said that the rule was necessary to allow demand response programs to succeed while maintaining grid reliability. Commenters had argued that, by encouraging greater use of uncontrolled backup generators, EPA’s rule makes other generators less economic, thus creating a negative feedback loop, with less and less power generated by controlled units, resulting in greater and greater need for uncontrolled backup generators. Here’s what the Court concluded:
- EPA failed adequately to respond to the commenters’ arguments. Noting that “an agency must respond sufficiently to “enable [the court] to see what major issues of policy were ventilated,” the Court instead found that EPA “refused to engage with the commenters’ dynamic markets argument."
- To the extent EPA did respond, it was “self-contradictory”, arguing that it was not justifying the regulation on reliability grounds, even though the final rule said that it was based on reliability concerns.
- The 100-hour rule was based on faulty evidence. EPA relied on evidence that backup sources had to be available at least 60 hours to participate in a PJM “Emergency Load Response Program.” However, PJM itself noted that this minimum does not apply to individual engines.
- Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while EPA justified the rule on reliability grounds, the Court stated that:
grid reliability is not a subject of the Clean Air Act and is not the province of EPA.
This last issue is the part of the opinion that could have some bearing on judicial review of EPA’s GHG rule. The Court noted that there was no evidence that FERC or NERC had participated in the backup generator rule or provided comments to EPA. When, during the course of the rulemaking, a commenter suggested that EPA work with FERC, this was EPA’s response:
the rulemaking’s purpose was to address emissions from the emergency engines “and to minimize such pollutants within the Agency’s authority under the CAA. It is not within the scope of this rulemaking to determine which resources are used for grid reliability, nor is it the responsibility of the EPA to decide which type of power is used to address emergency situations.”
This statement did not make the Court happy:
EPA cannot have it both ways it [sic] cannot simultaneously rely on reliability concerns and then brush off comments about those concerns as beyond its purview. EPA’s response to comments suggests that its 100-hour rule, to the extent that it impacts system reliability, is not “the product of agency expertise.”
And why is this relevant for the GHG rule?
First, because EPA had better consult with FERC and NERC, so that it can defend any statements it makes in the GHG rule about its impact, if any, on reliability. Second, it’s clear that the court will not show deference to EPA’s conclusions about reliability, since that is not within the scope of EPA’s expertise.
Posted on April 3, 2015
As most followers of this blog know, EPA proposed its “Clean Power Plan” for existing electric power plants under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in June 2014. And just this week (March 31), the Obama Administration with great fanfare submitted its 2025 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target to the United Nations for the international climate change convention.
The Administration pledged to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 26-28% (below 2005 levels) by 2025, and the bulk of these reductions are supposed to come from the Plan. But will the massive reductions EPA claims will result from the Plan ever occur?
Defending the legality of the Plan in an interview published in the March 31 Wall Street Journal, EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy claims she is “following the direction of the Supreme Court” and doing “exactly what the statute [CAA] tells us we’re supposed to do.”
Huh? While the Supreme Court has recognized EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs under the CAA, it most certainly has not given EPA the “direction” EPA is taking in its pending proposal. And neither has Congress.
EPA’s Plan would mandate a panoply of groundbreaking controls on energy supply and demand. It would force utilities to use natural gas rather than coal, ramp up renewable energy use (wind, solar), and impose mandates for reducing energy consumption. Yet the CAA provision for which EPA claims authority for all this (§111(d)) only authorizes EPA to impose “standards for emissions” upon “existing sources” of air pollution — such as power plants. The controls must also be “adequately demonstrated.” In the past EPA applied this authority faithfully to the statutory terms, so “sources” that emit pollution are limited to prescribed amounts of emissions.
While EPA’s proposal includes some real emission standards for air pollution sources (power plants), the vast majority of GHG reductions are to come from the energy supply/demand measures that have no basis in the text of the CAA. If you are compelled through these mandates to limit your dishwasher use to specified hours or pay higher rates, is your dishwasher an “existing source” of “air pollution” and are the hourly restrictions “emission standards”? And how can such novel approaches be “adequately demonstrated”?
The Administration tried but failed to obtain amendments to the CAA from Congress to address climate change. EPA’s Plan might have been authorized by that failed effort, and it might be authorized by future legislation. The Plan’s pioneering provisions might arguably reflect good public policy. But under the CAA as it now stands, EPA is not authorized to impose them.
As for “direction” from the Supreme Court? In its recent Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA opinion (June 23, 2014), the Court rejected EPA’s attempt to regulate GHGs by “tailoring” the unambiguous text of the statute. The Clean Power Plan doesn’t just “tailor” the terms of the statute — it attempts to weave new authority out of whole cloth.
Posted on January 5, 2015
If you want a sense of emerging developments likely to impact the business community it is important to keep an eye on pronouncements from EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance (OECA). OECA is the “lead” for EPA’s Next Gen compliance initiative, which will continue to set enforcement priorities as it rolls out through 2015. Next Gen is far from perfect and severely underfunded, but since its principles provide the guideposts for compliance policy, being well informed provides an important edge in compliance situations.
For years EPA has been calling on federal and state enforcement managers to develop approaches that go beyond traditional single facility inspections and enforcement. EPA took the lead in its FY 2014 National Program Manager’s Guidance OECA by announcing the Next Generation Compliance Initiative.
Next Gen focuses on five areas:
1. Designing and drafting regulations and permits that are simpler and easier to implement.
2. Using advanced emissions/pollutant detection technology so that regulated entities, government, and the public have prompt access to monitoring data concerning environmental conditions (as well as potential violations).
3. Electronic submission of permit applications and monitoring data.
4. Prompt web-posting of traditional compliance data, and presenting information obtained from advanced emission monitoring and electronic reporting (so-called big data sets) to the public.
5. Developing data analytics to guide enforcement activities.
EPA kicked off Next Gen in style. A major policy statement appeared in the September-October 2013 issue of ELI’s Environmental Forum. The Next Gen strategy was reaffirmed in OECA’s FY 2015 national program manager’s guidance; in numerous interviews and public statements by senior EPA officials and in a compliance plan announced in October 2014. These efforts are continuing. Indeed, George Washington Law School will convene the latest in a series of events focusing on Next Gen compliance on March 26 and 27, 2015. The symposium will address the role of advanced monitoring in environmental compliance and enforcement. In addition, OECA staff have presented a number of Next Gen workshops to state officials.
Despite EPA’s roll-out efforts, Next Gen has had critics who find the initiative too vague to be helpful. The Government Accountability Office found that OECA lacks a strategic plan to implement the initiative. In addition, Next Gen does little to reward good behavior. In fact, Next Gen ignores positive feed-back as a driver of improved compliance.
While increased use of technology and public disclosure sound great, it remains to be seen how OECA will implement Next Gen in practice. Nevertheless, whether Next Gen has staying power or not, there are several themes that need to be considered:
1. OECA’s focus on improved transparency and community participation is here to stay and enhanced community outreach will increasingly find its way into EPA (and state) regulations. To keep pace, the regulated community needs to continuously rethink how to use media (new and old) to inform and engage stakeholders, especially members of vulnerable communities.
2. EPA and delegated states will continue to experiment with ‘innovative enforcement strategies’ using advanced monitoring and data analytics and that rely less upon traditional inspections; self-reporting and tips. Industry should look for opportunities to provide input to these efforts.
3. Monitoring data is now a public resource, easily shared and routinely subjected to new uses. Therefore, rigorous quality assurance and quality control is essential at every step of the data collection and reporting cycle. Use of software that flags inconsistent results or mathematically impossible outcomes (like EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Tool) should be dramatically expanded.
4. E-reporting cannot be a one-way street based simply on replacing paper reports with electronic submissions. OECA needs to provide guidance and support so that regulators can invest resources and develop policies that ensure that they can use e-reporting to provide relevant compliance assistance in real time.
We’ll need to wait and see whether OECA’s Next Gen Initiative will play a major role in shaping future environmental enforcement. In the meantime, OECA’s framework for achieving more effective compliance can serve as a guide for advanced companies to refine their environmental management systems while helping to focus enforcement efforts on the worst performers.
Posted on November 17, 2014
November 1967: The Moody Blues release their second album, Days of Future Passed, said to be an influential work of the countercultural, psychedelic era. May 2014: Wolverine goes back in time to rally the X-Men against the Sentinels in Days of Future Past. In between: Ed Muskie and Leon Billings roamed the Earth, particularly the U.S. Senate, and modern-day environmental law was born and thrives.
2014 also is the centennial of the birth of Muskie in the old mill town of Rumford, Maine. On November 15, almost exactly 47 years after release of Future Passed, Harvard Law Professor Richard Lazarus and Leon Billings, Senator Muskie’s former chief of staff, spoke on a panel looking back and to the future of laws like the Clean Air and Water Acts that were unanimously passed by the Senate through the guidance of Muskie and Billings.
Billings spoke of how what Muskie was able to shepherd through Congress and into law involved concepts still pervasive and taken for granted today—such as private attorneys general, nondegradation, open decision-making, the public’s right to breathe healthy air and removal of the right to pollute. He described Muskie’s insistence of and ability to achieve bipartisanship, with allies for the CAA and CWA efforts including such Senators as Baker, Eagleton, Cooper, Bayh, Boggs and Dole, as well as the exhaustive efforts to fully vet and document the need for legislation. For example, for the CWA the Senate Committee held 33 days of hearings with 1721 witnesses, 470 statements and 6,400 pages of testimony, followed by 45 sub-or-full-Committee markup sessions and 39 Conference meetings.
Billings then focused on two concepts that he said demonstrate Muskie’s ability over 40 years ago to look to the future. The first, “waters of the Unites States” grew out of the Senator’s knowledge of the 1899 Refuse Act; he successfully convinced his colleagues that the Act supported a broad view of “waters of the US” to include, for example, wetlands. Since then, the Supreme Court has gone “at least as far as we had expected, and more broadly than we could have hoped”, said Billings.
The second concept is that of climate change and the Clean Air Act. Billings was very clear: Section 111(d) was no accident, is not being misinterpreted, and Muskie intended there to be a legislative basis for then-unknown or undefined pollution problems like CO2, what Billings now calls the “epitome of the precautionary principle”. The phrase “selected air pollution agents” almost never made it out of the House-Senate Conference in December 1970, but a compromise was struck so late at night it never made it into the Conference reports. And while no one then envisioned CO2 and climate change, Billings said that if Muskie were alive when the Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts v EPA that CO2 is a pollutant, he would have said, “Why do you think I put that provision in there in the first place?”
Richard Lazarus then spoke of Senator Muskie’s enduring legacy in the courts as the font of legislative intent underlying many environmental laws, including frequent references to Muskie in court opinions and during oral arguments at the Supreme Court. He also demonstrated that while President Nixon did sign the bills authored by Muskie and had the label of being an environmental President, in fact he was largely using the issue for a short time as a defensive measure to cut off Muskie’s prospects as a potential 1972 Presidential candidate. Richard then showed slides of handwritten notes made by Nixon’s Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman of three discussions with the President: in February 1971, even when they thought environmental protection “has to be done”, at the same time they thought it “is not worth a damn”; in June “should take on environment—it’s not a sacred cow”; and by July 1971 they wanted to put the “brakes on pollution bills…when we can without getting caught”, and to “reexamine all pollution bills in terms of current economic impact”.
Richard also discussed the current EPA rulemaking under 111, especially referencing the term “best system of emission reduction”; EPA’s June 2014 legal memorandum in support of its rulemaking proposal used Senator Muskie’s own words concerning “system” as encompassing the potential for emission reductions to occur outside the fence, and to include more than just controls. He said that for EPA, Muskie is its “Mr. Clean”.
During Q&A, both panelists discussed the partisanship of the past 10-20 years contrasted with during Muskie’s era. Billings mentioned how during Muskie’s opening presentation of the Clean Air Act on the Senate floor, the presiding officer was Senator Barry Goldwater, who sent down a note (now lost to history) saying, “Ed, that is the finest speech I think I have ever heard on the floor of the U.S. Senate.” Turning to NEPA, the concept of an” environmental impact statement” developed through a personal compromise Muskie struck with Senator Jackson.
Afterwards I asked Billings, “If Ed Muskie and you were in the Senate now, what would you be doing?” He said, “If we were the majority party, holding a lot of oversight hearings to bring in all the scientists and evidence; if the minority party, writing speeches.”
And that is how the Past (or Days Passed) in Environmental Law still have major force in today’s many controversies. Oh, by the way: The Moody Blues recently released a new box set, “Timeless Flight”, and are still touring. Long live rock and environmental laws!
Posted on September 25, 2014
Momentum continues to build as investors and fund managers develop and implement policies and investment guidelines favoring sustainability and clean energy, and disfavoring -- and in certain cases shedding -- investments in companies that are major producers of carbon emissions and greenhouse gases.
While legislators and regulators continue to grapple with the means to establish and enforce mandates to fight climate change, sectors of the investment community are weighing in by redeploying capital.
Two recent developments illustrate different approaches to investor action on climate change.
In the first, Yale University’s Chief Investment Officer, David Swensen, reportedly issued a letter to Yale’s outside investment managers requesting that they take into account climate change impacts and greenhouse gas emissions in evaluating investment options. Yale’s Investment Office is reputed to oversee the second largest endowment in the U.S., valued last year at close to $21 billion.
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF), a philanthropy valued at $860 million this year, announced that it is working to divest itself from fossil fuel investments. RBF, which in 2010 had already committed ten percent of the endowment to investments consistent with the goals of its Sustainable Development program, will focus initially on coal and tar sand investments, with the goal of reducing those exposures to less than one percent of the portfolio by the end of the year, while analyzing exposure to remaining fossil fuel investments in order to implement a strategy for additional divestments in the coming years.
The Yale approach stops short of requiring divestment from existing portfolio holdings, and, as reported by the Yale Daily News, Mr. Swensen’s letter came after the Yale Corporation Committee on Investor Responsibility voted against divesting the endowment’s holdings in fossil fuel companies. Still, the Yale paper quoted the letter as stating: “Yale asks its [investment managers] to avoid companies that refuse to acknowledge the social and financial costs of climate change and that fail to take economically sensible steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”
The RBF announcement follows the growing number of individuals and institutions that have determined to sell off their fossil fuel holdings in the last few years. The announcement came a day after more than 300,000 participants gathered in New York City for The Peoples’ Climate March, and a day before commencement of the U.N. climate change summit in New York.
The New York Times cites a report from Arabella Advisors that investors ranging from wealthy individual to pension funds, and from philanthropic and religious organizations to local governments, have committed to divesting over $50 billion in fossil fuel investments and to turning to investments in cleaner energy.
Socially responsible investment strategies are nothing novel; funds dedicated to such benchmarks have been around for years. But as the Times article pointed out, it is notable that the latest reported entrant in the fossil fuel divestment trend is a fund established by a family whose wealth was substantially derived from the oil industry.
Posted on August 25, 2014
On August 12th, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision that arguably explains everything from why the Tea Party exists to why otherwise calm and sane executives suddenly lose all their hair. Perhaps most astounding, the decision is clearly correct. Perhaps the law is an ass.
In 2008, Avenal Power submitted an application to EPA for a PSD permit to construct a new 600 MW natural gas-fired power plant in Avenal, California. Although section 165(c) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to act on such applications within one year, EPA failed to do so.
Subsequently, and before EPA ever did issue a permit, EPA revised the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for NOx. Avenal Power apparently could demonstrate that emissions from the new plant would comply with the old NAAQS, but could not demonstrate that it would not cause an exceedance of the new NAAQS. After some waffling, EPA took the position that it could grandfather the permit application and review it under the prior NAAQS. Citizen groups appealed and the Court of Appeals held that EPA had no authority to grandfather the application.
To the Court, this was a simple application of Step 1 of Chevron. The Court concluded that sections 165(a)(3) and (4) and 110(j) of the CAA unambiguously require EPA to apply the NAAQS in effect at the time a permit is issued. Thus, EPA has no discretion to grandfather permit applications, even though EPA was required by law to issue a permit decision at a time when more lenient requirements were in effect.
I think that the Court’s decision is clearly right on the law. The statutory language seems unambiguous. But what did the Court have to say to those who feel that the result is inequitable, because Avenal was legally entitled to a decision in one year, and would have obtained its permit if EPA had acted timely? Pretty much, tough luck:
Finally, EPA relies heavily on the argument that the equities weigh in favor of Avenal Power. In short, we agree. Avenal Power filed its application over six years ago, and endeavored to work with EPA for years, even after filing suit, to obtain a final decision. But however regrettable EPA’s treatment of Avenal Power has been, we simply cannot disregard the plain language of the Clean Air Act, or overlook the reason why an applicant must comply with revised and newly stringent standards —that is, “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.” Honoring the statute’s plain language and overriding purpose, we must send EPA and Avenal Power back to the drawing board. (Emphasis added.)
In other words, EPA screwed up, and Avenal Power got screwed. Imagine having to explain that to your client.
Posted on August 4, 2014
For those who may be interested in the interplay of renewable energy, climate change and the public trust doctrine, I have a new article out in the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal on how federal and state public trust doctrines can be more central in the work and advocacy of environmental lawyers. The article (co-written with one of my students, Patrick Lyons), “THE SEAS ARE CHANGING: IT’S TIME TO USE OCEAN-BASED RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, AND A GREEN THUMB TO PROTECT SEAS FROM OUR CHANGING CLIMATE”, demonstrates how the public trust doctrine (PTD) can play a role in protecting ocean and coastal resources from climate change.
More specifically, the Article proposes that both federal and state PTDs can help protect traditional trust values of commerce, navigation and fishing—in addition to modern trust values of protecting tidal wetlands, estuaries, and wildlife—through establishing ocean-based renewable energy (ORE) as a public trust value. In addition to elevating ORE to equal footing with traditional trust values, we call for placing a “green thumb” on the scales of balancing competing trust values to explicitly guide courts and agencies alike to operate under a rebuttable presumption favoring ORE over other PTD values because of its ability to help reduce carbon and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This way, ocean based renewable energy would benefit public trust resources that are now being damaged by use of non-renewable energy sources—for example, the National Research Council (NRC), using 2005 dollars, that U.S. fossil fuel energy production caused $120 billion in damage, primarily through damages to human health from air pollution, and another $120 billion in damages from climate change, such as harm to ecosystems and infrastructure, insurance costs, negative effects of air pollutants, and national security risks.
The article first provides a brief overview of the history of the PTD in the United States, including its adoption from English common law and its evolution to its present status among the various states, and an introduction to the current legal framework governing federal ocean resources and sets up the argument for recognizing a federal PTD. It then focuses on climate change, how it is currently impacting the earth’s ecosystems, and the potential detrimental effects to our planet if carbon emissions are left unabated. We further document how climate change is affecting public trust resources and highlights the degradation and alteration these resources have already experienced, calling on all levels of government to fulfill their fiduciary obligation to protect ocean and coastal resources from the impacts of climate change.
With that as the foundation, we move to a discussion of offshore wind, tidal and wave energy, and the variety of public trust-like language found throughout the federal legislation that has authority over the permitting and compliance of ORE projects. We then bring PTD, climate change, and ORE together, in order to establish the basis for a federal PTD and legitimize its inception through common law, legislation, and executive order. The Article concludes by providing examples of how ORE can be incorporated into both federal and state PTDs, providing courts and governmental agencies with a doctrine that encourages and requires the utilization of ocean and coastal resources for harnessing clean, renewable energy in an effort to mitigate the impacts of climate change.
I hope you find it useful in your law and non-law work. Ironically, it was exactly fifty years ago that one of the leading songwriters wrote and sang these words:
Come gather around people, wherever you roam / And admit that the waters around you have grown / And accept it that soon you'll be drenched to the bone / If your time to you is worth savin’ / Then you better start swimmin’ or you'll sink like a stone / For the times they are a-changin’.
Isn’t it well past time to heed that warning and combat the rising levels of greenhouse gases, temperatures, seas, health care costs and storm damages by making maximum use of the clean, renewable energy available and waiting off our shores?
Posted on July 10, 2014
Last Monday June 23, it was the Supreme Court’s turn in the UARG case to decide whether EPA could “tailor” its climate policy to fit the PSD and operating permit programs in the current Clean Air Act. Both the Court and EPA faced the issue without any precise guidance from the missing branch: Congress.
As a result, yet another court – the DC Circuit – must next consider the proper remedy in the UARG case and, if past DC Circuit decisions are a sound guide, remand the matter back to EPA to take action consistent with the courts’ decisions. The DC Circuit will almost certainly not tell EPA what it can do, nor should it tell EPA how to exercise its remaining substantial discretion. The courts are only telling EPA what it cannot do in certain respects. Thus, the courts’ guidance to EPA is limited.
EPA will retain considerable discretion when it tries again to regulate GHG emissions from major stationary sources and major stationary source modifications under titles 1 and 5 of the Clean Air Act. EPA has loads of options, as many commenters pointed out during the prior EPA rulemaking. The options may fit the current Clean Air Act to varying degrees. In the words of the Supreme Court in the June 23 UARG decision, though, “Even under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must operate ‘within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’” (J. Scalia for the Court, slip opinion at p. 16)
EPA may try to avoid options that would be most vulnerable to challenge under the principles expressed by the Court in the UARG opinion. One Court majority held that EPA lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s numerical thresholds governing the PSD and operating permit programs. A different Court majority upheld EPA’s BACT rules for GHGs. Some commenters will undoubtedly urge EPA to continue its drive towards regulating GHGs under titles 1 and 5 of the current Clean Air Act. But, EPA should re-solicit the broadest public comment and carefully consider all options, as the Supreme Court requires under the Chevron standard of judicial review. After all, there will be a national election in 2016 and there will be a new Administration with its own views on the options. If the current Administration wishes to leave a lasting legacy in this area, it would be well advised to act on the basis of the most solid record and adopt moderate, fully vetted polices that can survive. As retiring Congressman John Dingell recently said in a farewell speech held by the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., “Compromise is an honorable word."
Congress is very unlikely to provide any additional guidance in this area any time soon, though. The nation will miss some basic policy decisions and compromises, such as:
• Should the PSD and operating permit programs apply to GHGs? How?
• Which sources should be covered? When? With a phase-in? Tied to what?
• In the PSD program, can and should BACT work the same way for GHGs as for criteria pollutants?
• In the operating permit program, when should sources have to add GHG provisions (since there aren’t yet any substantive requirements for the operating permits to pick up)?
• What substantive requirement should EPA develop and for which sources? When? E.g., should EPA set GHG emissions standards or other requirements for power plants and other source categories under section 111(d) of the Act, as EPA recently proposed?
• What role(s) should state and local agencies and programs play?
In the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, Congress resolved issues like these in the Act itself. The leading precedent is title 4 – acid rain – where Congress even allocated emissions of SO2 by individual numbered electric power generators in named powerplants in named states. Both houses and both parties held hands and made this deal under the Capitol dome – a deal which has resulted in a stunning and stable policy success. The acid rain deal largely avoided the dilemmas that EPA and the courts now face in dealing with stationary source permitting under titles 1 and 5 of the Clean Air Act. It seems most likely that whatever EPA does next under the current Clean Air Act will be challenged vigorously in court – again and again – until Congress can once again come together under the dome.
Posted on June 27, 2014
Having unleashed EPA rulemaking of unprecedented scale in Massachusetts v. EPA (holding GHGs are “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act (CAA) that EPA must regulate upon finding “endangerment”) and having further acknowledged EPA’s GHG authority in AEP v. Connecticut (holding CAA displaces federal nuisance common law), early this week in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency et al., the Supreme Court started the inevitable process of reining in the Agency’s exercise of its potentially boundless GHG authority under a statute designed for regulation of conventional air pollutants. Although interpretive gymnastics would be required whatever direction it took, the Court decided in a fractured decision that the CAA’s preconstruction Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V operating permit programs allow EPA to impose Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for GHGs only when a source has triggered these programs “anyway” due to its conventional criteria pollutant emissions.
The consolidated cases below challenged a full basket of major EPA GHG rulemakings, including EPA’s endangerment finding, motor vehicle regulations (the Tailpipe Rule) and stationary source permitting rules. But the Court granted certiorari on only one question - whether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under one part of the Act triggered permitting requirements under the Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases under another part of the Act. The Court rejected EPA’s PSD and Title V Triggering and Tailoring Rules, leaving intact only the ancillary BACT review of a source’s non-de minimis GHG emissions when a source otherwise undergoes PSD review for conventional pollutants.
The PSD program requires a permit to construct or modify a “major emitting facility”—defined as any stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” or 100 tons per year for certain types of sources—in areas where the PSD program applies. To qualify for a permit, the facility must, among other things, comply with emissions limitations that reflect BACT for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the CAA. Title V requires a comprehensive operating permit to operate any “major source”—defined as any stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant”—wherever located.
Recognizing that applying these thresholds to GHGs would result in permitting for numerous small sources, such as schools, hospitals and even large homes, EPA promulgated the so-called Tailoring Rule with special thresholds for GHGs that would apply in addition to the statutory thresholds and said that it would revisit whether to continue applying these special thresholds after five years, during which time it would study the feasibility of extending permitting to the small sources per the statutory thresholds. Under Step 1 of the Tailoring Rule, commencing January 2, 2011 (the effective date for its Tailpipe Rule), it obligated sources already required to obtain permits under the PSD program or Title V (so-called “anyway” sources) to comply with BACT for GHGs if they emitted at least 75,000 tons per year (tpy) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) units. Then, under Step 2, commencing July 1, 2011, it obligated sources with the potential to emit at least 100,000 tpy of CO2e to obtain permits under the PSD program and Title V for construction and operation, and sources with the potential to emit at least 75,000 tpy of CO2e to obtain permits under the PSD program for modifications. These higher thresholds were needed on a temporary basis, according to the EPA, because the number of permit applications would otherwise grow by several orders of magnitude, exceeding the agency’s administrative resources and subjecting to the major permit programs sources that Congress clearly did not intend to cover. EPA’s Tailoring Rule also contemplated a Step 3 where GHG permitting would apply to additional sources as well as a five year study on how to extend the program to remaining sources per the statutory thresholds.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, concluded that EPA’s legal interpretation that the PSD and Title V programs were triggered once EPA regulated GHGs under the mobile source program not only is not compelled, but moreover, simply is not reasonable. He reasoned that the “air pollutants encompassed by the Act-wide definition as interpreted in Massachusetts” are not the same “air pollutants referred to in the permit-requiring provisions” at issue. This is so because EPA has routinely given “air pollutant” in the permit-requiring provisions a narrower, context-driven meaning. The same five justices also concluded that EPA is not permitted to augment with additional thresholds – even temporarily, as EPA claimed – the 100 tpy and 250 tpy statutorily-defined thresholds for triggering the PSD program and Title V permitting requirements. He writes that the need for such an adjustment simply demonstrates that the PSD program and Title V were never intended to be expanded in this way, and adds that the EPA does not have the power to “rewrit[e] unambiguous statutory terms” such as the statutorily-defined numerical thresholds for applying the PSD program and Title V.
Justice Scalia, joined in this part by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, then determined that the EPA reasonably interpreted the CAA to require that those new and modified sources already subject to PSD permitting due to their potential to emit conventional criteria pollutants also must comply with BACT for GHGs. In this context, he emphasizes that the statutory language – once permitting already has been triggered – requiring BACT “for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” contextually leaves less room for interpretations that could limit BACT to a smaller set of pollutants, in contrast to the triggering “any air pollutant” language, which must be read contextually in a more limited manner. Additionally, he argues that applying BACT to greenhouse gases “is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable.”
Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. He joins the Court’s opinion as to the application of BACT to greenhouse gases, but asserts that the EPA is also permitted to interpret the CAA so as to trigger permitting requirements for stationary sources that emit an adjusted threshold level of greenhouse gases. Justice Alito concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice Thomas. He argues that neither the EPA’s interpretation of provisions triggering permitting requirements nor its interpretation regarding BACT is permissible.
The Court’s decision to require independent PSD and BACT applicability before subjecting sources to BACT for GHG emissions squares fully with significant industry input to EPA early in its discussion of stationary source permitting. Our National Climate Coalition, for example, urged EPA to embrace such an interpretation in our 2009 Tailoring Rule comments and 2010 PSD White Paper.
Although this decision does not directly affect EPA’s authority to regulate stationary source GHG emissions by establishing New (or Existing) Source Performance Standards under section 111 of the Act, it portends significant challenges for the agency’s recent §111(d) proposal. Most notable are the several statements in the 5-4 portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion in which he cautions the agency not to “rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.” In articulating the Court’s test for whether an agency interpretation of ambiguous terms is reasonable, he stresses that an interpretation is less likely be viewed as reasonable to the extent it:
brings about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a ‘significant portion of the American economy,’ [cite omitted], we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’
This portion of the Court’s ruling will likely figure prominently in the Court’s inevitable review of the agency’s §111(d) proposal. It thus may behoove EPA to consider in its final rulemaking approaches that bring the existing source program somewhat closer to its traditional rulemakings under that section.
Posted on June 12, 2014
Buoyed by favorable recent Supreme Court and DC Circuit decisions recognizing EPA’s broad discretion under the Clean Air Act, on Monday, June 2, EPA scaled new heights of legal adventurism by proposing the Clean Power Plan, a greenhouse gas reduction program for the power sector that would compel states to implement supply- and demand-side energy strategies. EPA projects that its proposal would achieve approximately a 30% reduction from 2005 levels by 2030.
EPA’s action is under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, a little-utilized section that authorizes EPA to set emission guidelines for states to regulate listed source categories whose emissions are not regulated under either the Act’s criteria pollutant program under section 108 or the hazardous air pollutant program of section 112. The College recently prepared an excellent overview of section 111 authority for the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS).
Certain aspects of EPA’s proposal are worth noting. First, in stark contrast to prior stationary source rules, EPA seeks to harness the entire energy system, not just efforts at individual sources. The bulk of the proposed emission reductions will come not from the minor expected heat rate improvements at individual electric generating units (EGUs)(EPA’s first “building block”), but from directing states to increase generation at natural gas plants and renewables while reducing electricity demand. Three of EPA’s four “building blocks” thus address emission reductions that are outside the control of EGUs, the listed source category. Consistent with this approach, EPA proposes a portfolio enforcement approach by which states would be authorized to oblige entities other than the affected source for the reductions in building blocks two through four. The proposal calls for an overall state energy plan, not just for implementing emission reduction opportunities available to individual sources.
Second, the proposal does not establish common performance standards, but sets highly-variable standards for each state based on EPA’s assessment of the state’s individual capacity to reduce emissions under each of the four building blocks. EPA clearly listened to state pre-proposal input regarding material differences in each state’s EGU portfolio, its capacity to harness wind and solar generating technologies and other state differences.
Although the proposal’s projected benefits reflect an estimated 30% emission reduction from 2005 levels, EPA actually uses 2012 as the baseline for measuring a state’s starting carbon intensity. Because EPA sets each state’s interim and future carbon intensity targets based on the state’s capacity for reducing, shifting or avoiding EGU emissions, it is not surprising that the proposal does not provide any state with early action credit in the traditional sense. Some states are further along on their individual progress lines, but as currently designed the proposal does not allow any state to monetize its early reductions nor to avoid future progress based on its prior actions. This means that some states will be expected to do more than others for the foreseeable future. And, unless a true early action mechanism is included in EPA’s final rule, some states, such as California, may continue to incur net energy costs higher than their neighbors.
Several commenters have noted the material legal risk that EPA takes with this proposal. Among the many expected challenges will be that EPA cannot regulate EGUs under section 111(d) because the House version of that section precludes such regulation if the source category already has been listed under section 112. The proposal also could be challenged for including in the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER) emission reductions outside the control of the source and for obliging the state and entities other than EGUs to achieve such reductions. EPA argues in its proposal that it can require states to consider any measure that has the effect of reducing EGU emissions (i.e., an “effects” or “ends” test), but some will argue that section 111 only allows EPA to require those emission reduction options (i.e., “means”) available to the EGU itself.
Should EPA fail to finalize one or both of its section 111(b) new and modified/reconstructed unit proposals, then it may be challenged for a failure to finalize the prerequisite 111(b) rule. Other challenges could relate to an alleged failure properly to subcategorize facilities and for stepping beyond its emission reduction role to, in essence, regulate a state’s energy policy.
EPA has left some important design issues unresolved. EPA strongly encourages interstate cooperation, including the use of emissions trading, but it leaves the actual shape of such linkages undefined. Similarly unresolved is the question of how states can interact if they act alone. Given the regional nature of power markets and the fact that emission reductions occurring in one state often result from investment (on either the supply or demand side) in another, states and companies will need to know the ground rules for adjudicating potentially-conflicting claims for state plan credit and company compliance credit. EPA seeks comment on these and other critical issues.
For those interested, a more substantive analysis of the proposal can be found here.
Posted on April 22, 2014
Apart from a relatively mild editorial in the New York Times, the April 13, 2014 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warning that despite global efforts, greenhouse gas emissions actually grew more quickly in the first decade of the 21st century than in each of the three previous decades, was greeted, let us say, rather tepidly. In essence, the IPCC report declared that meeting the consensus goal limit of two degrees Celsius of global warming by mid-century would require mitigation measures on an enormous scale which, if not begun within the next decade, would become prohibitively expensive thereafter. As the New York Times put it, this is “the world’s last best chance to get a grip on a problem that . . . could spin out of control.”
Humankind’s track record for global cooperation on any scale is not good. When was the last time world peace broke out, or global poverty became a worldwide priority? The 2008 re-make of the 1951 classic film, The Day the Earth Stood Still, illustrates the problem. In the original movie, the alien civilization sent police robots to stop human aggression and nuclear weapons from spreading beyond Earth; in the re-make, the alien civilization decided that our species would have to be eliminated lest it destroy one of the rare planets in the universe capable of enormous biodiversity. In pleading with the alien for another chance, Professor Barnhardt says, “But it’s only on the brink that people find the will to change. Only at the precipice do we evolve.” And, of course, eventually and after a pretty flashy show of power and destruction, the alien rescinds the death sentence, agreeing with the Professor that at the precipice, humans can change.
Are we there yet? At the precipice? Hard to know. As Seth Jaffe pointed out in his April 14, 2014 post, global giant ExxonMobil has recognized the reality of climate change, but doubts there is sufficient global will to do much about it. On the other hand, the American Physical Society warmed the hearts of climate change skeptics in appointing three like-minded scientists to its panel on public affairs. I tend to agree with that great fictional academic, Professor Barnhardt; it will take something that all humankind recognizes as the clear and unmistakable hallmark of the precipice before we collectively put on the brakes. In the meantime, we muddle through to the next opportunity, the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris in December 2014, the first such summit meeting on climate change since Rio in 1992.