Posted on January 12, 2017
As the Obama Administration comes to an end and the Trump Administration is about to begin, I want to reflect on the current relationship between EPA and state environmental agencies. I have been active in the environmental law arena for over 30 years, in private practice, in the Office of General Counsel at EPA, and for the past six years as a state environmental commissioner. In addition, for four of the past six years, I served as an officer for the Environmental Council of States (ECOS). In each of those roles, I have witnessed the give and take relationship between EPA and state environmental agencies.
This has not been a static relationship. Over the past few years, the working relationship between state agencies, ECOS, and EPA has improved substantially - even when strong differences concerning particular regulatory initiatives or policies exist. For example, even those states opposed to EPA’s Clean Power Plan rule readily acknowledge that EPA’s outreach to stakeholders, and especially their state partners, was unprecedented. In many other cases, Administrator McCarthy and her team worked collaboratively as partners with states in addressing an issue. Indeed, it has become the way to do business. This change in culture across EPA is due in large part to the efforts of EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy, and current and former Deputy Administrators Stan Meiburg and Bob Perciasepe. Together they reached out to states, brought them to the table and found committed, willing partners in ECOS members. They listened and treated states as equal partners. Their leadership made clear that all parts of EPA should follow that partnership model.
Truly, the relationship between EPA and the states has matured to a working relationship of joint governance. One of my state colleagues has commented that if you said “co-regulator” to EPA ten years ago, they would flinch. Today, states and EPA leaders use that term freely and are engaged in many projects together as partners to protect public health and the environment in an efficient and cost effective way. We have moved from a parent- child relationship to equal partners. This has been a positive both for state and federal entities, but also for regulated industry, environmental organizations, and the public.
As Administrator McCarthy and her leadership team prepare to depart, it’s clear that the new Administration will have different policy goals. That is the consequence of elections and change of Administrations. Regardless of the substantive policy decisions that will be confronted in the days ahead, I hope the efforts made over the past few years by Administrator McCarthy and her team to foster a more collaborative approach between EPA and the states will continue.
Posted on July 7, 2016
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) legal practitioners and every American interested in chemical safety celebrated President Obama’s signature Wednesday, June 22, 2016, of H.R. 2576, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act. The bill extensively amends TSCA, the federal chemical management law, and President Obama’s signature made the Act immediately effective. The amendments go a long and comforting way in fixing what was wrong with TSCA, and empower the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to identify and manage chemical risks more efficiently and effectively.
EPA wasted no time in beginning the challenging task of implementing the new law, and on June 22, rolled out a web page on the new law. EPA’s web page includes links for users to access: the text of the new law; answers to frequently asked questions (FAQ) on the new law; a brief summary of the provisions found in the new law; and Administrator McCarthy’s blog post -- TSCA Reform: A Bipartisan Milestone to Protect Our Health from Dangerous Chemicals.
On the whole, the new TSCA is vastly improved and, if implemented smartly, will make good on fulfilling the promise to make TSCA a truly muscular law that ensures chemical safety and public health. While there are many, many implications of the law’s enactment, its most immediate effect will be on the new chemicals review process. Under old TSCA, entities wishing to bring a new chemical or significant new use of an existing chemical (new chemical) to market submitted a notification and, if the 90-day review period lapsed without notice from EPA, commercialization could occur as permitted under the conditions of the notification. Speed to market and predictability are critical to innovation and business equilibrium. Under new TSCA, EPA must make one of three affirmative determinations: (1) that the new chemical presents an unreasonable risk; (2) that there is insufficient information on the new chemical to decide, or, in the absence of sufficient information, that it may present unreasonable risk, or that the substance is produced in substantial qualities and can be expected to enter the environment or pose substantial exposure risks; or (3) that the new chemical is not likely to present an unreasonable risk.
For new chemicals in the review process on June 22, TSCA Section 26 gives EPA discretion to apply old TSCA to pending notifications not yet “dropped” from EPA review. Importantly, EPA has interpreted this provision and notes on its new webpage “[f]or companies that submitted premanufacture notices (PMNs) prior to enactment and which are currently undergoing review, the new law effectively resets the 90-day review period. The agency will make every effort to complete its review and make a determination within the remaining time under the original deadline. EPA will be making additional information available on new chemical reviews in the very near future.”
EPA has the discretion to proceed in this way, but a preferred interpretation would have been to continue to apply the old TSCA provisions to pending cases for some time period into the future. While clarity is welcomed, the more flexible alternative reading would have allowed for a smoother and more measured transition. The take away here is that pending notifications will have their 90-day clocks reset (it is not entirely clear from what date the clock restarts), and submitters will need to recalibrate their delayed commercialization trajectory accordingly. More information is available in the Bergeson & Campbell, P.C. (B&C®) memorandum TSCA Reform: An Analysis of Key Provisions and Fundamental Shifts in the Amended TSCA and in the new B&C blog TSCAblog.com.
Posted on July 6, 2016
The Mined Lands Act directs the Bureau of Land Management to issue regulations governing mining on public lands for, inter alia, “the protection of the interests of the United States, . . . and for the safeguarding of the public welfare.” More recently, the Federal Lands Policy Management Act specifically directs the BLM to take environmental issues into account in promulgating regulations governing the use of federal lands, that is, to manage federal lands in a way,
That will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values,
Last year, acting under these statutory authorities, the BLM issued regulations governing fracking on federal lands, which required federal lessees to disclose chemicals in their fracking fluids and to take measures to prevent well leakage. This week, the Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming struck down these regulations as exceeding BLM’s authority to regulate mining on public lands. The Court purported to find this result under the Chevron step I analysis, i.e., finding specific congressional intent that the Bureau of Land Management does not have authority to protect groundwater on public lands. Despite the broad statutory authorities cited above, the Court found that the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which specifically exempted fracking from EPA regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act, evidenced Congressional intent that no federal agency has jurisdiction to regulate fracking activities, even on federal lands.
This ruling ignores the obvious difference between EPA regulation to protect groundwater generally under the Safe Drinking Water Act and actions by the BLM to protect the United States’ own properties that are subject to federal leases. FLPMA specifically directs BLM to take measures to protect ecological interests in managing federal lands, and it seems inappropriate for a federal court to second guess BLM’s balance between resource extraction and groundwater protection. The United States in general has very broad authority to regulate activities on its own land, and Congress’ decision to exempt fracking on private lands from EPA regulation can’t possibly be read as specific Congressional intent to preclude BLM from protecting groundwater on lands owned by the United States. On another level, this decision reflects a concerning trend towards judicial activism tearing down the Obama administration’s invocation of statutory authorities to advance environmental protection in the face of a hostile Congress – witness the Supreme Court’s stay of EPA’s Clean Power Plan, and the Sixth Circuit’s stay of the Clean Water Rule.
Environmental law got its start when courts, like the Second Circuit in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, read broad statutory grants of regulatory authority to include environmental protection. This decision by the District of Wyoming departs from that tradition. The BLM plans to appeal.
Posted on June 9, 2016
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence had a huge impact on environmental law. Part I focused on standing. This short piece addresses his impact on takings and Administrative Law.
Modern takings jurisprudence is also Justice Scalia’s handiwork. He, more than any other Justice, was inclined to find government regulation – particularly that which serves environmental ends – “goes too far” and thus constitutes a regulatory taking warranting just compensation. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, he held for the majority that a state law designed to protect barrier islands constituted a compensable taking when it had the effect of depriving a developer of what he considered to be all economic use. And in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Justice Scalia—again for the majority—held that a requirement that a shorefront property owner maintain a public pathway to a public beach was “illogical” and constituted a compensable taking.
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence makes policymakers think twice about regulating in the environmental realm.
Deference to Agency Rulemaking
Justice Scalia was consistently skeptical of environmentally-protective interpretations by federal agencies, especially those by EPA. In Rapanos v. EPA, writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court, he rejected the Army Corps of Engineers’ interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s term “navigable waters” to include temporally-saturated areas, instead insisting on a direct surface water connection to a water that is “navigable in fact.” Likewise, he joined the Court’s decision in SWANCC v. Army Corps of Engineers, holding that Congress did not intend to permit the Corps and EPA to regulate dredging and filling of isolated ponds and wetlands that are not adjacent to otherwise navigable waters, under what was known as the “migratory bird rule.” Most recently, in Michigan v. EPA, he wrote for the majority to invalidate EPA’s mercury and toxics rule, finding it unreasonable “to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.” And shortly before he died, he joined four other justices to order a stay of EPA’s Clean Power Plan.
Yet Scalia was more inclined to defer to EPA interpretations that were less environment-minded. For instance, in Entergy v. Riverkeeper, he wrote on behalf of the majority to uphold EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis in assessing “best technology available” for minimizing the adverse environmental effects of cooling water intake structures under section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act. Likewise, he dissented in EPA’s favor in Massachusetts v. EPA, voting to uphold the agency’s decision at that point that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act.
Early during his tenure on the bench, however, Justice Scalia seemed more inclined to endorse the edict from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, to defer to “reasonable” statutory interpretations from mission-oriented agencies. For example, in EDF v. Chicago, Scalia on behalf of the Court upheld EPA’s interpretation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that “solid waste” includes ash from municipal waste incinerators. And then in dissent he decried the result in U.S. v. Mead Corp., where the Court strayed from the Chevron standard by granting only “power to persuade” as opposed to “reasonableness” deference to agency interpretations that are not the result of a deliberative process.
Last, Whitman v. American Trucking stands as a bit of an outlier to Scalia’s seeming antipathy to EPA’s reach, in which his majority opinion upheld as an “intelligible principle” under the non-delegation doctrine Congress having EPA establish national ambient air quality standards that are “requisite” to protect human health and the environment.
Justice Scalia’s views on deference to rulemaking gave agencies – except for EPA – more leeway. For further reading on these subjects, please see Principles of Constitutional Environmental Law.
Posted on June 9, 2016
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence had a huge impact on environmental law. Part I focuses on standing. Part II (a forthcoming post) then turns to takings and Administrative Law.
Justice Scalia’s most lasting legacy on environmental law is how his jurisprudence makes it more difficult for environmental plaintiffs to demonstrate constitutional standing under Article III of the Constitution. Since at least Sierra Club v. Morton, plaintiffs needed to show that they possessed an “injury in fact,” which could be commercial, economic, aesthetic, or environmental. Raising the bar, Scalia stated that plaintiffs must demonstrate at an “irreducible minimum”: (1) imminent and concrete “injury-in-fact” that is (2) fairly “traceable” to the defendant’s actions, and (3) “redressible” by the court. Applying this standard, Scalia found standing lacking in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, because using land “in the vicinity of” affected federal land wasn’t sufficient, and in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, due to the absence of what has come to be known as “tickets in hand” to return to the places of alleged injury. Dissenting in Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Blackmun, bemoaned Scalia’s new requirements as “a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing.”
Justice Scalia then dissented in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services v. EPA, when the majority held that it is injury to the person, and not the environment, that matters in standing analysis. There, he complained that the majority had proceeded “to marry private wrong with public remedy in a union that violates traditional principles of federal standing—thereby permitting law enforcement to be placed in the hands of private individuals. I dissent from all of this.”
Justice Scalia was skeptical that the effects of climate change could ever support standing, even for states. Speaking from his dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA, Scalia would have found that petitioning states lacked standing to challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) failure to institute rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources, thereby rejecting that states are entitled to “special solicitude” in standing analysis.
Justice Scalia was more inclined to find standing when litigants challenged environmentally-protective agency action. For example, writing for a plurality, he found that alleged injury to economic interests to water districts and to corporate ranching and agricultural interests was sufficient injury in Bennett v. Spear. Moreover, he held that homeowners possessed both standing and a cause of action to challenge an EPA-issued but not enforced administrative compliance order in Sackett v. EPA.
Concur or not, Justice Scalia’s standing test took hold and stands firm. For further reading on this subject, please see Principles of Constitutional Environmental Law.
Posted on February 22, 2016
In my last blog entry, I advocated for the amendment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to eliminate the bar on pre-enforcement review as one step toward improving the investigation and cleanup of sediment sites. In this entry, I propose that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and potentially responsible parties (PRPs) significantly revise the dispute resolution process for EPA Administrative Settlement Agreements and Orders on Consent (“ASAOCs”) to require the resolution of disputes by neutral third parties unaffiliated with EPA or an affected PRP.
The goal of sediment remediation is to protect public health and the environment through prompt and cost-effective remedial action. Unfortunately, this goal has not been met at many sediment sites. At some sites, neither the public nor the PRPs have been served by investigations that have unnecessarily taken decades and wastefed hundreds of millions of dollars to undertake. EPA’s selection of remedies at many sites has been delayed and has not resulted in the selection of protective and cost-effective remedies.
Most sediment cleanups are performed in accordance with consent decrees, which appropriately vest dispute resolution authority in federal district court judges. In contrast, most sediment investigations are conducted under ASAOCs, which vest dispute resolution authority in EPA personnel. While many at EPA with responsibility for dispute resolution have the best of intentions and seek to be objective, the fact that they work for EPA, often supervise the EPA staff who made the decision leading to the dispute, and are often steeped in EPA practices renders most of them unable to serve in a truly independent role. To ensure fairer dispute resolution, ASAOCs should instead vest dispute resolution authority in neutral third parties with no affiliation with either EPA or the PRPs subject to the ASAOC. This would require the amendment of existing ASAOCs and the insertion of new dispute resolution language, which differs from EPA’s model language, in ASAOCs that have not yet been signed.
Additionally, while the dispute resolution official should be deferential to EPA, he or she should not rubber-stamp agency decisions, as currently is often the case. Where investigations have been mired in years of inaction, an independent dispute resolver with a fresh perspective may determine that EPA has sufficient data to make informed cleanup decisions and could compel agency action. At other sites where EPA is requiring PRPs to prepare feasibility studies advocating for remedies that almost certainly will fail, it is essential that a neutral decision-maker act independently to ensure that feasible remedies are selected.
EPA will resist any effort to revise its approach to dispute resolution, and it may require the intervention of elected officials or others to compel such a change. The public, EPA, and affected PRPs would all benefit from it.
Posted on February 22, 2016
As a private practitioner and former trial attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, I have advocated for timely and cost-effective cleanups that protect public health and the environment. Unfortunately, only a minority of cleanups under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) have met these criteria. Of the many impediments to the thorough, prompt and cost-effective remediation of contaminated sites, and sediment sites in particular, one of the most significant is CERCLA’s bar on pre-enforcement review of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) remedial decisions. To promote more effective and timely cleanups of sediment sites, I suggest that CERCLA be amended to eliminate the current bar on pre-enforcement review. By allowing potentially responsible parties (PRPs) to seek and obtain judicial review of EPA decisions or failures to make decisions, more progress would likely be made on more sites.
CERCLA Section 113(h) states that, with limited exceptions, “No Federal court shall have jurisdiction … to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title ….” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Despite many challenges, courts have generally upheld the validity of this provision. As a result, PRPs typically cannot challenge EPA's decisions unless EPA has sought to compel performance under an enforcement order or if EPA is acting under a consent decree. As the “opportunity” for challenge may not come until years after EPA has made its cleanup decision, most PRPs are not willing to face the risk of losing a remedy challenge and the potential imposition of treble damages.
CERCLA should be amended to allow parties to challenge agency action or inaction at other times in the process, such as during the preparation of remedial investigations and feasibility studies. At many sediment sites, EPA has delayed remediation and required parties to incur hundreds of millions of dollars during investigations. If PRPs had the opportunity to obtain judicial review of agency action and inaction earlier in the process, they could seek to compel the agency to act in a way that is consistent with CERCLA’s requirements.
Having worked at the Department of Justice when CERCLA Section 113(h) was drafted, I recall my colleagues stating at the time that a bar on pre-enforcement review was necessary to avoid the challenges of having a non-expert federal judge address complex scientific questions and to prevent PRPs from tying up EPA in litigation. I offer three suggestions in response to these concerns. First, if a federal judge were confronted with a particularly complex issue, the court could appoint a special master to handle the proceedings. Second, to encourage PRPs to seek prompt resolutions, a CERCLA amendment could require PRPs to fully comply with an agency’s directives pending resolution of the judicial dispute and impose a penalty on those parties whose challenge of agency action was unsuccessful. Third, agencies could seek an expedited hearing of disputed issues.
While it is very unlikely that Congress would consider a CERCLA amendment to address only this issue, PRPs should raise this issue the next time amendments are being considered. It will succeed only through the concerted efforts of advocates who seek more and better cleanups and those who seek prompt and reasonable government decision-making.
Posted on February 8, 2016
The ecosystem services framework focuses on the economic values humans derive from functioning ecosystems in the form of services—such as water filtration, pollination, flood control, and groundwater recharge—rather than commodities—such as crops, timber, and mineral resources. Because many of these services exhibit qualities similar to public goods, ecologists and economists began forging the concept of ecosystem services valuation in the 1990s as a way of improving land use and resource development decision making by ensuring that all relevant economic values were being taken into account when making decisions about the conservation or development of “natural capital” resources. Research on ecosystem services exploded onto the scene in ecology, economics, and other disciplines bearing on environmental and natural resources management.
The policy world quickly picked up on the ecosystem services idea as well. In 1998 the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) issued a report emphasizing the importance of the nation’s natural capital. The United Nations embraced the concept at the global scale with its Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, in which it explicitly tied ecosystem services to human prosperity.
By contrast, uptake in law has been slow to come. Almost two decades after the PCAST report, it is fair to say that the ecosystem services concept has made few inroads into achieving “law to apply” status in the form of legislative and regulatory text. In one prominent example, when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency issued a joint regulation in 2008 overhauling their policies on compensatory mitigation under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the agencies adopted a watershed-scale focus and declared that compensatory mitigation decisions would take losses to ecosystem services into account. See 33 C.F.R. 332.3(d)(1). This and the few other federal initiatives to use ecosystem services in decision making, while on the rise, have been ad hoc and uncoordinated. But a more coherent federal ecosystem services policy appears on the horizon.
On October 7, 2015, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and Office of Science and Technology (OST) issued their Memorandum for Executive Departments and Agencies on Incorporating Ecosystem Services into Federal Decision Making (the Memorandum). The Memorandum “directs agencies to develop and institutionalize policies to promote consideration of ecosystem services, where appropriate and practicable, in planning, investments, and regulatory contexts.” The goal of doing so is “to better integrate in Federal decision making due consideration of the full range of benefits and tradeoffs among ecosystem services associated with potential Federal Actions.” The scope of the policy goal is broadly stated to include all federal programmatic and planning activities including “natural-resource management and land-use planning, climate-adaptation planning and risk-reduction efforts, and, where appropriate, environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other analyses of Federally-assisted programs, policies, projects, and regulatory proposals.” To facilitate agencies in achieving its policy goals, CEQ will prepare a guidance document outlining best practices for: (1) describing the action; (2) identifying and classifying key ecosystem services in the location of interest; (3) assessing the impact of the action on ecosystem services relative to baseline; (4) assessing the effect of the changes in ecosystem services associated with the action; and (5) integrating ecosystem services analyses into decision making. In the interim, agencies have until March 30, 2016 to submit documentation describing their current incorporation of ecosystem services in decision making and establishing a work plan for moving toward the goals of the policy directive. Id. at 4. Meanwhile, CEQ has assembled a task force of experts from relevant agencies to craft a best practices implementation guidance, which will be subject to interagency review, public comment, and, by November 2016, to external peer review consistent with OMB’s information quality procedures and standards. Once the guidance is released, agencies will adjust their work plans as needed. The Memorandum also acknowledges that “ultimately, successful implementation of the concepts in this directive may require Federal agencies to modify certain practices, policies, or existing regulations to address evolving understanding of the value of ecosystem services.”
ACOEL Fellows should watch the Memorandum’s implementation over the next year closely. In particular, incorporation of best practices for ecosystem services impact assessments under NEPA would project the ecosystem services framework into state, local, and private actions receiving federal agency funding or approval. To be sure, there is plenty of work to be done before one can evaluate the Memorandum’s impact on the mainstreaming of the ecosystem services framework into environmental law. Significantly, the timeline of the Memorandum directives will deliver the best practices implementation guidance in the final months of the Obama Administration, leaving it to the incoming administration to determine where to take it. Nevertheless, simply by declaring the incorporation of ecosystem services into federal agency decision making as an Executive policy and laying out the tasks and timelines for doing so, the issuance of the Memorandum has done more to advance the ecosystem services framework as a legal concept than has any previous initiative.
Posted on February 2, 2016
Tensions ran high in eastern Oregon in early January 2016 as an armed group seized the headquarters of a national wildlife refuge. The occupation began as a protest of the sentencing of ranchers who were convicted of arson on federal lands in Oregon. The occupation subsequently became a rally for opening federal public lands to all. Entering the fray, albeit indirectly, the Ninth Circuit in its January 15, 2016 decision in United States v. Hage, held that defendants’ unauthorized grazing of cattle on federal lands in Nevada was unlawful. Contrary to the views of the Oregon occupiers that they are defending the Constitution, the Ninth Circuit held that grazing cattle without a grazing permit violated federal statutes as well as the state law of trespass, noting that a grazing permit is “a revocable privilege” and is not a “property right.” The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s ruling that the government cannot claim trespass if the cattle stayed within a reasonable distance of a source to which defendants had water rights. Concluding that the district judge “harbored animus toward the federal agencies,” the Ninth Circuit requested the Chief Judge of the Northern District of Nevada to assign the case to a different judge on remand. Meanwhile, back in Oregon, several of the protesters have been arrested. One was killed.
Posted on November 17, 2015
In a string of recent decisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appears to be shifting away from the long-standing general presumption that standing is self-evident for target entities of a regulatory program — Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. EPA, and Delta Construction Company v. EPA.
In Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit held industry had “failed to establish that the [Greenhouse Gas] Rules caused them ‘injury in fact,’ [or that] injury … could be redressed by the Rules’ vacatur.” The court found that although “Industry Petitioners contend[ed] that they are injured because they are subject to regulation of [GHGs],” they lacked standing because several aspects of “the … Rules … actually mitigate Petitioners’ purported injuries.”
In Grocery Manufacturers and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, EPA decisions concerning the ethanol regulatory program were challenged by a multitude of trade groups – automakers, oil companies, food suppliers – each claiming its members were harmed by the regulations. In twin decisions separated by over two years, the D.C. Circuit held none of this broad universe of industry petitioners had standing to challenge EPA’s actions.
In Delta Construction Company v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit held all petitioners lacked standing to seek remand of EPA’s Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) emission standards for heavy-duty trucks. Some Petitioners had attacked the Rule because the emission standards would drive up the price of the trucks they purchased; another Petitioner alleged the rule made its products—modified diesel engines to run on vegetable oil —“economically infeasible.” The Court found the Purchaser Petitioners’ standing failed on both the causation and redressibility prongs of the standing test. The Manufacturer Petitioner was determined not to fall within the “zone of interests” intended to be protected by the Clean Air Act.
These four D. C. Circuit rulings all found technical defects in the industry petitioners’ standing. They may signal a lasting shift away from the basic assumption that a regulated industry has standing to challenge regulations aimed at its activities.
Given this new, strict scrutiny of industry standing, practitioners would be well advised not to take for granted the standing of their clients. In the docketing statement for a regulatory challenge, industry counsel should substantively focus on the “brief statement of the basis for the … petitioner’s claim of standing” and reference materials in “the administrative record supporting the claim of standing.”
Posted on July 28, 2015
ACOEL Fellow John Cruden, head of DOJ’s Environment and Natural Resources Division, recently gave this speech to the ABA Litigation Section on the current direction of federal environmental enforcement efforts. The speech focuses on efforts to coordinate with and leverage local, state, regional and international partners.
Posted on February 24, 2015
In a decision lauded by local residents, Alaska Native tribal and business interests, the commercial and sport fishing communities, and conservationists, President Obama recently withdrew the Arctic waters of the North Aleutian Basin (also known as Bristol Bay) from future oil and gas leasing. As President Obama noted, Bristol Bay is a national treasure, one of Alaska’s most powerful economic engines, and home to one of the world’s largest salmon runs. At the same time, the Obama Administration is working on the next outer continental shelf leasing program, and will soon be making critical decisions about whether and how to include within it leasing in the U.S. portion of the Arctic’s Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.
Industry interest in the area is led by Shell, which holds leases in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, and as detailed in an article I recently co-authored and in a dramatic cover story in the New York Times Magazine, has experienced a stormy effort to drill there. Not content, however, to focus on the on-the-water challenges of drilling in the Arctic, Shell also pursued a novel legal strategy by preemptively suing its critics in an effort to smooth the waters for its drilling.
After receiving approval from U.S. agencies for various aspects of its drilling plans, Shell filed lawsuits against conservation groups alleging that the groups were engaged in an “ongoing campaign to prevent Shell from drilling in the Arctic” and that it was “virtually certain” that the groups would challenge the federal approvals. Shell sought a declaration from the courts that the approvals were legal.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion rejecting Shell’s strategy on the jurisdictional ground that the Declaratory Judgment Act, on which Shell had based its strategy, “does not create new substantive rights, but merely expands the remedies available in federal courts.” The court noted that the law underlying Shell’s request for declaratory judgment was the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which allows a party aggrieved by agency action to seek judicial review of that action, and that since it is only the agency that can be sued under the APA, “it would be odd to conclude that a [jurisdictionally-required] case or controversy exists merely because Shell seeks to know who would prevail if the environmental groups asserted an APA claim against the [agency].” Indeed, as the court found, were it to hold otherwise, its “holding would create several unusual consequences,” two of which it found “particularly noteworthy”:
First, it would allow a district court to declare the [agency]’s actions unlawful under the APA in a judgment that is not binding on the [agency] itself. ... Second, absent agency intervention, such a lawsuit would allow the lawfulness of agency action to be adjudicated without hearing the agency’s own justification for its actions.
I would suggest that two other “unusual consequences” of a ruling for Shell would have been the upsetting of the historical body of administrative law guiding judicial review of federal agency action and an illegal limit on the First Amendment right of citizens to petition the government.
Posted on December 12, 2014
Even before the Republican sweep of the mid-term elections in November 2014, working for the Federal Government in general and EPA in particular has not been – shall we say – always “fun” for the typical federal employee. Regardless of the party in power, federal employees always play the whipping boy (or girl) for any politician trying to make a point. When your agency is in the lead on making headline-grabbing news that enflame the core on the right and the left, such as with EPA, the invective target is placed squarely on that Agency, and by extension, its employees.
For many of the last dozen years, EPA has been accused of being a job-killer on one hand and indifferent to the health impacts of pollution on the other. More recently it has become the poster child for supposed incompetence when it comes to the basic tenets of good management by keeping porn-watchers, phony spies, and “healthy-but-still-on-medical leave” personnel on the payroll. It has seen its staffing cut by almost 15%.
Of EPA’s 14 Senate-confirmed positions, six are held by career employees in an “acting” capacity; and two are simply vacant. Senior agency officials point to employee morale as their primary management concern. With expectations of an increase in Washington gridlock and an accompanying increase in oversight hearings likely on the full panoply of Agency programs, the next two years will be particularly hard on EPA.
While some might simply say “oh pity the poor EPA employee”, I believe there will be a practical impact on companies because of this gridlock and “fed-bashing”. In addition to personnel reductions already in place, over 30% of the approximately two million civilian Federal workers are eligible for retirement.
This could result in a severe “brain drain” as employee morale continues to plummet in the face of constant Congressional investigations, criticism and budget cuts. This also will result in seasoned and experienced personnel being replaced by younger and significantly less experienced employees.
Highly regulated companies usually have anywhere from dozens to thousands of weekly contacts with their Federal regulators, usually for routine operating, permitting and approval questions and approvals. As experienced personnel are replaced by those who are less experienced, or in many instances not replaced at all, these routine business activities will increasingly be subject to delays which may ultimately have serious impacts on the company.
Company estimates for a major capital improvement could be off by months and millions of dollars if an experienced Agency permit writer retires and is either not replaced or is replaced by someone totally unfamiliar with either the program under which the permit is written or the company’s operations. In this respect the gridlock between Congress and the President has a more granular and underappreciated impact on such a company than merely being the grist for the Sunday news shows’ debates on Washington DC’s dysfunctional approach to government.
Posted on December 5, 2014
The 468 megawatt Cape Wind project, slated for construction in federal waters off the coast of Massachusetts in Nantucket Sound, is the first offshore wind project to be proposed and approved in the United States. The project has strong support from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, many national, state and local environmental groups, organized labor and many others.
But being the first in an innovative venture is always difficult, and unsuccessful litigation by project opponents – some funded in large part by billionaire Bill Koch – has slowed the pace of the project. By Cape Wind’s count, thirty-two cases have been filed by project opponents. Cape Wind has ultimately prevailed in all of these actions.
A recently issued but unheralded district court decision now signals yet another legal victory for Cape Wind.
In April 2010, after a lengthy and comprehensive environmental review and permitting process which included preparation of two environmental impact statements, the U.S. Department of Interior approved the Cape Wind project. Project opponents then filed three complaints in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The complaints, which were ultimately consolidated, challenged approval of the project by various federal agencies and alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Birds Treaty Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006.
Cape Wind intervened in the actions as a defendant-intervenor. Because of the project’s clean energy significance, NRDC attorneys (including me), joined by the New England-based Conservation Law Foundation and Mass Audubon, the state’s leading wildlife protection organization, filed two “friend of the court” briefs in support of the project.
In March 2014, U.S. District Court Judge Reggie Walton issued an 88-page decision granting summary judgment to the defendants, rejecting the bulk of opponents’ challenges to the federal government’s 2010 approval of the project. The court dismissed outright a host of claims that related to the government’s environmental review of the project under the National Environmental Policy Act and to the Coast Guard’s review of navigation issues under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
The court remanded two limited issues back to the federal agencies. First, it directed the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) to make an independent determination about whether a potential operational adjustment for the project was a “reasonable and prudent measure”. The court explained that it was unable to tell, based on the record, whether the Fish & Wildlife Service had made an independent determination or had adopted a position taken by a sister agency.
Second, the court directed the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to issue an incidental take permit covering right whales. While the NMFS biological opinion stated that the project “was not likely to adversely affect right whales” and that “incidental take was not likely to occur,” the court found that the opinion did not state that an incidental take would not occur or determine the volume of any potential take.
After the court’s decision, the two federal agencies complied with the district court’s instructions. FWS issued its independent determination with respect to the potential operational adjustment. NMFS amended the incidental take opinion to state that no take of right whales was anticipated, and thus the incidental take amount for this species could be set at zero.
However, that did not end the matter. As the district court noted in its September 12, 2014 order, “history should have forewarned that any attempt to bring this [protracted] litigation to an expeditious conclusion would prove difficult.” And as expected, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint challenging the two agencies’ actions on remand.
On November 18, 2014, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ supplemental complaint. The court made short work of the claims, finding them all to be barred – some because they had been previously waived or abandoned and some because the Court had previously considered and rejected them. Indeed, the court noted that some of the claims were “difficult to understand.” With that decision, this chapter in the long string of legal challenges was concluded, at the district court level at least. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal yesterday.
Meanwhile, the Cape Wind project continues to move forward. In July, the U.S. Department of Energy issued a conditional loan guarantee commitment for the project, the first step toward securing a $150 million loan guarantee. In August, the project selected its lead construction contractors. Construction is expected to proceed in 2015.
And Cape Wind’s example has spurred forward movement in the U.S. offshore wind industry. Currently, there are some fourteen offshore wind projects in an advanced stage of development along the East Coast and elsewhere, representing 4.9 gigawatts of potential renewable electricity capacity. Despite the protracted litigation, it’s my hope that Cape Wind, buoyed by its legal victories, will herald the start of a new renewable energy industry that will fully and sustainably tap into the United States’ huge offshore wind resource.
Posted on November 6, 2013
On November 1, President Obama issued an executive order organizing several task forces and coordinating councils to focus on climate change adaptation. Among the necessary and appropriate beltway benefactions was Section 3, which orders federal departments and agencies to “complete an inventory and assessment of proposed and completed changes to their land- and water-related policies, programs and regulations necessary to make the Nation’s watersheds, natural resources, and ecosystems, and the communities and economies that depend on them, more resilient in the face of a changing climate.” That’s quite an assignment.
The order applies specifically to Defense, Interior, Agriculture, EPA, NOAA, FEMA, and the Army Corps of Engineers. The CEQ and OMB Co-Chairs can spread the assignment to other federal agencies as need be. If you are left out of this list, you must not be very important. The required inventory must also include a “timeline and plan for making changes to policies, programs and regulations.” This is all supposed to happen in the next 9 months, a rather pregnant period of time in a variety of ways.
The scope of the task catches your attention, but perhaps the limitations should also be of interest. The inventory assignment is not supposed to include “wish lists” that have not yet been proposed or completed. It is supposed to focus on resiliency-enhancing land and water programs, rather than air programs that are usually the target of any climate change discussion. However, “agencies shall, where possible, focus on program and policy adjustments that promote the dual goals of greater climate resilience and carbon sequestration, or other reductions to the sources of climate change.”
It’s a big job. It imposes new priorities for all federal departments and agencies. Sounds almost like an Act of Congress. Come to think of it, I wonder what Congress thinks about this? I mean… I’m just sayin’...
Posted on October 17, 2013
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 75 years old—they went into effect on September 16, 1938. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has just published for public comment very significant changes to the FRCP. Every environmental litigator—indeed, every litigator—should read them. The changes are too numerous to outline completely in this blog posting, but let me highlight the proposed changes to the discovery rules.
Rule 26(b)(1), which addresses the “scope” of discovery, would be changed in three important ways. First, discovery would be limited solely to matters relevant to a party’s “claim or defense” and the former text also permitting for good cause discovery of matters “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action” will be deleted. Second, the word “proportionality” will be included in the scope of discovery. The proportionality factors that were in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) will be included specifically in the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1). With the proposed change, discovery must be “proportional to the needs of the case considering the amount in controversy, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Finally, the text “calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” has been deleted. The goal of this text originally was to make it clear that information like hearsay could be discovered since it might lead to discoverable admissible evidence. But this language has been used by many courts to expand the scope of discovery beyond its original purpose. In its place, the proposed rule will read: “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”
Rules 30 and 31 will be amended so that the presumptive limit of 10 depositions per side or for third parties and a duration limit of 7 hours for each deposition are reduced to 5 depositions per side with a maximum duration of 6 hours. Rules 30 and 31 still would require the district court to grant leave to take more depositions as long as that outcome is consistent with Rules 26(b)(1) and (2) (currently the reference is just to Rule 26(b)(2)). Parties can stipulate to have more depositions; there is no change there. And parties can still stipulate to longer depositions and the court “must” still allow additional time “consistent with Rules 26(b)(1) and (b)(2)” (again Rule 26(b)(1) has now been added to this phrase) if needed to fairly examine the deponent, or if the deponent, another person, or any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination.
Interrogatories would be limited to 15 instead of 25 under a change to Rule 33 and for the first time requests for admissions under Rule 36 would be limited to 25 requests except as to the genuineness of documents.
With respect to responses to Rule 34 requests for production, Rule 34(b)(2)(B) would require that the grounds for objecting to a request be stated with specificity. Rule 34(b)(2)(C) would then require that an objection state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. But an objection can state that documents are not being searched if that is the case (e.g., that a search was limited to documents created after a specific date). Where a party states that it will produce documents or electronically stored information instead of permitting inspection, the production must be completed no later than the time for inspection in the request or a later reasonable time stated in the response. A corresponding change will be made to Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv) to provide that a party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling production if a party “fails to produce documents.”
There are other changes to Rule 26 and 37 as well as proposed changes to Rules 1, 4, and 16. You can read them all on the website of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
As a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, let me also encourage readers to submit comments on the proposed rules if you believe the proposals can be improved upon or should not be implemented. Commenting is easy. Go to the link above and follow the instructions to “Comment Now!” The comment period ends February 15, 2014.
Posted on August 28, 2013
A recent post from Mary Ellen Ternes characterized the August 23, 2013 decision in EME Homer City Generation as another blow to EPA’s ability to enforce against long ago violations of the requirement to obtain New Source Review.
The Third Circuit’s decision certainly is a blow to EPA’s NSR enforcement initiative, but not nearly a knock-out.
First, the decision depended on the fact that neither the Clean Air Act or Pennsylvania’s EPA-enforceable State Implementation Plan expressly requires a major source to operate in compliance with the results of a New Source Review. But some states do have that requirement in their EPA-enforceable SIPs, as the Third Circuit recognized in distinguishing other cases. In such states, major sources that did not go through NSR as allegedly required at the time of construction or modification should still anticipate potential EPA enforcement via the SIP.
Second, even where it is not illegal to operate in compliance with NSR, the question is still open whether the government may obtain injunctive relief anyway. In United States v. United States Steel Company (N.D. Indiana), the Court held on August 21, 2013 that no penalties could be imposed at law because there is no federally enforceable requirement in Indiana to operate in accordance with the results of an NSR. Yet the Court went on to hold that the United States still can seek injunctive relief against a plant that allegedly violated the NSR requirement. The Court reasoned that because the sovereign is not subject to laches, the government remains able to invoke the Court’s equitable powers and to seek an injunction to correct the violation.
On to the Seventh Circuit?
Posted on August 27, 2013
Followers of this Blog will not be at all surprised with the Third Circuit’s August 22, 2013 ruling denying EPA’s requested CAA New Source Review enforcement relief against former and current owners of the grandfathered and allegedly subsequently modified power plant that has been called “one of the largest air pollution sources in the nation.” Former and current owners of such aging power plants caught in EPA’s NSR national enforcement initiative are reassured with the Third Circuit’s finding that text of the Clean Air Act does not authorize injunctive relief for wholly past PSD violations, even if that violation causes ongoing harm.
Having lost its battle for the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR, or the Transport Rule) in August 2012, EPA was dealt another blow with United States v. EME Homer City Generation, in which the Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s 2011 dismissal of the government’s claims.
In 2011, the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania agreed with the current and former owners of the power plant that EPA had no authority to hold either party liable for alleged PSD violations arising from purported modifications to their grandfathered power plant. In reaching defendants’ bases for dismissal, the District Court reviewed the permit actions approved by air permitting authorities in 1991, 1994, 1995 and 1996, which EPA alleged with Notices of Violation in 2008 (against the current owner) and 2010 (against current and former owners), to have triggered PSD, and which caused the current Title V permit to be incomplete. The Court’s holding that the PSD violations constituted singular, separate failures by the former owner rather than ongoing failures meant that EPA was outside the five year statute of limitations, allowing no civil penalties against the former and current owners. Moreover, the District Court held EPA was left with no injunctive relief against the current owner because they were in no position to apply for a PSD permit prior to their acquisition of the plant in 1998, and thus could not have violated PSD.
The District Court separately addressed EPA’s claims of injunctive relief against the former owner, recognizing the ongoing higher SO2 emissions that occurred without the benefit of an historic PSD permit. The District Court was unwilling to reach a broad conclusion regarding its authority to award injunctive relief under the PSD program, but given that the former owners no longer owned or operated the plant, and therefore no longer violate PSD, held that there was no plausible basis for granting the rare and extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief, despite the higher emissions occurring the absence of BACT, which the court characterized as a present consequence of a one-time violation.
Upon review, the Third Circuit rejected EPA’s arguments that the current owners violated PSD by operating the plant without BACT with a simple, “no,” pursuant to the plain text of 42 USC 7475(a) which references merely “construction” and “modification,” not “operation, ” relying on U.S. v. Midwest Generation and Sierra Club v. Otter Tail Power Co., adopting the positions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that “even though the preconstruction permitting process may establish obligations which continue to govern a facility’s operation after construction, that does not necessarily mean that such parameters are enforceable independent of the permitting process,” and thoroughly refuting EPA’s arguments that PSD could somehow result in ongoing operational requirements outside the PSD permitting process.
Likewise, the Third Circuit rejected EPA’s proposed injunctive relief, which would have required the former owners to install BACT or purchase emission credits and retire them, affirming the District Court’s decision on narrower grounds. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that the text of the Clean Air Act does not authorize an injunction against former owners and operators for a wholly past PSD violation, even if that violation causes ongoing harm.
Hopefully, this Third Circuit decision, along with the Seventh and Eighth Circuit decisions relied upon therein, will signal a substantive end to EPA’s NSR/PSD Enforcement Initiative for similarly situated historic grandfathered power plants and their former and current owners. But, we may have to wait out EPA’s hard headed circuit by circuit enforcement approach. See e.g., EPA’s December 21, 2013 enforcement memorandum, “Applicability of the Summit Decision to EPA Title V and NSR Source Determinations,” following the Sixth Circuit’s Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA et al.
Posted on February 7, 2013
For Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) aficionados, a new federal legislative session holds the promise of long overdue legislative reform. Among the oldest environmental laws, it is also the most neglected. While hope springs eternal, the odds are against reform any time soon. A deeply divided Congress makes any environmental measure contentious. Pile on other Congressional priorities, including immigration reform, gun safety, and climate change, and we have the makings of more Congressional inaction and gridlock.
It is against this backdrop that we await introduction of Senator David Vitter’s (R-LA) TSCA reform bill, expected this month. As the new ranking Republican on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, Senator Vitter’s much-awaited bill marks the first Republican alternative to Senator Frank Lautenberg’s (D-NJ) long-standing TSCA reform measure, the Safe Chemicals Act.
Among many contentious issues is the TSCA safety standard. Senator Lautenberg’s bill contains a “reasonable certainty of no harm” standard to replace the current “unreasonable risk” standard. This language is found in the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act and defines the applicable standard for pesticide exposures in food. A key area of controversy is whether such a standard for food safety is appropriate for chemical exposures, or otherwise represents a “zero risk” standard that likely would inspire epic regulatory costs for questionable improvements in true risk reduction. In the void left by Congressional inaction, state measures are gaining ground. The California Safer Consumer Products Regulations are expected to be issued in final form sometime this year. This game-changing approach to assessing the safety of chemicals in consumer products by requiring chemical “alternative” assessments may well become the default safety standard in the absence of federal legislation.
2013 will be a watershed year for domestic chemical management initiatives. Even if federal inaction continues, a California initiative, like so many others in the past, may prevail and take domestic chemical product safety to places and levels Congress declines to go.
Posted on November 9, 2012
We’ve all seen the advertisements. Products that are supposedly “recycled,” “environmentally friendly,” and “green,” with labels and commercials resplendent in shades of light green and yellow, seeking to evoke nature, sunlight, and a family-friendly, non-toxic product. But how “green” must a product be in order to rightfully proclaim itself to be so? The revised “Green Guides,” issued by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) on October 1, 2012, propose to answer that very question.
Originally issued in 1992, and revised in 1996 and 1998, the FTC’s “Green Guides” offer guidance to marketers on how to properly use words of environmental attribution in describing products. The Guides are examples of environmental claims that the FTC might find deceptive under the FTC Act, § 5; they are neither rules nor regulations. The current version of the Guides was released in proposed form in 2010 and received several hundred unique comments. Beyond analyzing the comments, the FTC accumulated additional information based on three public workshops and a study designed to understand how consumers perceived environmental claims. The final version of the Guides, in addition to updating its original content, provided additional information on newer types of environmental claims.
The new sections in the Guides cover carbon offsets, certifications and seals of approval, “free-of” claims, non-toxic claims, and two claims relating to the manner and materials used in production: renewable energy claims and renewable materials claims. As an illustration of the new sections, the FTC addresses deceptive practices used to claim an emissions reduction through carbon offsets. Marketers should “clearly and prominently disclose if the carbon offset” does not provide an emissions reduction for over two years. Similarly, claiming that a carbon offset corresponds to an emissions reduction that is otherwise required by law is a deceptive practice.
Other sections are modified. For example, the Guides clarify that an unqualified degradable claim must be able to show that the entire product or package will break down completely within one year after disposal. Objects that are expected to go to a landfill, incinerator, or be recycled do not degrade within a year, and thus should not be linked to such a claim. In each of its 13 total sections, the FTC provides concrete examples of practices it terms deceptive.
The Guides recommend that some environmental claims not be used at all, such as “environmentally friendly” or “eco-friendly.” The consumer study performed by the FTC found that these terms indicate wide-ranging environmental benefits that few, if any, products may obtain. The Guides do not address “sustainable,” “natural,” and “organic” to avoid conflicting or duplicative advice from other agencies that have the purview of these terms.
In order to provide assistance to the general public in understanding the Guides, the FTC produced several educational and business resources, from summaries to a highlight video to relevant legal documents. These resources, in conjunction with the Green Guides themselves, provide protection to consumers, allowing us more transparency into just how “green” our products really are.
Posted on November 7, 2012
On January 27, 2011, the Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) issued an environmental assessment (“EA”) for the Ute Lake Diversion Project in eastern New Mexico, which would withdraw up to 24,000 acre-feet per year of water from Ute Lake and transport it via hundreds of miles of pipeline to communities in eastern New Mexico. Inexplicably, the BOR found that this major federal project would not materially affect the environment and issued a finding of no significant impact (“FONSI”). Based on the FONSI, the members of the proposed pipeline (including various municipalities in eastern New Mexico), announced their intention to begin construction of a $14 million intake structure at the side of the lake, which would require detonation activities and result in a potential fish kill from the detonation and the resulting turbidity.
The Village of Logan, a small community wholly dependent on the recreational resources derived from Ute Lake, filed suit in New Mexico Federal District Court, claiming that the BOR’s decision to perform an EA was contrary to its internal regulations and that an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) must be prepared based on numerous significant environmental impacts resulting from the proposed project. Additionally, Logan claimed that numerous alternatives existed to the project, including retiring groundwater rights presently used for agriculture, or treating effluent and re-injecting water into the Ogallala Aquifer. Both options, according to Logan, would create a sustainable water source for eastern New Mexico until at least 2060.
The CEQ Regulations identify the specific circumstances under which a federal agency should perform an EIS before committing resources to a major federal action. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 provides that an EIS should be prepared where an agency’s own internal guidelines and procedures provide that a proposed federal action is the type that “normally requires” an EIS. The BOR’s internal guidelines provide that the Bureau will “normally require” the preparation of an EIS prior to the initiation of construction of any major water project, which all parties agree includes the Ute Lake Diversion Project. However, the BOR says it has discretion not to perform an EIS because the word “normally” does not mean “always.” Logan has countered by claiming that the Bureau cannot avoid an EIS unless it has developed specific procedures stating when and under what circumstances an EA may be performed, in lieu of an EIS. In the present situation, the BOR has no such guidelines identifying the projects for which an EA, rather than an EIS, may be appropriate. Accordingly, Logan contends that there is no objective basis for the Bureau to side-step the EIS requirements and that the FONSI must be reversed.
The matter is presently scheduled for a preliminary injunction hearing before the Honorable William Johnson, District Court Judge, District of New Mexico.
Posted on October 23, 2012
The technique known as hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), especially in the context of developing natural gas, continues to generate controversy, legal fees and emotion. The question remains as to whether the technique itself presents any unusual risk to the environment or natural resources. What is clear, however, is the political significance of fracturing and the challenges that our polarized, political dialog presents to achieving a rational result in or from the fracturing debate.
On the federal side, the Administration has taken steps in order to represent to voters that the President has done what he could to see that hydraulic fracturing occurs in a manner that does not threaten the environment. Concrete steps are taking place in three Agencies.
- BLM has issued draft regulations relating to fracturing activities taking place on federal lands. The proposal drew thousands of comments and no action is likely until well after the election.
- EPA issued draft guidance proposing to regulate hydraulic fracturing under the UIC program. This proposal also resulted in thousands of comments, all but precluding any chance that EPA will be in a position to act until well after the election.
- EPA is continuing its study into the possible connection between hydraulic fracturing and underground sources of drinking water. A partial report reflecting some retrospective analysis is due before year end, but the meat of the report will not be available until 2014.
- EPA continues to pursue its general investigation into the way fracturing occurs through its investigation into 9 fracturing companies. EPA has proposed to publish information reflecting well densities and chemical use relatively soon.
- EPA has reviewed and is continuing to review petitions filed by environmental organizations seeking to force the Agency to take steps to regulate fracturing under various regulatory programs, including TSCA. EPA has denied some of the relief sought, but is collecting information under some and beginning its evaluation of others.
- At the regional level, EPA has engaged in studies when citizen pressure has suggested a connection between fracturing and contaminated drinking water. This has proven to be an area where EPA has not maintained consistency or scientific integrity. The agency’s work at Dimmock, Pavillion and elsewhere has resulted principally in controversy and criticism, and has done little to advance the state of knowledge about fracturing.
- DOE Secretary Chu has been an Administration spokesman for White House efforts to coordinate the many federal entities that seem to be working on fracturing issues. His role has been above the weeds and the fact that a Secretary charged with overseeing national energy policy, if there is one, is the Administration’s front man, appears to be a bone to those suggesting the sole interest of the President is in making energy development more difficult.
- Within DOA, the Forest Service has sent mixed signals with respect to whether fracturing is viewed as posing risks to other resources. While several forests have adopted plans anticipating the development of resources within their jurisdiction, including by fracturing, the George Washington National Forest plan remains under review, having proposed to ban fracturing in its initial draft release.
- The USGS recently has entered the fray in connections with published concerns linking fracturing and increased seismic activity. Preliminary indications suggest the true focus of such efforts may be long term injection wells, rather than transient fracturing activities, but there is more to follow on this topic.
The federal role in the fracturing debate also has occurred in courts. Environmental interest groups recently have begun to raise fracturing activities in a number of lawsuits challenging the adequacy of the environmental reviews conducted in connection with federal leases. Many such cases are making their way through the courts, and are being watched for the decisions..
In his public statements, the President, of course, has been careful to promote the safe development of natural gas resources, including by fracturing. He has offered what generally have been viewed as favorable statements in his state of the union address, and more recently in his remarks at the Democratic National Convention. Of course none of those favorable comments has slowed any of the developments noted above, nor were the President’s remarks necessarily inconsistent with such action.
There is much resistance to the above federal efforts from states, and from industry which has had decades of experience accommodating state regulators in connection with drilling and developing wells. States too have been active, to varying degrees, with some devising thoughtful programs balancing the needs of developers with the concerns of some members of the public. The politicization of the issue also has reached the states, however, and nowhere is it more in evidence than in the glacial SGEIS process that has been under way for years, with no regulations on the horizon. There also have been intrastate efforts directed at fracturing by the Susquehanna River and Delaware River Basin Commissions, with the former moving forward with water management programs while the latter has, by default, banned fracturing until a compromise is agreed upon among the member sovereign constituencies.
And – don’t expect the controversy and misunderstandings surrounding fracturing to disappear soon. In addition to a small scale advocacy film last year, Hollywood is entering the fray with a major film slated for release in the not-too-distant future. Television already has managed to capitalize on the drama fracturing offers in more than one series.
Things will change after the election. Stay tuned to find out how.
Posted on September 27, 2012
Depending on how you count, advocates have led over 25 state legislatures or regulators to consider or adopt bans on certain uses of Bisphenol A (BPA), the recently publicized monomer that is (or was) present as a residual at low levels in some plastic products. Recently, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) accepted a petition from the American Chemistry Council banning use of BPA in baby bottles and sippy cups, because the use had been abandoned by manufacturers.
For many, FDA’s scientific review of BPA studies and thoughtful analysis on the merits of regulation was too slow, and to those who conclude “I don’t want exposure to any substances of concern” use-by-use regulation did not (and will never) provide comfort. What started as a concern in baby bottles and sippy cups, and was the subject of numerous state bans several years ago -- before the FDA acted this summer to acknowledge the abandonment of BPA in those bottle and sippy cups -- is more recently the subject of additional state proposals for bans from lids of food cans and containers. Some ask: “Can you please ban it from any product that may reach my children?”
Because it is difficult to get the federal machine to act quickly, why not seek an audience in your state capital? It is easier to file legislation in many states than in Congress, easier to get exercised citizens to the state capital, easier to involve local media looking for a controversy, and cheaper for citizens to play at the state level than in Washington. However, state toxicologists and regulators often don’t have the resources of the FDA, they are often not as well equipped (and certainly not as experienced) in making the necessary risk evaluations and product regulations. And putting environmental police in the grocery aisles seems to squander limited state environmental resources. As Maine DEP Commissioner Patricia Aho recently put it: “We’re environmental regulators. You’re asking us to be the FDA in some regards here.”
Even assuming states are equipped to address those issues, how can national manufacturers (or national or regional retailers) deal with state-by-state regulation of different products using the same materials? Not very well! And how are consumers to understand why chemicals in a product present acceptable risks in one state, but unacceptable risks in another? They don’t. Why is state-by-state regulation of chemicals in products in the national interest when FDA has jurisdiction? Maybe it isn’t.
Congressman Markey has petitioned the FDA for a federal ban on coatings in infant formula packages (arguing abandonment), and the federal agency has sought comment. But that petition was made after extensive state efforts against use in baby bottles and sippy cups. The FDA will consider the matter, so it may be some time before the FDA acts. In the interim, states are still being encouraged to adopt their own bans on certain uses of BPA.
FDA is even more broadly considering BPA safety and its uses under FDA jurisdiction, but in the meantime, keep your eye on your local legislature if you want to watch a messy process that is frustrating for everyone.
Posted on July 23, 2012
The Supreme Court’s recent decision on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Act) caused equal parts celebration and outrage by upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate as a tax. Environmental lawyers, however, are focusing on other, less prominent aspects of the decision, which could have implications for the constitutionality of environmental laws. These aspects are: (1) the conclusion of a bare majority of the Court that the Act’s individual mandate was not within Congress’ Commerce Power; (2) the holding -- concurred in by seven justices -- that the withholding of all Medicaid funds from states refusing to expand their coverage as required by the Act exceeded Congress’ power under the Spending Clause and ran afoul of the anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment.
The Court’s Commerce Clause ruling addressed the individual mandate’s requirement that those not participating in the health insurance market purchase health insurance unless covered by an exclusion. In their opinions on this issue, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito agreed that failure to participate in the health insurance market did not warrant regulation under the Commerce Clause simply because that inactivity had an effect on the premiums charged to others buying health insurance. As Chief Justice Roberts put it: “The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it.” Slip op. at 24 (emphasis in original). This feature of the Court’s ruling may have no precise analogue in environmental statutes: typically environmental statutes prohibit or restrict activity with an arguable relation to interstate commerce rather than compelling such activity. But certainly environmental lawyers will be searching for one.
More generally, the five justices in the majority on this issue made clear their resolve to extend the restrictive view of the Commerce Power announced in cases such as U.S. v. Lopez and U.S. v. Morrison and to cabin decisions suggesting a more generous view of that power, such as Wickard v. Filburn and Gonzales v. Raich. This resolve could affect future Commerce Clause rulings on the permissible scope of the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and other environmental statutes: interpretations of the Clean Water Act influenced by restrictive commerce clause decisions have already narrowed its scope.
The Court’s holding on the Medicaid expansion provision could have more direct implications for environmental statutes, particularly for cooperative federalism arrangements under statutes such as the Clean Air Act that threaten to withhold federal funds if states do not agree to implement prescribed programs. The expansion provision required states to expand coverage to low income individuals as well as make other changes; states that failed to undertake this expansion were threatened with loss of all federal Medicaid funds. Seven justices agreed that the choice the Act offered to the states – expand or forfeit all Medicaid funds – was not a choice at all, but coercion and therefore impermissible. Their views appear in two opinions, one by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, and another by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.
While coming to the same conclusion on this issue, the two opinions were not entirely aligned on the features of the case that justified this conclusion, and neither drew clear lines for application in future cases. Both opinions stressed the relative size of the forfeiture – all of Medicaid funds, which equaled nearly 22% of all state expenditures. Both noted that the penalty upheld in South Dakota v. Dole -- withholding of 5% of federal-aid highway funds from states that failed to raise their drinking age to 21 – amounted to less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget. But neither offered to fix the outermost line: too much is somewhere between 0.5 and 22%. In a theme not picked up by the others, Justice Roberts’ opinion also argued that the expansion represented a new program, which impermissibly used the funds provided through an existing program (pre-expansion Medicaid) to leverage its acceptance by the states. How the courts develop these different strains of analysis in future cases and what lines of demarcation emerge will determine the significance of threats to existing or future environmental law provisions that rely on the Spending Power.
Posted on January 26, 2012
Last summer, the U.S. Department of Justice, acting on allegations made by agents of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, brought criminal indictments against three oil companies operating oil fields in North Dakota, charging them with violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act for acts resulting in the killing in the aggregate four Mallards, one North Pintail, one Red-Neck Duck and a Say’s Phoebe. The birds allegedly fell victim to the oil companies “reserve pits” -- basically big holes dug into the ground to collect waste water and mud from drilling operations. When such pits are not properly netted, birds can get into these ponds, get covered in muck and die.
In dismissing the government’s case, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota stated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 is far too vague to justify such indictments. If inadvertently killing birds and drilling operations ought to be criminalized, Congress must state so explicitly. If the Act’s concepts of “take” or “kill” were read to prohibit any activity that could accidentally result in a dead migratory bird many every day activities could be criminally prosecuted such as “cutting brush and trees, and planting and harvesting crops, driving a vehicle, owning a building with windows or owning a cat.”
According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, here are some estimates on how many birds die from crashes involving:
Windows 100 million killed
Communication Towers 5-50 million killed
Power Lines 10,000 to 174 million killed
Cars 60 million killed
Windmills 39,000 killed
Even for those of us, bird lovers and hunter, who support efforts to save migratory birds, it is hard to disagree that if the court were to decide otherwise “many every day activities become unlawful -- and subject to criminal sanctions -- when they cause the death of pigeons, starlings and other common birds.” Such prosecutorial actions fuel resistance to proper enforcement of environmental laws.