Is United Haulers the Final Word on Local Flow Control?

Posted on August 17, 2010 by Thomas Lavender, Jr.

The most recent Supreme Court examination of the validity of solid waste flow control ordinances under the dormant Commerce Clause occurred in United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007). In United Haulers, the Court held that flow control ordinances which favor a state-created solid waste authority, but treat in-state and out-of-state private entities the same, ‘do not “discriminate against interstate commerce” for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause.’ Id. at 345. In such case, the validity of a nondiscriminatory ordinance with an incidental effect on interstate commerce is analyzed under balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). Id. at 346.   However, if the flow control ordinance favors a single private entity over other private entities, the holding in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), controls. Id. at 341.   

 

 

United Haulers has been the linchpin for local governments to launch flow control ordinances. However, although the United Haulers decision upheld the validity of a flow control ordinance against a commerce clause challenge, the decision was based on an ordinance that was expressly authorized by the New York legislature and which required the disposal of solid waste at a landfill operated by a solid waste authority created by the New York legislature.   In United Haulers, the New York legislature enacted specific legislation which allowed Oneida and Herkimer Counties to “impose ‘appropriate and reasonable limitations on competition’ by, for instance, adopting ‘local laws requiring that all solid waste . . . be delivered to a specified solid waste management-resource recovery facility.’”   Id. at 335. Additionally, the flow control ordinance in United Haulers directed that all waste in Oneida and Herkimer Counties be disposed of at the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority (“Oneida-Herkimer Authority”), which was created by the New York legislature and was therefore a political subdivision of the state. Id. at 335. As such, under United Haulers, it is clear that a local flow control ordinance authorized by state legislation and directing solid waste to a public waste authority created by state legislation does not violate the commerce clause if it satisfies the Pike balancing test. It is likewise clear that a flow control ordinance which directs all solid waste generated within the boundaries of a local government to be directed to a privately-owned facility is still controlled by the holding in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown and invalid. 511 U.S. at 391. However, the United Haulers decision does not specifically address the significance of the authorization for the flow control ordinance by the New York legislature. 

 

 

According to a 1995 EPA report to Congress, state legislatures in 35 states have expressly authorized the enactment of flow control ordinances by local governments. For those states in which flow control is not expressly authorized by the state legislature, it is unclear whether a flow control ordinance enacted by a subdivision of the state would withstand a commerce clause challenge. At the very least, the absence of state authorization for flow control measures may affect the analysis of certain elements under the Pike balancing test.  Additionally, in states in which the state legislature has not expressly authorized the enactment of flow control ordinances by local governments, a local flow control ordinance could be preempted by state solid waste laws and therefore invalid even if it does not violate the commerce clause; thus, leaving open the question of whether or not United Haulers has opened the door forever on local flow control.

 

 

At least one frontal challenge to local flow control is pending in S.C. In Sandlands, LLC, et al. vs. Horry County, et al., Case No. 4:09-cv-01363-TLW-TER (currently pending in United States District Court in the District of South Carolina), a landfill and affiliated hauling company are challenging a county’s ability to restrict the exportation of waste to out-of-county landfills on commerce clause and preemption claims. The plaintiffs are attempting to distinguish United Haulers as well as arguing that the ordinance is preempted by State law. The impacts of the ordinance are being felt on disposal facilities in the region as the State has implemented a regional planning approach for siting disposal facilities. While the defendants removed the commerce clause question to federal court, the federal court has certified and the State Supreme Court has accepted the preemption question.

South Carolina Supreme Court Allows Enforcement of Unpromulgated Rule

Posted on February 3, 2010 by Thomas Lavender, Jr.

In a unanimous decision, the S.C. Supreme Court upheld the implementation of South Carolina’s Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) and finally decided the question landowners have argued for years – how could the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) enforce an unpromulgated rule?[1] 

 

The developer in the Spectre case had sought a land-disturbance permit under the SCDHEC stormwater program. The agency denied the permit contending that the proposed filling of 31.76 acres of isolated freshwater wetlands on a 62.93 acre site was inconsistent with the CZMP. An appeal of the denial was taken to the State Administrative Law Court, which held that the CZMP was not enforceable because it was not a regulation promulgated pursuant to the State’s Administrative Procedures Act (APA).[2] 

 

Following the United State Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC[3], isolated wetlands in South Carolina have been largely without protection. South Carolina has seen the introduction of several bills aimed to fill the void by expressly authorizing the regulation of impacts to isolated wetlands; however, none are pending in the current session of the General Assembly. Nonetheless, in those areas covered by the CZMP, South Carolina relied upon its authority to determine consistency with the CZMP in connection with the consideration of state permits. Isolated wetlands beyond the reach of the CZMP remain unregulated. However, numerous attacks on the validity of the CZMP have been made, but none reaching the Supreme Court until Spectre.

 

SCDHEC was charged in 1976 with developing a comprehensive coastal management program that it was to enforce “in accordance with this chapter and any rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter.”[4] The statute provided that statewide hearings and public review of the CZMP would occur and the CZMP would become the “final management plan for the State’s coastal zone” upon review and approval by the Governor and General Assembly. 

 

The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the Spectre decision from its previous holdings relating to the imposition of requirements by means other than properly promulgated regulations.[5] In spite of numerous references to the necessity of SCDHEC to adopt regulations to implement its coastal program[6], the Court concluded that the “General Assembly did not believe it was meant to be an unenforceable document.” Despite the fact that the statute specifically mandated SCDHEC to adopt interim and final rules it would follow in evaluating permits, and expressly provided that such final rules must be promulgated pursuant to the APA[7], the Court concluded that the General Assembly had created a “separate and more rigorous procedure for promulgation of the CZMP.” Moreover, since SCDHEC had developed the CZMP in accordance with those specified procedures, “the plan is valid.” 

It remains unclear where the Court will stop in crafting exclusions to the APA, but it now appears that the Court is prepared to conclude that a separate process by which a policy document is developed can be deemed functionally equivalent to the APA and afford an unpromulgated rule the force and effect of law.



[1] Spectre, LLC v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, et al., (Opinion No. 26764, February 1, 2010).

[2] S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-10, et seq. (2009).

[3] Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 12 S.Ct. 675, 531 U.S. 159, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001).

[4] SC Code Ann. § 48-39-80 (2009).

[5] Captain’s Quarters Motor Inn, Inc. v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 306 S.C. 488, 413 S.E.2d 13 (1992).

[6] S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-50(E), (F), (I), and (R), -70(A), -80(A), and -130(B).

[7] S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-130(B) also provided that the interim rules and regulations were not subject to the APA.

South Carolina Supreme Court Allows Enforcement of Unpromulgated Rule

Posted on February 3, 2010 by Thomas Lavender, Jr.

In a unanimous decision, the S.C. Supreme Court upheld the implementation of South Carolina’s Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) and finally decided the question landowners have argued for years – how could the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) enforce an unpromulgated rule?[1] 

 

The developer in the Spectre case had sought a land-disturbance permit under the SCDHEC stormwater program. The agency denied the permit contending that the proposed filling of 31.76 acres of isolated freshwater wetlands on a 62.93 acre site was inconsistent with the CZMP. An appeal of the denial was taken to the State Administrative Law Court, which held that the CZMP was not enforceable because it was not a regulation promulgated pursuant to the State’s Administrative Procedures Act (APA).[2] 

 

Following the United State Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC[3], isolated wetlands in South Carolina have been largely without protection. South Carolina has seen the introduction of several bills aimed to fill the void by expressly authorizing the regulation of impacts to isolated wetlands; however, none are pending in the current session of the General Assembly. Nonetheless, in those areas covered by the CZMP, South Carolina relied upon its authority to determine consistency with the CZMP in connection with the consideration of state permits. Isolated wetlands beyond the reach of the CZMP remain unregulated. However, numerous attacks on the validity of the CZMP have been made, but none reaching the Supreme Court until Spectre.

 

SCDHEC was charged in 1976 with developing a comprehensive coastal management program that it was to enforce “in accordance with this chapter and any rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter.”[4] The statute provided that statewide hearings and public review of the CZMP would occur and the CZMP would become the “final management plan for the State’s coastal zone” upon review and approval by the Governor and General Assembly. 

 

The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the Spectre decision from its previous holdings relating to the imposition of requirements by means other than properly promulgated regulations.[5] In spite of numerous references to the necessity of SCDHEC to adopt regulations to implement its coastal program[6], the Court concluded that the “General Assembly did not believe it was meant to be an unenforceable document.” Despite the fact that the statute specifically mandated SCDHEC to adopt interim and final rules it would follow in evaluating permits, and expressly provided that such final rules must be promulgated pursuant to the APA[7], the Court concluded that the General Assembly had created a “separate and more rigorous procedure for promulgation of the CZMP.” Moreover, since SCDHEC had developed the CZMP in accordance with those specified procedures, “the plan is valid.” 

It remains unclear where the Court will stop in crafting exclusions to the APA, but it now appears that the Court is prepared to conclude that a separate process by which a policy document is developed can be deemed functionally equivalent to the APA and afford an unpromulgated rule the force and effect of law.



[1] Spectre, LLC v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, et al., (Opinion No. 26764, February 1, 2010).

[2] S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-10, et seq. (2009).

[3] Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 12 S.Ct. 675, 531 U.S. 159, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001).

[4] SC Code Ann. § 48-39-80 (2009).

[5] Captain’s Quarters Motor Inn, Inc. v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 306 S.C. 488, 413 S.E.2d 13 (1992).

[6] S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-50(E), (F), (I), and (R), -70(A), -80(A), and -130(B).

[7] S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-130(B) also provided that the interim rules and regulations were not subject to the APA.

South Carolina Supreme Court Allows Enforcement of Unpromulgated Rule

Posted on February 3, 2010 by Thomas Lavender, Jr.

In a unanimous decision, the S.C. Supreme Court upheld the implementation of South Carolina’s Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) and finally decided the question landowners have argued for years – how could the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) enforce an unpromulgated rule?[1] 

 

The developer in the Spectre case had sought a land-disturbance permit under the SCDHEC stormwater program. The agency denied the permit contending that the proposed filling of 31.76 acres of isolated freshwater wetlands on a 62.93 acre site was inconsistent with the CZMP. An appeal of the denial was taken to the State Administrative Law Court, which held that the CZMP was not enforceable because it was not a regulation promulgated pursuant to the State’s Administrative Procedures Act (APA).[2] 

 

Following the United State Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC[3], isolated wetlands in South Carolina have been largely without protection. South Carolina has seen the introduction of several bills aimed to fill the void by expressly authorizing the regulation of impacts to isolated wetlands; however, none are pending in the current session of the General Assembly. Nonetheless, in those areas covered by the CZMP, South Carolina relied upon its authority to determine consistency with the CZMP in connection with the consideration of state permits. Isolated wetlands beyond the reach of the CZMP remain unregulated. However, numerous attacks on the validity of the CZMP have been made, but none reaching the Supreme Court until Spectre.

 

SCDHEC was charged in 1976 with developing a comprehensive coastal management program that it was to enforce “in accordance with this chapter and any rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter.”[4] The statute provided that statewide hearings and public review of the CZMP would occur and the CZMP would become the “final management plan for the State’s coastal zone” upon review and approval by the Governor and General Assembly. 

 

The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the Spectre decision from its previous holdings relating to the imposition of requirements by means other than properly promulgated regulations.[5] In spite of numerous references to the necessity of SCDHEC to adopt regulations to implement its coastal program[6], the Court concluded that the “General Assembly did not believe it was meant to be an unenforceable document.” Despite the fact that the statute specifically mandated SCDHEC to adopt interim and final rules it would follow in evaluating permits, and expressly provided that such final rules must be promulgated pursuant to the APA[7], the Court concluded that the General Assembly had created a “separate and more rigorous procedure for promulgation of the CZMP.” Moreover, since SCDHEC had developed the CZMP in accordance with those specified procedures, “the plan is valid.” 

It remains unclear where the Court will stop in crafting exclusions to the APA, but it now appears that the Court is prepared to conclude that a separate process by which a policy document is developed can be deemed functionally equivalent to the APA and afford an unpromulgated rule the force and effect of law.



[1] Spectre, LLC v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, et al., (Opinion No. 26764, February 1, 2010).

[2] S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-10, et seq. (2009).

[3] Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 12 S.Ct. 675, 531 U.S. 159, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001).

[4] SC Code Ann. § 48-39-80 (2009).

[5] Captain’s Quarters Motor Inn, Inc. v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 306 S.C. 488, 413 S.E.2d 13 (1992).

[6] S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-50(E), (F), (I), and (R), -70(A), -80(A), and -130(B).

[7] S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-130(B) also provided that the interim rules and regulations were not subject to the APA.