New Flow Control Decision in New York Examines Constitutionality of Ordinance

Posted on June 28, 2011 by Karen Aldridge Crawford

The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York recently took at least a small bite out of the legacy established by the 2007 U. S. Supreme Court decision in United Haulers Association v. United Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority which first allowed flow control by a county under the unique circumstances set forth in that case.

Emboldened by the 2007 decision, several counties in various states have enacted flow control ordinances that require solid waste to be disposed only at county owned facilities. Not surprisingly, private waste management companies have systematically challenged those laws. In JWJ Industries, Inc. and Jeffrey Holbrook v. Oswego County, 5:09-CV-0740 (NPM/DEP) (N.D.N.Y. June 13, 2011), the district court addressed the narrow question of whether the flow control ordinance adoped by Oswego County was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, both on its face and as applied. As an initial matter, the court, citing to United Haulers, noted that "the County was unquestionably within its right to implement a flow control ordinance directly affecting the operation of [Plaintiffs' facility]." However, after subjecting the ordinance to the two-pronged analysis set forth in Thibodeau v. Portuondo, 486 F. 3rd 61 (2d Cir. 2007), the court determined that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.

The Second Circuit in Thibodeau set forth two independent grounds recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether a law is so vague as to deny due process of law:

 

  1. Fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct the law prohibits.
  2. Authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.


Applying this two-pronged analysis, the court in JWJ Industries determined that the ordinance at issue failed both prongs. As to the first prong, the court found specifically that portions of the ordinance were contradictory and could be read to both require and prohibit the same exact actions, while also prohibiting inaction. As to the second prong, the court determined that the ordinance failed to take JWJ’s status or prior existence into account, providing no explicit standards on how it would treat existing private transfer facilities or processing facilities within the county; that scrutiny of letters and directives from the County and its director of solid wastes revealed that the flow control ordinance in question authorized and encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; and that such arbitrary enforcement was manifest. Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, set aside the ordinance as unconstitutionally vague and otherwise dismissed the case.

Of note, the court also admonished the county, stating that, if the county government was basing its ordinance on a template obtained from elsewhere or was adopting an ordinance from another municipality (which often is done), it needed to at least try to conform the law to the conditions in that specific county.

EPA Stays New Boiler MACT Standards

Posted on May 20, 2011 by Karen Aldridge Crawford

By:  Karen Aldridge Crawford and Stacy Kirk Taylor

Facing opposition from a number of business groups and trade organizations and resistance from Capitol Hill, EPA announced on Monday, May 16, 2011 that it was staying indefinitely the effective dates for the new emission standards for boilers (i.e. the boiler MACT standards) that the EPA issued in February of this year.

Acting under a court mandated deadline, EPA finalized the new regulations in February even though the regulations as enacted varied significantly from the initial draft rules issued for comment. Given the significant difference, EPA tried to provide an opportunity for further comment and input, but the Court denied EPA's request for a 15 month extension for issuing a final rule. As a result, EPA went ahead and issued the final rule but immediately issued a reconsideration notice and agreed to continue to receive public comments. This left the regulated community in the untenable position of investing a significant amount of money into technology to comply with the final regulation, when EPA was still reviewing the final regulations and therefore the requirements could change (in which case one may have invested significant money into an unnecessary or misdirected technology).

With an effective date for the new regulations of May 20, 2011, several industry groups, including the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Petroleum Institute, the American Chemistry Council, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, petitioned the EPA for a stay of the effective date. A stay would extend the effective date of any new regulations beyond the deadline provided under the Clean Air Act. EPA, however, acting under authority provided agencies in the Administrative Procedures Act to delay new rules "when justice so requires," agreed to a stay the new regulations to provide EPA an opportunity to seek and adequately consider additional comments on the new regulations before requiring facilities to make significant investment in technology. EPA also announced that it will continue to collect data and comments from stakeholders until July 15 of this year, at which point it will start reworking the new rules. 

Tailoring Rule Gets Further Alteration (or Nip and Tuck EPA Style)

Posted on December 30, 2010 by Karen Aldridge Crawford

On December 30, 2010, just days before the first Greenhouse Gas (GHG) regulations are to become effective, EPA issued another final rule to clarify and narrow the applicability of those regulations. 75 FR 82254 (12/30/10).

 

After reviewing the “60-day letters” received by EPA from most of the states, the agency realized its initial strategy for regulating GHG emissions was flawed in those states that had approved Title V permitting programs Those state programs were based on Clean Air Act and federal regulatory provisions in 40 CFR Parts 52 and/or 70 that established the threshold for major source determinations as 100 tons per year (tpy) for certain air pollutants subject to regulation, rather than the 100,000 tpy threshold on a carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) which EPA determined should apply to GHG emissions (the Tailoring Rule).

 

While some state laws and regulations were worded broadly enough to be consistent with the initial Tailoring Rule, many states would be required to modify their program to only regulate GHG emissions at the higher Tailoring Rule threshold upon the January 2. 2011 effective date of the new rule. Otherwise, those states’ programs would require regulation of GHG emissions at the original threshold of 100 tpy, which would inundate the states with many more permit applications than EPA’s regulations actually intended.

 

The provisions in both Part 52 and Part 70 applicable to the affected state programs are revised to read, “… EPA approves such provisions only to the extent they require permits for such sources where the source emits or has the potential to emit at least 100,000 tpy CO2e, as well as 100 tpy on a mass basis, as of July 1, 2011.” EPA has stated this language means that GHGs are regulated at 100,000 tpy and all other pollutants subject to regulation are regulated at the 100 tpy mass-based threshold.

 

It will be interesting to watch whether the courts’ interpret this additional “clarifying” language to be clear and legal.

If You Thought That State RCRA Enforcement Order Was a Bar to Any Citizen Suit, Think Again

Posted on June 21, 2010 by Karen Aldridge Crawford

Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Dickson, Tennessee, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32423 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2010).

A district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss an environmental group’s claims under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA to abate an alleged imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the environment posed by trichloroethylene and perchloroethylene disposed at a landfill.  The state agency had issued an order addressing this issue, and so Defendants, among other defenses, asserted that the group’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) which bars citizen suits where a court order or administrative order has been issued.  According to the Court, "Administrator" is defined as the "Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency," and thus the Court was not persuaded by Defendants' argument that Tennessee had stepped into the shoes of the EPA administrator for purposes of enforcing the federally-mandated hazardous waste program based on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the state and EPA.  According to the Court, the MOU referenced Subchapter III, while the provision governing "imminent hazards" is located in Subchapter IV.  Therefore, the MOU did not authorize the state to step into the shoes of the EPA administrator for purposes of bringing an action or issuing an order regarding an imminent hazard. That authority is retained by the EPA administrator.  The Court also found that despite Defendants’ assertions otherwise, the group had standing to sue, its claims were not moot, and the doctrines of abstention and primary jurisdiction did not warrant dismissal of the case.

When Does The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 Trump the Clean Water Act?

Posted on December 3, 2009 by Karen Aldridge Crawford

 

United States v. Milner, Nos. 05-35802, -36126, 39 ELR 20232 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2009)

 

In a suit brought by the United States against homeowners for common law trespass to tidelands held in trust for a Native American tribe, the Ninth Circuit held that waterfront homeowners who built shoreline defense structures on this property are liable for common law trespass and for violating the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 (RHA).  

 

 Between 1963 and 1988, the homeowners leased the tidelands from the tribe, giving them the right to erect shore defense structures on the tidelands. After the lease expired, the homeowners refused to remove the structures or enter into a new lease agreement. The homeowners argued that they cannot be liable for trespass, despite the movement of the tideland boundary, because their structures were lawfully built on the homeowners' property landward of the mean high water (MHW) line.  

 

 The court disagreed.  Under common law, however, the boundary between the tidelands and the uplands is ambulatory, changing when the water body shifts course or changes in volume. Because both the upland and tideland owners have a vested right to gains from the ambulation of the boundary, the homeowners cannot permanently fix the property boundary, thereby depriving the tribe of tidelands that they would otherwise gain. And although the structures may have been legal as they were initially erected, the court found that this is not a defense against the trespass action nor does it justify denying the tribe land that would otherwise accrue to them.  

 

The court also determined the homeowners are liable under the RHA because they have maintained at least part of their shore defense structures below the MHW line and because the structures alter the course, location, condition, or capacity of a navigable U.S. water. Addressing whether the homeowners had also violated the Clean Water Act (CWA), the court held that it was unclear from the evidence whether the high tide line actually reached the area where the homeowners discharged fill material during their maintenance of the structures. The court emphasized that although the jurisdictional reach of the CWA is generally broader than that of the RHA, the RHA is concerned with preventing obstructions, whereas the CWA is focused on discharges into water. Since the two laws serve different purposes, their regulatory powers will diverge in some circumstances, such as this one. 

EPA Attempts to Increase Recycling by Redefining Solid Waste

Posted on December 31, 2008 by Karen Aldridge Crawford

73 Fed. Reg. 64668 (Oct. 30, 2008) to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 260-261

 

On October 30, 2008, the EPA revised the definition of solid waste to exclude certain recycled materials under RCRA. The purpose behind this change is twofold: first is to respond to a series of decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit and second is to clarify the RCRA concept of "legitimate recycling."   The EPA estimates that 5600 facilities in 280 industries in 21 economic sectors may be affected by this revision and expects that the revision will encourage recycling of additional hazardous secondary materials. Exclusion of certain hazardous secondary materials from the definition based on how they are reclaimed should result in resource conservation, as well as cost savings to those who engage in beneficial recycling/reclamation in accord with the new rules.

 

Under the new rule, hazardous secondary materials that are legitimately reclaimed may be excluded from regulation as hazardous waste. The new rule excludes certain hazardous secondary materials, such as RCRA-listed sludges, listed by-products, and spent materials that are generated and legitimately reclaimed under the control of the generator. Only those hazardous secondary materials that are handled in non-land based units, e.g., tanks, containers, or containment buildings, are excluded. This exclusion does not apply to hazardous secondary materials that are inherently waste-like, that are used in a manner constituting disposal or used to produce products that are applied to or placed on the land, or that are burned to recover energy or used to produce a fuel or are otherwise contained in fuels. The following activities fall within the exclusion: recycling on-site at the generating facility, recycling off-site within the same company, and recycling through a tolling agreement. Additionally, the rule contains a petition procedure for a generator to obtain a non-waste determination that its recycled hazardous secondary material is not discarded, making it exempt from hazardous secondary materials regulation. Intermediate facilities and recyclers/reclaimers also must comply with provisions of the rule to receive and recycle/reclaim exempt hazardous secondary materials and must meet the financial assurance requirements. Generators who ship to such intermediate facilities or recyclers/reclaimers must make "reasonable efforts", as defined by the new rules, to ensure proper management and legitimate recycling of the exempt materials prior to shipping, and must document their investigatory efforts addressing specific issues defined in the new rules.

 

To be excluded from hazardous secondary materials regulation, the recycling of the hazardous secondary material must be legitimate. Legitimacy of the recycling relies on the following mandatory factors: (1) the hazardous secondary material provides a useful contribution to the recycling process or product and (2) the recycling process produces a valuable product or intermediate. The EPA will also consider two other factors, which are not mandatory: (1) the hazardous secondary material should be managed as a valuable commodity and (2) the final product of the recycling cannot contain significantly higher levels of hazardous constituents than are in analogous products.

 

The EPA received hundreds of comments on the long-awaited new rule (first proposed five years earlier), raising multiple issues, including the scope of the new rule and whether the EPA had the legal authority to make these changes. In particular, the EPA received many comments from environmental groups and the waste treatment and recycling industry regarding the EPA's authority to define when recyclable hazardous secondary materials are solid wastes and how. Other commenters argued that the EPA needed stronger conditions to protect human health and the environment before it could lawfully claim that excluded materials are not discarded. Additionally, the hazardous waste generating industry disputed the EPA's authority to promulgate the new rule, arguing that the EPA has no authority to regulate such recycling. 

 

The EPA also received extensive comments requesting that the scope of the rule be expanded to include hazardous secondary materials used in a manner constituting disposal and hazardous secondary materials burned for energy recovery. The EPA maintains, however, that these are outside the scope of the solid waste exclusion's focus on reclamation. 

 

Additionally, most states, the environmental community, and the waste management industry argued that all four of the legitimacy factors should be mandatory requirements for a recycling activity to be considered legitimate recycling. Industry, however, had some commenters who supported the proposed structure and others who preferred that the factors be balancing factors. The EPA compromised between the two approaches, instituting two mandatory requirements and two non-mandatory factors.

 

The revised "solid waste" definition provides opportunities to recycle hazardous secondary materials but also includes many details that regulated industries will need to be aware of and implement to ensure their recycling of hazardous secondary materials falls within the newly crafted exception to hazardous secondary materials regulation.