Nanotechnology - Health and Risk Management Concerns
In June last year insurance giant Zurich issued a report of the work of its Emerging Risks Group study begun in 2006. The report stated that the risks with the greatest potential to affect Zurich and its customers are those associated with nanotechnology.
Similarly, an alphabet soup of regulators—foreign and domestic—is wrestling with largely unknown and largely theoretical risks. The human health and environmental alarms have been sounded by numerous commentators, without yet meaningful, documented empirical observation or controlled studies of human health and safety issues or environmental concerns. Regulation in a factual vacuum is potentially counterproductive and can stifle one of the 21st century’s most promising new technologies. But no one wants “another asbestos” or to have stood by silent in the spring while nanobots consume an ecosystem. This blog will skim the surface of an increasingly deeper and broader pond.
What is Nanotechnology?
Nanotechnology involves the manipulation of matter at the near atomic or nanometer scale--a nanometer is one billionth of a meter; a standard sheet of paper is 100,000 nanometers thick. Materials composed of or including devices and systems with components at the nanometer scale represent fundamentally new molecular organizations with highly different and potentially unpredictable properties and functions compared to their macromolecular cousins. The technology has found uses in a wide variety of commercial products including wound dressings, pregnancy tests, toothpastes, lubricants, paints, nonstick coatings, tennis racquets, air filters and many other products. In each of these products, the nano scale materials exhibit dramatically different characteristics than would be true of those materials at normal scale. For example, gold is an excellent conductor of heat and electricity but simply reflects ordinary light. Properly structured gold nano particles absorb light and can actually convert light into heat (which, in turn, can be used for cutting purposes in thermal scalpels). Nano sized particles of titanium dioxide provide UV protection while remaining transparent. Nano scale materials in thin films applied to eyeglasses, computer displays and cameras make them water repellant, anti-reflective or give them other useful physical characteristics.
Continue Reading...When a Discharge Isn't
For all environmental lawyers and especially for business advisors and bankruptcy lawyers, a very important case was decided by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in fall 2009. The case concerns the effect of a bankruptcy discharge from a 1986 bankruptcy filing versus an affirmative Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) clean-up injunction. The question is whether the injunction is a discharged claim in bankruptcy. The Court of Appeals concludes a mandatory injunction to perform clean-up does not equate to an equitable remedy giving rise upon breach to a right to payment, which is the covered equitable remedy subject to discharge.
Here, the formerly bankrupt company’s reorganization left it no choice but to have this particular clean-up conducted by a third party at an estimated cost of $150,000,000. The Court found, however, the clean-up order did not result in a right to payment because RCRA does not allow either a demand for clean-up costs or any monetary relief.
Finding that all equitable orders will inevitably require the ordered party to spend money to comply, the Court concludes discharges are limited to matters where the claim gives rise to a right to payment. Such situations arise where an equitable decree can not be executed and results in a right to seek money damages and not merely those that impose a cost on the defendant.
This case reaches a conclusion contrary to a 6th Circuit case and is distinguishable from the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Ohio v. Kovacs. In Kovacs a receiver was appointed to take possession of the debtor’s assets so it could obtain money to pay for an ordered clean-up, and the Supreme Court found the receiver, therefore, was seeking money rather than an order that the debtor clean up the contaminated site.
The holding in this 7th Circuit case is certainly one that will likely reverberate around the country for years to come. United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009).
Has the BNSF Case Changed the Superfund Practice?
It has been nearly nine months since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v. United States (BNSF),[1] a case some called a landmark decision that would change the Superfund practice.[2] In some respects that has turned out to be the case, in others it has not. There have been several reported cases citing BNSF, and all of them confirm that the decision requires both the EPA and potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) to engage in a more fact-intensive inquiry into “arranger” liability. Less clear, however, is how the apportionment of liability among liable parties in private contribution cases will be affected, given the relatively small number of reported decisions.
Readers will recall that the BNSF decision had two elements: (1) it addressed the scope of arranger liability under CERCLA, and (2) it affirmed the view of several circuit courts that PRPs can avoid joint and several liability if a “reasonable basis” to apportion liability exists. This article reviews how lower court decisions issued subsequent to BNSF have applied those two components.
Continue Reading...Practical Impacts of Burlington Northern on Multi-Party Superfund Sites
To many Superfund practitioners, United States v. Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company, __ U.S. __, 129, S. Ct. 1870 (2009) represents the latest in a series of surprises from the Supreme Court. The decision follows Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc, 543 U.S. 157 (2004), from which we learned that the statutory words “during or following” really mean just what they say and contribution claims under the Comprehensive Response Compensation and Liability Act (also referred to as CERCLA or the Superfund statute) are only available in those limited circumstances. A few years later, in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007), we learned that “covered persons” (also referred to as potentially responsible parties or PRPs) under the statute may, in certain procedural circumstances, have cost recovery claims in the event they do not meet the criteria for contribution claims. In Burlington Northern, we learned that “arranger” liability may not be as broad as we had thought it was, and that joint and several liability may not be the automatic we thought it was. It is probably fair to say that the outcome in Burlington Northern, like the outcomes in Aviall and Atlantic Research, was not intuitive to Superfund practitioners.
A Superfund practitioner might have expected the Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern to look more like the Ninth Circuit opinion it reversed (found at 502 F.3d 781), endorsing a broad reading of “arranger” liability under the statute and applying joint and several liability to all the defendants, the latter being the norm for more than 25 years since the seminal decision in United States v. ChemDyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
Continue Reading...When Do EPA BACT Requirements "Redesign the Source"? Not When EPA Says They Don't
Shortly before the holidays, EPA Administrator Jackson issued an Order in response to a challenge to a combined Title V / PSD permit issued by the Kentucky Division for Air Quality to an Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle, or IGCC, plant. The Order upheld the challenge, in part, on the ground that neither the permittee nor KDAQ had adequately justified why the BACT analysis for the facility did not include consideration of full-time use of natural gas notwithstanding that the plant is an IGCC facility.
The Order may not be shocking in today’s environment – all meanings of that word intended – but the lengths to which the Order goes to avoid its own logical consequences shows just what a departure this decision is from established practice concerning BACT. BACT analyses have traditionally involved the proverbial “top-down” look at technologies that can be used to control emissions from a proposed facility. In other words, EPA takes the proposal as a given, and then asks what the best available control technology is for that facility.
In EPA’s own words – from its New Source Review Workshop Manual (long the Bible for BACT analysis):
Historically, EPA has not considered the BACT requirement as a means to redefine the design of the source when considering available control alternatives. For example, applicants proposing to construct a coal-fired electric generator, have not been required by EPA as part of a BACT analysis to consider building a natural gas-fired electric turbine although the turbine may be inherently less polluting per unit product (in this case electricity).
Apt example, don’t you think? (In case you are wondering, EPA’s decision does not discuss or refer to this text from the NSR Manual.)
What was the basis for EPA’s decision here? Largely, it is that the IGCC facility will be designed to burn natural gas as well as syngas and the permittee specifically stated that it planned to combust natural gas during a 6-12 month startup period. On these facts, EPA concluded that the permittee and KDAQ had to do a better job explaining why full-time use of natural gas should be considered “to redefine the design of the source.”
As noted above, EPA went to great lengths to minimize the scope of the decision. It states that the Order:
should in no way be interpreted as EPA expressing a policy preference for construction of natural-gas fired facilities over IGCC facilities.
should not be interpreted to establish or imply an EPA position that PSD permitting authorities should conclude … that BACT for a proposed electricity generating unit is … natural gas.
does not conclude that it is not possible or permissible for the permit applicant … to develop a rationale which shows that firing exclusively with natural gas would “redefine the source.”
EPA does not intend to discourage applicants that propose to construct an IGCC facility from seeking to hedge the risk of investing in … IGCC technology by proposing … utilizing natural gas for some period….
Methinks EPA doth protest too much. If I may say so, this is a freakin’ IGCC facility. Isn’t it obvious that one doesn’t plan or build an IGCC facility if one plans to burn natural gas? Don’t you think that EPA could have taken administrative notice of what IGCC technology is?
All of EPA’s protestations about the Order’s limits may be designed to mollify IGCC supporters, but what does its rationale mean for all of the existing facilities – coal and oil – that are already capable of firing on natural gas? Next time they are subject to NSR/PSD review, must they evaluate the possibility of switching completely to natural gas? As I’ve said here before, yikes!
Ninth Circuit Rejects CERCLA UAO Due Process Challenge
The 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, over a “pattern and practice” claim by a company that complied with an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) unilateral administrative order (UAO) to conduct a remedial investigation. City of Rialto v. W. Coast Loading Corp., 581 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2009). While acknowledging that CERCLA's judicial review provisions contain "some pitfalls and difficult decisions for a PRP that faces a UAO," the court stated that the pattern and practice claim was not an “automatic shortcut” to federal court jurisdiction.
The case arose as a result of a unilateral administrative order (UAO) issued by EPA in July 2003 directing Goodrich to conduct a remedial investigation at a 160-acre site in Rialto, California. Goodrich elected to comply with the order. However, in late 2006 Goodrich filed a complaint against EPA alleging, inter alia, that the CERCLA review provisions on their face constitute a coercive regime violating due process. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Goodrich’s “as-applied” challenge to the UAO because such pre-enforcement judicial review is foreclosed by §9613(h) of CERCLA. Goodrich then filed an amended “pattern and practice” claim alleging that EPA issues orders where no emergency exists, obstructs judicial review by delaying its discretionary certificates of completion, and controls and manipulates the record of decision. The district court granted EPA’s motion to dismiss, and Goodrich appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals concluded that Goodrich’s allegation that EPA routinely issues orders beyond its statutory authority was substantive because it necessarily depended on the facts of the particular UAO, and that meaningful judicial review of Goodrich’s substantive challenge is available under §9613(h). A claim that a UAO is unlawful can be addressed, the court stated, either by not complying with the UAO and defending an enforcement action, or by complying with a UAO and seeking reimbursement from the government. With respect to Goodrich’s claim that EPA routinely delays certifications of completion in order to thwart judicial review, the Ninth Circuit held that Goodrich’s claim is not ripe because the work required by the UAO has not been completed. Once Goodrich completes the work, it may bring a claim for reimbursement under §9606(b)(2). Finally, with respect to Goodrich’s allegation that EPA controls and manipulates the administrative record supporting the selected cleanup plan, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Goodrich allegations were not a “pattern and practice” claim , but rather were a challenge to the judicial review provisions of the statute itself, which were rejected by the District Court and not appealed by Goodrich.
The Ninth Circuit noted that in General Electric v. Whitman, 360 F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the D.C. Circuit remanded GE’s suit to the district court to address the merits of GE’s facial due process claim, and on remand the district court ruled on merits and rejected GE’s pattern and practice claim. General Electric v. Jackson, 595 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009). This ruling on the merits contrasts with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit, however, commented that its decision was “consistent” with the District Court’s decision in GE, noting that the District Court there held that it had jurisdiction not because of any independent analysis but because of its interpretation of the D.C. Circuit’s decision remanding the case for further proceedings.
Companies receiving a UAO and facing the statutory pitfalls and difficult decisions will likely not find much solace in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. The district court’s opinion in the GE case is being appealed.
Judge Dismisses Contribution Claims re: Fox River PCB Contamination
“Thus, the Plaintiffs’ present claim that they never knew about the dangers of PCBs until after 1971 rings roughly as hollow as Captain Renault’s feigned outrage upon being ‘shocked, shocked’ to discover gambling at Rick’s Casablanca café.”
Appleton Papers Inc. and NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., et al. (slip op. at 25, US District Court, Eastern District of WI, Case No. 08-C-16)
With those words, on December 16, 2009 Judge William C. Griesbach, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed CERCLA §107 contribution claims brought by Plaintiffs Appleton Papers, Inc. (API) and NCR Corp. against all Defendants. NCR and API sought contribution from 23 other paper mills, cities, utilities, and sewerage districts, and industrial dischargers to allocate the multi-million dollar costs of remediating the polychlorinated byphenyl (PCB) contamination in the Lower Fox River in northeastern Wisconsin. Defendants’ Summary Judgment motions asserted that Plaintiffs were not entitled to contribution because the Defendants are “essentially innocent parties who had no knowledge that recycling NCR paper or processing wastewater could lead to environmental damage.” Slip op. at 4. The Judge agreed.
Beginning in 1954, NCR developed a carbonless copy paper that relied on an emulsion based on Aroclor 1242, a PCB solvent manufactured by Monsanto Corporation. NCR created the emulsion and developed and sold the carbonless paper product. API’s predecessor manufactured the paper and coated it with the NCR emulsion. API’s wastewater was discharged to the Fox River, taking the PCBs with it. API also sold its waste paper to other mills to be recycled into paper products, resulting in PCB-containing wastewater discharges from those facilities. The result: significant PCB-contamination in the sediments of the Lower Fox River from the mouth at Green Bay to Lake Winnebago and what has been called the largest contaminated sediment cleanup in the world..
Continue Reading...Tenant Liability Under CERCLA: Is It time To Move Beyond Enforcement Discretion Guidance?
Arguably the most significant moderation of CERCLA’s harsh “owner” liability scheme occurred in 2002 through the enactment of the “Brownfields Amendments.” Included in those amendments was the creation of new liability protection for “Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers” (“BFPP”) who acquire ownership of a facility after January 11, 2002.
A relatively straightforward roadmap for prospective purchasers to achieve BFPP status is set out in the Brownfields Amendments and the subsequently-promulgated All Appropriate Inquiry rule. The extent to which tenants might obtain protection from possible “owner” liability has, however, always been far less certain.
The potential applicability of this liability defense to tenants is currently limited to a short parenthetical in CERCLA §101(40). Specifically, a “tenant of a person” that achieves BFPP status shares the liability protections of the property purchaser. Although this “derivative” BFPP status established by the Brownfields Amendments helped clarify the reach of the liability defense with respect to tenants, a number of questions remained unanswered. For example, what happens if the property owner loses its BFPP status through non-compliance with the statutory requirements? Also, does the language of the amendment as it relates to tenants preclude a tenant from independently achieving BFPP status?
Continue Reading...Another Corner Heard From: Portland (Oregon) Releases a New Climate Action Plan
Last week, the City of Portland, Oregon (together with Multnomah County) released an updated Climate Action Plan. The Plan presents a number of aggressive goals and targets, with ultimate goals of GHG reductions of 40% by 2030 and 80% by 2050.
The details of the Plan are obviously only relevant to those in the Portland area, but for those anticipating what regulation might look like in California, Massachusetts, and other states that have enacted or will soon enacted some version of a Global Warming Solutions Act, the Plan provides a helpful catalogue of the types of changes that might be sought. Therefore, a quick summary of some of the 2030 goals seems warranted
Reduce energy use from existing buildings by 20%-25%
All new buildings – and homes -- should have zero net GHG emissions.
Reduce VMT by 30% from 2008 levels
Recover 90% of all waste generated
Reduce consumption of carbon-intensive foods
Expand “urban forest canopy” to cover one-third of Portland
Reduce emissions from City and County operations by 50% from 1990 levels
What’s my take? I have two immediate reactions. First, if any further evidence were needed that attaining significant GHG emission reductions is going to involve major social and economic changes, this is certainly it.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this Plan, and others like it, have to constitute a heavy thumb on the side of the scale arguing for comprehensive federal legislation. In the past, I’ve argued that federal legislation would be preferable to a patchwork made up of EPA regulation under existing Clean Air Act authority, public nuisance litigation, and state and regional initiatives. To that list, we can now add comprehensive local regulation. I don’t mean to be too sanguine about the ability of federal legislation to harmonize this entire process; the existing bills would not preempt most state, regional, and local regulations (other than cap-and-trade programs). Nonetheless, delays in federal enactment can only contribute to the proliferation of state, regional, and local programs, some of which may be beneficial, but many of which will be inefficient, contradictory, or both.
PCB-Containing Caulk: How Old Is Your Building?
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found evidence that buildings constructed or renovated between 1950 and 1978 may have PCBs at high levels in caulk around windows and door frames, between masonry columns and in other building materials. Congress banned the manufacture and most uses of PCBs in 1976.
On September 25, 2009, EPA issued general guidance to communities as well as specific guidance to help school administrators and teachers reduce the risk of PCB exposure to children, and to assist contractors renovating buildings with suspect caulk.
Although EPA has generated specific guidance for school administrators and teachers, all buildings constructed during this time period may have PCB-containing caulk. EPA’s guidance helps to identify the extent of potential risks and to determine if mitigation steps are needed. EPA will work directly with building owners and administrators facing serious problems to help develop a practical approach to reduce exposures and prioritize caulk removal.
EPA has also identified several unresolved scientific issues that must be better understood to determine the magnitude of the issue and to develop the best long-term solutions. As a result, EPA will conduct new research to better understand the risks posed by PCB-containing caulk. EPA plans to use these research findings to make additional recommendations to further minimize exposure and generate an action plan for caulk removal.
While the materials EPA released identify the issue of PCB-containing caulk as a concern, the agency advises there is insufficient information concerning the scope or severity of the issue to provide property owners and school administrators with very concrete advice about next steps. Unfortunately, this can only leave both property owners and school administrators wondering, "just how big a concern is this and how should I respond?" Like lead paint, asbestos, mold, indoor air quality and other types of building hazards, PCBs can be added to the list of risks that real estate professionals and lawyers will have to address in building transactions.
For more information, contact EPA’s toll free hotline at 1-888-835-5372 or the EPA website located at: http://www.epa.gov/pcbsincaulk.
EPA Issues a New Policy on Superfund Negotiations: Time For Another Rant?
Late last week, Elliott Gilberg, Acting Director of EPA’s Office of Site Remediation Enforcement (OSRE) issued an Interim Policy on Managing the Duration of Remedial Design/Remedial Action Negotiations. Members of the regulated community may not be surprised by the contents of the memo, but they certainly will not be pleased. In brief, the memorandum fundamentally makes two points:
EPA wants to shorten the duration of RD/RA negotiation
EPA is going to use the heavy hammer of unilateral administrative orders, or UAOs, to keep PRPs’ feet to the fire and ensure that negotiations move quickly.
PRPs will likely agree that shortening the duration of negotiations would be a good outcome in the abstract – but achieving it by greater use of UAOs? I don’t think so.
I can only wonder if EPA has even considered the impact of the Burlington Northern decision here. Is this a perverse reaction from EPA? A metaphorical throwing down the gauntlet to PRPs? It certainly feels that way.
I have a different suggestion, if EPA truly wants to shorten negotiations. First, acknowledge Burlington Northern and compromise on the merits in those great majority of cases where there are legitimate divisibility arguments. Second, stop acting like the last bastion of command and control regulation. Set cleanup standards and then, to the maximum extent permitted by existing law, let PRPs clean up to those standards, without micromanaging every detail of the cleanup process.
Essential Ingredients For Risk Transfer on Display in N.J.
Last month, Missouri based Environmental Liability Transfer (ELT) purchased a heavily contaminated site from Asarco in Perth Amboy, New Jersey. Due to bankruptcy court deadlines, the transaction was put together and closed in less than 90 days. The 70-acre site was a challenging candidate for risk transfer due to the perpetual nature of the risk. However, the transaction had the following essential components of a successful environmental risk transfer:
- a buyer (ELT) that was willing to take long term risk, beyond the term of environmental insurance;
- a sophisticated seller that was facing an unattractive monetization of the remediation risk, in this instance an estimation proceeding in bankruptcy court. Monetization is a often also caused by regulatory financial assurance requirements and in the context of mergers and acquisitions;
- an active remedy of modest duration (in this instance stabilization of residuals and containment) that is defined with sufficient technical and regulatory certainty that partial collateralization of ELT's indemnity by "cost cap" insurance (in this case by Zurich) is practicable.
As mergers and acquisitions return from hibernation and financial assurance requirements become more stringent after the demise of several major corporations, interest in risk transfer is sure to grow. Not every deal is a good candidate, but those transactions that have the factors described above are worth considering to achieve a favorable, short term monetization of environmental risk.
GHG Regulation under the Existing CAA: Coming Soon to a [Large] Stationary Source Near You
On Thursday, EPA issued its long-awaited proposed rule describing how thresholds would be set for regulation of GHG sources under the existing Clean Air Act PSD authority. Having waded through the 416-page proposal, I’m torn between the appropriate Shakespeare quotes to describe it: “Much ado about nothing” or “Methinks thou dost protest too much.”
First, notwithstanding its length, the proposal is quite limited in scope. In essence, it has three parts:
Establishment of an applicability threshold for PSD and Title V purposes of 25,000 tons per year of CO2e.
Establishment of a PSD significance level of from 10,000 tpy CO2e and 25,000 CO2e.
Development over the next five years of means to streamline GHG regulation of sources greater than the current statutory levels of 100-250 tpy.
Basically, EPA’s position is that, once it begins to regulate GHGs as a pollutant by promulgating its mobile source rule – expected next spring – stationary source regulation under the PSD and Title V programs follow automatically. Thus, the issue for EPA at this point is not whether to regulate stationary sources, but how to do so without the entire program grinding to a halt.
Here’s where the protestation comes in. Most of the proposal is devoted to explaining EPA’s reliance of the doctrines of “absurd results” and “administrative necessity” to justify exclusion of sources that would seem to be categorically included by the explicit language of the statute. Members of the regulated community will understand the irony in EPA’s extensive discussion regarding how the purpose of the PSD program is to achieve environmental protection and economic development – and that this latter purpose would be jeopardized by regulation of sources at the 100/250 tpy threshold. I don’t think we will ever again see EPA devote this many pages to a description of its concern about economic growth.
I’m not going to predict here whether EPA will win any challenge to the higher thresholds. Certainly, the absurd results doctrine argument is the stronger of the two. It is noteworthy that the four leading environmental cases EPA cites in support of its administrative necessity argument, while acknowledging the existence of the doctrine, all went against EPA.
More relevant still is the question of who would in fact challenge this regulation and what would be the result even if the challenge succeeded. Following the debacle that resulted from vacation of the CAIR rule, what is the likelihood that a successful challenge would result in vacation of the rule in its entirety? Isn’t it more likely that the rule would stay in effect as to the large sources, with the remanding the case to EPA to promulgate rules governing smaller sources? In fact, that’s what EPA is already doing, which is probably EPA’s strongest practical argument in support of the rule.
Public comments will be due 60 days from Federal Register promulgation and there are some issues that the regulated community should consider. These include the significance threshold, and suggestions regarding how to streamline the program for smaller sources. EPA has proposed some interesting ideas, including presumptive BACT determinations and general permits.
Bottom line? Large sources better get ready to comply. Smaller sources, take a deep breath and count your blessings – for now.
Statute of Limitations: Don't Miss Your CERCLA Deadline
Overview
There are three avenues of recovery under CERCLA - a contribution action and two types of cost recovery actions. These cost recovery actions are based on either the plaintiff’s “removal” of the hazardous substances or “remediation” efforts at the site. Each of these avenues has an independent statute of limitations provision. Thus, whether the statute of limitations period has been triggered will depend on how an action is characterized, i.e. whether the action constitutes a contribution action, a cost recovery removal action, or a cost recovery remedial action. While there are various state-specific causes of action related to environmental contamination in Connecticut, this article is confined to the statute of limitations for CERCLA cost recovery and contribution claims.
Continue Reading...New Jersey Follows Massachusetts into the World of Licensed Environmental Consultants and Privatized Cleanup Oversight
On May 7, 2009, New Jersey enacted the Site Remediation Reform Act (S.1897/A.2962). SRRA, with its new Licensed Site Remediation Professional (“LSRP”) Program, is having a far-reaching impact on the way transactions and redevelopment projects are being planned and handled in New Jersey.
Following the Massachusetts Licensed Site Professional program, SRRA establishes a licensing procedure for consultants and contractors to be certified as LSRPs and overseen by a licensing board.
In most cases New Jersey DEP will no longer be required or authorized to review and approve investigation and cleanup plans in advance, or to issue No Further Action letters and Covenants Not To Sue when cleanups have been wrapped up. Instead, LSRPs will determine the propriety and conclusion of investigations and cleanups, and will issue the final sign-off document, which is now to be known as a "Response Action Outcome" ("RAO"). LSRPs – rather than DEP – will determine the required amount of any financial assurance, and will determine when and to what extent the financial assurance can be reduced as a cleanup progresses.
Continue Reading...Tenth Circuit Holds Collateral Source Rule Inapplicable to CERCLA 113 Actions
Friedland v. Indus. Co, No. 08-1042, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 11660 (10th Cir. May 29, 2009).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that the collateral source rule is inapplicable in CERCLA actions, affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on the ground that Mr. Friedland already recouped all of his recoverable costs from other persons and therefore had no damages to recover.
The plaintiff, Mr. Friedland, is the former director and president of the Summitville Consolidated Mining Company, Inc. (“SCMCI”). SCMCI operated a gold mine from 1984 to 1992. Defendants-appellees helped construct the mine and provided quality assurance regarding the heap leaching system – where cyanide solution was sprayed on gold-bearing ore to remove the gold.
Continue Reading...Eleventh Circuit Wades into the Everglades on ESA Issues, Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, No. 08-10799
The Eleventh Circuit has waded, again, into the ongoing debates over restoration of the Everglades. In addressing yet another lawsuit filed by the Miccosukee Tribe, the Court largely upheld the Fish & Wildlife Service’s delicate balance between the competing and inconsistent habitat needs of the Cape Sable seaside sparrow and the Everglade Snail kite, both endangered species. The seaside sparrow needs stable low water levels below a certain water control structure; the kite’s habitat is destroyed by the resulting rising water levels in the impoundment. The FWS issued a biological opinion allowing the Corps of Engineers to operate the structure to avoid extinction of the sparrow and to conduct an incidental take of the kite. While largely affirming the agency, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the issue of the trigger that would require initiation of consultation under Section 7 and, along the way, made new law in this circuit on several important issues.
First, the court rejected the tribe’s argument, often advanced by conservation groups in ESA litigation, that the ESA requires that FWS “give the benefit of the doubt to the species.” The court held that this language, taken from a conference committee report, does not mean that the FWS is required to issue a jeopardy opinion if the evidence is evenly balanced between likely jeopardy and likely no jeopardy. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit explained, the language was intended to prevent FWS from shirking its consultation duties by relying on scientific uncertainty, but did not require any substantive result. The court held that “the need to give a species the benefit of the doubt cannot stand alone as a challenge to a biological opinion.”
Continue Reading...The Burlington Northern Decision
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern was not unexpected from my vantage point especially given the literal interpretation of CERCLA by the Court in Aviall and Atlantic Research and the flow of the oral argument.
I was a little surprised that Justice Stevens was assigned the task of writing the opinion since Justice Thomas wrote Aviall and Atlantic Research. But with 7-2 (Justices Ginsburg and Stevens dissented in Aviall because the Court would not decide the issue of entitlement to sue under Section 107), 9-0 (Atlantic Research decided the Section 107 private of action question left unresolved in Aviall), and 8-1 (Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter in Burlington Northern) votes in these three opinions, the Court is not going out of its way to fix CERCLA’s language. Section 113(f)(1) means what it says. Section 107 means what it says. An arranger must have an intent to dispose. And joint and several…
Continue Reading...Superfund Liability
In a stunning 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court changed the landscape of Superfund liability, holding that a company’s mere knowledge of spills in the course of delivery of a product is not a sufficient basis for liability as an arranger, and that defendant may avoid joint and several liability based on reasonable evidence supporting apportionment. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway co. et al. v. United states et al. (No. 07–1601, May 4, 2009.)
In 1960, Brown & Bryant, Inc.(B&B), a now defunct agricultural chemical distributor, began operating on a parcel of land in California and expanded on to an adjacent parcel owned by two railroads. As part of its business, B&B purchased and stored various hazardous chemicals, including a pesticide supplied by Shell Oil Company. Many of these chemicals spilled during transfers and deliveries and equipment failures, resulting in soil and ground water contamination. In 1989, the EPA and the state cleaned up the site and then brought suit to recover their costs against Shell and the Railroads.
Continue Reading...A Rant Against Superfund
As some of my clients know all too well, I’ve been spending a lot of time on some Superfund matters recently. Although I can’t remember a period when I didn’t have at least one moderately active Superfund case, significant immersion in complex remedial decision-making and negotiations provides an unwelcome reminder just how flawed CERCLA is. Almost 20 years after the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act ushered in wide-spread acceptance of the use of market mechanisms to achieve environmental protection goals and the state of Massachusetts successfully privatized its state Superfund program, the federal Superfund program, like some obscure former Russian republic which remains devoted to Stalinism, is one of the last bastions of pure command and control regulation.
Continue Reading...PENNSYLVANIA CLEAN WATER AND BROWNFIELDS INVESTMENT OF STIMULUS FUNDS
Among the priorities under the $787.5 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is repairing, rebuilding, and constructing the nation’s water infrastructure. Approximately $6 billion will augment the EPA’s clean water and drinking water state revolving funds, of which approximately $221 million will be disbursed to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Infrastructure Investment Authority (PennVest). The governing board of PennVest is appointed by Governor Rendell, and I have been serving as its chair for the past six years.
Continue Reading...EPA's Roll-Back of Bush-Era Rules Appears to Begin in Earnest
While a lot of attention has been paid to whether EPA would reverse the Bush EPA decision denying California’s petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources, it is now clear even outside the climate change arena that life at EPA is going to be substantially different under the current administration. As if evidence were really needed for that proposition, EPA announced this week that it was putting on hold the NSR aggregation rule that EPA had promulgated on January 15, 2009.
The rule, which had been long sought by industry, would have provided that nominally separate projects would only have to be combined – aggregated for NSR/PSD purposes – if they are “substantially related.” It also would have created a rebuttable presumption that projects more than three years apart are not substantially related. Responding to a request from NRDC and the OMB memo asking agencies to look closely at rules promulgated before the transition but not yet effective, EPA concluded that the rule raises “substantial questions of law and policy.” Therefore, EPA postponed the effective date of the rule until May 18, 2009 and also announced that it was formally reconsidering the rule in response to the NRDC petition.
To those in industry, the aggregation rule was not a radical anti-environmental roll-back of environmental protection standards. Rather, it was more of a common-sense approach towards making the NSR program simpler and clearer. It is one of my pet peeves with the prior administration, however, that it gave regulatory reform a bad name.
In any case, I feel as though I should open a pool regarding what will be the next Bush-era rule to be tossed overboard. We surely won’t have to wait long for it to happen.
Superfund Liability and Apportionment - Burlington Northern v. United States
Although the Superfund statute is now 28 years old, basic issues of liability and apportionment of liability remain unresolved. This term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide a case with broad implications for CERCLA liability, Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607, Burlington Northern v. United States. These consolidated cases, which will be argued early in 2009, raise important issues concerning the circumstances under liability is divisible and the scope of “arranger” liability under CERCLA. If the Ninth Circuit’s approach is upheld, the heightened evidentiary standards may impose a difficult hurdle on parties to prove reasonable apportionment of liability. The Ninth Circuit’s approach to “arranger” liability is of concern to entities that sell chemicals or other products in the ordinary course of business. The allocation of risk and provisions for insurance and best practices to avoid spills in contracts between suppliers and common carriers may need to be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case.
Continue Reading...Environmental Site Assessment Flexibility or Further Complexity? EPA Adopts Forestland and Rural Property Phase I Standard Practice
On December 23, 2008, EPA issued a direct final rule amending the “All Appropriate Inquiries Rule” [Standards for Conducting All Appropriate Inquiry]by adopting ASTM International’s “Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessment Process for Forestland or Rural Property” (ASTM E2247-08) [EPA Amendment to AAI Rule]. ASTM E2247-08 was published after EPA promulgated the All Appropriate Inquires (AAI) rule and is specifically tailored to conducting Phase I environmental site assessments of large tracts of rural and forestland property. EPA’s action incorporates the ASTM E2247-08 forestland and rural property assessment practices as a federal standard for establishing the AAI component of the bona fide prospective purchaser, contiguous property owner and innocent landowner defenses to CERCLA owner/operator liability.
Continue Reading...EPA Attempts to Increase Recycling by Redefining Solid Waste
73 Fed. Reg. 64668 (Oct. 30, 2008) to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 260-261
On October 30, 2008, the EPA revised the definition of solid waste to exclude certain recycled materials under RCRA. The purpose behind this change is twofold: first is to respond to a series of decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit and second is to clarify the RCRA concept of "legitimate recycling." The EPA estimates that 5600 facilities in 280 industries in 21 economic sectors may be affected by this revision and expects that the revision will encourage recycling of additional hazardous secondary materials. Exclusion of certain hazardous secondary materials from the definition based on how they are reclaimed should result in resource conservation, as well as cost savings to those who engage in beneficial recycling/reclamation in accord with the new rules.
Continue Reading...SALMON WARS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
Each year thousands of salmon and steelhead protected under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) migrate up and down the Columbia River and its tributaries and into the Pacific Ocean as part of the species’ cycle of life. Seemingly, each year armies of lawyers migrate to federal court to argue whether the federal government is carrying out its obligations to protect these species under the ESA. “As part of the modern cycle of life in the Columbia River system, each year brings litigation to the federal courts of the Northwest over the operation of the Federal Columbia River System (“FRCPS”) and, in particular, the effects of system operation on the anadromous salmon and steelhead protected by the Endangered Species Act.” National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 422 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2005).
2008 is no exception as the National Wildlife Federation, the state of Oregon and the Nez Perce Tribe have again filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of Oregon against the federal government for allegedly failing to carry out their obligations under the ESA in the operation of the FRCPS. The precipitating event for the 2008 lawsuit, is a 2008 Biological Opinion authored by NOAA Fisheries pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA opining that if the action agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“COE”) and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) carry out a comprehensive reasonable and prudent alternative (“RPA”) then jeopardy to the listed species and adverse modification to critical habitat will be avoided.
Continue Reading...ALABAMA JOINS OTHER STATES IN ENACTING UNIFORM ENVIRONMENTAL COVENANTS ACT
Alabama joined a number of other states dealing with environmental covenants when it enacted the Alabama Uniform Environmental Covenants Act, effective January 1, 2008. Ala. Code§35-19-1 et seq. (“Act”).The Alabama Department of Environmental Management (“ADEM”) has been working on implementing regulations, which are expected to mimic the Act and be released in the next few months. ADEM will also charge a fee for implementation and oversight of the program and covenants.
For those not familiar with the concept, in many situations environmental contamination cannot be completely addressed by total removal (clean closure) of the offending soil or remediation of the groundwater to a level allowed for unrestricted use. Some amount or concentration of contamination must be left behind. In those situations, EPA and ADEM will require additional measures, such as land use controls or continuing monitoring and maintenance. The idea is that if property has contamination on it unsuitable for a residential housing development or the construction of a school, those interested in buying or developing the property are put on notice of the limit of the property to commercial or industrial use. These controls and obligations are often embodied in deed restrictions or recorded declarations which could be terminated by various common law mechanisms; therefore, the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act was created to provide a mechanism by which environmental covenants and land use restrictions survive the potential fatal operations of the common law. States were encouraged to adopt the uniform act, and Alabama has now done so.
An “Environmental Covenant” is defined as “[a] servitude arising under an environmental response project that imposes activity and use limitations.” Ala. Code § 35-19-2(5). Such “environmental response projects” can arise under state or federal hazardous waste cleanup laws, such as CERCLA, RCRA, or Alabama’s version of brownfields.
Before the Act was passed, ADEM still required a restrictive covenant or deed of some kind when contaminants were being left behind, but it was never sure what might happen to the restriction upon a subsequent sale of the property because it had no enforcement authority. If the property changed hands several times, there was no manner by which ADEM could require the Seller and the Buyer to maintain that restriction as a part of the sale. With the Act, there is a “holder” of the covenant which can enforce the covenant, and ADEM has enforcement power even if it is not a holder. A holder can be any person, a governmental agency (such as ADEM), an environmental group, or a unit of local government. The interest of a holder is considered to be an interest in real property; however, the Department’s interest in a covenant, unless it becomes a holder, will not be considered to be an interest in real property. There are certain elements that each covenant must meet in order to be effective, and those are clearly set out in the Act. Importantly, each environmental covenant requires at least one holder, and a holder can be the fee simple owner and/or the grantor of the covenant.
If, at the time an environmental covenant is recorded or registered, the Act does not abrogate the common-law doctrine of “first in time, first in right” as it relates to prior and valid property interests. If there are other interests in the subject real property with priority over the covenant, unless the prior interest in the property is made subordinate to the covenant by the owner of such interest, then the prior interest is not affected.
The grantor of an environmental covenant has a statutory responsibility to notify certain persons or entities of the covenant. Specifically, the grantor must provide a copy of the covenant to (i) each person signing the covenant; (ii) each person with a “recorded interest” in the subject property; (iii) each tenant or person in possession of the subject property; and (iv) each county or municipality in which the real property is located (normally the county or municipal office where deeds are recorded, such as the probate office). You also have the option of filing the covenant with ADEM (it keeps a registry), and then filing a notice with the county probate office in lieu of the entire covenant.
Environmental covenants are perpetual although there are exceptions set out in the Act, such as if the covenant itself has a specified length of time, a condition allowing termination is satisfied, or a court is petitioned for its modification. Of course, one always has the option of conducting additional remediation of the property to reach unrestricted use standards, which would then allow for termination of the covenant.
The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions made to this article by Bryan Nichols of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C.
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Submits RGGI Regulations for Legislative Approval
The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) has submitted for legislative approval regulations to control carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and establish a CO2 emissions credit program.[i] The controversial regulations are designed to fulfill Connecticut’s commitment to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), which establishes a CO2 emissions cap and trade program for power plants in nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states.[ii] RGGI is designed to be a model for a broader, national market-driven program to establish a market value for greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions to provide incentives for reducing GHG emissions over the long term.
Carbon dioxide is the most significant GHG by volume. Unlike many other pollutants emitted by the combustion of fossil fuels, there are no commercially available control technologies to limit CO2 emissions. Therefore, programs to reduce GHG emissions focus on improving energy efficiency, reducing the use of fossil fuels through conservation efforts, and using renewable and alternative fuels.
[i] Proposed Conn. Agencies Regs. § 22a-174-31 and 31a.
[ii] Information about RGGI can be found at http://rggi.org.
Delaware Environmental Law Update
On May 15, 2008, Delaware enacted legislation that will affect the transfer or closing of facilities in Delaware where chemical or hazardous substances have been or are located. The legislation establishes three principal requirements for affected facilities. First, prior to the transfer of a facility, the parties to the transaction must conduct "All Appropriate Inquiry" as defined in Delaware's Hazardous Substances Cleanup Act, and all documents prepared or identified pursuant to such inquiry must be submitted to the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC). Second, if an affected facility terminates its operations or files for bankruptcy, certain requirements must be completed no later than 90 days after termination of all business or activities at the facility, including certification of the removal of the chemicals or hazardous substances from the facility. Third, financial assurance will be required for transferred facilities or new facilities, in an amount to ensure that, upon termination, abandonment or liquidation of activities at the facility, all appropriate means will be taken to stabilize and secure the facility.
The legislation will become effective upon the promulgation by DNREC of facility transfer regulations. DNREC will begin the development of regulations to implement this legislation in late summer or early fall and is expected to promulgate regulations in early 2009.
If you have any questions about this Delaware Corporate Update , or other legal issues, please contact a Richards, Layton & Finger attorney.
Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc. - The Heightened Pleading Standards Announced In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly Apply To Toxic Tort Cases
I. Introduction
On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955; 167 L.Ed. 2d 929, announced a new standard for testing the sufficiency of pleadings in the face of a motion to dismiss. The Court set aside the rule in Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 41; 78 S.Ct. 99; 2 L.Ed. 80 (1957), which held that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it could be shown that it was not possible, pursuant to the pleadings, to demonstrate any set of facts which would support recovery; instead, the Court said that the appropriate test was whether the allegations of the complaint, if taken as true, would support the conclusion that recovery was “plausible.” In overruling Conley, the Court said, of the “possible” standard, “*** after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard ****.”
Bell Atlantic was an anti-trust case based on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Many commentators suggested that the Bell Atlantic standard would only apply to matters (such as anti-trust) where the requirements of a statute dictated specific pleading requirements, that the Court had not intended to completely change the standards for testing the sufficiency of complaints.
Shortly after the Bell Atlantic decision, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama was faced with the question in Evans v. Walter Industries, case no. 1:05-CV-01017-KOB. The Alabama court held the “plausible” standard applicable to a putative class action toxic tort case and it dismissed the case, with prejudice, against one of the Defendants.
As noted below, this decision could have significant implications in other Superfund cases if the federal courts, generally, reach the same conclusion.
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