Eleventh Circuit Wades into the Everglades on ESA Issues, Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, No. 08-10799
The Eleventh Circuit has waded, again, into the ongoing debates over restoration of the Everglades. In addressing yet another lawsuit filed by the Miccosukee Tribe, the Court largely upheld the Fish & Wildlife Service’s delicate balance between the competing and inconsistent habitat needs of the Cape Sable seaside sparrow and the Everglade Snail kite, both endangered species. The seaside sparrow needs stable low water levels below a certain water control structure; the kite’s habitat is destroyed by the resulting rising water levels in the impoundment. The FWS issued a biological opinion allowing the Corps of Engineers to operate the structure to avoid extinction of the sparrow and to conduct an incidental take of the kite. While largely affirming the agency, the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the issue of the trigger that would require initiation of consultation under Section 7 and, along the way, made new law in this circuit on several important issues.
First, the court rejected the tribe’s argument, often advanced by conservation groups in ESA litigation, that the ESA requires that FWS “give the benefit of the doubt to the species.” The court held that this language, taken from a conference committee report, does not mean that the FWS is required to issue a jeopardy opinion if the evidence is evenly balanced between likely jeopardy and likely no jeopardy. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit explained, the language was intended to prevent FWS from shirking its consultation duties by relying on scientific uncertainty, but did not require any substantive result. The court held that “the need to give a species the benefit of the doubt cannot stand alone as a challenge to a biological opinion.”
Continue Reading...The Burlington Northern Decision
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern was not unexpected from my vantage point especially given the literal interpretation of CERCLA by the Court in Aviall and Atlantic Research and the flow of the oral argument.
I was a little surprised that Justice Stevens was assigned the task of writing the opinion since Justice Thomas wrote Aviall and Atlantic Research. But with 7-2 (Justices Ginsburg and Stevens dissented in Aviall because the Court would not decide the issue of entitlement to sue under Section 107), 9-0 (Atlantic Research decided the Section 107 private of action question left unresolved in Aviall), and 8-1 (Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter in Burlington Northern) votes in these three opinions, the Court is not going out of its way to fix CERCLA’s language. Section 113(f)(1) means what it says. Section 107 means what it says. An arranger must have an intent to dispose. And joint and several…
Continue Reading...Superfund Liability
In a stunning 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court changed the landscape of Superfund liability, holding that a company’s mere knowledge of spills in the course of delivery of a product is not a sufficient basis for liability as an arranger, and that defendant may avoid joint and several liability based on reasonable evidence supporting apportionment. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway co. et al. v. United states et al. (No. 07–1601, May 4, 2009.)
In 1960, Brown & Bryant, Inc.(B&B), a now defunct agricultural chemical distributor, began operating on a parcel of land in California and expanded on to an adjacent parcel owned by two railroads. As part of its business, B&B purchased and stored various hazardous chemicals, including a pesticide supplied by Shell Oil Company. Many of these chemicals spilled during transfers and deliveries and equipment failures, resulting in soil and ground water contamination. In 1989, the EPA and the state cleaned up the site and then brought suit to recover their costs against Shell and the Railroads.
Continue Reading...A Rant Against Superfund
As some of my clients know all too well, I’ve been spending a lot of time on some Superfund matters recently. Although I can’t remember a period when I didn’t have at least one moderately active Superfund case, significant immersion in complex remedial decision-making and negotiations provides an unwelcome reminder just how flawed CERCLA is. Almost 20 years after the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act ushered in wide-spread acceptance of the use of market mechanisms to achieve environmental protection goals and the state of Massachusetts successfully privatized its state Superfund program, the federal Superfund program, like some obscure former Russian republic which remains devoted to Stalinism, is one of the last bastions of pure command and control regulation.
Continue Reading...PENNSYLVANIA CLEAN WATER AND BROWNFIELDS INVESTMENT OF STIMULUS FUNDS
Among the priorities under the $787.5 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is repairing, rebuilding, and constructing the nation’s water infrastructure. Approximately $6 billion will augment the EPA’s clean water and drinking water state revolving funds, of which approximately $221 million will be disbursed to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Infrastructure Investment Authority (PennVest). The governing board of PennVest is appointed by Governor Rendell, and I have been serving as its chair for the past six years.
Continue Reading...EPA's Roll-Back of Bush-Era Rules Appears to Begin in Earnest
While a lot of attention has been paid to whether EPA would reverse the Bush EPA decision denying California’s petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources, it is now clear even outside the climate change arena that life at EPA is going to be substantially different under the current administration. As if evidence were really needed for that proposition, EPA announced this week that it was putting on hold the NSR aggregation rule that EPA had promulgated on January 15, 2009.
The rule, which had been long sought by industry, would have provided that nominally separate projects would only have to be combined – aggregated for NSR/PSD purposes – if they are “substantially related.” It also would have created a rebuttable presumption that projects more than three years apart are not substantially related. Responding to a request from NRDC and the OMB memo asking agencies to look closely at rules promulgated before the transition but not yet effective, EPA concluded that the rule raises “substantial questions of law and policy.” Therefore, EPA postponed the effective date of the rule until May 18, 2009 and also announced that it was formally reconsidering the rule in response to the NRDC petition.
To those in industry, the aggregation rule was not a radical anti-environmental roll-back of environmental protection standards. Rather, it was more of a common-sense approach towards making the NSR program simpler and clearer. It is one of my pet peeves with the prior administration, however, that it gave regulatory reform a bad name.
In any case, I feel as though I should open a pool regarding what will be the next Bush-era rule to be tossed overboard. We surely won’t have to wait long for it to happen.
Superfund Liability and Apportionment - Burlington Northern v. United States
Although the Superfund statute is now 28 years old, basic issues of liability and apportionment of liability remain unresolved. This term, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide a case with broad implications for CERCLA liability, Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607, Burlington Northern v. United States. These consolidated cases, which will be argued early in 2009, raise important issues concerning the circumstances under liability is divisible and the scope of “arranger” liability under CERCLA. If the Ninth Circuit’s approach is upheld, the heightened evidentiary standards may impose a difficult hurdle on parties to prove reasonable apportionment of liability. The Ninth Circuit’s approach to “arranger” liability is of concern to entities that sell chemicals or other products in the ordinary course of business. The allocation of risk and provisions for insurance and best practices to avoid spills in contracts between suppliers and common carriers may need to be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in this case.
Continue Reading...Environmental Site Assessment Flexibility or Further Complexity? EPA Adopts Forestland and Rural Property Phase I Standard Practice
On December 23, 2008, EPA issued a direct final rule amending the “All Appropriate Inquiries Rule” [Standards for Conducting All Appropriate Inquiry]by adopting ASTM International’s “Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessment Process for Forestland or Rural Property” (ASTM E2247-08) [EPA Amendment to AAI Rule]. ASTM E2247-08 was published after EPA promulgated the All Appropriate Inquires (AAI) rule and is specifically tailored to conducting Phase I environmental site assessments of large tracts of rural and forestland property. EPA’s action incorporates the ASTM E2247-08 forestland and rural property assessment practices as a federal standard for establishing the AAI component of the bona fide prospective purchaser, contiguous property owner and innocent landowner defenses to CERCLA owner/operator liability.
Continue Reading...EPA Attempts to Increase Recycling by Redefining Solid Waste
73 Fed. Reg. 64668 (Oct. 30, 2008) to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 260-261
On October 30, 2008, the EPA revised the definition of solid waste to exclude certain recycled materials under RCRA. The purpose behind this change is twofold: first is to respond to a series of decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit and second is to clarify the RCRA concept of "legitimate recycling." The EPA estimates that 5600 facilities in 280 industries in 21 economic sectors may be affected by this revision and expects that the revision will encourage recycling of additional hazardous secondary materials. Exclusion of certain hazardous secondary materials from the definition based on how they are reclaimed should result in resource conservation, as well as cost savings to those who engage in beneficial recycling/reclamation in accord with the new rules.
Continue Reading...SALMON WARS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
Each year thousands of salmon and steelhead protected under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) migrate up and down the Columbia River and its tributaries and into the Pacific Ocean as part of the species’ cycle of life. Seemingly, each year armies of lawyers migrate to federal court to argue whether the federal government is carrying out its obligations to protect these species under the ESA. “As part of the modern cycle of life in the Columbia River system, each year brings litigation to the federal courts of the Northwest over the operation of the Federal Columbia River System (“FRCPS”) and, in particular, the effects of system operation on the anadromous salmon and steelhead protected by the Endangered Species Act.” National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 422 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2005).
2008 is no exception as the National Wildlife Federation, the state of Oregon and the Nez Perce Tribe have again filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of Oregon against the federal government for allegedly failing to carry out their obligations under the ESA in the operation of the FRCPS. The precipitating event for the 2008 lawsuit, is a 2008 Biological Opinion authored by NOAA Fisheries pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA opining that if the action agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“COE”) and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) carry out a comprehensive reasonable and prudent alternative (“RPA”) then jeopardy to the listed species and adverse modification to critical habitat will be avoided.
Continue Reading...ALABAMA JOINS OTHER STATES IN ENACTING UNIFORM ENVIRONMENTAL COVENANTS ACT
Alabama joined a number of other states dealing with environmental covenants when it enacted the Alabama Uniform Environmental Covenants Act, effective January 1, 2008. Ala. Code§35-19-1 et seq. (“Act”).The Alabama Department of Environmental Management (“ADEM”) has been working on implementing regulations, which are expected to mimic the Act and be released in the next few months. ADEM will also charge a fee for implementation and oversight of the program and covenants.
For those not familiar with the concept, in many situations environmental contamination cannot be completely addressed by total removal (clean closure) of the offending soil or remediation of the groundwater to a level allowed for unrestricted use. Some amount or concentration of contamination must be left behind. In those situations, EPA and ADEM will require additional measures, such as land use controls or continuing monitoring and maintenance. The idea is that if property has contamination on it unsuitable for a residential housing development or the construction of a school, those interested in buying or developing the property are put on notice of the limit of the property to commercial or industrial use. These controls and obligations are often embodied in deed restrictions or recorded declarations which could be terminated by various common law mechanisms; therefore, the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act was created to provide a mechanism by which environmental covenants and land use restrictions survive the potential fatal operations of the common law. States were encouraged to adopt the uniform act, and Alabama has now done so.
An “Environmental Covenant” is defined as “[a] servitude arising under an environmental response project that imposes activity and use limitations.” Ala. Code § 35-19-2(5). Such “environmental response projects” can arise under state or federal hazardous waste cleanup laws, such as CERCLA, RCRA, or Alabama’s version of brownfields.
Before the Act was passed, ADEM still required a restrictive covenant or deed of some kind when contaminants were being left behind, but it was never sure what might happen to the restriction upon a subsequent sale of the property because it had no enforcement authority. If the property changed hands several times, there was no manner by which ADEM could require the Seller and the Buyer to maintain that restriction as a part of the sale. With the Act, there is a “holder” of the covenant which can enforce the covenant, and ADEM has enforcement power even if it is not a holder. A holder can be any person, a governmental agency (such as ADEM), an environmental group, or a unit of local government. The interest of a holder is considered to be an interest in real property; however, the Department’s interest in a covenant, unless it becomes a holder, will not be considered to be an interest in real property. There are certain elements that each covenant must meet in order to be effective, and those are clearly set out in the Act. Importantly, each environmental covenant requires at least one holder, and a holder can be the fee simple owner and/or the grantor of the covenant.
If, at the time an environmental covenant is recorded or registered, the Act does not abrogate the common-law doctrine of “first in time, first in right” as it relates to prior and valid property interests. If there are other interests in the subject real property with priority over the covenant, unless the prior interest in the property is made subordinate to the covenant by the owner of such interest, then the prior interest is not affected.
The grantor of an environmental covenant has a statutory responsibility to notify certain persons or entities of the covenant. Specifically, the grantor must provide a copy of the covenant to (i) each person signing the covenant; (ii) each person with a “recorded interest” in the subject property; (iii) each tenant or person in possession of the subject property; and (iv) each county or municipality in which the real property is located (normally the county or municipal office where deeds are recorded, such as the probate office). You also have the option of filing the covenant with ADEM (it keeps a registry), and then filing a notice with the county probate office in lieu of the entire covenant.
Environmental covenants are perpetual although there are exceptions set out in the Act, such as if the covenant itself has a specified length of time, a condition allowing termination is satisfied, or a court is petitioned for its modification. Of course, one always has the option of conducting additional remediation of the property to reach unrestricted use standards, which would then allow for termination of the covenant.
The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions made to this article by Bryan Nichols of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C.
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Submits RGGI Regulations for Legislative Approval
The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) has submitted for legislative approval regulations to control carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and establish a CO2 emissions credit program.[i] The controversial regulations are designed to fulfill Connecticut’s commitment to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), which establishes a CO2 emissions cap and trade program for power plants in nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states.[ii] RGGI is designed to be a model for a broader, national market-driven program to establish a market value for greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions to provide incentives for reducing GHG emissions over the long term.
Carbon dioxide is the most significant GHG by volume. Unlike many other pollutants emitted by the combustion of fossil fuels, there are no commercially available control technologies to limit CO2 emissions. Therefore, programs to reduce GHG emissions focus on improving energy efficiency, reducing the use of fossil fuels through conservation efforts, and using renewable and alternative fuels.
[i] Proposed Conn. Agencies Regs. § 22a-174-31 and 31a.
[ii] Information about RGGI can be found at http://rggi.org.
Delaware Environmental Law Update
On May 15, 2008, Delaware enacted legislation that will affect the transfer or closing of facilities in Delaware where chemical or hazardous substances have been or are located. The legislation establishes three principal requirements for affected facilities. First, prior to the transfer of a facility, the parties to the transaction must conduct "All Appropriate Inquiry" as defined in Delaware's Hazardous Substances Cleanup Act, and all documents prepared or identified pursuant to such inquiry must be submitted to the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC). Second, if an affected facility terminates its operations or files for bankruptcy, certain requirements must be completed no later than 90 days after termination of all business or activities at the facility, including certification of the removal of the chemicals or hazardous substances from the facility. Third, financial assurance will be required for transferred facilities or new facilities, in an amount to ensure that, upon termination, abandonment or liquidation of activities at the facility, all appropriate means will be taken to stabilize and secure the facility.
The legislation will become effective upon the promulgation by DNREC of facility transfer regulations. DNREC will begin the development of regulations to implement this legislation in late summer or early fall and is expected to promulgate regulations in early 2009.
If you have any questions about this Delaware Corporate Update , or other legal issues, please contact a Richards, Layton & Finger attorney.
Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc. - The Heightened Pleading Standards Announced In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly Apply To Toxic Tort Cases
I. Introduction
On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955; 167 L.Ed. 2d 929, announced a new standard for testing the sufficiency of pleadings in the face of a motion to dismiss. The Court set aside the rule in Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 41; 78 S.Ct. 99; 2 L.Ed. 80 (1957), which held that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it could be shown that it was not possible, pursuant to the pleadings, to demonstrate any set of facts which would support recovery; instead, the Court said that the appropriate test was whether the allegations of the complaint, if taken as true, would support the conclusion that recovery was “plausible.” In overruling Conley, the Court said, of the “possible” standard, “*** after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard ****.”
Bell Atlantic was an anti-trust case based on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Many commentators suggested that the Bell Atlantic standard would only apply to matters (such as anti-trust) where the requirements of a statute dictated specific pleading requirements, that the Court had not intended to completely change the standards for testing the sufficiency of complaints.
Shortly after the Bell Atlantic decision, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama was faced with the question in Evans v. Walter Industries, case no. 1:05-CV-01017-KOB. The Alabama court held the “plausible” standard applicable to a putative class action toxic tort case and it dismissed the case, with prejudice, against one of the Defendants.
As noted below, this decision could have significant implications in other Superfund cases if the federal courts, generally, reach the same conclusion.
Continue Reading...