What Will You be Reading Over the Holidays?

Posted on December 30, 2014 by John Manard

You’ll have to turn to more traditional holiday reading because EPA’s methane reduction strategy for the oil and gas industry won’t be available until next year.  On March 28, 2014, the White House released its Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions and instructed EPA to develop a comprehensive plan to reduce methane emissions from landfills, coal mines, agricultural operations, and the oil and gas industry.  The White House further directed EPA to address oil and gas sector methane emissions by building on the emission reduction successes of existing regulations and voluntary programs. 

EPA responded to this directive by publishing five white papers on methane emission sources in the oil and gas sector in April 2014, and requesting peer review and comment on each. The white papers address methane and volatile organic compound (VOC) emission mitigation techniques for: compressors, hydraulically fractured oil well completions and associated gas from ongoing production, equipment fugitive leaks, liquids unloading, and pneumatic devices.

Contemporaneously, EPA proposed enhancements to its long-standing and successful voluntary program for methane emission reductions—the Natural Gas STAR Program. EPA initiated the Natural Gas STAR program in 1993 to encourage voluntary methane emission reductions in the oil and gas sector through the application of cost-effective technologies and improved work practices.

EPA seeks to enhance the existing voluntary program with 17 “Gas STAR Gold” methane reduction protocols and a heightened recognition incentive for participating companies.  There is a proposed Gas STAR Gold protocol for each of the source activities addressed by a technical white paper, with the exception of methane emissions from well completions following hydraulic fracturing.  Other proposed Gold STAR protocols address methane emissions associated with casinghead gas, flares, glycol dehydrators, hydrocarbon storage tanks, and pipelines.

To achieve Gas STAR Gold status, a participating company must certify that at least one of its facilities has implemented all applicable Gold STAR protocols. Companies with at least 90% of their facilities implementing all applicable Gold STAR protocols achieve “Gas STAR Platinum” status.  

While few doubt that EPA will pursue methane emission reductions via a regulatory framework, it is speculation only whether EPA’s approach will consist of methane reductions as: (1) a co-benefit of regulations aimed at VOC emissions; (2) direct regulation of methane emissions; or (3) a combination of these approaches. Regardless of the regulatory direction EPA takes, expanded and enhanced voluntary measures will certainly be part of its comprehensive strategy for reduced methane emissions.

EPA’s next step will be to announce the type of regulatory framework necessary to achieve White House goals, and explain how voluntary efforts fit into that framework. Although EPA aimed to announce that planned strategy by the end of the year, recent reports indicate that a January 2015 announcement is more realistic. It looks like we will have to look elsewhere for our leisure holiday reading. (Thanks are due to Karen Blakemore in our Baton Rouge office for all that is good and useful in this post.)

Time to Clean Up Our Dirty Food System

Posted on December 19, 2014 by Peter Lehner

For decades, environmental lawyers focused on cleaning up the air and water. We made tremendous progress. Today, in most of the country, our air is safer to breathe and our waters more fit for drinking and recreation than at the dawn of the environmental movement. 

But while our air and water got cleaner, our food system got dirtier during that same time period. Vast numbers of chemicals started to be used in the production and processing of food, with little thought given to the long-term impacts on human health and the environment. 

Safeguards have failed to keep pace with the introduction of new chemicals, and the powerful industries behind these products put tremendous pressure on federal agencies to limit health protections, putting our health and our environment at risk. 

Here are three ways to start cleaning up our dirty food system:

1. Close the Giant Food Additive Loophole

Hundreds, if not a thousand or more, chemical food additives used in processed and packaged foods that make up the majority of the American diet are never publicly revealed, much less reviewed for safety by the FDA. A recent report from NRDC explored this loophole in food safety law, known as GRAS, or “generally recognized as safe,” which allows chemical manufacturers to decide for themselves if their product is safe. In many cases, the FDA isn’t even notified when chemical additives enter our food supply.

Some additives which manufacturers claimed to be “generally recognized as safe” have been linked to fetal leukemia, testicular degeneration, and other adverse effects in human cell or animal tests. NRDC found these additives listed as ingredients in at least 20 food products.

The FDA can and should move now to end the conflict of interest in this system; and when the agency does review a manufacturer’s safety claims, their concerns should be made available to the public. Ultimately, Congress needs to close the GRAS loophole and reform outdated food safety law. 

2. Stop Risky Herbicide Used on Corn and Soy

The EPA recently approved the herbicide Enlist Duo, which is toxic to many plants, but not to a new strain of genetically modified corn and soy. Enlist Duo is likely to become the replacement for the weed-killer popularly known as Roundup, which became one of the most widely used herbicides in the nation after Monsanto developed genetically modified corn engineered to resist it. According to Monsanto, Roundup and its family of glyphosate-based herbicides are registered for use in more than 130 countries.   

But after 20 years of heavy use, Roundup is no longer effective against certain weeds, which have evolved a resistance to it.  The industry’s solution is to escalate: develop a new strain of GMO crops that can withstand a new, more potent herbicide.  

Enlist Duo is a combination of glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup, and another herbicide, 2,4-D. The EPA signed off on Enlist Duo despite ample evidence of the harm caused by 2,4-D, and without taking into account the last two decades of research on glyphosate. 

In recent years, glyphosate has emerged as a major contributor to the alarming decline of monarch butterflies, as it has decimated milkweeds across the Midwest, the only plant on which a monarch will lay its eggs. (Milkweeds have not evolved any resistance to glyphosate.) Emerging evidence suggests glyphosate may pose a threat to human health, with possible links to kidney disease, pre-term deliveries, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, birth defects, and miscarriages. 

2,4-D has been associated with decreased fertility, higher rates of birth defects, and other signs of endocrine disruption. It’s been found in drinking water and can drift in the air over great distances, increasing the likelihood of human exposure far from the fields where it’s sprayed. 

The approval of Enlist Duo will expand both the geographic area and the length of the season during which 2,4-D would be used, potentially increasing the risk of exposure to 20 million children and women of childbearing age here in the U. S.

NRDC is suing the EPA for its approval of Enlist Duo.  

3. Stop Antibiotic Abuse in Livestock Industry

Eighty percent of the antibiotics sold in this country are for use in livestock and poultry, not for humans. And these antibiotics are largely used on animals that aren’t sick. 

To keep antibiotics effective, we need to change the way we raise animals for their meat. NRDC has been spearheading a campaign to raise awareness of antibiotic abuse in the livestock industry and pressing the FDA to take action. Recently, a number of major food companies have announced that they have or will transition away from antibiotics, including Perdue Farms, Chik-Fil-A, Panera Bread, Chipotle and others. 

These moves are encouraging and welcome but still voluntary, and not yet backed up by any increased transparency into antibiotic practices. And Foster Farms, the biggest chicken producer in the West, whose product was linked to a widespread Salmonella outbreak in 2013 and 2014, has yet to announce any changes in its antibiotics practices. 

Meanwhile, the latest FDA statistics show that antibiotic sales to the livestock industry continue to rise. Real change will come when we have truly effective safeguards—not the voluntary measures offered by the FDA, and not the similarly weak proposal recently (and commendably) vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown of California. 

Governor Brown has called stakeholders back to the table to find a more effective way for the industry to change its risky practices. It’s possible that California could lead the way forward on antibiotic stewardship. 

Superfund Rant For a New Congress

Posted on November 13, 2014 by Seth Jaffe

So the new Congress will be controlled by the GOP.  The House and Senate will consider various bills to rein in EPA authority.  Here’s one relatively modest suggestion for congressional consideration:  amend CERCLA to limit EPA’s authority to recover oversight costs.

How many of us in the private sector have been in meetings with EPA where EPA had more technical people in attendance than the PRPs who were performing the remedy?  How many of us have had clients receive oversight cost bills where the total amount of the oversight costs approached the amount spent on actually performing the remedy?  How many us have had oversight requests that have turned response actions into research projects?  All of this for a program that EPA’s own analyses always show to be at the bottom of the barrel when it comes to actual risks to the public.

Here’s the proposal.  I’m not suggesting that EPA have no authority to recover oversight costs.  Just limit it to 10% of the response costs incurred to actually design and implement the remedy.  Make it 15% if you want to be generous.

Mitch McConnell, are you listening? 

Looking ahead to EPA’s next GHG Permit Program: more 2/3rds solutions when Congress goes missing

Posted on July 10, 2014 by Michael R. Barr

Last Monday June 23,  it was the Supreme Court’s turn in the UARG case to decide whether EPA could “tailor” its climate policy to fit the PSD and operating permit programs in the current Clean Air Act.  Both the Court and EPA faced the issue without any precise guidance from the missing branch:  Congress.

As a result, yet another court – the DC Circuit – must next consider the proper remedy in the UARG case and, if past DC Circuit decisions are a sound guide, remand the matter back to EPA to take action consistent with the courts’ decisions.  The DC Circuit will almost certainly not tell EPA what it can do, nor should it tell EPA how to exercise its remaining substantial discretion.  The courts are only telling EPA what it cannot do in certain respects.  Thus, the courts’ guidance to EPA is limited.

EPA will retain considerable discretion when it tries again to regulate GHG emissions from major stationary sources and major stationary source modifications under titles 1 and 5 of the Clean Air Act.  EPA has loads of options, as many commenters pointed out during the prior EPA rulemaking.  The options may fit the current Clean Air Act to varying degrees.  In the words of the Supreme Court in the June 23 UARG decision, though, “Even under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must operate ‘within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’” (J. Scalia for the Court, slip opinion at p. 16)  

EPA may try to avoid options that would be most vulnerable to challenge under the principles expressed by the Court in the UARG opinion.  One Court majority held that EPA lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s numerical thresholds governing the PSD and operating permit programs.  A different Court majority upheld EPA’s BACT rules for GHGs.  Some commenters will undoubtedly urge EPA to continue its drive towards regulating GHGs under titles 1 and 5 of the current Clean Air Act.  But, EPA should re-solicit the broadest public comment and carefully consider all options, as the Supreme Court requires under the Chevron standard of judicial review.  After all, there will be a national election in 2016 and there will be a new Administration with its own views on the options.  If the current Administration wishes to leave a lasting legacy in this area, it would be well advised to act on the basis of the most solid record and adopt moderate, fully vetted polices that can survive.  As retiring Congressman John Dingell recently said in a farewell speech held by the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., “Compromise is an honorable word."  

Congress is very unlikely to provide any additional guidance in this area any time soon, though.  The nation will miss some basic policy decisions and compromises, such as:

Should the PSD and operating permit programs apply to GHGs?  How?

Which sources should be covered?  When?  With a phase-in?  Tied to what?

In the PSD program, can and should BACT work the same way for GHGs as for criteria pollutants?

In the operating permit program, when should sources have to add GHG provisions (since there aren’t yet any substantive requirements for the operating permits to pick up)?

What substantive requirement should EPA develop and for which sources?  When? E.g., should EPA set GHG emissions standards or other requirements for power plants and other source categories under section 111(d) of the Act, as EPA recently proposed?

What role(s) should state and local agencies and programs play?

In the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, Congress resolved issues like these in the Act itself.  The leading precedent is title 4 – acid rain – where Congress even allocated emissions of SO2 by individual numbered electric power generators in named powerplants in named states.  Both houses and both parties held hands and made this deal under the Capitol dome – a deal which has resulted in a stunning and stable policy success.  The acid rain deal largely avoided the dilemmas that EPA and the courts now face in dealing with stationary source permitting under titles 1 and 5 of the Clean Air Act.  It seems most likely that whatever EPA does next under the current Clean Air Act will be challenged vigorously in court – again and again – until Congress can once again come together under the dome.

A Splash of Cold Water: Supreme Court Trims EPA’s GHG Permit Program

Posted on June 27, 2014 by Robert Wyman

Having unleashed EPA rulemaking of unprecedented scale in Massachusetts v. EPA (holding GHGs are “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act (CAA) that EPA must regulate upon finding “endangerment”) and having further acknowledged EPA’s GHG authority in AEP v. Connecticut (holding CAA displaces federal nuisance common law), early this week in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency et al., the Supreme Court started the inevitable process of reining in the Agency’s exercise of its potentially boundless GHG authority under a statute designed for regulation of conventional air pollutants.  Although interpretive gymnastics would be required whatever direction it took, the Court decided in a fractured decision that the CAA’s preconstruction Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V operating permit programs allow EPA to impose Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for GHGs only when a source has triggered these programs “anyway” due to its conventional criteria pollutant emissions.

The consolidated cases below challenged a full basket of major EPA GHG rulemakings, including EPA’s endangerment finding, motor vehicle regulations (the Tailpipe Rule) and stationary source permitting rules.  But the Court granted certiorari on only one question - whether EPA permissibly determined  that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under one part of the Act triggered permitting requirements under the Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases under another part of the Act.  The Court rejected EPA’s PSD and Title V Triggering and Tailoring Rules, leaving intact only the ancillary BACT review of a source’s non-de minimis GHG emissions when a source otherwise undergoes PSD review for conventional pollutants.

The PSD program requires a permit to construct or modify a “major emitting facility”—defined as any stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” or 100 tons per year for certain types of sources—in areas where the PSD program applies.  To qualify for a permit, the facility must, among other things, comply with emissions limitations that reflect BACT for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the CAA.  Title V requires a comprehensive operating permit to operate any “major source”—defined as any stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant”—wherever located.

Recognizing that applying these thresholds to GHGs would result in permitting for numerous small sources, such as schools, hospitals and even large homes, EPA promulgated the so-called Tailoring Rule with special thresholds for GHGs that would apply in addition to the statutory thresholds and said that it would revisit whether to continue applying these special thresholds after five years, during which time it would study the feasibility of extending permitting to the small sources per the statutory thresholds.  Under Step 1 of the Tailoring Rule, commencing January 2, 2011 (the effective date for its Tailpipe Rule), it obligated sources already required to obtain permits under the PSD program or Title V (so-called “anyway” sources) to comply with BACT for GHGs if they emitted at least 75,000 tons per year (tpy) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) units.  Then, under Step 2, commencing July 1, 2011, it obligated sources with the potential to emit at least 100,000 tpy of CO2e to obtain permits under the PSD program and Title V for construction and operation, and sources with the potential to emit at least 75,000 tpy of CO2e to obtain permits under the PSD program for modifications.  These higher thresholds were needed on a temporary basis, according to the EPA, because the number of permit applications would otherwise grow by several orders of magnitude, exceeding the agency’s administrative resources and subjecting to the major permit programs sources that Congress clearly did not intend to cover.  EPA’s Tailoring Rule also contemplated a Step 3 where GHG permitting would apply to additional sources as well as a five year study on how to extend the program to remaining sources per the statutory thresholds.

Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, concluded that EPA’s legal interpretation that the PSD and Title V programs were triggered once EPA regulated GHGs under the mobile source program not only is not compelled, but moreover, simply is not reasonable.  He reasoned that the “air pollutants encompassed by the Act-wide definition as interpreted in Massachusetts” are not the same “air pollutants referred to in the permit-requiring provisions” at issue.  This is so because EPA has routinely given “air pollutant” in the permit-requiring provisions a narrower, context-driven meaning.  The same five justices also concluded that EPA is not permitted to augment with additional thresholds – even temporarily, as EPA claimed – the 100 tpy and 250 tpy statutorily-defined thresholds for triggering the PSD program and Title V permitting requirements.  He writes that the need for such an adjustment simply demonstrates that the PSD program and Title V were never intended to be expanded in this way, and adds that the EPA does not have the power to “rewrit[e] unambiguous statutory terms” such as the statutorily-defined numerical thresholds for applying the PSD program and Title V.

Justice Scalia, joined in this part by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, then determined that the EPA reasonably interpreted the CAA to require that those new and modified sources already subject to PSD permitting due to their potential to emit conventional criteria pollutants also must comply with BACT for GHGs.  In this context, he emphasizes that the statutory language  – once permitting already has been triggered – requiring BACT “for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” contextually leaves less room for interpretations that could limit BACT to a smaller set of pollutants, in contrast to the triggering “any air pollutant” language, which must be read contextually in a more limited manner.  Additionally, he argues that applying BACT to greenhouse gases “is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable.”

Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.  He joins the Court’s opinion as to the application of BACT to greenhouse gases, but asserts that the EPA is also permitted to interpret the CAA so as to trigger permitting requirements for stationary sources that emit an adjusted threshold level of greenhouse gases.  Justice Alito concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice Thomas.  He argues that neither the EPA’s interpretation of provisions triggering permitting requirements nor its interpretation regarding BACT is permissible.

The Court’s decision to require independent PSD and BACT applicability before subjecting sources to BACT for GHG emissions squares fully with significant industry input to EPA early in its discussion of stationary source permitting.  Our National Climate Coalition, for example, urged EPA to embrace such an interpretation in our 2009 Tailoring Rule comments and 2010 PSD White Paper.

Although this decision does not directly affect EPA’s authority to regulate stationary source GHG emissions by establishing New (or Existing) Source Performance Standards under section 111 of the Act, it portends significant challenges for the agency’s recent §111(d) proposal.  Most notable are the several statements in the 5-4 portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion in which he cautions the agency not to “rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.”  In articulating the Court’s test for whether an agency interpretation of ambiguous terms is reasonable, he stresses that an interpretation is less likely be viewed as reasonable to the extent it:

brings about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.  When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a ‘significant portion of the American economy,’ [cite omitted], we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism.  We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’

This portion of the Court’s ruling will likely figure prominently in the Court’s inevitable review of the agency’s §111(d) proposal.  It thus may behoove EPA to consider in its final rulemaking approaches that bring the existing source program somewhat closer to its traditional rulemakings under that section.

Pulling the Plug on Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Posted on June 12, 2014 by Robert Wyman

Buoyed by favorable recent Supreme Court and DC Circuit decisions recognizing EPA’s broad discretion under the Clean Air Act, on Monday, June 2, EPA scaled new heights of legal adventurism by proposing the Clean Power Plan, a greenhouse gas reduction program for the power sector that would compel states to implement supply- and demand-side energy strategies.  EPA projects that its proposal would achieve approximately a 30% reduction from 2005 levels by 2030.

EPA’s action is under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, a little-utilized section that authorizes EPA to set emission guidelines for states to regulate listed source categories whose emissions are not regulated under either the Act’s criteria pollutant program under section 108 or the hazardous air pollutant program of section 112.  The College recently prepared an excellent overview of section 111 authority for the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS).

Certain aspects of EPA’s proposal are worth noting.  First, in stark contrast to prior stationary source rules, EPA seeks to harness the entire energy system, not just efforts at individual sources.  The bulk of the proposed emission reductions will come not from the minor expected heat rate improvements at individual electric generating units (EGUs)(EPA’s first “building block”), but from directing states to increase generation at natural gas plants and renewables while reducing electricity demand.  Three of EPA’s four “building blocks”  thus address emission reductions that are outside the control of EGUs, the listed source category.  Consistent with this approach, EPA proposes a portfolio enforcement approach by which states would be authorized to oblige entities other than the affected source for the reductions in building blocks two through four.  The proposal calls for an overall state energy plan, not just for implementing emission reduction opportunities available to individual sources.

Second, the proposal does not establish common performance standards, but sets highly-variable standards for each state based on EPA’s assessment of the state’s individual capacity to reduce emissions under each of the four building blocks.  EPA clearly listened to state pre-proposal input regarding material differences in each state’s EGU portfolio, its capacity to harness wind and solar generating technologies and other state differences.

Although the proposal’s projected benefits reflect an estimated 30% emission reduction from 2005 levels, EPA actually uses 2012 as the baseline for measuring a state’s starting carbon intensity.  Because EPA sets each state’s interim and future carbon intensity targets based on the state’s capacity for reducing, shifting or avoiding EGU emissions, it is not surprising that the proposal does not provide any state with early action credit in the traditional sense.  Some states are further along on their individual progress lines, but as currently designed the proposal does not allow any state to monetize its early reductions nor to avoid future progress based on its prior actions.  This means that some states will be expected to do more than others for the foreseeable future.  And, unless a true early action mechanism is included in EPA’s final rule, some states, such as California, may continue to incur net energy costs higher than their neighbors.

Several commenters have noted the material legal risk that EPA takes with this proposal.  Among the many expected challenges will be that EPA cannot regulate EGUs under section 111(d) because the House version of that section precludes such regulation if the source category already has been listed under section 112.  The proposal also could be challenged for including in the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER) emission reductions outside the control of the source and for obliging the state and entities other than EGUs to achieve such reductions.  EPA argues in its proposal that it can require states to consider any measure that has the effect of reducing EGU emissions (i.e., an “effects” or “ends” test), but some will argue that section 111 only allows EPA to require those emission reduction options (i.e., “means”) available to the EGU itself.

Should EPA fail to finalize one or both of its section 111(b) new and modified/reconstructed unit proposals, then it may be challenged for a failure to finalize the prerequisite 111(b) rule.  Other challenges could relate to an alleged failure properly to subcategorize facilities and for stepping beyond its emission reduction role to, in essence, regulate a state’s energy policy.

EPA has left some important design issues unresolved.  EPA strongly encourages interstate cooperation, including the use of emissions trading, but it leaves the actual shape of such linkages undefined.  Similarly unresolved is the question of how states can interact if they act alone.  Given the regional nature of power markets and the fact that emission reductions occurring in one state often result from investment (on either the supply or demand side) in another, states and companies will need to know the ground rules for adjudicating potentially-conflicting claims for state plan credit and company compliance credit.  EPA seeks comment on these and other critical issues.

For those interested, a more substantive analysis of the proposal can be found here.

EPA Meets Regional Uniformity Requirement – the Hard Way

Posted on June 3, 2014 by Robert Wyman

On Friday, in a case argued by my colleague, Greg Garre and briefed by Leslie Ritts, the D.C. Circuit decided a closely watched case construing the EPA’s “regional uniformity” requirement under the Clean Air Act (CAA.)  The court declared the agency’s directive to regional offices outside the Sixth Circuit to ignore a 2012 Sixth Circuit decision interpreting the CAA’s “single source” requirements as inconsistent with EPA’s uniformity requirement. The decision brings to light an important component of the CAA’s nationwide scheme.

Under the CAA, any “major source” of pollution is subject to certain heightened requirements.  EPA regulations provide that multiple pollutant-emitting activities will be considered together for purposes of the “major source” analysis if they are—among other things—“adjacent.”  But EPA has, in recent years at least, given “adjacent” an expansive and atextual meaning, concluding that even facilities separated by considerable physical distance should be deemed “adjacent” as long as they are “functionally interrelated.” 

In 2012, the Sixth Circuit in Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA held that EPA’s interpretation was “unreasonable and contrary to the plain meaning of the term ‘adjacent.’”  The EPA opted not to seek Supreme Court review of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling.  A few months after the Summit decision, however, EPA circulated a directive to the Regional Air Directors informing them that the agency would abide by the Sixth Circuit’s decision within the Sixth Circuit, but that “[o]utside the [Sixth] Circuit, at this time, the EPA does not intend to change its longstanding practice of considering interrelatedness in the EPA permitting actions.”

The National Environmental Development Association’s Clean Air Project (NEDA/CAP), an industry group, filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, challenging the EPA’s “Summit Directive” as contrary to the statute and EPA’s own regulations.  NEDA/CAP explained that EPA’s Directive would impermissibly place NEDA/CAP members operating outside of the Sixth Circuit at a competitive disadvantage, subject to a more onerous permitting regime than their peers operating within the Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction.  That disparity between regions, NEDA/CAP explained, was inconsistent with the CAA’s requirement that EPA assure “uniformity in the criteria, procedures, and policies applied by the various regions,” 42 U. S. C. § 7601(a)(2), as well as EPA regulations that similarly require inter-regional uniformity.

On Friday, the D.C. Circuit issued a decision agreeing with NEDA/CAP in National Environmental Development Association’s Clean Air Project v. EPA. Rejecting EPA arguments that the policy could only be challenged in the context of a discrete stationary source permit application, the Court held that NEDA/CAP’s blanket challenge to the EPA’s creation of two different permitting regimes across the country could be challenged today because of the competitive disadvantages it created for companies operating in different parts of the country.  

On the merits, the Court concluded that maintaining a standard in the Sixth Circuit different from the one applied elsewhere in the country was inconsistent with the agency’s regulatory commitment to national uniformity.  The Court recognized that an agency is ordinarily free, under the doctrine of “intercircuit nonacquiescence,” to refuse to follow a circuit court’s holding outside that court’s jurisdiction.  Here, however, the Court held that EPA’s own regulations required it to “respond to the Summit Petroleum decision in a manner that eliminated regional inconsistency, not preserved it.”  Finding that the agency’s “current regulations preclude EPA’s inter-circuit nonacquiescence in this instance,” the Court vacated the directive.

The decision is noteworthy in a number of respects.  Not only does the decision roundly reject EPA’s threshold objections to NEDA/CAP’s petition (standing, finality, and ripeness), but it appears to represent the first time a court has applied EPA’s uniformity regulations to invalidate a rule.  The decision therefore puts a light on an important component of the CAA’s nationwide enforcement scheme—the “regional uniformity” requirement.    

Homer's Odyssey Continues Without Cooperative Federalism

Posted on April 30, 2014 by Paul Seals

On April 29, 2014, Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S._(2014) reversing the DC Circuit’s decision regarding the Transport Rule, also known as the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), a rulemaking designed to address the significant contribution of upwind States to nonattainment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards in downwind States under the Good Neighbor Provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA).   In addition to upholding EPA’s cost-effective allocation of air pollutant emission reductions among upwind States as a permissible interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision, the majority held that the CAA does not compel EPA to provide States with an opportunity to file a SIP after EPA has quantified the State’s interstate pollution obligations.  This opinion is a severe blow to cooperative federalism.

In the majority opinion, cooperative federalism was relegated to a single footnote, which was surprising given the issues for which certiorari was granted.  The second issue addressed in the briefs and argument – whether states are excused from adopting state implementation plans prohibiting emissions that “contribute significantly” to air pollution problems in other states until after the EPA has adopted a rule quantifying each state’s inter-state pollution obligations – provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to address the relative health of cooperative federalism and whether the federalism bar should be raised or lowered in the context of the CAA. 

Justice Ginsburg’s footnote addressed Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in which he criticized the majority for “making hash of the Clean Air Act, transforming it from a program based on cooperative federalism to one of centralized federal control.”  EPA’s promulgation of federal implementation plans without providing the States with a meaningful opportunity to perform the emissions reductions through state implementation plans is inconsistent with the core principle and regulatory strategy of cooperative federalism embedded in the CAA – air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.   

Homer’s Odyssey continues.  For the next chapter, his ship will not sail under the fair winds of cooperative federalism.

EPA Finalizes Revisions to Stormwater Permitting Rule for Construction Sites

Posted on April 21, 2014 by Daniel Riesel

 

New EPA Rule to Have Broad Implications for Construction Industry; Describes Required Best Management Practices for Stormwater

 

EPA recently finalized revisions to the effluent limitations rules for the Construction and Development (“C&D”) point source category under the Clean Water Act. The revisions will take effect on May 5th, and reflect the terms of a settlement agreement between EPA and the Wisconsin Builders Association, the National Association of Home Builders, and the Utility Water Act Group. See Wisconsin Builders Association v. EPA, No. 09-4413 (7th Cir. 2012). 

The groups challenged EPA’s 2009 Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the Construction and Development Industry, known as the 2009 C&D Rule, arguing that the rule was unworkable and reflected incorrect calculations, and that compliance could cost stakeholders up to $10 billion annually.

The new revisions to the C&D rule eliminate the numeric limitations for turbidity in stormwater discharges from construction sites, in favor of non-numeric effluent controls and best management practices for reducing the effects of erosion and scour on water quality.  EPA had previously included numeric limitations for turbidity in its 2009 C&D rule but had stayed implementation of those limitations as a result of several legal challenges to the rule. 

The C&D rule has wide-ranging applicability, as it typically covers construction activities such as clearing, grading, and excavating at sites where one or more acres of land will be disturbed.  Improperly managed soil at construction sites can easily be washed off during storms and has the potential to negatively impact nearby water bodies. 

Under the stormwater permitting rule, construction site owners and operators are generally required to:

  • implement erosion and sediment controls;
  • stabilize soils;
  • manage dewatering activities;
  • implement pollution prevention measures;
  • provide and maintain buffers around surface waters;
  • prohibit certain discharges, such as motor fuel and concrete washout; and
  • utilize surface outlets for discharges from basins and impoundments.

The new revisions to EPA's stormwater permitting standards may have implications for states that have issued construction-related stormwater permits since 2009. For projects in New York State, for example, the Department of Environmental Conservation Construction General Permit (“CGP”) expires in 2015; any necessary updates to the CGP resulting from the EPA C&D rule are likely to be incorporated into the revised CGP permit due in 2015.

D.C. Circuit Affirms EPA’s Utility Air Toxics Rule: An “Appropriate” Rule Need Not Be Justified By Cost-Benefit Analysis

Posted on April 17, 2014 by Seth Jaffe
On April 15th, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed EPA’s rule setting limits for emissions of mercury and other air toxics from fossil-fuel-fired electric steam generating units.  The focus of the decision – and the issue on which Judge Kavanaugh dissented – was whether EPA was required to consider the costs that would be imposed by the rule.  EPA said no and the majority agreed.

Section 112(n) of the Clean Air Act required EPA to perform a study of the health hazards related to hazardous emissions from EGUs prior to regulating them.  How was EPA to utilize the results of the study?

"The Administrator shall regulate [EGUs] under this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of the study required by this subparagraph."

The industry petitioners and Judge Kavanaugh took the position that Congress’s use of the word “appropriate” evidenced an intent to require EPA to consider costs.  To Judge Kavanaugh, “that’s just common sense and sound government practice.”  However, persuasive Judge Kavanaugh may be as a matter of policy, the majority was not persuaded that the law requires a consideration of cost.

As the majority noted, nothing in section 112(n) requires that EPA consider cost.  Indeed, the word “cost” is not mentioned in section 112(n).  Moreover, Congress required EPA to make the “appropriate and necessary” determination based on a study of health impacts, not a study of costs.  Finally, as EPA and the majority noted, the Supreme Court, in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, cautioned against finding authority – let alone a mandate – to consider costs in ambiguous provisions of the CAA, given that there are sections of the Act which do address costs.

I’m with Judge Kavanaugh as a matter of policy (though it’s worth noting that EPA in fact did a cost-benefit analysis and found that the benefits of the rule substantially outweigh its costs).  On the law, however, the dissent seems pretty much a case of ipse dixit.  When the rule was promulgated, I said that I would be “stunned” if the rule was not upheld on judicial review. Notwithstanding the dissent, I’d be equally stunned if the Supreme Court flips this decision.  I don’t think that there’s anything here warranting Supreme Court review.

Massachusetts High Court Upholds Environmental Agency’s “Improvement” Of Statute: Will The Us Supreme Court Follow Suit?

Posted on March 17, 2014 by Stephen Leonard

How far can an agency deviate from a statutory scheme in order to achieve what it sees as the goals of that scheme? Can the regulatory structure “improve on” the statute?  These issues are currently playing out in two closely watched cases.

Last year these pages described a then-undecided Massachusetts state court case that had attracted a surprising degree of national attention. Pepin v. Division of Fisheries and Wildlife began as a relatively straightforward challenge to an agency determination that the plaintiffs’ land provided habitat for the Eastern Box Turtle and that construction of their planned retirement home was therefore subject to regulation under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act (MESA). In the course of judicial appeals of the agency decision, the plaintiffs, with new counsel, shifted the focus of their argument to a challenge to the regulations themselves. When the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Mass SJC), acting sua sponte, transferred the case to its own docket, interest in the case spiked dramatically. Amicus curiae briefs were filed not only by state-based groups, on both sides of the issue (Massachusetts Audubon Society, Development Council of Western Massachusetts, Home Builders Association of Massachusetts), but also by those from farther afield (Pacific Legal Foundation, Defenders of Wildlife, National Association of Homebuilders, The Nature Conservancy). Clearly, something was at stake. And now, just as the Mass SJC has reached a decision in Pepin, very similar arguments are being made, with even more at stake, in this year’s most closely watched environmental case, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the United States Supreme Court’s review of the Obama Administration’s attempt to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources. 

To understand these issues, some background on the Massachusetts endangered species regulatory scheme and the challenge to it is necessary. (These are described in more detail in the earlier posting.) The challenged regulations established a process for mapping “priority habitats,” areas that are important for species that fall into any of the three categories established under MESA – in descending order of the peril that they face, endangered species, threatened species, and species of special concern. These Priority Habitat regulations require that before a project is undertaken in such an area, it must be reviewed by the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife to determine whether it will result in a “take” of a species falling into any of the three categories.  (“Take” is very broadly defined in the statute and includes habitat alteration.) If a take will occur, the regulations provide, the project may nevertheless proceed if it can be conditioned in such a way as to avoid that result or, in more difficult cases, if the project proponent takes other steps that will result in “a long-term net benefit to the conservation of the impacted species.”   

In practice, the evidence showed, 75% of projects proposed in Priority Habitat have been approved without conditions, 22% have proceeded with conditions, and 3% have required that other measures, resulting in a “long-term net benefit,” be taken in order to permit the project to proceed. Because of this history, at least parts of the development community in Massachusetts had accepted the Priority Habitat regulations as a reasonable way of accommodating both developers’ interests and the purposes of MESA.  

This acceptance was likely based on something else as well: As a practical matter, the Priority Habitat regulations were promulgated in lieu of regulations under another scheme, specifically set out in the legislation but never put into effect by the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife. MESA authorizes the Division to designate as “Significant Habitat” areas that are important to the survival of endangered and threatened species (but not species of special concern). And MESA severely constrains development in areas that the Division has so designated. But, because of the severity of the constraint, the Act also establishes substantial procedural protections before a particular property can be designated as Significant Habitat.  

Rather than designating any Significant Habitat, the Division, relying on a general grant of authority to adopt regulations, created the Priority Habitat scheme, with its less severe restrictions on development and its less burdensome (for the agency) procedural requirements. In short, the Division chose not to adopt regulations specifically contemplated in the enabling legislation and  adopted instead regulations that were easier to administer, less intrusive for those in the regulated community who would have fallen under the legislatively-contemplated scheme and, as a consequence, arguably more effective at protecting at-risk species in Massachusetts. Doing that, though, made the Priority Habitat regulations subject to challenge by those who might prefer that there be no regulation of land use in the interest of protecting at-risk species at all.

The challenge in the Pepin case to the Massachusetts wildlife agency’s rulemaking power is very like the industry challenge to EPA’s rulemaking in Utility Air Regulatory Group. On February 18 of this year, the Mass SJC upheld the validity of the Priority Habitat regulations. On February 24, the United States Supreme Court heard argument on the challenge by industry and certain states to the Environmental Protection Agency greenhouse gas regulations. (Other states intervened in support of the regulations, and there was extensive amicus participation.) At the heart of the challenge in the Supreme Court is an attack on EPA’s determination that it would raise very substantially the threshold at which emitters of greenhouse gases would be regulated; the emission levels specified in the Clean Air Act are much lower, but they were intended for “conventional” pollutants, not greenhouse gases. Using the Congressionally-specified levels would have been an administrative nightmare for EPA. And it would have been enormously burdensome for businesses and even individuals.  EPA therefore determined to use higher thresholds.  This presumably benefits the industry petitioners and the states that support them. But that is not the point. EPA’s action leaves it subject to the accusation leveled at the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife: That it re-wrote a statute in order, in its view, to make it work better, and that an administrative agency may not do that.

The Mass SJC had little difficulty rejecting this claim. The unanimous opinion begins its discussion of the validity of the Priority Habitat regulations by noting that “[d]uly promulgated regulations . . . are presumptively valid and ‘must be accorded all the deference due to a statute.’” And in analyzing whether the plaintiffs had overcome that presumption, the court “look[ed] to the statute as a whole to determine the scope of the agency’s power.” In the recent United States Supreme Court argument, EPA sought to invoke these principles in defense of its greenhouse gas regulations.  And it received some support from the Court. Justice Elena Kagan, according to the New York Times, acknowledged that what the agency did “was true to the law’s larger purpose.” But other Justices were less comfortable: Justice Anthony Kennedy “couldn’t find a single precedent that strongly supports [EPA’s] position.” And Justice Samuel Alito insisted that the agency’s use of its own threshold numbers, rather than those in the Clean Air Act, was unprecedented “in the entire history of federal regulation.”

The two cases are not the same, of course: the statutes are different; the agencies’ actions and choices were different; and the governing administrative law principles may be different in some respects. But it seems likely that the outcomes in the cases turned and will turn less on any of those factors and more on the views of the judges deciding them about the appropriateness of administrative agencies  making their own judgments about how best to accomplish broadly-stated legislative objectives.

One could easily argue that the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife took a more dramatic step, in declining to promulgate regulations that the enabling legislation called for and instead promulgating regulations that were not specifically contemplated by that legislation, than EPA did in adopting the regulatory model that Congress had called for but limiting its reach when it was clear that not doing that would be havoc-making. Perhaps if the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had reviewed EPA’s actions and the United States Supreme Court had reviewed the Priority Habitat regulations, the results would reflect that distinction. But they didn’t. And what we got, and likely will get, are decisions that reflect as much the views of the members of those courts as they do the substantive nuances of the cases themselves.

Where are we now? EPA's Audit Policy, Next Generation Compliance and Budgetary Implications

Posted on January 21, 2014 by Mary Ellen Ternes

The EPA Audit Policy, “Incentives for Self-Policing:  Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations,” adopted in 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995), amended at 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000), was targeted by EPA for abandonment in 2012.  Perhaps in response to resounding objections by industry and outside counsel, EPA has not yet dismantled this cherished avenue toward forgiveness. 

For counsel productively utilizing the EPA’s Audit Policy, EPA’s announcement that it intended to abandon the Audit Policy, particularly in the context of Next Generation Enforcement and budgetary cutbacks in “boots on the ground” inspections, created significant concern that industry would be caught in a communication and policy void that would lead to more punitive yet unnecessary enforcement proceedings.  While EPA has removed the possibility of e-reporting per its Audit policy electronic disclosure website, EPA has maintained regulated entities’ ability to utilize the Audit Policy by directly reporting to regional Audit Policy staff.  See EPA’s Audit Policy website here.  Hopefully, EPA will continue to recognize the many benefits resulting from continued support of the Audit Policy, particularly in the context of more remote enforcement strategies, fewer “boots on the ground” and heavier reliance on state enforcement resources.

Audit policy – History

In response to developing state audit privilege legislation, EPA developed an interim policy addressing the scope of “privilege” allowed for voluntary environmental audits and their findings.  60 Fed. Reg. 66,709 (March 31, 1995).  Seeking to avoid litigation regarding the scope of privileged environmental audit findings, EPA’s interim policy offered incentives to conduct voluntary audits where the findings were disclosed and promptly corrected.  EPA issued its final Audit Policy in 1995, with the specific purpose of enhancing protection of public health and the environment by encouraging regulated entities to voluntarily discover, disclose, correct and prevent violations of Federal enforcement law.  The benefits offered by EPA’s 1995 final Audit Policy included reductions in the amount of civil penalties, possible elimination of gravity-based penalties, and a determination not to recommend criminal prosecution of disclosing entities.  EPA’s adoption of the 1995 Audit Policy followed five days of dialogue, hosted by ABA’s SEER (then SONREEL) with representatives from regulated industry, states and public interest organizations which identified options for strengthening the former interim policy and included changes reflecting insight gained through this ABA dialogue, over 300 comments received and EPA’s practical experience in implementing the interim policy.  Since its adoption, EPA has issued several guidance documents, including EPA’s Audit Policy Interpretive Guidance (January 1997), Audit Policy; Frequently Asked Questions (2007); and EPA’s Audit Policy:  Tailored Incentives for New Owners, 73 Fed. Reg. 44, 991 (Aug. 1, 2008), all available here

Enforcement budgetary constraints

In the face of fierce political opposition and severe budgetary cutbacks, EPA issued public statements regarding areas where resources would be cut back or eliminated.  Specifically, on April 30, 2012, EPA’s OECA issued its “National Program Manager (NPM) Guidance” to EPA’s regional offices proposing to spend no resources processing self-disclosures under the Audit Policy beginning with EPA’s 2013 Fiscal Year. In the NPM Guidance, EPA stated its position that internal compliance reviews had become more widely adopted by the regulated community as part of good management, that most violations disclosed under the Policy were not in the highest priority enforcement areas for protecting human health and the environment, and that EPA could reduce its investment in the program to a limited national presence without undermining the incentives for regulated entities to do internal compliance reviews to find and correct violations with potentially a modified Audit Policy that is self-implementing.  See the FY2013 OECA NPM Guidance (Publication Number – Final: 305R12001) available here

With the issuance of the April 2012 NPM Guidance came a strong response by regulated entities.  Members of the national environmental bar, including individual practitioners, the American College of Environmental Lawyers and the Corporate Environmental Enforcement Council, reached out to the EPA and requested discussion, urging EPA to retain the Audit Policy.  See e.g., related ACOEL blog postings available here, and  CEEC letter to Cynthia Giles, Assistant Administrative, EPA OECA (Feb. 8, 2013), available here

Common arguments defending the continued implementation of the Audit Policy include the fact that the Audit Policy serves as the basis for a continued culture of compliance even in landscape of dynamic changes to industry and regulation, quantifiable benefits in achieving compliance, as well as serving as a consistent baseline for states adopting their own audit policies.

EPA’s Promotion of Next Generation Enforcement

In 2012, EPA began promoting its Next Generation Compliance initiative.  See Next Generation Compliance article from Environmental Forum, republished here.  With EPA’s NGC, EPA is seeking to streamline federal enforcement oversight with regulations adopting “built-in” compliance, advanced pollution monitoring, electronic reporting, increased transparency and innovative enforcement strategies.  EPA’s examples of “built-in” compliance include standards for manufacturers of mobile sources and air pollution control equipment, where compliance with standards are certified initially by the manufacturer, rather than relying initially on post-installation field testing.  Following installation of air pollution control equipment, EPA’s approach would utilize advanced pollution monitoring to evaluate compliance of operating air pollution control equipment.  Advanced pollution monitoring would also include fence-line monitoring and remote sensing techniques including infrared cameras.  Examples of electronic reporting include NPDES Electronic Reporting, see 78 Fed. Reg. 46006 (July 30, 2013) (proposed rule), and EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory electronic reporting data based, TRI-MEweb, available here. With electronic reporting, greater electronic availability of data allows greater transparency of reported data.  Finally, innovative enforcement strategies build on advanced monitoring, electronic reporting and third-party verification, coupled with industry sector approaches,  including industry wide recognition and notification of noncompliance, followed by set compliance deadlines and, if necessary, enforcement.

EPA’s Reduced Enforcement Goals for 2014-2018 

On November 19, 2013, EPA published its Draft 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, with public comment ending on January 3, 2014. 78 Fed. Reg. 69412 (Nov. 19, 2013).  Comparing EPA’s proposed 2014-2018 enforcement goals to its 2011-2015 enforcement goals shows that EPA intends to significantly cut back on the number of inspections as well as many other enforcement goals.  Specifically, EPA is reducing its 5-year cumulative inspection and evaluation goal from 105,000 inspections to 70,000 inspections.  EPA expects to initiate fewer civil judicial and administrative enforcement cases, setting its initiation goal at 11,600 compared to an earlier 19,500, and conclude fewer cases, 10,000 compared to an earlier 19,000.  Compare  Draft FY 2014-2018 EPA Strategic Plan, available here, to FY 2011-2015 EPA Strategic Plan, available here

Implications of NGC and Reduction in Inspections

EPA’s Next Generation Compliance approaches, coupled with significantly reduced inspections, may seem like a relief to some.  However, EPA’s NGC emphasizes remote monitoring methods and automatic electronic reporting.  In other words, data will be reported electronically, potentially without the necessary context required for a full compliance evaluation.  However, numbers alone do not allow a conclusive compliance determination.  Reliance on mere data without the context achieved with an in-person inspection raises risks that enforcement actions, albeit reduced in number, may be allowed to proceed despite facts that mitigate against taking such action.  Of course, this risk varies depending upon the regulatory program and may be less significant where delegated states maintain sufficient budgets for inspections.  However, this concern remains magnified where qualitative data, such as, for example, fence-line monitoring and use of remote infrared cameras, may be relied upon in the Clean Air Act enforcement context to create a presumption of noncompliance, potentially collected in a manner that is divorced from actual quantitative point-source emission data and permitted parametric operating conditions which facilities rely on to demonstrate ongoing compliance.  While regulated entities maintain documentation demonstrating ongoing compliance, the threat remains that such NGC techniques could mire entities in unnecessary enforcement actions where an in-person inspection could preempt such proceedings.  

In this uncertain enforcement environment, regulated entities will likely want to continue to directly rely on the assurance provided by EPA’s Audit Policy, as well as state audit policies adopted pursuant to, and maintained consistent with, EPA’s Audit Policy and the policies and principles therein.

Conclusion

As of January 2014, EPA continues to allow regulated entities to avail themselves of EPA’s Audit Policy by reporting to named regional EPA Audit Policy staff.  Hopefully, EPA’s dismantling of its electronic Audit Policy reporting program constitutes sufficient savings to allow EPA’s regional offices to continue accepting Audit Policy disclosures. 

EPA’s Draft Groundwater Remedy Completion Strategy: Focusing on the Procedures or the Problems?

Posted on December 9, 2013 by Charles Efflandt

EPA is seeking stakeholder input on its draft Groundwater Remedy Completion Strategy.   Released on October 29, 2013, the strategy is advertised as a guide for evaluating remedy performance and improving decision-making to more effectively and expeditiously move groundwater sites to completion. Having experienced the problems associated with the “set it and forget it” approach to groundwater remedial action, my interest was piqued by the prospect of a new EPA strategy incorporating more flexibility in evaluating remedial action objectives, remedy performance and systematic risk assessment.

The potential impact of EPA’s remedy completion strategy is arguably diminished, however, by a lack of clarity as to its scope and purpose. The stated objective of documenting a uniform approach to efficiently completing groundwater remedial actions is qualified by an ambiguous disclaimer that the strategy does not change other guidance or policy, is not intended to alter the way the agency develops remedial objectives and cleanup goals and is not intended to interfere with the federal or state site decision-making process. So, what exactly does EPA hope to accomplish in proposing this new strategy?

The elements of the strategy consist of understanding site conditions, designing a site-specific remedy evaluation process, developing performance metrics, conducting remedy evaluations and making appropriate site management decisions. The focus of EPA’s strategy as presented is largely procedural. The strategy does not address common site impediments to achieving an effective and expeditious groundwater exit strategy. To that extent, it is primarily a restatement of a remedy evaluation process that has been the subject of numerous articles and that, in fact, has historically been implemented at many sites.

But perhaps my initial reading is too narrow. The strategy hints at more substantive remedy completion issues, such as addressing site remedial action objectives that become impracticable and unnecessary for the protection of health and the environment, as well as the need to more consistently evaluate remedy change at mature groundwater sites.

From the perspective of focusing on site groundwater scenarios that often delay remedy completion, I suggest that the draft strategy falls short of the goal line. Rather than simply allude to the remedy completion obstacles that presumably inspired the agency’s effort, EPA might better achieve its stated purpose if it revises its strategy to include more discussion of how the strategy may apply to common groundwater completion impediments. For example, it would be useful for the strategy to address the cost and inefficiencies of continuing to operate and maintain asymptotic pump and treat systems at low-threat sites, how to better incorporate plume stability trend information in the evaluation of remedy change, changes in exposure pathway risks and the impact of natural attenuation mechanisms, institutional controls and land use on remedy modification and remedy completion decision-making.

What I had hoped to see in the draft strategy was EPA’s blessing of a more flexible and common sense approach to specific groundwater remedy completion obstacles. My first reading of the draft strategy suggested to me that it was essentially a redundant procedural roadmap for remedy evaluation.  But upon reflection, I think it could be more.  Indeed, it could also be – and I hope, after consideration of stakeholder comments, will be – a tool for encouraging more consistent regulatory acceptance of remedy change and evolving risk assessments to overcome the inertia of inflexible remedial action objectives and remedy selection impacting many groundwater sites.

“Waters of the U. S.” - What’s Not to Understand?

Posted on November 26, 2013 by Rick Glick

EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers continue their ongoing effort to bring clarity to the tangled mess wrought by the Supreme Court in Rapanos v. U. S. In that 2006 case, a fractured Court issued five separate opinions on the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act.  Congress didn’t help in the first place by extending such jurisdiction to “navigable” waters, defined in the Act as “waters of the United States” without further elucidation.  EPA and the Corps have developed new rules now under review by the Office of Management and Budget prior to release for public comment.

The agencies and the courts have long struggled with a workable definition of “waters of the United States,” particularly in the context of filling wetlands.  The Supreme Court previously held that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are jurisdictional because of their ecological connection to those waters, but isolated wetlands in the Pacific Flyway are not.  In Rapanos, a four member plurality in an opinion by Justice Scalia limited jurisdiction to areas that are wet with flowing or standing water on a more or less regular basis, which would exclude many areas that appear dry but meet the agency definition of wetlands.  The determinative fifth vote, however, was from Justice Kennedy, who applied a different test, requiring only a “significant nexus” between the navigable waterways and the wetland. 

Since Rapanos, many courts have been unable to discern guiding precedent and adopted hybrids of the Scalia and Kennedy tests. In the meantime, the agencies on two occasions have adopted guidance to help permit writers and the regulated community recognize jurisdictional wetlands.  The agencies’ latest effort would go beyond guidance to rules having the force of law. 

The rules define jurisdictional waters of the United States to include categories of wet areas, such as tributaries of navigable waterways.  The rules would exclude drainage ditches excavated on uplands or other artificially wet areas, such as waste treatment systems or irrigated lands.  The expectation is that by establishing by rule categories of jurisdictional waters that per se have a significant nexus to navigable waters, the cost of permitting and litigation would decrease, while certainty for land developers would increase. 

The rules are based on a report by EPA staff that compiles and synthesizes peer-reviewed scientific research on the relationship between tributaries, wetlands and open waters.  The report is under review by EPA’s Science Advisory Board, and EPA has said the rules would not be released for public comment until that review is complete. 

Still, the fact that the rules were developed before the report and Science Advisory Board review is complete has drawn criticism from Congressional Republicans.  They charge that the report is just window dressing for EPA doing what it wants.  In a letter dated November 13 to EPA, the Senate and House Western caucuses urge EPA to withdraw the rule “based on the devastating economic impacts that a federal takeover of state waters would have.”

The prospect of having rules in place to define jurisdictional waters is, on its face, a positive development because of the uncertainty that now pervades this area.  However, in addition to Congressional resistance, the goal of avoiding litigation will likely prove elusive.  If challenged, the agencies will be entitled to a measure of deference once the rules are adopted, but we can safely predict there will be many challenges.  

Once the rules clear OMB and the Science Advisory Board, they will be published for public comment.  Watch this space for updates.

New ASTM E1527-13 Standard for Phase I ESA

Posted on November 11, 2013 by Thomas Lavender

On November 6, 2013, the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) issued the revised version of the ASTM E1527 Standard for Phase I Environmental Site Assessments.  The new standard supersedes the prior 2005 standard, which had been deemed to satisfy EPA’s “all appropriate inquiry” rules.    EPA has expects to confirm whether the new standard is compliant by the end of 2013.

The 2013 amendment to ASTM E1527 provides clarification on the definitions of Recognized Environmental Condition and Historical Recognized Environmental Condition.  The amendment also includes a new term, Controlled Recognized Environmental Condition, and addresses the potential assessment for Vapor Migration Risk.  The amendment further clarifies requirements for the requisite regulatory file review and includes updates to User responsibilities under the standard.  The EPA has summarized the updates and changes from the E1527-05 standard in a document in the EPA docket.  (See Amendment to Standards and Practices for All Appropriate inquiry.)

Grant of Certiorari in Greenhouse Gas Regulation Litigation: Limited But Important

Posted on October 30, 2013 by David Buente

Of the 21 separate questions presented in the 9 petitions for writ of certiorari filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al., challenging nearly every aspect of the Environmental Protection Agency’s recent greenhouse gas regulations—from the initial “endangerment” finding to the restriction on motor vehicle emissions to the stationary-source permitting requirements—the Court granted review of only a single issue:  “[w]hether [EPA’s] regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.”  Several commentators have interpreted this decision (reported in a prior post by Theodore Garrett) as an implicit affirmation of EPA’s regulatory regime, insofar as the Court chose not to address some of the broader challenges to the agency’s basic authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.  But, whatever implications might be drawn from the Court’s decision not to grant review of certain issues, far more telling is the Court’s deliberate rewriting of the question presented, narrowly tailored to address the validity of the stationary-source permitting regulations.

Those regulations rest on an exceedingly questionable interpretation of the Clean Air Act.  The stationary-source provisions of the Act require any industrial facility that emits an “air pollutant” in “major” amounts—defined by the statute as 250 or more tons of the pollutant per year—to obtain pre-construction and operating permits from the local permitting authority.  42 U.S.C. § 7475.  EPA acknowledges that it would be “absurd” to apply these provisions by their terms to sources of greenhouse gas emissions, since nearly every business in the country (including even small commercial enterprises and residential facilities) emit greenhouse gases at more than 250 tons per year, and the agency can offer no reason why the statute should not be interpreted instead to apply only to the large industrial facilities that emit “major” amounts of a pollutant otherwise subject to regulation under the permitting provisions—i.e., one of the so-called “criteria pollutants” for which a national ambient air quality standard has been issued.  Nevertheless, EPA has interpreted the statute to apply to sources of greenhouse gas emissions and, to address the acknowledged “absurd results” created thereby, has decided that for these purposes the threshold for a “major” emissions source should be increased from 250 tons per year—as stated in the statute—by 400-fold, to 100,000 tons per year.  The agency has, in other words, literally rewritten the express terms of the statute in order to justify its preferred interpretation.

The dissenting judges in the D.C. Circuit severely criticized the result.  That is most likely the reason the Supreme Court granted review of the case, to correct the agency’s  interpretation of the Act and ensure that neither EPA nor other agencies attempt to redo legislative power in this way in the future.  Whether or not the limited nature of the certiorari grant can be viewed as an approval of EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases from mobile sources, it almost certainly reflects suspicion—if not disapproval—of the agency’s stationary-source regulations.  The definitive answer should come by June 2014, when the Court is expected to rule. 

Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act – Cooling Water Intake Requirements – Update on EPA and State of Maine Actions

Posted on October 21, 2013 by Philip Ahrens

Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act requires that the location, design, construction and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.  Although the statutory language is straight-forward, EPA continues to face – and create – enormous difficulties in promulgating the rules to implement Section 316(b).

The latest in a series of rulemaking efforts began on April 20, 2011 when EPA published a proposed rule to protect fish from being killed at water intake structures that withdraw at least 2,000,000 gallons per day from waters of the United States and use at least 25% of that water exclusively for cooling purposes.  Pursuant to a judicial Settlement Agreement with the environmental group Riverkeeper and other organizations, EPA was required to issue the revised rule by July 27, 2012. 

When EPA was unable to issue its new rule by the court-approved date, it entered into a Second Amendment to the Settlement Agreement with Riverkeeper and other organizations.  That Agreement required that “Not later than June 27, 2013, the EPA Administrator shall sign for publication in the Federal Register a notice of its final action pertaining to issuance of requirements for implementing Section 316(b) of the CWA at existing facilities.” 

On June 18, 2013, nine days before the June 27 deadline for publication of notice of final action, EPA initiated Endangered Species Act (ESA) Section 7 consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service.  EPA has been criticized for many years for its failure to initiate Section 7 ESA consultation during rulemaking.  With the agreement of Riverkeeper and the other plaintiffs, a revised Settlement Agreement now allows a delay in the issuance of the final rule until November 4, more than four months after the June 27, 2013 deadline. 

Although the revised Settlement Agreement allows time for Section 7 consultation, it does not appear to allow time for review of the rule by the White House Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs. 

Given the delays that have been experienced to date on this rule, coupled with the delays engendered by the government shutdown, it seems doubtful that EPA will be able to meet the new November 4, 2013 deadline for issuance of its cooling water intake rule.  We shall see.

Smackdown Alert: Certiorari granted to review EPA’s GHG rules

Posted on October 15, 2013 by Theodore Garrett

The Supreme Court agreed today to review the EPA’s authority to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from stationary sources.  The Justices accepted six petitions for review of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA (No., 12-1146 et al.), consolidated them for argument, and limited review to a single question:

“Whether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.” 

The six petitions granted were filed by the Utility Air Regulatory Group, the American Chemistry Council, the Energy-Intensive Manufacturers, the Southeastern Legal Foundation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and a number of states.

EPA’s position, as presented in the DC Circuit and in its opposition to certiorari, is that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under Title II triggered permitting requirements under the PSD program and Title V of the Act, which apply to stationary sources emitting “any air pollutant” above the statutory threshold.  EPA has interpreted “any air pollutant” to mean “any air pollutant regulated under the Clean Air Act,” and thus when the EPA’s regulation of emissions from new motor vehicles took effect in January 2011, the permitting requirements under the PSD program and Title V automatically applied to stationary GHG sources above the statutory threshold.

In its petition, the US Chamber of Commerce noted that EPA acknowledged that its tailoring rule would create a result “so contrary to what Congress had in mind — and that in fact so undermines what Congress attempted to accomplish with the [statute’s] requirements — that it should be avoided under the ‘absurd results’ doctrine.”  With respect to the issue upon which cert was granted, the Chamber argued that EPA incorrectly determined that all “air pollutants” regulated by the agency under the Clean Air Act’s motor vehicle emissions provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7421(a)(1), must also be regulated under the Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality and Title V programs when emitted from stationary sources.

The Utility Air Regulatory Group petition expressly did not ask the Supreme Court to revisit its holding in Massachusetts v. EPA.  However, the UARG petition did ask the Court to consider whether its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA compelled EPA to include GHGs in the PSD and Title V programs when inclusion of GHGs would expand the PSD program to cover a substance that does not deteriorate the quality of the air that people breathe.  UARG emphasized EPA’s admission that regulation of GHGs under the Title I and Title V permit programs subjects “an extraordinarily large number of sources” to the Act for the first time, “result[ing] in a program that would have been unrecognizable to the Congress that designed PSD.” 

A coalition of environmental groups opposed certiorari, emphasizing that EPA’s endangerment and contribution findings and emissions standards for motor vehicles simply implement  the Supreme Court’s mandate in Massachusetts v. EPA.  They emphasize that the Petitioners’ arguments ignore the “air pollutant” definition that the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held “unambiguous[ly]” (549 U.S. at 529) covers greenhouse gases. 

It is worth noting that four justices dissented in Massachusetts v. EPA, and the successful petitioners in Coalition for Responsible Regulation argue that Massachusetts does not compel the regulations at issue here.  The granting of the petitions for certiorari is sobering news for EPA. Stay tuned.

EPA Proposes to Take Away State Discretion on Antidegradation Analysis

Posted on October 14, 2013 by Patricia Barmeyer

One basic premise of the Clean Water Act is that EPA sets minimum standards but allows the States some latitude, in some areas, to design their own programs to meet their own needs.  One area where the States have traditionally been allowed flexibility is the antidegradation analysis required for any new or expanded discharge, to assure that high quality waters are not degraded.  However, in a notice published September 4, EPA is proposing to amend the federal antidegradation rule to require a review of alternative treatment levels for every permit and to require selection of the “least degrading alternative” in each case.  The proposed rule would have a dramatic effect in Georgia, and perhaps in some other states. 

The current antidegradation rule--both the federal rule and the Georgia rule--provides that the quality of high quality waters shall be maintained unless “allowing water quality is necessary to accommodate important economic or social development in the area….”  In Georgia the longstanding process, approved by EPA, is that the state Environmental Protection Division determines whether the proposed discharge is “necessary” by considering any no-discharge alternatives, such as land application.  If the no-discharge alternative is not feasible and the agency concludes, after public input, that the proposed discharge has significant positive economic or social value, then EPD considers the antidegradation analysis complete.  The agency then proceeds to apply the water quality regulations to determine effluent limitations and other permit conditions. 

Under EPA’s proposal, the antidegradation analysis would mandate a consideration of a full range of alternatives that could prevent or minimize the degradation that would result with the proposed activity, so long as they are “practicable.”  As proposed, this would apply not only to industrial dischargers but also to POTWs, even though the Clean Water Act clearly provides for less stringent technology for public facilities.  The result would be to require substantial expenditures on additional controls even if they are not needed and even if they will produce negligible water quality benefits. 

This very issue has been the subject of debate and litigation in Georgia for the past ten years.  It has enormous implications, because Georgia has declared that all its waters are “high quality” and subject to the Tier 2 requirements.  The environmental community in Georgia has long argued that the determination that a proposed discharge is “necessary” must be supported by a demonstration that the facility, even a POTW, has employed the highest level of treatment that is technologically and economically feasible.  In their view, if a facility can implement better controls, it must, without regard to a cost-benefit analysis and whether or not the lower standard would have any impact on water quality.  The Georgia experience counsels against EPA’s proposal to impose a “one-size-fits-all” antidegradation analysis on all 50 states.

Shoot First -- Ask Questions Later

Posted on September 26, 2013 by Mark Walker

“Shoot first, ask questions later” is how Congressman Chris Stewart described EPA’s efforts to link groundwater contamination to hydraulic fracturing.  Stewart is the Chair of the Environmental Subcommittee of the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, chairing the July 24 hearing on “Lessons Learned:  EPA’s Investigations of Hydraulic Fracturing.”  Specifically at issue was the EPA’s investigation in Pavillion, Wyoming.

In December, 2011, the EPA issued a “draft” report which concluded that hydraulic fracturing in the Pavillion, Wyoming gas field had caused pollution of the deep drinking water aquifer.  The draft report was based upon sample results from two EPA monitor wells and was issued without peer review or stakeholder input.

There were serious flaws with EPA’s work.  For starters, EPA failed to complete the monitor wells according to its own guidelines.  Annular sealants were not properly installed, allowing cement to impact the water quality.  A landowner’s complaint that EPA had an anti-freeze leak during drilling operations was not disclosed in the draft report.  EPA exposed the wellbores to painted low-carbon steel casing and welding materials, which are known to contain various organic and metal compounds, yet the report inaccurately stated that stainless steel casing had been used.  Moreover, several of the constituents which the EPA attributed to hydraulic fracturing fluids (e.g. glycols, 2-butoxyethanol and phenols) are known to be associated with the high pH cement that the EPA used to complete the wells.  The bottom line is that the EPA’s own operations introduced the contaminants that it blamed on hydraulic fracturing fluids.

Subsequent testing by the USGS was unable to verify the EPA’s results.  The USGS was unable to find some of the compounds that EPA claimed were present, and other constituents were found at significantly lower levels.  The USGS was unable to sample one of the two wells due to improper well construction.

The EPA has now walked away from its flawed study, turning the entire investigation over to the State of Wyoming.  The EPA has stated that the draft report will not be peer reviewed or finalized, and that the results will not be used in its national hydraulic fracturing study.  Nevertheless, the EPA’s handling of Pavillion has cast doubt over the EPA’s national investigation of hydraulic fracturing intended to develop regulatory policy for unconventional reserves, causing Chairman Stewart to conclude, “given EPA’s rush to judgment in Wyoming…we should question whether the Agency’s ongoing study is a genuine, fact-finding, scientific exercise, or a witch-hunt to find a pretext to regulate.”

Court Upholds Multi-State Chesapeake TMDL

Posted on September 25, 2013 by Ridgway Hall

On September 13, in a 99 page decision, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania upheld EPA’s multi-state Clean Water Act Total Maximum Daily Load (“TMDL”) for the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries against a broad range of challenges brought by the American Farm Bureau Federation and six other farm industry trade associations. Six environmental organizations led by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, plus four municipal water associations led by the National Association of Clean Water Agencies, intervened in support of EPA.

The Chesapeake Bay TMDL is not the first to cover multiple states, but it is by far the largest, covering 64,000 square miles in Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, New York and the District of Columbia.  It requires substantial reductions of nitrogen (25%), phosphorus (24%) and sediment (20%) by 2025 to  meet water quality standards.  Because of the interstate nature of the long-standing pollution problems, after more than two decades of collaborative but unsuccessful efforts, the states agreed in 2007 that EPA should develop the TMDL. It was issued in 2010 and included allocations for each of 92 tidal segments which, after consultation with the states, were further allocated among states, watersheds and sectors (such as agriculture, wastewater, stormwater, etc). During the process, each state developed its own Watershed Implementation Plan (“WIP”), specifying  wasteload allocations (“WLA’s”) for point sources, load allocations (“LAs”) for nonpoint sources, and identifying the regulations, programs and resources that would be used to achieve the required reductions. For more on this TMDL see "EPA Issues Biggest TMDL Ever for Chesapeake Bay Watershed" and ELI Environmental ForumThe Chesapeake Bay TMDL” (May/June 2011). 

The plaintiffs alleged that (1) the TMDL was an unauthorized “implementation” of  allocations by EPA, (2) requiring WIPs exceeded EPA’s authority, (3) EPA’s use of watershed and related models in setting the allocations was an abuse of discretion, and (4) there was insufficient public notice.  In addressing these challenges, the court first held (as several others have) that a TMDL is not self-implementing, but is an “informational tool”, developed collaboratively by EPA and the states under CWA Section 303(d), and implemented primarily by the states.

Turning to the merits, the court upheld EPA’s definition of a TMDL for a waterbody or segment as the sum of all WLAs and LAs plus natural background.  It also upheld  EPA’s authority to establish a multi-state TMDL,  when the affected states either fail to do so or ask EPA to do it (both occurred here), including limitations on sources in upstream states to achieve compliance with water quality standards in downstream states. It held that EPA’s “holistic” or “watershed-wide approach” was consistent with the broad national goals of the CWA to “restore … our Nation’s waters.” In reaching this result the court emphasized the collaborative efforts of the Bay states and EPA starting in 1983 to address the problems of interstate pollution, transported by rivers and tides, and their consensus that an EPA-led multistate effort was needed.

The court further held that the WIPs – new tools in the TMDL context – were authorized as part of the “continuing planning process” under CWA Section 303(e). This process is initiated by the states to achieve water quality goals, and is subject to review and approval by EPA. Because EPA had advised the states in letters what it expected in terms of general content and specificity in the WIPs, but left the details to the states, the court held EPA did not exceed its authority. The court also relied on CWA Section 117(g) - a Chesapeake Bay-specific provision - requiring EPA to “ensure that management plans are developed and implementation is begun by [all the affected states] to achieve and maintain…” the applicable water quality goals.

The plaintiffs also challenged EPA’s requirement that each WIP contain “reasonable assurances” of timely and effective implementation, and EPA’s use of “backstop” allocations where EPA determined that a WIP provision was deficient.  “Backstops” involved requiring NPDES permits from previously unregulated sources. The court held that EPA could properly require “reasonable assurance” under CWA 303(d)(1), which requires a TMDL must be “established at a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards.”  The court upheld “backstops”, which were only used in 3 instances, as a reasonable exercise of EPA’s authority under CWA 303(d)(2) to ensure that the contents of the TMDL are designed to achieve the applicable water quality goals.

The court upheld EPA’s use of models as scientifically supported and within EPA’s discretion.  It rejected the challenge to adequate notice and opportunity for public participation since (1) a 45 day public comment period had been provided, (2) there had been hundreds of public meetings during the more than 10 year development of the TMDL, and (3) plaintiffs showed no prejudice from the fact that some details of the modeling were not available until after the comment period.

The court held that TMDL establishment and implementation involves “cooperative federalism” between the states and EPA, and that the Chesapeake Bay TMDL properly reflects the shared responsibilities and necessary interactions, despite some bumps along the road. While EPA exerted strong leadership, the court held that it did not unlawfully usurp the states’ implementation functions. The court noted  the preserved authority of the states to implement nutrient trading and offsets, and to set or revise source-specific loading allocations.  In conclusion, there is a lot of thoughtful analysis, as well as precedent, in this decision, which makes it an excellent resource for CWA practitioners.

Yes, Another Blow, but not a Knockout

Posted on August 28, 2013 by Ralph Child

A recent post from Mary Ellen Ternes characterized the August 23, 2013 decision in EME Homer City Generation as another blow to EPA’s ability to enforce against long ago violations of the requirement to obtain New Source Review.

The Third Circuit’s decision certainly is a blow to EPA’s NSR enforcement initiative, but not nearly a knock-out.

First, the decision depended on the fact that neither the Clean Air Act or Pennsylvania’s EPA-enforceable State Implementation Plan expressly requires a major source to operate in compliance with the results of a New Source Review.  But some states do have that requirement in their EPA-enforceable SIPs, as the Third Circuit recognized in distinguishing other cases.  In such states, major sources that did not go through NSR as allegedly required at the time of construction or modification should still anticipate potential EPA enforcement via the SIP. 

Second, even where it is not illegal to operate in compliance with NSR, the question is still open whether the government may obtain injunctive relief anyway.  In United States v. United States Steel Company (N.D. Indiana), the Court held on August 21, 2013 that no penalties could be imposed at law because there is no federally enforceable requirement in Indiana to operate in accordance with the results of an NSR.  Yet the Court went on to  hold that the United States still can seek injunctive relief against a plant that allegedly violated the NSR requirement.  The Court reasoned that because the sovereign is not subject to laches, the government remains able to invoke the Court’s equitable powers and to seek an injunction to correct the violation.

On to the Seventh Circuit?

Petroleum Refinery Enforcement Initiative 2.0

Posted on August 5, 2013 by Paul Seals

Enforcement with a Flair

EPA has seen the smoke.
This certainly is no joke.
Benzene is a neighborhood scare,
With upsets going to the flare.

On July 10, the Department of Justice and EPA announced the lodging of a consent decree with Shell Oil Company to resolve alleged Clean Air Act violations at Shell’s refinery and chemical plant in Deer Park Texas.  This agreement represents the fourth “refinery flare consent decree” in the past year.  More are expected.

Shell will spend $115 million to control emissions from flares and other processes, and will pay a $2.6 million civil penalty.  EPA alleged that Shell was improperly operating its flaring devices resulting in excessive emissions of benzene and other hazardous air pollutants.  Shell will spend $100 million to reduce flare emissions.

These flare consent decrees represent a new chapter in EPA’s national Petroleum Refinery Initiative (“PRI”), which, beginning in 2000, resulted in the entry of 31 settlements covering 107 refineries in 32 states, affecting 90% of the domestic refining capacity.  EPA did address refinery flares as one of the marquee issues in PRI consent decrees – compliance with the New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) for Petroleum Refineries.

EPA is now pushing the envelope to impose “regulatory requirements plus.”  Through an enforcement alert in August of last year, EPA warned industry that there were significant issues with flare efficiency and excessive emissions.  EPA Enforcement Alert:  EPA Enforcement Targets Flaring Efficiency Violations.

What is EPA doing?  What is the basis of this Petroleum Refinery Initiative 2.0 and the imposition of “regulatory requirements plus”?

EPA bases this new initiative on the “general duty” requirements.  NSPS requires that at all times owners and operators should operate and maintain a facility or source consistent with “good air pollution control practices.”  In addition, Section 112r of the CAA requires owners and operators to maintain a safe facility by taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases of hazardous air pollutants (“HAP”), and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur.  Accordingly, with no threshold amount, any release of a listed HAP (e.g. benzene) that could have been prevented violates this general duty.  If a flare smokes, there must be a violation.

This general duty is used to require control measures that go beyond those specified in the regulations.  The consent decrees include conditions addressing flare combustion efficiency limits incorporating automated controls with complex and expensive monitoring systems, flaring caps for individual flares and the overall refinery, and flare gas recovery systems for individual flares.

The enforcement train has left the station.  Who will be next in line?  How much will the ticket cost?  Are there rulemaking or other actions that may be taken to slowdown or stop the train?  Flares are not unique to petroleum refineries and petrochemical plants (e.g. flaring in oil and gas production facilities).  Will EPA provide other industries the opportunity to go for a train ride?

Partners?

Posted on June 25, 2013 by Steve McKinney

Congress said EPA and the States are partners in implementing the Clean Air Act.  It’s simple: EPA sets pollutant-by-pollutant standards for clean air (NAAQS) and each State develops and implements a state-specific plan to meet and maintain those NAAQS.  Each partner is well-positioned and equipped to perform its assignment and Congress included appropriate “carrots and sticks” in the Act to ensure that both do their job.  The Supreme Court has extolled Congress’s partnership approach and EPA routinely professes its deep appreciation of its State partners and their important role.  So wassup with EPA suddenly demanding that thirty-six States delete rules about excess emissions during startup, shutdown and malfunction (SSM) that have been EPA-approved for 30 to 40 years?

On February 22, in response to a 2011 petition by Sierra Club, EPA proposed to “call” thirty-six state implementation plans (SIPs) because they contain affirmative defense, exemption, or director’s  discretion rules for excess emissions during periods of SSM. EPA’s previous approval of the offending rules wasn’t even a speedbump.  EPA also rejected any obligation to connect the offending rules with air pollution problems in the affected States.  EPA’s legal position on how the States should enforce their CAA permits was enough to shuck the partnership and impose the federal will.  And EPA didn’t even ask nicely.  State requests for information about EPA’s consideration of their SIPs were ignored and States were given 30 days to comment on a proposal EPA took more than a year to develop.  EPA gave its State partners another 45 days only after more than a dozen State Attorneys General jointly asked for more time and the Senate Committee considering the new Administrator’s confirmation made the same request.

When comments were filed on May 13, thirty affected States filed comments; none of them supported EPA’s proposed call of their SIP.  Not even EPA’s regular supporters on issues like tougher NAAQS thought EPA’s dictation was a good idea.  Complaints from EPA’s partners ranged from being wrongfully excluded from EPA’s evaluation of their SIP to EPA trampling on the States’ planning and implementation responsibilities to EPA creating a lot of work that could have been avoided if EPA had just talked to them.  No amount of spin can make this look good for state–federal relationships.

So why?  Well, Sierra Club did ask for it.  Maybe because an obvious compliance impact is on emission limits with continuous monitoring and short averaging times like opacity.  And maybe because coal-fired power plants always have opacity limits and deleting common excess emission rules will set those sources up for widespread enforcement litigation.  Or, maybe the States and the previous EPAs had it wrong for all these years and someone finally straightened everyone else out.  Like so many conundrums of this type, it might take some judges to give us the answer.

Pursuant to a settlement agreement with Sierra Club, EPA must finalize the SSM SIP Call by August 27, 2013.

I Believe in Environmental Regulation, But….

Posted on June 10, 2013 by Seth Jaffe

I believe in governmental environmental regulation.  We have a complicated world and it is not surprising that many activities, including those generating greenhouse gases, cause negative externalities.  At the same time, however, I have spent more than 25 years representing regulated entities in negotiations with government regulators and it is impossible to do such work without obtaining an appreciation for the very significant costs that bureaucracies impose.

With all due respect – cue the upcoming diss – to my many friends in government, the absence of market discipline or the ability to fire nonpolitical bureaucrats often leads to street level bureaucrats operating under a law of their own devising.  Moreover, if a complex economy causes externalities requiring regulation, that same complexity should cause regulators to pause before imposing or revising complicated regulatory regimes.  Unintended consequences abound.

The genesis of these musings was the confluence of a number of otherwise unrelated recent regulatory developments.  The most significant was headline in the Daily Environment Report earlier this week noting that “EPA [is] Still Unable to Provide Time Frame For Revising Definition of Solid Waste Rule.”  RCRA is the perfect example. No one can really quarrel with the need for hazardous waste regulation, in order to prevent the creation of more Superfund sites.  However, if we’re still fighting over the definition of something as basic as solid waste more than 30 years after the inception of the program and EPA’s most recent efforts to update the definition remain fruitless after about five years of effort, then we have to acknowledge some serious implementation problems where the rubber is trying to hit the road.

I’ll also provide two recent examples from my home state of Massachusetts.  MassDEP has been engaged in a serious regulatory reform effort, which has earned deserved praise.  However, as NAIOP has recently noted in comments on the draft proposal to revise the Massachusetts Contingency Plan, MassDEP’s proposed Active Existing Pathway Elimination Measure Permit is “so cumbersome that it is not clear that a PRP or redeveloper would want to seek such a permit.”  This calls to mind MassDEP’s reclaimed water regulations, which were intended to encourage water reuse, but are so cumbersome that no one is applying for the permits.

Thus, the final caution.  The MassDEP example is extremely common – and extremely troubling.  Regulator gets great idea for innovative program. Prior to implementation, concerns are raised about what happens if….  More effort is put into avoiding the perceived downsides than in actually making the program work.  Program ends up being worse than nothing.

I believe in environmental regulation, but…