Another Corner Heard From: Portland (Oregon) Releases a New Climate Action Plan

Posted on November 4, 2009 by Seth Jaffe

Last week, the City of Portland, Oregon (together with Multnomah County) released an updated Climate Action Plan. The Plan presents a number of aggressive goals and targets, with ultimate goals of GHG reductions of 40% by 2030 and 80% by 2050.

The details of the Plan are obviously only relevant to those in the Portland area, but for those anticipating what regulation might look like in California, Massachusetts, and other states that have enacted or will soon enacted some version of a Global Warming Solutions Act, the Plan provides a helpful catalogue of the types of changes that might be sought. Therefore, a quick summary of some of the 2030 goals seems warranted

Reduce energy use from existing buildings by 20%-25%

All new buildings – and homes -- should have zero net GHG emissions. 

Reduce VMT by 30% from 2008 levels

Recover 90% of all waste generated

Reduce consumption of carbon-intensive foods

Expand “urban forest canopy” to cover one-third of Portland

Reduce emissions from City and County operations by 50% from 1990 levels

What’s my take? I have two immediate reactions. First, if any further evidence were needed that attaining significant GHG emission reductions is going to involve major social and economic changes, this is certainly it. 

Second, and perhaps more importantly, this Plan, and others like it, have to constitute a heavy thumb on the side of the scale arguing for comprehensive federal legislation. In the past, I’ve argued that federal legislation would be preferable to a patchwork made up of EPA regulation under existing Clean Air Act authority, public nuisance litigation, and state and regional initiatives. To that list, we can now add comprehensive local regulation. I don’t mean to be too sanguine about the ability of federal legislation to harmonize this entire process; the existing bills would not preempt most state, regional, and local regulations (other than cap-and-trade programs). Nonetheless, delays in federal enactment can only contribute to the proliferation of state, regional, and local programs, some of which may be beneficial, but many of which will be inefficient, contradictory, or both.

Another Corner Heard From: Portland (Oregon) Releases a New Climate Action Plan

Posted on November 4, 2009 by Seth Jaffe

Last week, the City of Portland, Oregon (together with Multnomah County) released an updated Climate Action Plan. The Plan presents a number of aggressive goals and targets, with ultimate goals of GHG reductions of 40% by 2030 and 80% by 2050.

The details of the Plan are obviously only relevant to those in the Portland area, but for those anticipating what regulation might look like in California, Massachusetts, and other states that have enacted or will soon enacted some version of a Global Warming Solutions Act, the Plan provides a helpful catalogue of the types of changes that might be sought. Therefore, a quick summary of some of the 2030 goals seems warranted

Reduce energy use from existing buildings by 20%-25%

All new buildings – and homes -- should have zero net GHG emissions. 

Reduce VMT by 30% from 2008 levels

Recover 90% of all waste generated

Reduce consumption of carbon-intensive foods

Expand “urban forest canopy” to cover one-third of Portland

Reduce emissions from City and County operations by 50% from 1990 levels

What’s my take? I have two immediate reactions. First, if any further evidence were needed that attaining significant GHG emission reductions is going to involve major social and economic changes, this is certainly it. 

Second, and perhaps more importantly, this Plan, and others like it, have to constitute a heavy thumb on the side of the scale arguing for comprehensive federal legislation. In the past, I’ve argued that federal legislation would be preferable to a patchwork made up of EPA regulation under existing Clean Air Act authority, public nuisance litigation, and state and regional initiatives. To that list, we can now add comprehensive local regulation. I don’t mean to be too sanguine about the ability of federal legislation to harmonize this entire process; the existing bills would not preempt most state, regional, and local regulations (other than cap-and-trade programs). Nonetheless, delays in federal enactment can only contribute to the proliferation of state, regional, and local programs, some of which may be beneficial, but many of which will be inefficient, contradictory, or both.

PCB-Containing Caulk: How Old Is Your Building?

Posted on November 3, 2009 by Linda Bochert

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found evidence that buildings constructed or renovated between 1950 and 1978 may have PCBs at high levels in caulk around windows and door frames, between masonry columns and in other building materials. Congress banned the manufacture and most uses of PCBs in 1976.

 

On September 25, 2009, EPA issued general guidance to communities as well as specific guidance to help school administrators and teachers reduce the risk of PCB exposure to children, and to assist contractors renovating buildings with suspect caulk.

 

Although EPA has generated specific guidance for school administrators and teachers, all buildings constructed during this time period may have PCB-containing caulk. EPA’s guidance helps to identify the extent of potential risks and to determine if mitigation steps are needed. EPA will work directly with building owners and administrators facing serious problems to help develop a practical approach to reduce exposures and prioritize caulk removal. 

 

EPA has also identified several unresolved scientific issues that must be better understood to determine the magnitude of the issue and to develop the best long-term solutions. As a result, EPA will conduct new research to better understand the risks posed by PCB-containing caulk. EPA plans to use these research findings to make additional recommendations to further minimize exposure and generate an action plan for caulk removal.

 

While the materials EPA released identify the issue of PCB-containing caulk as a concern, the agency advises there is insufficient information concerning the scope or severity of the issue to provide property owners and school administrators with very concrete advice about next steps.  Unfortunately, this can only leave both property owners and school administrators wondering, "just how big a concern is this and how should I respond?" Like lead paint, asbestos, mold, indoor air quality and other types of building hazards, PCBs can be added to the list of risks that real estate professionals and lawyers will have to address in building transactions.

 

For more information, contact EPA’s toll free hotline at 1-888-835-5372 or the EPA website located at: http://www.epa.gov/pcbsincaulk.

PROPOSED LONGLEAF FACILITY KEEPS MOVING FORWARD

Posted on November 2, 2009 by Patricia Barmeyer

Over persistent objections from the Sierra Club and a local environmental group, LS Power’s proposed new coal-fired power plant in southwest Georgia continues to make its way through the permitting and appeals process. Correcting the stunning reversal of the permit by the Superior Court on multiple grounds, the Georgia Court of Appeals overturned the Superior Court in most respects, and the Georgia Supreme Court has declined to hear the case.

 

            In May 2007 LS Power obtained a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) permit from Georgia EPD to construct and operate a 1200 MW pulverized coal-fired power plant, the Longleaf Energy Station. Shortly after issuance of the permit, the Sierra Club and a local environmental group filed a seventeen-count petition for administrative review. The petition contained many of the same challenges that Sierra Club has raised in other coal-fired power plant permit appeals all around the country, including the claim that the permit should have contained an emissions limitation for CO2. A state administrative law judge dismissed a number of these counts as a matter of law; the remaining counts were resolved against petitioners after a 21-day evidentiary hearing. The petitioners appealed the ALJ’s decision on six grounds, and in June of 2008, a Fulton County Superior Court judge ruled in favor of petitioners on all six grounds. The Superior Court’s decision was widely-touted by the Sierra Club, and it received national attention, as it was the first court in the country to hold that the Clean Air Act required PSD permits to include an emissions limitation for CO2

 

The business community in Georgia rallied to support Longleaf’s efforts to persuade the appellate court in Georgia to reverse the Superior Court holding, and over 100 business entities signed on to an amicus brief urging reversal. On July 7, 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court on five of the six grounds before the Court. Longleaf Energy Associates, LLC, et al. v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc., et al., Nos. A09A0387 & A09A0388, 2009 WL 1929192 (Ga. Ct. App. July 7, 2009). 

 

            Most notably, the Court of Appeals squarely rejected the claim that the Clean Air Act requires an emissions limitation for CO2 in a PSD permit. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that while CO2 may be a pollutant under the Clean Air Act, it is not currently a pollutant “subject to regulation” under the Act because there are no regulations that limit or otherwise control CO2 emissions. The Court’s decision is consistent with former EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson’s December 18, 2008 memorandum which outlined EPA’s official position on this issue in response to the Environmental Appeals Board’s decision in In re: Deseret Power Electric Coop., PSD Appeal No. 07-03 (E.A.B. Nov. 13, 2008). See http://www.epa.gov/nsr/guidance.html. EPA’s new Administrator, Lisa Jackson, is currently reconsidering the Johnson memorandum but has declined to stay the effectiveness of that memorandum during her review. See id. While recent activity both at EPA and in Congress indicate that the treatment of CO2 in the context of PSD permitting may soon be changed, the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision confirms that, at least for now, the law does not require an emissions limitation for CO2 in PSD permits. 

 

            The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the other substantive claims raised by the petitioners. The Court held that EPD was not required to consider integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) — a type of power plant in which coal is converted into a synthetic gas and that gas is then burned in a combustion turbine to produce electricity — as part of its best available control technology (“BACT”) analysis for the Longleaf facility. The Court reaffirmed a principle that many administrative tribunals and courts have previously recognized: the required scope of a BACT analysis does not extend to those pollution control technologies that would redefine the proposed source. In the case of IGCC, the Court relied on the undisputed physical and chemical differences between an IGCC power plant and the pulverized coal-fired power plant that Longleaf proposed to build to conclude that IGCC could not be applied to the Longleaf facility without redefining the proposed source. 

 

            The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioners’ challenge to the air dispersion modeling for fine particulate matter, or PM2.5. EPD and Longleaf utilized PM10 modeling as a surrogate for PM2.5 to demonstrate compliance with the PM2.5 National Ambient Air Quality Standard. The Court reasoned that at the time Longleaf’s final permit was issued, this surrogate approach was the only approved method of conducting PM2.5 modeling for purposes of PSD permitting. 

 

            On September 28, 2009, a unanimous Georgia Supreme Court denied Sierra Club’s petition for a writ of certiorari, clearing the way for the parties to proceed with a remand limited to the ALJ’s standard of review. Sierra Club has since moved for reconsideration of that denial, and a decision on that motion is expected soon. For now, however, coal project developers can look to the recent Longleaf decision as an example of a court that has properly refused to preempt the deliberations in EPA and Congress concerning the future of coal-fired power plant permitting.

Applying Clean Air Act Permit Requirements to Stationary Sources of Greenhouse Gases

Posted on October 27, 2009 by Chester Babst

I.          Introduction

 

            On September 15, 2009, EPA announced a proposed rule to regulate greenhouse gases (“GHG”) from light-duty vehicles. EPA estimates that the light-duty vehicle GHG regulation could become final as early as the first quarter of 2010, at which time carbon dioxide and the other specified GHG would become air pollutants “subject to regulation” under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) and Title V permit programs.

 

            The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) “major source” applicability threshold for both permit programs is 100 or 250 tons per year (“tpy”) of any regulated pollutant, depending upon the type of facility. EPA recognized that applying these traditional thresholds to GHG could “overwhelm” permitting authorities and subject the newly expanded regulated community to increased uncertainty, delay, and costs.

 

            In response to these concerns, EPA issued a proposed rule on September 30, 2009 to address how CAA permitting requirements will be applied to stationary sources of GHG emissions. The “Tailoring Rule” would provide temporary relief for some sources, but ultimately leaves the regulated community with the same degree of uncertainty while creating additional legal issues.

 

II.         Litigation Risks

 

            Although EPA acknowledges the significant legal issues associated with agency action to change the statutory “major source” thresholds from 100/250 tpy to 25,000 tpy, it relies on a principle that administration agencies must interpret statutes in a way that avoids absurd results and a principle that administrative necessity can sometimes justify an agency’s plan to implement a statute. Having to rely on these principles as a source of its authority seems only to strengthen the argument that the CAA was not enacted to address GHG, but that is another issue that will be “teed up” by the Tailoring Rule.

 

            Because of the uncertainty regarding EPA’s authority to change the statutory thresholds, the regulated community faces the potential for citizen suits to challenge proposed projects and leaves uncertain the issues of permitting, timing, and cost. As environmental practitioners, we must be sure clients understand these uncertainties as they evaluate any plan to construct or modify their facilities.

 

III.       Permit Delay

 

            Although the Tailoring Rule would dramatically reduce the number of sources initially impacted by application of the PSD and Title V programs to stationary sources of GHG, EPA estimates that PSD permit applications will increase by approximately 100 applications per year, and sources subject to Title V will increase by 3,000. On a percentage basis, these estimates represent significant increases and will further burden permitting authorities at a time when many state agencies are facing or will face meaningful budget reductions (e.g., Pennsylvania’s recently announced 27% budget cut for the Department of Environmental Protection). At a minimum, these added permitting burdens will increase delays in obtaining necessary permits and thereby create additional uncertainty for businesses wishing to grow or modernize their facilities.

 

IV.       Best Available Control Technology for Stationary Sources of GHG

 

            Stationary sources of GHG subject to PSD will be required to install best available control technology (“BACT”). BACT for sources of currently regulated pollutants has developed over the years, so the regulated community, in most cases, has an ability to estimate the potential cost of controls. To the contrary, BACT for stationary sources of GHG is a complete unknown. While some have argued that efficiency improvements should qualify for BACT, others have insisted that traditional add-on emissions control technology is required. Once again, this debate results in cost uncertainty for any project affected by the PSD program and further frustrates business planning.

 

V.        Conclusion

 

            The Tailoring Rule does little to address significant problems and issues that will flow from the application of the PSD and Title V permit programs to stationary sources of GHG. The significant uncertainties created by EPA’s path to regulate GHG under the CAA will likely affect the timing and cost of future permitting. Environmental practitioners must be prepared to communicate these consequences to clients as they plan for the future.

Connecticut v. AEP Decision Supports Public Nuisance Actions Aimed at GHGs

Posted on October 23, 2009 by Gregory Sharp

In Connecticut v. AEP, the Second Circuit upheld the right of state and municipal governments and private land preservation groups to pursue public nuisance claims against electric generating facilities with significant greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), including those operated by TVA,. The plaintiffs alleged that facilities operated by five of the six defendants were the largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the country and among the largest in the world.

 

A recent ACOEL blog by Bob Wyman and Mike Romey touched on the decision in the context of the similar issues raised in the Fifth Circuit’s Comer decision and the Northern District of California’s decision in Kivalina. This blog will focus on some of the specific issues raised in the AEP decision.

 

 

 

The 139 page opinion exhaustively analyzes the numerous issues raised in the appeal, which was taken by the plaintiffs from a dismissal of their complaints by the District Court. The trial court held that the claims were non-justiciable as raising political questions.

The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaints on political question grounds, that all of the plaintiffs have standing , that the federal common law of nuisance governs their claims, that plaintiffs have stated claims under the federal common law of nuisance, that the claims have not been displaced by Congressional action, and that the TVA’s alternate grounds for dismissal were without merit.

 

The decision turns in large part on the Supreme Court’s landmark “one man, one vote” decision in Baker v. Carr in 1962, which laid out six factors for determining when a complaint raises a non-justiciable political question based on the separation of powers doctrine.

 

One of the central issues was whether the federal common law was inapplicable because Congress had displaced common law rights through legislative action. On the displacement issue, the Second Circuit relied in part on Milwaukee I&II, noting that if Congress does not adopt statutes which cover a plaintiff’s claims and provide a remedy for them, then the plaintiff is free to bring its claims under the federal common law of nuisance. The Second Circuit concluded that Congress had not done so with respect to GHGs.

 

The Court concluded that all plaintiffs satisfied the injury in fact test for federal standing. The states alleged current injury from an increase in carbon dioxide levels that has caused rising temperatures and climate change resulting in reduced snowpack and related harms. The states also alleged future catastrophic injuries from continued increases in temperature, including a catastrophic change in climate when a tipping point is reached.

 

The land trusts alleged no current injury, but alleged future injuries and increased risk of harm. The Court found these injuries constitute “special injuries” to the land trust plaintiffs’ property interests, which are different in kind from injuries sustained by the general public.

In its conclusion, the Court found that, as to air pollution, and GHGs in particular, this case fits the same niche occupied by Milwaukee I with respect to water pollution. Paraphrasing the concluding words of Milwaukee I, the opinion notes: “’It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance’ by greenhouse gases.”

 

In an interesting footnote, the decision notes that Justice Sonia Sotomayor was originally a member of the panel, but was elevated to the Supreme Court in August, so the appeal was determined by the remaining two members of the panel.

 

As with the recent 5th Circuit decision in Comer, the decision can be expected to increase pressure on Congress to act to develop a comprehensive greenhouse gas emission regulatory program, unless the Supreme Court reverses before Congress acts.

TWO NEW GHG NUISANCE CASES GO DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS

Posted on October 20, 2009 by Robert Wyman

Following on last month's Second Circuit decision in Connecticut v. AEP, two recent climate change decisions show that the federal courts continue to grapple with whether to allow nuisance suits against emitters of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs). It will likely take some time -- and a trip to the Supreme Court -- before this area of the law is settled. 

 Just last week in Comer v. Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit gave the green light to a class action brought by property owners along the Mississippi Gulf Coast against oil and chemical companies and utilities. Plaintiffs' alleged that GHG emissions from the defendants' operations contributed to global warming, heated the oceans, raised sea levels and made Hurricane Katrina stronger than it would have been. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing to assert state law nuisance and trespass claims for the resulting damage to their property and that the political question doctrine did not apply to this "ordinary tort suit."

 

On September 30 the Northern California district court hearing Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil went the other way and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court found that the Eskimo village who brought the suit could not establish that the threat to its existence from rising sea levels was "fairly traceable"

to the defendants' GHG emissions and thus lacked standing. The court also found that the plaintiffs' federal common law nuisance suit intruded on the separate political branches as it "seeks to impose liability and damages on a scale unlike any prior environmental pollution case . . . ."

Both cases cited AEP, where the Court rejected similar standing and political question challenges and allowed the plaintiffs, including eight states, to sue a group of electric power companies. The Fifth circuit lauded AEP's "careful analysis" of the political question doctrine and sharply criticized the AEP trial court's "serious error of law." Judge Saundra Brown Anderson's decision in Kivalina, on the other hand, found little to like in the AEP decision: "neither Plaintiffs nor AEP offers any guidance as to precisely what judicially discoverable and manageable standards are to be employed in resolving the claims at issue."

So what can we take away from this trio of cases?

The appellate courts are clearly more comfortable with taking these cases than the trial courts. In each of these three cases, the District courts dismissed the suits. Odds are good that the Ninth Circuit in Kivalina will agree with her sister circuits making it a clean sweep.

Cases like Comer which assert state common law claims in diversity and seek only damages for past conduct are bound to run into less trouble than cases like AEP and Kivalina which assert federal common law claims and seek to enjoin future emissions OR ALLEGE potential future injury.

The latter cases more directly call into question the limits of the power of the federal judiciary to make common law, the traceability of the harm to the defendants' emissions and the prerogatives of the legislative and federal branches and their ability to displace federal common law. On the other hand, state common law claims seeking damages for past injury are, as the Comer court said, just "'ordinary tort suits." The court applies easily discernable state law and is not asked to promulgate emissions standards.

It is worth remembering that the issues the courts in AEP, Comer and Kivalina grappled with are issues that are specific to the federal courts -- federal common law, Article III standing, and federal separation of powers. It remains to be seen whether plaintiffs will assert these same cases in the state courts and avoid the uncertainty that will continue to exist in the federal system for some time.

However interesting the procedural issues presented by these cases might be, they are nothing in comparison to the complex and difficult issues presented by the merits of these cases. Liability, causation and damages still must be proven.

Finally, the green light given to the federal judiciary by the Second and Fifth Circuits, combined with the EPA's recent steps to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act, will place additional pressure on Congress and the relevant stakeholders to pass a comprehensive climate change law. If not, federal courts (and juries) could soon be in the business of climate change regulation.

 

Authored by: Robert Wyman and Michael Romey of Latham & Watkins, LLP

EPA Issues a New Policy on Superfund Negotiations: Time For Another Rant?

Posted on October 19, 2009 by Seth Jaffe

Late last week, Elliott Gilberg, Acting Director of EPA’s Office of Site Remediation Enforcement (OSRE) issued an Interim Policy on Managing the Duration of Remedial Design/Remedial Action Negotiations. Members of the regulated community may not be surprised by the contents of the memo, but they certainly will not be pleased. In brief, the memorandum fundamentally makes two points:

EPA wants to shorten the duration of RD/RA negotiation

EPA is going to use the heavy hammer of unilateral administrative orders, or UAOs, to keep PRPs’ feet to the fire and ensure that negotiations move quickly.

PRPs will likely agree that shortening the duration of negotiations would be a good outcome in the abstract – but achieving it by greater use of UAOs? I don’t think so.

I can only wonder if EPA has even considered the impact of the Burlington Northern decision here. Is this a perverse reaction from EPA? A metaphorical throwing down the gauntlet to PRPs? It certainly feels that way.

I have a different suggestion, if EPA truly wants to shorten negotiations. First, acknowledge Burlington Northern and compromise on the merits in those great majority of cases where there are legitimate divisibility arguments. Second, stop acting like the last bastion of command and control regulation. Set cleanup standards and then, to the maximum extent permitted by existing law, let PRPs clean up to those standards, without micromanaging every detail of the cleanup process.

Essential Ingredients For Risk Transfer on Display in N.J.

Posted on October 15, 2009 by George von Stamwitz

Last month, Missouri based Environmental Liability Transfer (ELT) purchased a heavily contaminated site from Asarco in Perth Amboy, New Jersey. Due to bankruptcy court deadlines, the transaction was put together and closed in less than 90 days. The 70-acre site was a challenging candidate for risk transfer due to the perpetual nature of the risk. However, the transaction had the following essential components of a successful environmental risk transfer:

  1. a buyer (ELT) that was willing to take long term risk, beyond the term of environmental insurance;
  2.  a sophisticated seller that was facing an unattractive monetization of the remediation risk, in this instance an estimation proceeding in bankruptcy court. Monetization is a often also caused by regulatory financial assurance requirements and in the context of mergers and acquisitions;
  3. an active remedy of modest duration (in this instance stabilization of residuals and containment) that is defined with sufficient technical and regulatory certainty that partial collateralization of ELT's indemnity by "cost cap" insurance (in this case by Zurich) is practicable.

            As mergers and acquisitions return from hibernation and financial assurance requirements become more stringent after the demise of several major corporations, interest in risk transfer is sure to grow. Not every deal is a good candidate, but those transactions that have the factors described above are worth considering to achieve a favorable, short term monetization of environmental risk.

GHG Regulation under the Existing CAA: Coming Soon to a [Large] Stationary Source Near You

Posted on October 7, 2009 by Seth Jaffe

On Thursday, EPA issued its long-awaited proposed rule describing how thresholds would be set for regulation of GHG sources under the existing Clean Air Act PSD authority. Having waded through the 416-page proposal, I’m torn between the appropriate Shakespeare quotes to describe it: “Much ado about nothing” or “Methinks thou dost protest too much.”

First, notwithstanding its length, the proposal is quite limited in scope. In essence, it has three parts:

Establishment of an applicability threshold for PSD and Title V purposes of 25,000 tons per year of CO2e.

Establishment of a PSD significance level of from 10,000 tpy CO2e and 25,000 CO2e.

Development over the next five years of means to streamline GHG regulation of sources greater than the current statutory levels of 100-250 tpy.

Basically, EPA’s position is that, once it begins to regulate GHGs as a pollutant by promulgating its mobile source rule – expected next spring – stationary source regulation under the PSD and Title V programs follow automatically. Thus, the issue for EPA at this point is not whether to regulate stationary sources, but how to do so without the entire program grinding to a halt.

Here’s where the protestation comes in. Most of the proposal is devoted to explaining EPA’s reliance of the doctrines of “absurd results” and “administrative necessity” to justify exclusion of sources that would seem to be categorically included by the explicit language of the statute. Members of the regulated community will understand the irony in EPA’s extensive discussion regarding how the purpose of the PSD program is to achieve environmental protection and economic development – and that this latter purpose would be jeopardized by regulation of sources at the 100/250 tpy threshold. I don’t think we will ever again see EPA devote this many pages to a description of its concern about economic growth.

I’m not going to predict here whether EPA will win any challenge to the higher thresholds. Certainly, the absurd results doctrine argument is the stronger of the two. It is noteworthy that the four leading environmental cases EPA cites in support of its administrative necessity argument, while acknowledging the existence of the doctrine, all went against EPA.

More relevant still is the question of who would in fact challenge this regulation and what would be the result even if the challenge succeeded. Following the debacle that resulted from vacation of the CAIR rule, what is the likelihood that a successful challenge would result in vacation of the rule in its entirety? Isn’t it more likely that the rule would stay in effect as to the large sources, with the remanding the case to EPA to promulgate rules governing smaller sources? In fact, that’s what EPA is already doing, which is probably EPA’s strongest practical argument in support of the rule.

Public comments will be due 60 days from Federal Register promulgation and there are some issues that the regulated community should consider. These include the significance threshold, and suggestions regarding how to streamline the program for smaller sources. EPA has proposed some interesting ideas, including presumptive BACT determinations and general permits. 

Bottom line? Large sources better get ready to comply. Smaller sources, take a deep breath and count your blessings – for now. 

GHG Regulation under the Existing CAA: Coming Soon to a [Large] Stationary Source Near You

Posted on October 7, 2009 by Seth Jaffe

On Thursday, EPA issued its long-awaited proposed rule describing how thresholds would be set for regulation of GHG sources under the existing Clean Air Act PSD authority. Having waded through the 416-page proposal, I’m torn between the appropriate Shakespeare quotes to describe it: “Much ado about nothing” or “Methinks thou dost protest too much.”

First, notwithstanding its length, the proposal is quite limited in scope. In essence, it has three parts:

Establishment of an applicability threshold for PSD and Title V purposes of 25,000 tons per year of CO2e.

Establishment of a PSD significance level of from 10,000 tpy CO2e and 25,000 CO2e.

Development over the next five years of means to streamline GHG regulation of sources greater than the current statutory levels of 100-250 tpy.

Basically, EPA’s position is that, once it begins to regulate GHGs as a pollutant by promulgating its mobile source rule – expected next spring – stationary source regulation under the PSD and Title V programs follow automatically. Thus, the issue for EPA at this point is not whether to regulate stationary sources, but how to do so without the entire program grinding to a halt.

Here’s where the protestation comes in. Most of the proposal is devoted to explaining EPA’s reliance of the doctrines of “absurd results” and “administrative necessity” to justify exclusion of sources that would seem to be categorically included by the explicit language of the statute. Members of the regulated community will understand the irony in EPA’s extensive discussion regarding how the purpose of the PSD program is to achieve environmental protection and economic development – and that this latter purpose would be jeopardized by regulation of sources at the 100/250 tpy threshold. I don’t think we will ever again see EPA devote this many pages to a description of its concern about economic growth.

I’m not going to predict here whether EPA will win any challenge to the higher thresholds. Certainly, the absurd results doctrine argument is the stronger of the two. It is noteworthy that the four leading environmental cases EPA cites in support of its administrative necessity argument, while acknowledging the existence of the doctrine, all went against EPA.

More relevant still is the question of who would in fact challenge this regulation and what would be the result even if the challenge succeeded. Following the debacle that resulted from vacation of the CAIR rule, what is the likelihood that a successful challenge would result in vacation of the rule in its entirety? Isn’t it more likely that the rule would stay in effect as to the large sources, with the remanding the case to EPA to promulgate rules governing smaller sources? In fact, that’s what EPA is already doing, which is probably EPA’s strongest practical argument in support of the rule.

Public comments will be due 60 days from Federal Register promulgation and there are some issues that the regulated community should consider. These include the significance threshold, and suggestions regarding how to streamline the program for smaller sources. EPA has proposed some interesting ideas, including presumptive BACT determinations and general permits. 

Bottom line? Large sources better get ready to comply. Smaller sources, take a deep breath and count your blessings – for now. 

GHG Regulation under the Existing CAA: Coming Soon to a [Large] Stationary Source Near You

Posted on October 7, 2009 by Seth Jaffe

On Thursday, EPA issued its long-awaited proposed rule describing how thresholds would be set for regulation of GHG sources under the existing Clean Air Act PSD authority. Having waded through the 416-page proposal, I’m torn between the appropriate Shakespeare quotes to describe it: “Much ado about nothing” or “Methinks thou dost protest too much.”

First, notwithstanding its length, the proposal is quite limited in scope. In essence, it has three parts:

Establishment of an applicability threshold for PSD and Title V purposes of 25,000 tons per year of CO2e.

Establishment of a PSD significance level of from 10,000 tpy CO2e and 25,000 CO2e.

Development over the next five years of means to streamline GHG regulation of sources greater than the current statutory levels of 100-250 tpy.

Basically, EPA’s position is that, once it begins to regulate GHGs as a pollutant by promulgating its mobile source rule – expected next spring – stationary source regulation under the PSD and Title V programs follow automatically. Thus, the issue for EPA at this point is not whether to regulate stationary sources, but how to do so without the entire program grinding to a halt.

Here’s where the protestation comes in. Most of the proposal is devoted to explaining EPA’s reliance of the doctrines of “absurd results” and “administrative necessity” to justify exclusion of sources that would seem to be categorically included by the explicit language of the statute. Members of the regulated community will understand the irony in EPA’s extensive discussion regarding how the purpose of the PSD program is to achieve environmental protection and economic development – and that this latter purpose would be jeopardized by regulation of sources at the 100/250 tpy threshold. I don’t think we will ever again see EPA devote this many pages to a description of its concern about economic growth.

I’m not going to predict here whether EPA will win any challenge to the higher thresholds. Certainly, the absurd results doctrine argument is the stronger of the two. It is noteworthy that the four leading environmental cases EPA cites in support of its administrative necessity argument, while acknowledging the existence of the doctrine, all went against EPA.

More relevant still is the question of who would in fact challenge this regulation and what would be the result even if the challenge succeeded. Following the debacle that resulted from vacation of the CAIR rule, what is the likelihood that a successful challenge would result in vacation of the rule in its entirety? Isn’t it more likely that the rule would stay in effect as to the large sources, with the remanding the case to EPA to promulgate rules governing smaller sources? In fact, that’s what EPA is already doing, which is probably EPA’s strongest practical argument in support of the rule.

Public comments will be due 60 days from Federal Register promulgation and there are some issues that the regulated community should consider. These include the significance threshold, and suggestions regarding how to streamline the program for smaller sources. EPA has proposed some interesting ideas, including presumptive BACT determinations and general permits. 

Bottom line? Large sources better get ready to comply. Smaller sources, take a deep breath and count your blessings – for now. 

Power Point Presentations from the 2009 Annual Meeting in Maine

Posted on October 6, 2009 by Rachael Bunday

Climate Change Update

Panelists: Michael Gerrard, Jeffrey Thaler, Linda Bullen, John Cruden

Moderator: Karen Crawford

 

Climate Change Legislation and Regulation

Panelists: Carol Dinkins, Bradley Marten, Stephen Ramsey

Moderator: David Farer

Power Point Presentations from the 2009 Annual Meeting in Maine

Posted on October 6, 2009 by Rachael Bunday

Climate Change Update

Panelists: Michael Gerrard, Jeffrey Thaler, Linda Bullen, John Cruden

Moderator: Karen Crawford

 

Climate Change Legislation and Regulation

Panelists: Carol Dinkins, Bradley Marten, Stephen Ramsey

Moderator: David Farer

It's Here: EPA's Final Mandatory GHG Reporting Rule

Posted on September 25, 2009 by Mary Ellen Ternes

On April 14, 2009, I alerted you to EPA’s proposed Mandatory GHG Reporting rule on April 10, 2009.  And while we are still waiting for EPA’s Endangerment Finding, and new energy legislation may not see the Senate floor in 2009, we do have a final GHG rule. On September 22, 2009, EPA Administrator Jackson signed the final Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule. This rule should be published in the Federal Register soon, so that it becomes effective before January 1, 2010. The rule imposes monitoring requirements beginning January 1, 2010, and reporting by impacted facilities and other entities by March 31, 2011.

 

With this rule, EPA is requiring reporting of Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) emissions by specified GHG emission source categories that exceed 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide (“MTCO2”), or varying amounts of several other GHG representing equivalent amounts of emissions based upon their “global warming potential,” referred to as “CO2e.” The rule also requires emissions reporting from suppliers of fuels and industrial gases, as well as mobile source (vehicle) manufacturers. EPA finds its authority for this rule in the Clean Air Act, Sections 114 and 208. The GHGs tracked by the rule include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) and other fluorinated compounds. Those familiar with the annual Inventory of United States GHG Emissions and Sinks will recognize the sources and GHGs tracked by this rule.

 

Generally, the final rule is not significantly changed from the proposed rule. However, several source categories were reserved. Thus, this final rule does not currently require reporting of the following source categories: electronics manufacturing, ethanol production, fluorinated GHG production, food processing, industrial landfills, magnesium production, oil and natural gas systems, SF6 from electrical equipment, underground coal mines, wastewater treatment, suppliers of coal.

 

Additionally, there are several important revisions. In response to significant objections to the “once in, always in” approach for reporting requirements, EPA also included provisions allowing exit from the program upon reduction of GHG emissions below certain thresholds. Specifically, if a facility decreases its emissions below 25,000 metric tons of CO2e per year for five years in a row, or decreases its emissions below 15,000 metric tons of CO2e per year for three years in a row, the facility can apply to exit the program. Facilities can also cease reporting if they shut down GHG-emitting processes or operations.

 

In response to concern about lack of adequate preparation time, EPA added a provision allowing the use of best available monitoring methods for the initial quarter of 2010, rather than the required monitoring methods. Impacted facilities needing a longer period of time to install necessary monitoring equipment can request an extension beyond March 2010, but not beyond 2010. EPA has also modified monitoring options, changed monitoring locations and allowed use of calculations rather than monitoring to lessen the monitoring burden.

All environmental practitioners will need to become familiar with the requirements of this rule due to its broad applicability. EPA has committed to posting guidance for each subpart and conducting training. EPA has even posted an “applicability tool” computer software program to assist in applicability determinations. This guidance cannot be available soon enough. Clients need to determine applicability and prepare for implementation immediately.

Statute of Limitations: Don't Miss Your CERCLA Deadline

Posted on September 14, 2009 by Earl Phillips

Overview       

There are three avenues of recovery under CERCLA - a contribution action and two types of cost recovery actions. These cost recovery actions are based on either the plaintiff’s “removal” of the hazardous substances or “remediation” efforts at the site. Each of these avenues has an independent statute of limitations provision.  Thus, whether the statute of limitations period has been triggered will depend on how an action is characterized, i.e. whether the action constitutes a contribution action, a cost recovery removal action, or a cost recovery remedial action. While there are various state-specific causes of action related to environmental contamination in Connecticut, this article is confined to the statute of limitations for CERCLA cost recovery and contribution claims. 

 

Analysis         

            Contribution Claim

           

            The statute of limitations analysis related to contribution claims is thankfully quite straight forward. Under CERCLA Section 113, these claims must be brought within three years of a civil action under Section 106 or 107, a CERCLA administrative order, or a judicially approved settlement with respect to costs or damages.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3). While questions may arise as to what may constitute a CERCLA “administrative order” or whether a “judicially approved settlement” must reference Section 106 or 107, we leave those discussions for another article.

 

            Cost Recovery Claim

 

 

            The analysis of what constitutes a viable cost recovery claim, whether it is removal or remedial, and when the statute of limitations is first triggered is more intricate. First, it is important to note that certain actions performed on a site may not trigger the statute of limitations period.   “[T]here are some cases in which work on a site is neither a remedial nor a removal action, but rather constitutes ‘preliminary’ or ‘interim’ measures that do not trigger the statute of limitations . . ..” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44282, *117 (D. Conn. May 22, 2009). While caselaw on what constitutes a preliminary remedy, as opposed to a permanent remedy, is limited, at least one court has determined that “evaluation, sampling, surveying and measuring” do not constitute the initiation of physical on-site construction because “these activities [do] not constitute ‘construction.’” Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)(quoting United States v. Findett Corp., 220 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2000)).

 

            Beyond this, the characterization of a cost recovery action as either removal or remedial is crucial to determining whether an action to recover response costs is time-barred because there are different statute of limitations periods for a removal action and a remedial action. The statute of limitations for recovery of costs related to removal actions is three years after the completion of the removal action, whereas the limitations period for recovery of costs related to remedial actions is six years after the initiation of physical on-site construction of the remediationAlthough there is a lack of clarity as to what constitutes a removal verses a remedial action, removal actions have generally been construed as “time-sensitive responses to public health threats . . ..”[1] Remedial actions, in contrast, are often described as “permanent remedies to threats for which an urgent response is not warranted.”[2]

 

             Assuming for this discussion that the efforts undertaken at a site are beyond preliminary, there is inconsistency as to whether the statute of limitations for remedial actions would only run after a final Remedial Action Plan (RAP) has been approved for the site. One court in the Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded that initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action “can only occur after the final remedial action plan is adopted, and that . . . the statute of limitations, therefore, could not have begun to run until the final remedial action was approved . . ..” Cal. v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2004).  The Second Circuit, however, has rejected such a bright line rule and determined that the statute of limitations can be triggered without a final RAP, if the action is “consistent with a permanent remedy.” Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 205 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 

            Compounding the important distinction between removal and remedial actions is variability within the courts in determining the initial trigger for the statute of limitations period. Some courts apply a statute of limitations to an entire site after remediation commences on one portion of the site, while others look to multiple statute of limitations at a single property. See Colorado v. Sunoco, 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003) contra U.S. v. Manzo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70860 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006). While the Second Circuit has not spoken on this issue, a recent District of Connecticut case has adopted the opinion that “there can be only one removal and one remedial action per facility, regardless of the number of phases in which the clean-up occurs.” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44282 (D. Conn. May 22, 2009)(emphasis added).  Should a court adopt a one site, one action approach, the statute of limitations would be triggered by the first removal or remedial action at the site.  Id.; see also Colorado v. Sunoco   Thus, it is important to evaluate what actions have occurred at your facility and whether those actions would be considered “removal” or “remedial” to ensure the statute of limitations for a cost recovery action does not run., 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003).

 

At Robinson & Cole, we have environmental attorneys who have broad experience representing clients in CERCLA actions and the prosecution or defense of other environmental claims. We stand ready to apply this experience and insight to your specific needs. If you would like to discuss statute of limitations concerns, or broader environmental issues, please contact any of the attorneys in our Environmental and Utilities Practice Group. 

 

Earl Phillips                                           W. Richard Smith                                 Lauren Vinokur

(860) 275-8220                                   (860) 275- 8218                                  (860) 275-8341

ephillips@rc.com                                  wrsmith@rc.com                                  lvinokur@rc.com



[1] United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2005); see also OBG Tech. Servs. v. Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Sys. Corp., 503 F. Supp. 2d 490, 524 (D. Conn. 2007)(“[w]hether . . .actions are properly characterized as remedial or removal actions is a question of law for the Court to decide”); Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 926 (5th Cir. 2000)(“the CERCLA definitions [of removal and remedial action] are expansive enough that certain activities may well be covered by both…[and] the cases on this issue tend to be highly fact-specific . . ..”)

[2] United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2005); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2009). Under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) a remedial action “includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, on-site treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment.”

Obama Administration Environmental Initiatives & Priorities

Posted on September 14, 2009 by Rachael Bunday

Audio Now Available:

 A Special ACOEL Event

Obama Administration Environmental Initiatives and Policies

 

DAVID J. HAYES

Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior

 

Interviewed by David B. Farer, Farer Fersko

 

Audio of Mr. Farer's interview of Mr. Hayes at the Department of Interior on July 14, 2009, with discussion topics focusing on Interior's priorities concerning climate change, renewable energy and water.

 

Running time:  Approx. 45 min.

More than Indemnity?

Posted on September 8, 2009 by Brian Rosenthal

Is an indemnity for a third party’s liabilities just an indemnity and not a right of direct action? Yes, says the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because the indemnitor avoided words like “assume,” “become liable for,” or “assume all of the liabilities and obligations.” 

 

Here, the United States argued the indemnitor had crossed the line of indemnity into the land of assumption. The federal government pointed to a settlement agreement where the indemnitor agreed to provide remediation required by “law, regulation, order, judgment, or settlement agreement.” Finding the question one of contractual intent, the court found the language to defend and hold harmless does not sound in assumption and is only triggered when an indemnitee suffers a claim or pays damages on a claim. Finding the agreement lacking in the standard words of assumption, the indemnitor prevailed by summary judgment. United States v. Sunoco, Inc. No. 05-633 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

NATIVE AMERICAN WATER RIGHTS IN OKLAHOMA - CHAPTER 2

Posted on September 3, 2009 by Linda C. Martin

On March 9, 2009, we posted an article regarding issues raised in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, State of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., et al., Case No. 05-CV-329-GFK regarding the Cherokee Nation ownership interests in the Illinois River and its watershed. In this case, the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma sued several poultry companies for polluting the Illinois River and its watershed in eastern Oklahoma as the result of the disposal of poultry litter in the watershed. The suit alleges claims under CERCLA, RCRA, trespass and nuisance, among other things. The State of Oklahoma sought money damages and injunctive relief against the poultry companies.

The Poultry Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join the Cherokee Nation as a Required Party under Rule 19, or in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings alleging the State lacks standing to prosecute the case. The Poultry Defendants alleged the Cherokee Nation possessed significant, legally protected interests in the Illinois River and it’s Watershed that would be impaired or impeded by its absence from the litigation, and further that the Court should grant judgment as a matter of law to the defendants because the State did not have standing to bring the suit.

 

In an apparent response to the Motion, the State of Oklahoma filed a “Notice of Filing of Document” to which was attached an agreement between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Oklahoma (Agreement). The Agreement, dated May 19, 2009, acknowledged, among other things, that the Cherokee Nation “has substantial interests in . . . water and other natural resources located within the Illinois River Watershed though the extent of those interests has not been fully adjudicated.”

The Agreement stated that the Cherokee Nation “to the extent of its interests in lands, water and other natural resources in the Illinois River . . . delegates and assigns to the State of Oklahoma any and all claims it has or may have against Defendants named in the [Tyson litigation] for their alleged pollution of the lands, water and other natural resources of the Illinois River Watershed resulting from poultry waste.” The Agreement purported to have a retroactive effective date of June 13, 2005, and was signed by the Attorneys General of the Cherokee Nation and the State of Oklahoma. 

The Poultry Defendants immediately challenged the Agreement by filing a “Counter-Notice” the following day, raising several issues as to the procedural and substantive validity of the Notice and Agreement under Oklahoma Law. The Court did not allow further briefing on the issues. 

Instead, the Court ruled on the Defendants’ Motions in a recent Opinion and Order. ___F.R.D.___ 2009 WL 2176337 (N.D. Okla. July 22, 2009)  The Court held that Oklahoma law explicitly sets forth the requirements the State must follow when entering into agreements such as the purported Agreement with the Cherokee Nation, which procedures were not followed in this instance. After examining other issues negating the validity of the Agreement, the Court concluded that that the Agreement was invalid and does not resolve or moot the Rule 19 Motion to Dismiss raised by the Poultry Defendants.  Id. at **3-4.

The Court undertook a Rule 19 analysis to determine if the Cherokee Nation is a required party to the action. Under Rule 19(a)(1), the Court analyzed (1) whether the Cherokee Nation claims an interest relating to the subject of the action, and (2) is so situated that disposing of the action in the Cherokee Nation’s absence may impair or impede its ability to protect the interest or leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations. 

The Court stated that Rule 19 does not require an absent party to possess an interest; it only requires that it claim an interest in the subject matter of the action. Id. at *4. Thus, the Court did not actually rule on the Cherokee Nation’s rights in the Illinois River watershed. It did, however, determine that the Cherokee Nation claims rights to the Illinois River and its watershed. The Court also noted that the Agreement operates as an admission by Oklahoma of the Cherokee Nation’s interest in the action. Id. at *5.

In addition, the Court examined portions of the Cherokee Nation Code, and noted that it evidences the Cherokee Nation’s interest in protecting the Illinois River and in vindicating its rights for pollution of the Illinois River watershed. It further claims an interest in recovering for itself civil remedies, including damages, for the same injuries to the watershed which are claimed in this action. The Court noted other provisions of the Cherokee Nation Code which evidence the Cherokee Nation’s substantial interest in the subject matter of the instant action. 

The Court noted: “The claimed interests of the Cherokee Nation in the water rights portion of the subject matter of this action are substantial and are neither fabricated nor frivolous.” (citation omitted) Id. at *6. Thus, the Court concluded that the Cherokee Nation claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the instant case for Rule 19 purposes. Id. at *7.

Under the second prong of Rule 19 analysis, the Court reviewed, among other things, whether the Cherokee Nation was so situated that disposing of the action in the Cherokee Nation’s absence might impair or impede its ability to protect its interest or leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations. After conducting its analysis of the foregoing factors, the Court concluded that proceeding with the case in the absence of the Cherokee Nation would subject the defendants to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations with respect to the claims for monetary damages, and would potentially cause prejudice to the Cherokee Nation’s sovereign interests, among other things. Id. at *9 (The parties had agreed that the joinder of the Cherokee Nation in the case was not feasible because of sovereign immunity. Id. at *9.

The Court also noted that the State had an adequate remedy if the damage claims were dismissed in that it could dismiss and refile the action after the State and the Cherokee Nation entered into a legally binding agreement under Oklahoma law authorizing the State to assert the Cherokee Nation’s CERCLA and other damage claims. Id. at *11.

The Court concluded that the State lacked standing to assert the claims of the Cherokee Nation, Id. at *12, and that the Cherokee Nation is a necessary party under Rule 19 with respect to the State’s claims for damages. Id. at *13. (The Poultry Defendants did not seek dismissal of the claims for injunctive relief.) The Court held that the Cherokee Nation is not a required party to the claims for violation of state environmental and agricultural regulations. Id.

On September 2, 2009, the Cherokee Nation filed its Motion to Intervene in the case, only two weeks prior to trial, and one day prior to the Pretrial Conference. 

Stay tuned, we’ll keep you updated.

2009 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYERS ANNUAL MEETING

Posted on August 11, 2009 by Rachael Bunday

Portland, Maine - October 1-3, 2009

****THIS MEETING OPEN TO MEMBERS ONLY****

It's finally that time of year! The American College of Environmental Lawyers is having its Annual Meeting in Portland, Maine, October 1-3, 2009 at The Portland Regency http://www.theregency.com. Conference fees may be paid online below.  Please note that dress attire is business casual. The agenda is as follows:

THURSDAY

6 PM: Welcome Reception hosted by Bernstein Shur at the Portland Museum of
Art. Open to College members and their spouses/significant others.

 
FRIDAY

7:30-9:00 AM: Breakfast at the hotel (For members and spouses/significant others, in a large room)

9:00 - 9:15: Presidential Welcome and other announcements

9:15 - 10:30: Round the room member introductions: a quick 20 seconds of  info and humor to introduce yourself and describe what you do in the area of environmental law.
 
10:30 - 10:45: Break

10:45 - 11:50: Business Meeting: 1) Election and Induction of New Fellows (5 minutes); 2) Discussion and Vote on by-law changes (5-10 minutes); 3) Election of Officers and Board of Regents (5 minutes); 4) Plans for 2009-10 from incoming President (15 minutes); 5) Announcement of Committee Chairs and Duties of Committees—Nominating and Membership, Program and Education, Website, and Policy Committees; (5 minutes); 4) Committees each break into separate rooms have a preliminary meeting; those who have not previously selected a Committee can sit in on any meeting (45-50 minutes)

12:00 PM: College lunch at the hotel, guest speaker former Maine Governor Angus King

1:30-4:30: College member presentations/program

 

Session 1:

Climate Change Legislation and Regulation

Panelists:

Carol Dinkins – Vinson & Elkins, LLP

Bradley Marten – Marten Law Group PLLC

Stephen Ramsey – Yale Law School and Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

Moderator:

David Farer – Farer Fersko

Session 2:

Climate Change Litigation

Panelists:

Linda Bullen – Lionel Sawyer & Collins

John Cruden – U.S. Department of Justice

Michael Gerrard – Columbia University Center for Climate Change Law

Jeffrey Thaler – Bernstein Shur

Moderator:

Karen Crawford –Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP

 

Friday Excursion to Freeport

For those not attending the conference, enjoy a half-day trip to Freeport, Maine. Freeport is home to L.L. Bean’s famous flagship store, several dozen designer factory stores (Burberry, Coach, and Cole Haan to name a few), cafes, and a quaint historic district. Also nearby is Wolfe’s Neck State Park for anyone wanting to hike mild trails and enjoy the foliage, or possibly a stop in at the Delorme Map Store and visit “Eartha” the world’s largest to-scale and revolving globe

Cost $40 per person, minimum of 8 people needed

http://www.freeportusa.com/index.html

Saturday Lobster Bake

Take a short scenic ferry trip across Casco Bay to Peak’s Island. Once there, you will take a short walk to the historic Fifth Maine Regiment for a classic New England Lobster Bake, including fresh Maine lobsters, steamers, corn on the cob, blueberry cake, and more. The Fifth Maine Regiment sits atop Peak’s rocky coast, overlooking Cushing Island,  with quaint garden featuring breathtaking views, and  a wraparound porch (weather permitting) or dining hall. After the lobster bake, you can explore the island and return to Portland at your convenience (or come early and explore!); ferries run hourly through the evening. The bake will start at 12:30, so you’ll want to make the 11:15 (or earlier) ferry from the Casco Bay Ferry Terminal.

Cost $75 per person, minimum of 25 people needed

 
HOTEL

We have reserved a block of rooms at The Portland Regency, http://www.theregency.com, (207) 774-4200. There are a limited number of rooms still available. Please make sure to mention you are with the American College of Environmental Lawyers to get our discounted rate.

 

REGISTER HERE - http://acoel.eroievent.com/

 

PAY HERE - 
To add multiple items you will need to select one item at a time, add to your cart, then select "Continue Shopping".

 

ACOEL Meeting Fee and Optional Additions

 Friday and Saturday Night Dinner Options

Portland is Bon Appetit’s  2010 Foodiest Small Town (article here), and Food & Wine’s Kate Krader has written that Portland’s culinary scene is “all-around terrific.” While there is no shortage of great restaurants in Portland, most of the dining venues are small and intimate. For Friday night's No Host Dinner, we have secured reservations at the most talked (and written) about restaurants in Portland that are within walking distance of The Portland Regency (the conference hotel). Please e-mail acoel@bernsteinshur.com with your first and second choices for Friday (and Saturday, if applicable) night’s dinner. Please have your selection in no later than September 23.

 

555

Five Fifty-Five classifies its cuisine as modern American and New England fare. Chef Steve Corry changes the menu frequently, but keeps some signature dishes on the menu year-round, such as truffled lobster mac n’ cheese, pepper crusted diver scallops with butter and vanilla emulsion, and Bangs Island mussels.

http://fivefifty-five.com/

Reservations: Availability for 30 at 8:00

 

Hugos

Hugo’s chef/owner Rob Evans is this year’s recipient of the prestigious James Beard Foundation’s Best Chef Northeast. Hugo’s passion lies in its love for creative food, good wine and wholesome Maine ingredients. The culinary team at Hugo’s, under Rob’s direction, delivers regional cuisine that is both unexpected yet ultimately familiar. The menu will be a blind tasting menu (prix fixe, $85 per person).

http://hugos.net/

Reservations: 2 tables of 4 at 6:15

1 table of 4, 1 table of 6 at 6:30

 

Fore Street Grill

Fore Street’s menu changes daily is founded upon the very best raw materials from a community of Maine farmers, fishermen, foragers, and cheesemakers, who are also our friends and neighbors. Most of these Maine foods are organically grown or harvested wild, each brought to us at the peak of its season. Fore Street was one of five national finalists for the James Beard Outstanding Restaurant category.

http://www.forestreet.biz/en/Home

Reservations: 2 tables of 10 at 6:00; 1 table of 10 at 9:00

 

Street & Company

Street & Company specializes in fresh, local seafood dishes and is considered by many to be Portland’s best seafood restaurant. In fact, they serve only seafood based dishes. It is a local’s favorite that is in its 20th year of operation. Like most of the menus on this list, it changes daily, but there are a few specialty items that are always available.

http://www.streetandcompany.net/home

Reservations: 2 tables of 6 at 8:00

 

Cinque Terre

Cinque Terre serves “old school” Northern Italian cuisine, using produce grown on its owners’ farm. They were named in the “Top Ten Farm-to-Table Restaurants in the U.S.” by epicurious.com.

http://www.cinqueterremaine.com/main.html

Reservations: 2 tables of 10 at 6:30

 

Vignola

Vignola is the sister restaurant to Cinque Terre, and also serves Italian cuisine, in a more relaxed and casual atmosphere. It has an extensive beer and wine menu. Like Cinque Terre, the produce is grown by the owners for farm-to-table freshness.

http://www.vignolamaine.com/

Reservations: 2 tables of 10 at 6:30

 

Emilitsa

Emilitsa boasts a contemporary and casual atmosphere and brings a wide array of Mezethes (small plates), Megala Piata (large plates), and pristinely fresh seafood to the seacoast area. They take pride in honoring the breadth of traditional cuisine from all regions of Greece and prepare their dishes with as many local, fresh, organic, and natural ingredients as are available.

http://www.emilitsa.com/index.htm

Reservations: 16 seats at 7:00

 

Grace

Portland’s newest fine dining establishment is housed in a breathtaking restored church. The eclectic menu draws inspiration from all parts of the globe, using seasonal local ingredients.

http://www.restaurantgrace.com/

Reservations: 1 table for 10 at 7:00

 

For those of you staying for the weekend, also have the following reservations for Saturday night. Please note Saturday and your first and second choices in your response.

 

Fore Street Table for 10 at 6:00

Hugo’s Table for 6 at 8:30

Grace Table for 10 at 6:30

555 Table for 10 at 6:00

Stormwater Discharges From Construction Activity: What Next From EPA?

Posted on August 10, 2009 by Seth Jaffe

Construction and development companies praying for an economic recovery next year have something else to worry about: pending new EPA regulations regarding stormwater discharges from construction activities – and claims from environmental groups that EPA’s proposal isn’t stringent enough.

EPA issued a proposal on November 28, 2008. That proposal is complex, but the aspect of it that has received the most attention is the requirement that certain construction sites greater than 30 acres meet numerical turbidity limits (specifically, 13 nephelometric turbidity units (NTUs), which I had to include in this post just because it sounds so cool). Developers have opposed the numeric limits; the National Association of Home Builders estimates that the cost to comply would be $15,000 to $45,000 per acre.

On the other hand, the NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have threatened to sue EPA if EPA does not revise the propose rule to include post-construction controls as part of the rule. EPA has stated that it is not planning to do so. It’s not obvious that NRDC and Waterkeeper Alliance have the better of this specific debate, but the argument regarding post-construction controls is similar to the ongoing discussion in Massachusetts and elsewhere regarding the need for ongoing stormwater controls at properties other than industrial facilities that are already regulated.

The issue is not going to go away.  EPA is under a deadline to issue the rule by December 1, 2009.

MIXED RESULTS FOR OREGON CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION

Posted on August 3, 2009 by Rick Glick

In my February 23, 2009 posting, I described Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski’s ambitious agenda for state action to reduce green house gases (GHG). But then the tumbling economy got in the way and GHG lost its position at center stage. Still, some things did get done in the session that ended last month.

 

Oregon had already adopted renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS) for its electric utilities, adopted California automotive emissions standards and had the nation’s most generous business energy tax credit (BETC). This year the plan was to add a GHG cap and trade program and establish fuel standards, among other things.   Some of it passed, some didn’t, and the Governor has said little as to which he will sign into law.

 

SB 80 would have established the cap and trade program, in line with the Western Climate Initiative, but failed. The principle reason seems to be that a federal bill may be imminent. That legislation, the Waxman-Markey bill (HR 2454) passed the House on June 26 by a razor thin vote along party lines (219-212). The bill includes a provision pre-empting state legislation. Its fate is in the Senate, where it will need at least 60 votes to survive a filibuster, and the final shape of the bill is anyone’s guess. If it appears a federal cap and trade bill is not achievable or indefinitely delayed, SB 80 is likely to be reintroduced in Oregon in some form.

Other climate bills did pass. 

 

  • SB 38 authorizes a rulemaking to require registration and reporting for import to the state of electricity or fossil fuels. 
  • SB 101 establishes a GHG standard for electricity generation and prohibits utilities from long-term financial commitments for resources that do not meet the standard, effectively banning import of coal fired plant output. 
  • HB 2186 calls for development of a standard to reduce GHG emissions from transportation fuel 10% by 2020 and to conduct a study on retrofitting of trucks to make them more efficient; this element was proposed as mandatory, but a compromise calling for the study was adopted. This provision is intended to piggy-back on a California study of improving existing truck efficiency. HB 2186 also established a task force to look at reducing GHG emissions through integrated land use and transportation planning. 
  • HB 3039 promotes solar energy and provides a 2:1 RPS credit for each kWh produced from a qualifying facility operational before January 1, 2016 and that generates at least 500 kW. The bill sets a limit of 20 MW of capacity for the RPS credit. 

 

  • HB 2940 allows RPS credits for biomass facilities in place before 1995, capped at 100 MW. There are 8 biomass plants and one garbage burner in the state. This controversial bill was not proposed by the utilities, rather it was driven by the Oregon forest products industry in the interest of maintaining jobs and to provide a source of income for declining mills. Thought the bill had broad bi-partisan support among legislators, many observers see it as inappropriate to give RPS credits to old generating plants, predicting that existing hydropower will be right behind. The concept behind RPS for many is to offer an incentive for new development of renewable resources, not to reward existing ones. As of this writing the Governor has not acted on the bill but is known to be considering a veto.

 

  • HB 2472 modifies the BETC to include manufacture of electric vehicles among the industries eligible for the credit, along with renewable energy facilities and manufacturers of equipment for renewable energy production. The BETC was reduced to match budget concerns, and the Governor is also considering a veto of this bill in the interest of keeping Oregon competitive to attract clean tech business.

All eyes now shift to the U. S. Senate to see if there will be federal GHG controls enacted. It may take a while, these things take time.

MIXED RESULTS FOR OREGON CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION

Posted on August 3, 2009 by Rick Glick

In my February 23, 2009 posting, I described Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski’s ambitious agenda for state action to reduce green house gases (GHG). But then the tumbling economy got in the way and GHG lost its position at center stage. Still, some things did get done in the session that ended last month.

 

Oregon had already adopted renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS) for its electric utilities, adopted California automotive emissions standards and had the nation’s most generous business energy tax credit (BETC). This year the plan was to add a GHG cap and trade program and establish fuel standards, among other things.   Some of it passed, some didn’t, and the Governor has said little as to which he will sign into law.

 

SB 80 would have established the cap and trade program, in line with the Western Climate Initiative, but failed. The principle reason seems to be that a federal bill may be imminent. That legislation, the Waxman-Markey bill (HR 2454) passed the House on June 26 by a razor thin vote along party lines (219-212). The bill includes a provision pre-empting state legislation. Its fate is in the Senate, where it will need at least 60 votes to survive a filibuster, and the final shape of the bill is anyone’s guess. If it appears a federal cap and trade bill is not achievable or indefinitely delayed, SB 80 is likely to be reintroduced in Oregon in some form.

Other climate bills did pass. 

 

  • SB 38 authorizes a rulemaking to require registration and reporting for import to the state of electricity or fossil fuels. 
  • SB 101 establishes a GHG standard for electricity generation and prohibits utilities from long-term financial commitments for resources that do not meet the standard, effectively banning import of coal fired plant output. 
  • HB 2186 calls for development of a standard to reduce GHG emissions from transportation fuel 10% by 2020 and to conduct a study on retrofitting of trucks to make them more efficient; this element was proposed as mandatory, but a compromise calling for the study was adopted. This provision is intended to piggy-back on a California study of improving existing truck efficiency. HB 2186 also established a task force to look at reducing GHG emissions through integrated land use and transportation planning. 
  • HB 3039 promotes solar energy and provides a 2:1 RPS credit for each kWh produced from a qualifying facility operational before January 1, 2016 and that generates at least 500 kW. The bill sets a limit of 20 MW of capacity for the RPS credit. 

 

  • HB 2940 allows RPS credits for biomass facilities in place before 1995, capped at 100 MW. There are 8 biomass plants and one garbage burner in the state. This controversial bill was not proposed by the utilities, rather it was driven by the Oregon forest products industry in the interest of maintaining jobs and to provide a source of income for declining mills. Thought the bill had broad bi-partisan support among legislators, many observers see it as inappropriate to give RPS credits to old generating plants, predicting that existing hydropower will be right behind. The concept behind RPS for many is to offer an incentive for new development of renewable resources, not to reward existing ones. As of this writing the Governor has not acted on the bill but is known to be considering a veto.

 

  • HB 2472 modifies the BETC to include manufacture of electric vehicles among the industries eligible for the credit, along with renewable energy facilities and manufacturers of equipment for renewable energy production. The BETC was reduced to match budget concerns, and the Governor is also considering a veto of this bill in the interest of keeping Oregon competitive to attract clean tech business.

All eyes now shift to the U. S. Senate to see if there will be federal GHG controls enacted. It may take a while, these things take time.

GLOBAL WARMING: PROBABLY AN INCREMENTAL SUCCESS STORY

Posted on July 31, 2009 by Stephen E. Herrmann

On July 8, 2009, at the meeting of G8 world leaders, the United States agreed to a benchmark to limit climate change. It joined some other industrialized countries by agreeing that the globe should not warm up more than 2º Celsius (that is 3.6º Fahrenheit). A limit of 2º Celsius arose out of a scientific consensus. Scientists assembled by the United Nations in 2007 said that the world could face significant dangers if we warmed it up more than 2º Celsius. But David Archer at the University of Chicago said that it’s not a hard and fast danger point, more of a judgment call.

 

The results left some Western leaders cheering. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called the group’s statement a “historic agreement.” Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel said it was “a clear step forward.” However, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs was a little less definite, saying: “I think in many ways success for us is going to be getting something through Congress and to [the President’s] desk. It puts in place a system, a market-base system, that lessens the amount of greenhouse gases in the air. Look, that’s going to be the true measure of things.” 

So what was agreed to on July 8? Michael Forman, Obama’s chief negotiator at the Summit said: [The G8 countries] pledged to confront the challenges of climate change and committed to seek an ambitious global agreement. They agreed to join with other countries to achieve a 50% reduction in global emission by 2050 and a goal of 80% reduction by developed countries by 2050.” 

 

But, we should realize that there is a hitch. The 50%and 80% reductions do not refer to the same starting number. The language in the G8 declaration is that there will be an 80% reduction from 1990 or later years. In other words, nations could pick their own starting point. In the United States, emissions have increased nearly 16% since 1990 so there is quite a bite of room in deciding where to start. Also, much of the world’s population is in non-G8 countries. China, India, Mexico and Brazil feel the better-established nations are not doing enough in the short term. They also worry that major reduction commitments on their parts, even if below the 80% target of rich nations, would hamper their economic growth.

 

But, it would certainly appear that the G8 accord is probably an incremental success. Until now, the United States has resisted embracing a target because it implied a commitment to dramatically change the way the world generates electricity, fuels its cars and builds its houses. The long range goals over the coming decades may be easier to agree upon when what the short-term action should be to start moving in the right direction. We all need to hope for the best.

 

DC CIRCUIT UPHOLDS US EPA'S PM 2.5 NON-ATTAINMENT DESIGNATIONS

Posted on July 17, 2009 by David Flannery

On July 7, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rendered its decisions in the PM2.5 Designations Litigation, Catawba County, NC v. EPA, No. 05-1064 and consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. July 7, 2009). Applying the standard of review set forth in Section 307(d)(9) of the Clean Air Act, which “requires the Court to set aside EPA’s final actions when they are excess of the agency’s statutory authority or otherwise arbitrary and capricious,” the Court denied all of the petitions for review except Rockland County, New York and remanded the designation of Rockland County to EPA for a “coherent explanation of its designation”. Slip op. at 3, 9, 53-56. 

 

Overall, the Court complimented EPA on its handling of “the complex task of identifying those geographic areas that contribute to fine particulate matter pollution”. Id. The Court concluded “EPA both complied with the statute and, for all but one of the 225 counties or partial counties it designated as nonattainment, satisfied – indeed, quite often surpassed – its basic obligation of reasoned decisionmaking.” Id. (emphasis added).

 

The Court rendered two decisions: a published per curiam opinion and an unpublished memorandum attached to the judgment. In the per curiam opinion, the Court explains its holdings rejecting the following general challenges to the designations: (1) EPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to publish both the Designations Rule and the Holmstead Memo for notice and comment; (2) EPA violated the section of the Clean Air Act governing designations, § 107(d), by applying the C/MSA presumption and nine-factor test to identify areas that contribute to nearby PM2.5 violations; (3) EPA’s analysis contained such serious “methodological deficiencies and inconsistencies,” including the carbon error, as to render the entire Designations Rule arbitrary and capricious; and (4) EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making particular designations.  Id. at 10. The court in its opinion discusses in detail the New York county designations, rejects the petition as to all of the New York counties except Rockland County, and dismisses all of the other county-specific challenges in one paragraph concluding that “none of them has merit” Id. at 55. The memorandum, which will not be published pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, sets forth the Court’s rationale for rejecting the other county-specific challenges: Oakland County, Michigan; Anderson, Greenville, and Spartanburg Counties, South Carolina; Catawba County, North Carolina; Guilford County, North Carolina; Catoosa County, Georgia; Porter County, Indiana; Randolph County, Illinois; and the Ohio Townships.

 

On its own motion, the Court ordered the Clerk to withhold issuance of the mandate until after issuance of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. However, “any party may move for expedited issuance of the mandate for good cause shown.” Under Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any petition for panel rehearing is due within 14 days after entry of judgment. The judgment was filed July 7, 2009. 

 

Among the highlights of the decision are the following:

 

  1. Speciation data is useful for the area designation process. It reveals the kinds of particles (carbon, sulfate, nitrate, crustal particles, etc.) that account for an area’s PM2.5 problem and suggests, by extrapolation, the kinds of sources most responsible for the problem. Id. at 11. 
  1. No petitioner challenged EPA’s decision that a county boundary would determine the extent of an area reflected by a violating PM2.5 monitor. Id. at 13. 
  1. The Court upheld the C/MSA presumption to identify those areas that, although deemed to be meeting the standard themselves, are contributing to nearby violations.
  1. Weighted emissions scores (WESs) only provide a measure for comparing counties within the same C/MSA. “Importantly, because these scores scale a county’s raw emissions based on attributes specific to individual C/MSA – i.e., the urban excess number and total level of metropolitan emissions – [WESs] only provide a measure for comparing counties within the same C/MSA.”   Id. at 15.
  1. PM2.5 designations are exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 15-18.
  1. The mandate in § 107(d)(4) that EPA apply the C/MSA presumption in ozone and carbon monoxide designations, while the section pertaining to PM2.5 designations says nothing about the C/MSA presumption and instead provides that PM2.5 designations must be “based on air quality monitoring data,” does not prove that Congress intended to preclude EPA from using the C/MSA presumption in PM2.5 designations. Id. at 22-24.
  1. The word “contribute” in § 107(d)(1)(A)(i) is ambiguous. “Contribute” does not necessarily connote a significant causal relationship. EPA may not designate a county as contributing to nonattainment even if “corrective measures in [the county] will do nothing to address the problem or help achieve compliance in the nonattainment area.” Id. at 29. A contribution may simply exacerbate a problem rather than cause it. Id. 
  1. EPA “is free to adopt a totality-of-the-circumstances test to implement a statute that confers broad discretionary authority, even if that test lacks a definite ‘threshold’ or ‘clear line of demarcation to define an open-ended term’.” Id. (citations omitted). To be reasonable such an “all-things-considered standard” must simply define and explain the criteria the agency is applying. The Holmstead Memo and the Technical Support Document satisfied this test “in spades”.  Id. at 30-31.
  1. EPA does not owe to the states “substantive deference”. EPA has “no obligation to give any quantum of deference to a designation that ‘it deems necessary’ to change.” Id. at 32. 
  1. EPA did not err in refusing to consider emissions reductions from CAIR and the NOx SIP Call. With respect to CAIR, there was no “assurance” when EPA promulgated its PM2.5 designations in December 2004 as to “which power plants would reduce SO2 and NOx emissions and how they would do so,” i.e., installation of controls or trading, “near term,” and the NOx SIP Call “has nothing to do with reducing SO2”. Id. at 37-39. EPA may account for future emissions reductions in contribution designations only when “it is evident that federally enforceable pollution controls will yield significant near-term reductions in emissions.”  Id. at 37.
  1. The carbon error did not render the designations arbitrary and capricious because EPA “used the best available information”. Id. at 39. “EPA was not obligated to upend the designation process when it discovered a mistake in its speciation profile for certain power plants. EPA used the best information available in making its designations, and that is all our precedent requires.” Id. at 41.