Posted on June 21, 2016
In January my Columbia University colleague Jeffrey Sachs told me that the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (with which he had worked for several years) was organizing a conference at the Vatican to be comprised of judges, prosecutors and legal scholars from around the world to discuss how the law could address the scourge of human trafficking, and that Pope Francis would attend. He asked my help in identifying some individuals who should be invited, and I was happy to help.
I was not certain that I would be able to go until I received a letter in April from the Academy’s Chancellor, Monsignor Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo, which began, “Following Pope Francis’ wish, it is my pleasure to invite you” to this meeting on June 3-4. Though the dates conflicted with another commitment, this was an invitation I could not decline, so I found a substitute for that and booked a room in the Crowne Plaza St. Peter’s, as recommended by the Vatican. I also found a web site with the protocol for addressing certain personages, including the Pope, the Queen of England, and various heads of state. (The Pope should be addressed as Your Holiness. Catholics should kiss his ring if it is offered; non-Catholics like me should simply shake his hand.)
On the first morning of the conference, I joined other dark-suited men and women in their 50s and older in boarding a bus at the hotel. After we passed through a side entrance to Vatican City, we traversed narrow tree-lined streets (passing numerous priests in long robes walking to work) and parked at Casina Pio IV, which was completed in 1562 as the summer residence of Pope Pius IV. The dome of St. Peter’s Basilica loomed behind. Inside was a conference hall with rows of benches and desks; each desk had a plaque with the name of the person assigned to sit there, a headset for simultaneous translations in several languages, and a microphone that was remotely switched on when it was time to speak. A bust of Pope John Paul II sat above the podium. Throughout the building were original paintings and sculptures, and many of the ceilings had frescoes from the 16th century. Our meals were served on an outdoor elliptical courtyard. The buffet featured, along with less surprising fare, many plates of matzo.
The program was opened by Monsignor Sorondo, and then chaired by Valeria Mazza, an Argentinian supermodel from the 1990s and 2000s who did an excellent job of keeping all the speakers to 15 minutes. The speakers were judges and prosecutors from around the world (including several U.S. federal district court and court of appeals judges) and a few academics like Jeff Sachs and myself. Many of the judges told stories of the horrific cases of human trafficking they had handled in their courtrooms.
When my time came to speak, I discussed how increases in trafficking and smuggling often follow large-scale natural disasters; how climate change (such as drought, desertification and sea level rise) will likely cause a massive increase in the number of people displaced from their homes in the decades to come; and that therefore considerably more trafficking and smuggling will ensue, and the nations of the world should begin considering how to cope with these conditions. I quoted several passages in Pope Francis’s landmark Encyclical on Climate Change and Human Inequality, Laudato Si’, including its declarations there “there has been a tragic rise in the number of migrants seeking to flee from the growing poverty caused by environmental degradation,” and that “the establishment of a legal framework which can set clear boundaries and ensure the protection of ecosystems has become indispensable, otherwise the new power structures based on the techno-economic paradigm may overwhelm not only our politics but also freedom and justice.” (My paper is posted here.)
About two hours before the Pope’s scheduled arrival at the meeting, several large men appeared in and outside the room wearing wires going into their ears. About five minutes before schedule, I heard someone say “he’s here!” A door opened in front of the room, and Pope Francis walked in, wearing his white cassock and skull cap. He took a seat at the head table. Everyone in the room stood and applauded, and many took out their phones and cameras and started taking pictures.
The Pope gave a talk in Spanish. He thanked the participants and then discussed how important it is to halt the worldwide scourges of human trafficking and smuggling. He urged judges “to carry out their vocation and their essential mission of establishing that justice without which there can be no order, or sustainable and integral development, or social peace.” He spoke of a need to end “the globalization of indifference.” He also stated, “The Enlightenment slogan that the Church must not be involved in politics has no application here, for the Church must be involved in the great political issues of our day. For, as Pope Paul VI pointed out, ‘political life is one of the highest forms of charity.’”
Entering into another current debate, the Pope stated, “[t]here are those who believe that the [Pontifical] Academy would do better to be involved with pure science and theoretical considerations, which would certainly be consonant with an enlightenment vision of the nature of an academy. An academy must have roots, concrete roots; otherwise, it risks encouraging a free-flowing reflection which dissipates and amounts to nothing. The divorce between ideas and reality is clearly a bygone cultural phenomenon, an inheritance of the Enlightenment, but its effects are still felt today.”
After his talk, all were invited to join the Pope in front of the building for a joint photo. A swarm of photographers was waiting outside. After the photos, the Pope shook the hands of many of the participants, including myself, and gave each of us a friendly gaze and a warm smile. He posed for several selfies. He was jostled around a fair amount by those seeking to say a few words with him, but he seemed to enjoy the scene; indeed his whole demeanor was one of a person who believes strongly that he is doing important work and takes joy in doing it. Finally he climbed into a small sedan, sat in the front seat, and waved as he was driven away.
As we returned to the meeting hall, there was a collective glow for having spent time with someone who all present, regardless of faith, regard as a great man, and also a renewed commitment to use the law to address some of society’s greatest ills to the extent that our positions and abilities allow.
Posted on June 20, 2016
During this long and nasty election season, I am relieved that the Texas Supreme Court is embracing a little Tim McGraw (Hold the door, say please, say thank you / Don't steal, don't cheat, and don't lie/ I know you got mountains to climb but always stay humble and kind)(“Humble and Kind”). Yes, in what the Respondents argued would be a “momentous” change in Texas groundwater law, the Texas Supreme Court announced in Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v City of Lubbock, No. 14-0572 (Tex. May 27, 2016) that the age-old “accommodation doctrine” which has served the State so well in resolving disputes between landowners and oil and gas lessees, would apply between a landowner and the owner of the severed interest in the groundwater.
In addition to a great style (rest assured it will be known as the Coyote Ranch holding), the decision should remind you a little of reading Robert Fulghum’s All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten.
For those of you not steeped in Texas oil and gas law, the accommodation doctrine essentially recognizes that, absent a specific agreement to the contrary, an oil and gas lessee has an implied right to use the land as reasonably necessary to produce and remove the minerals but must exercise that right with due regard for the landowner’s right. Professor William Huie, Sylvan Lang Professor of Law Emeritus at The University of Texas, called it the “not in my living room” rule, and explained it in pretty simple terms something like this – if the oil and gas lessee can cost-effectively drill for and produce oil or gas without putting the wellhead in the landowner’s living room, he must not insist that the drilling rig be set up in the parlor. It’s not neighborly. And for those not steeped in Texas groundwater law, the “rule of capture” applies, generally allowing each landowner to pump whatever he or she can without waste, knowing that liability may arise if the pumping physically causes a neighbor’s land to subside. That’s also not neighborly.
The Coyote Ranch facts are a bit nuanced, but can be summed up as follows. In the midst of the 1950’s drought of record in Texas, the City of Lubbock bought the Ranch’s groundwater rights. The Ranch reserved groundwater for domestic use, ranching operations, oil and gas production and limited irrigation. The Ranch was limited to one or two wells in each of 16 specific areas for irrigation. During the first 60 years of the agreement, Lubbock installed a total of seven wells on the Ranch. In 2012, Lubbock announced it intended to dramatically ramp up its water production from the Ranch. Over the Ranch’s objection, the City mowed through vast swaths of native grass to drill sites etc., and otherwise acted in total disregard of the Ranch’s operations and habitat preservation. It wasn’t the living room, exactly, but the City plowed across sandy portions of the Ranch contributing to extensive wind erosion. The trial court enjoined the City with an injunction so broad that it operated as a de facto moratorium on any surface activity by the City.
On appeal, the City claimed its deed was broad enough that it could drill whenever and wherever and common law didn’t protect the landowners from the City’s boorish behavior. The Court of Appeals adopted the City’s view of the deed and concluded that the Ranch could not prevail unless the accommodation doctrine applied. Finding no prior authority to support application of the accommodation doctrine to a groundwater dispute, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and lifted the injunction.
The Texas Supreme Court granted the Ranch’s petition, quickly concluded that the deed provisions did not adequately address the dispute, and marched right into unchartered waters—whether the accommodation doctrine should apply to a dispute between the holder of a severed groundwater estate and the surface estate owner. The City had to know it was in trouble when the Court characterized its position as follows:
[The City claims it] has an all but absolute right to use the surface heedless of avoidable injury...[and] that it can drill wherever it chooses, even if it could drill in places less damaging to the surface and still access all the water.
That’s just NOT neighborly. Thus, to no one’s surprise who actually graduated from kindergarten, the Supreme Court concluded that the accommodation doctrine would indeed apply to resolve conflicts between the severed groundwater estate and the surface estate when the conflict was not governed by the express terms of the parties’ agreement. It’s a “let’s-all-just-try-to-get-along” policy that has worked successfully for nearly 50 years in oil and gas disputes, it is well-understood and, as the Supreme Court noted, it is not often disputed. The parties will now return to the trial court to see if they actually learned what they should have in kindergarten. It’s amazing that they had to go all the way to the Texas Supreme Court to be reminded how neighbors should act.
Posted on June 17, 2016
If you needed any further proof that energylaw is very complicated, Wednesday’s decision in North Dakota v. Heydinger should convince you. The judgment is simple – the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a Minnesota statute which provides in part that:
"no person shall . . . (2) import or commit to import from outside the state power from a new large energy facility that would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions; or (3) enter into a new long-term power purchase agreement that would increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions."
Why, you ask?
- The panel opinion, by Judge Loken, stated that the Minnesota statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause, by regulating purely “extraterritorial” economic activity.
- Judge Murphy, in the first concurrence, disagreed with Judge Loken’s conclusion that the statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause, but joined the judgment, because she concluded that the statute is preempted by the Federal Power Act.
- Judge Colloton, in the second concurrence, agreed with Judge Murphy that the statute does not violate the dormant clause, but also concurred in the judgment. Judge Colloton concluded that, to the extent that the “statute bans wholesale sales of electric energy in interstate commerce,” it is preempted by the Federal Power Act. However, Judge Colloton wrote separately, because he at least partially disagrees with Judge Murphy (as well as with Judge Loken) and does not believe that the Minnesota statute constitutes a complete ban on wholesale sales of energy that increase CO2 emissions. However, Judge Colloton concluded that, to the extent that the statute is not preempted by the Federal Power Act, it is preempted by the Clean Air Act.
Is that sufficiently clear?
I do feel compelled to add two final notes. First, I don’t understand why Judge Loken wrote the panel opinion, when his rationale did not command a majority. Indeed, as Judge Colloton pointed out, the Court should not even have reached the constitutional issue, since a panel majority existed that was prepared to strike down the Minnesota statute on statutory grounds. (Preemption is considered a statutory, not a constitutional, rationale.)
Second, don’t analogize the electric energy transmission to the flow of water in a pipe, at least before Judge Murphy. Here’s your electricity and magnetism primer for the day, courtesy of the Judge.
"In the electricity transmission system, individual electrons do not actually “flow” in the same sense as water in a pipe. Rather, the electrons oscillate in place, and it is electric energy which is transmitted through the propagation of an electromagnetic wave.
Certainly brought me back to course 8.02 at MIT. Not one of my favorites.
Posted on June 16, 2016
On Earth Day 2016, the Environmental Law Institute presented to the public a collection of 24 videotaped interviews conducted over the past five years to record the career experiences of many pioneers of environmental law. The men and women profiled were active in the environmental movement in the sixties and early seventies. They served as Democratic and Republican legislators, organizers and advocates for public interest organizations, administrators of national and state environmental agencies, academics producing new ideas and educating new lawyers, and legal counsel to business and government agencies contending with a host of new environmental laws. ELI’s interviewers wanted to learn why these pioneers chose to enter the field of environmental law, what they see as its major successes and shortcomings, and how they view the health of environmental activism and public commitment today.
Among other things, the oral histories provide interesting insight into the roots of activism for early environmental lawyers and what different life experiences and motivations may influence today’s new environmental lawyers. Practically every pioneer spoke of enjoyment of nature and the out of doors experienced through growing up on a farm or in rural areas or visiting campsites and parks on family vacations and scouting trips. They witnessed both the beauty and the degradation of natural and scenic resources and were inspired to seek ways to protect them. The other factor mentioned most often was the example and energy of other social movements in the sixties and seventies, first and foremost the civil rights struggle. Personal experience and the climate of social activism combined to motivate many environmental pioneers to become leaders in the new environmental movement.
Most of the pioneers express optimism that new generations of young women and men will take up activism and environmental law to attack today’s agenda of complex and serious problems. But many worry that the communications technology building young people’s impressive expertise may also be keeping them glued to their screens and disconnected from the natural world. Robert Stanton, former Director of the National Park Service and the first African American to hold the position, comments in his interview that we should not be unduly critical of young people who spend so much time inside. He observes that when he was growing up, there were only a few black and white TV channels to compete with going outdoors! Still, a lifelong activist like Gloria Steinem believes that excessive dependence on electronic connections can weaken the interpersonal qualities of empathy that depend on face-to-face communication and can dilute the emotional drivers for action in concert with others. Activism means more than making a statement and pressing “send.” The impact of technology is just one of many issues discussed in an engaging set of interviews available to all. Visit ELI’s website at http://www.eli.org/celebrating-pioneers-in-environmental-law for a unique source of perspective on the evolution of environmental law and the prospects for further progress on pressing problems in today’s very different social and political setting.
Posted on June 15, 2016
An issue that has recently come to the forefront of Clean Water Act (“CWA”) jurisprudence in numerous district courts across the country and which is currently before the Ninth Circuit is whether the discharge of pollutants into groundwater which is hydrologically connected to a surface water is regulated under the CWA. The CWA prohibits discharges from point sources to navigable waters, defined as “waters of the United States,” unless they are in compliance with another provision of the Act, such as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting program. Whether discharges to groundwater hydrologically connected to a surface water body fall under this prohibition is a question with far-reaching consequences for facilities as varied as coal ash basins, slurry pits, retention ponds, and hydraulic fracturing wastewater ponds, all of which could theoretically be deemed to be in violation of the CWA under this hydrological-connection theory if they leak into groundwater at all.
As a preliminary matter, there is no question that isolated groundwater itself is not a water of the United States regulated under the CWA. First, multiple courts, including several circuit courts of appeals, have held that groundwater is not “waters of the United States.” Second, the legislative history surrounding the CWA indicates clearly that Congress considered setting standards for groundwater or explicitly including it in the NPDES permitting program and decided against such an approach. Finally, in the rule, now stayed by the Sixth Circuit, which EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers promulgated last year defining the term “waters of the United States,” the agencies explicitly stated that they had “never interpreted” groundwater “to be a ‘water of the United States’ under the CWA.” 80 Fed. Reg. 37073.
The hydrological connection issue is not a new one; both the Seventh Circuit in 1994 and the Fifth Circuit in 2001 determined that discharges to groundwater which is hydrologically connected to waters of the United States are not regulated under the CWA or the Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) (courts have typically interpreted the term “navigable waters” to have the same meaning under both acts). In the past few years, however, the frequency of opinions on this topic has increased, and district courts have been very much split on this issue. Some courts and commentators have dubbed this theory of regulation the “conduit theory,” with the idea being that the groundwater serves as a conduit between the point source and the water of the United States.
Three district courts have recently rejected the conduit theory. In 2014, in Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., the Eastern District of North Carolina confronted the issue of whether seepage from coal ash basins at one of the defendant’s power plants, alleged to contain contaminants and to carry those contaminants through groundwater into a lake, was a discharge prohibited by the CWA. The court emphatically held that “Congress did not intend for the CWA to extend federal regulatory authority over groundwater, regardless of whether that groundwater is eventually or somehow ‘hydrologically connected’ to navigable surface waters.” As justifications for its holding, it cited the CWA’s dearth of language actually referring to groundwater, its legislative history, and the 2006 Supreme Court case on the meaning of waters of the United States, Rapanos v. United States, in which the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence appeared to reflect a limited construction of the term. The following year, in 2015, the District of Maryland came to a similar conclusion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Apex Oil Co., Inc. The court held that “even if it is hydrologically connected to a body of ‘navigable water,’” groundwater is not regulated under the OPA, also citing the language of the CWA, its legislative history, and Rapanos. Likewise, in 2013, in Tri-Realty Co. v. Ursinus College, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that “Congress did not intend either the CWA or the OPA to extend federal regulatory authority over groundwater, regardless of whether that groundwater is eventually or somehow ‘hydrologically connected’ to navigable surface waters.”
Other recent district court opinions, however, have come to the opposite conclusion. In 2014, in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, the District of Hawaii confronted the issue of whether the County would need a NPDES permit to discharge waste into underground injection wells when plaintiffs contended that some of the injected wastewater eventually finds its way to the Pacific Ocean. The district court concluded that “liability arises even if the groundwater…is not itself protected by the Clean Water Act, as long as the groundwater is a conduit through which pollutants are reaching navigable-in-fact water.” The district court also cited Rapanos in support of its argument. That case is now before the Ninth Circuit on appeal, and the Department of Justice recently filed an amicus brief supporting the argument that there is CWA jurisdiction where pollutants move through groundwater to jurisdictional surface waters if there is a “direct hydrological connection” between the groundwater and surface waters. Likewise, in 2015, in Yadkin Riverkeeper v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, the Middle District of North Carolina held that it had jurisdiction over claims where “pollutants travel from a point source to navigable waters through hydrologically connected groundwater serving as a conduit between the point source and the navigable waters.” That court based its determination in part on the idea that taking an expansive view of the types of discharges which the CWA prohibits is most in line with the statute’s purpose. A few weeks later in Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., the Eastern District of Virginia, citing Yadkin Riverkeeper, held that a CWA citizen suit against Dominion Virginia Power using the conduit theory should survive a motion to dismiss.
The line of cases rejecting CWA jurisdiction over discharges to groundwater which is hydrologically connected to surface waters of the United States gets it right. As the legislative history proves, Congress considered regulating discharges to groundwater and rejected such an approach. This decision is reflected in the language of the statute. Moreover, in Rapanos, the Supreme Court restricted the factual scenarios under which a wetland could be considered a water of the United States, thus revealing that a majority of the justices on the Court favored a narrower jurisdictional reach under the CWA. Finally, to accept the “conduit theory” would be to write the “point source” requirement out of the statute. As described above, a discharge must come from a point source, which the CWA defines as a “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.” Groundwater seepage seems to be about as far from a “discernible, confined and discrete” source as it gets, resembling nonpoint source pollution like stormwater runoff.
Posted on June 14, 2016
About 10 years ago, when Steve Herrmann began calling 22 other environmental lawyers around the country about starting a new College, I don’t think he or any of us envisioned the College’s reach extending overseas. Yet, thanks to the vision and efforts of Jim Bruen, Bob Percival, and now Jimmy May, in recent years the College has explored possible connections with China, Kenya, and just weeks ago—Haiti.
Six College members, dubbed by one as “Lawyers Without Borders,” spent four whirlwind days in Port-au-Prince Memorial Day and early June. Our key liaison was Widener Law Professor and former Dean Erin Daly, Jimmy’s colleague, who has spent some of her sabbatical year working at the Université de la Fondation Dr. Aristede (UNIFA) begun just a few years ago by former President Jean-Bertrand Aristede and his wife Mildred Aristede, an American-trained attorney. UNIFA was our wonderful host sponsor for the trip. Specifics on the ACOEL delegation and with whom we met can be found in the separate blog post of Jimmy May.
In brief, I arrived a day early with Erin Daly, and our guide, Junior St. Vil, took us to Sakala, a community center in one of the poorest sections of the city. It was Mother’s Day in Haiti, so there was a celebration going on that we witnessed, as well as touring a community garden used to teach children how to grow food—with recycled tires as planters.
On Memorial Day I briefly met Mme. Aristede at UNIFA, then went with Junior to “tour” the city. Port-au-Prince was hit hard by the major 2010 earthquake, and most roads are still in poor shape, clogged with motor vehicles and pedestrians. I saw very few traffic lights or cross walks; everyone shares the road. It thus takes a long time to get from one part of the city (3.5 million people) to another, so most of my morning was spent getting a feel for the street scene, and talking with Junior.
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. While one College member (who will remain nameless) said that Haiti ranks higher than the U.S. in the Happiness Index, my back-home research found Haitians much less happy than Americans. However, I suspect that may be explained in part by facts such as 1) 70% of the 10 million Haitians have no electricity and are illiterate, 2) most water and sewer infrastructure is in disrepair or worse, 3) only 2% of Haiti’s forest is left, with families reluctantly forced to cut remaining trees for charcoal to cook with, and 4) there are significant “rule of law” challenges from lack of enforcement or viable legal remedies.
Haiti presents lots of opportunities as well as challenges. Our visit focused in large part on the desire of UNIFA and local lawyers to develop a 1-year environmental law LLM program. Currently, “law school” in Haiti is a prescribed, 4-year college curriculum with little focus on environmental, energy or land use issues. During our visit, we met with large groups of students and of lawyers, as well as in smaller sessions with leading environmental, energy and sustainability practitioners. For me, it was clear that everyone wanted to develop, with assistance, initiatives to improve the quality of life for Haitian people. They were well aware of the many damaging pollution and climate change forces hurting the populace and economy; but a key question is how best to create home-designed programs similar to what we began to do in the U.S. in the early 1970s.
The challenge for us as College members, and for me personally, is how best to assist and collaborate with UNIFA and others in Haiti, to make a difference. Now that personal connections have been made, hopefully our Haitian hosts will be better able to propose to us possible measure to develop a sustained (not one-time) menu of actions that we can work on together with them. I hope to be able, someday soon, to work on environmental or renewable energy education or project-specific initiatives with the great people with whom we met.
Posted on June 14, 2016
A delegation of ACOEL Fellows visited Haiti, May 30-June 2, to share ideas about ways to advance environmental law and justice with leading members of the bar, academia, civil society, and the business community.
This visit takes place at a transformative time for the environment in Haiti. Deforestation hovers at around 95% as people are forced to burn charcoal for fuel or income, rivers and streams are choked by trash and runoff, motor vehicles are largely unregulated, and the public health system is overwhelmed. And of course, Haiti still suffers from the introduction of cholera in October 2010, resulting in more than 9,000 deaths thus far.
The visit was at the invitation of host institution Universite de la Fondation Aristide (UNIFA)(http://unifa-edu.info/contenu/). The delegation -- Alexander Dunn, Lee DeHihns, Tracy Hester, Dennis Krumholz, Jeff Thaler, and Jimmy May – had a transformative experience. Professor Erin Daly (Vice President for Institutional Development) served as the local liaison, with ACOEL Fellow and Professor James R. May serving as coordinator on behalf of the College's Committee on International and Pro Bono Programs, which he co-chairs with Professor Robert Percival.
The delegation met with many of Haiti’s leading policymakers, thinkers and advocates, former President Jean Bertrand and Mme. Mildred Aristide, Me. Fabrice Fievre (Co-Dean of UNIFA Law School), Me. Mario Joseph (director of the nation’s leading human right law firm, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, http://www.ijdh.org), Me. Jean Andre Victor (director of Haiti’s leading environmental rights firm, L'Association Haïtienne de Droit de l'Environnement), Me. Stanley Gaston, (President of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association), Me. Leslie Voltaire (Haitian architect and urban planner), and Me. Cedric Chauvet (a leading business-person). The delegation also enjoyed various cultural opportunities, including in Port Au Prince, Petionville, and Cite Soleil.
The delegation also visited SAKALA (a leading community center serving among Haiti’s poorest children, http://www.sakala-haiti.org), and the 'uncommon' artists’ community of Noailles, Haiti (http://www.uncommoncaribbean.com/2015/03/10/visiting-the-uncommon-artists-enclave-of-noailles-haiti/).
UNIFA is a leading private university in Haiti, and focuses on promoting dignity and social justice, including by advancing environmental sustainability. Earlier this year it hosted conferences dedicated to environmental human rights issues and their relationship to health, engineering, and law in Haiti (“Environmental Concerns: Today and Tomorrow”) (brochure available at: http://unifa-edu.info/contenu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/programmation-semaine-scientifique-2016.pdf), as well as to the environmental and social consequences of mining in Haiti (https://www.facebook.com/Aristide-Foundation-for-Democracy-306681307454/?fref=nf)."
ACOEL looks forward to continuing conversations about ways to coordinate and collaborate going forward.
Posted on June 9, 2016
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence had a huge impact on environmental law. Part I focused on standing. This short piece addresses his impact on takings and Administrative Law.
Modern takings jurisprudence is also Justice Scalia’s handiwork. He, more than any other Justice, was inclined to find government regulation – particularly that which serves environmental ends – “goes too far” and thus constitutes a regulatory taking warranting just compensation. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, he held for the majority that a state law designed to protect barrier islands constituted a compensable taking when it had the effect of depriving a developer of what he considered to be all economic use. And in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Justice Scalia—again for the majority—held that a requirement that a shorefront property owner maintain a public pathway to a public beach was “illogical” and constituted a compensable taking.
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence makes policymakers think twice about regulating in the environmental realm.
Deference to Agency Rulemaking
Justice Scalia was consistently skeptical of environmentally-protective interpretations by federal agencies, especially those by EPA. In Rapanos v. EPA, writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court, he rejected the Army Corps of Engineers’ interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s term “navigable waters” to include temporally-saturated areas, instead insisting on a direct surface water connection to a water that is “navigable in fact.” Likewise, he joined the Court’s decision in SWANCC v. Army Corps of Engineers, holding that Congress did not intend to permit the Corps and EPA to regulate dredging and filling of isolated ponds and wetlands that are not adjacent to otherwise navigable waters, under what was known as the “migratory bird rule.” Most recently, in Michigan v. EPA, he wrote for the majority to invalidate EPA’s mercury and toxics rule, finding it unreasonable “to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.” And shortly before he died, he joined four other justices to order a stay of EPA’s Clean Power Plan.
Yet Scalia was more inclined to defer to EPA interpretations that were less environment-minded. For instance, in Entergy v. Riverkeeper, he wrote on behalf of the majority to uphold EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis in assessing “best technology available” for minimizing the adverse environmental effects of cooling water intake structures under section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act. Likewise, he dissented in EPA’s favor in Massachusetts v. EPA, voting to uphold the agency’s decision at that point that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act.
Early during his tenure on the bench, however, Justice Scalia seemed more inclined to endorse the edict from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, to defer to “reasonable” statutory interpretations from mission-oriented agencies. For example, in EDF v. Chicago, Scalia on behalf of the Court upheld EPA’s interpretation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that “solid waste” includes ash from municipal waste incinerators. And then in dissent he decried the result in U.S. v. Mead Corp., where the Court strayed from the Chevron standard by granting only “power to persuade” as opposed to “reasonableness” deference to agency interpretations that are not the result of a deliberative process.
Last, Whitman v. American Trucking stands as a bit of an outlier to Scalia’s seeming antipathy to EPA’s reach, in which his majority opinion upheld as an “intelligible principle” under the non-delegation doctrine Congress having EPA establish national ambient air quality standards that are “requisite” to protect human health and the environment.
Justice Scalia’s views on deference to rulemaking gave agencies – except for EPA – more leeway. For further reading on these subjects, please see Principles of Constitutional Environmental Law.
Posted on June 9, 2016
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence had a huge impact on environmental law. Part I focuses on standing. Part II (a forthcoming post) then turns to takings and Administrative Law.
Justice Scalia’s most lasting legacy on environmental law is how his jurisprudence makes it more difficult for environmental plaintiffs to demonstrate constitutional standing under Article III of the Constitution. Since at least Sierra Club v. Morton, plaintiffs needed to show that they possessed an “injury in fact,” which could be commercial, economic, aesthetic, or environmental. Raising the bar, Scalia stated that plaintiffs must demonstrate at an “irreducible minimum”: (1) imminent and concrete “injury-in-fact” that is (2) fairly “traceable” to the defendant’s actions, and (3) “redressible” by the court. Applying this standard, Scalia found standing lacking in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, because using land “in the vicinity of” affected federal land wasn’t sufficient, and in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, due to the absence of what has come to be known as “tickets in hand” to return to the places of alleged injury. Dissenting in Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Blackmun, bemoaned Scalia’s new requirements as “a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing.”
Justice Scalia then dissented in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services v. EPA, when the majority held that it is injury to the person, and not the environment, that matters in standing analysis. There, he complained that the majority had proceeded “to marry private wrong with public remedy in a union that violates traditional principles of federal standing—thereby permitting law enforcement to be placed in the hands of private individuals. I dissent from all of this.”
Justice Scalia was skeptical that the effects of climate change could ever support standing, even for states. Speaking from his dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA, Scalia would have found that petitioning states lacked standing to challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) failure to institute rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources, thereby rejecting that states are entitled to “special solicitude” in standing analysis.
Justice Scalia was more inclined to find standing when litigants challenged environmentally-protective agency action. For example, writing for a plurality, he found that alleged injury to economic interests to water districts and to corporate ranching and agricultural interests was sufficient injury in Bennett v. Spear. Moreover, he held that homeowners possessed both standing and a cause of action to challenge an EPA-issued but not enforced administrative compliance order in Sackett v. EPA.
Concur or not, Justice Scalia’s standing test took hold and stands firm. For further reading on this subject, please see Principles of Constitutional Environmental Law.
Posted on June 7, 2016
Clean Power Plan (CPP) groupies are beside themselves over the D.C. Circuit’s surprise “straight-to-en banc” move for CPP judicial review. The buzz is mostly over the survivability of the CPP’s interpretations of Clean Air Act (CAA) §111(d) in light of the nine judges’ dispositions.
I won’t weigh in on that issue here. My target is another issue, one that has been lurking in the background and has bugged me greatly for the last couple of years. Now that the issue is before an en banc panel, I am fervently hoping the Court will do what only en banc panels can do: declare that a few recent D.C. Circuit rulings are wrong.
The issue involves garden variety adlaw: should the CPP be vacated because EPA failed to propose or adequately foreshadow key elements of the final rule? Parties attacking the CPP have advanced this argument, and EPA has defended on numerous grounds that its notice was adequate.
I won’t opine here on whether EPA’s notice was adequate. My beef is with EPA’s fall-back defense: EPA’s argument that even if there were wholly insufficient notice of the CPP’s final provisions, the Court has no authority to vacate the CPP on those grounds.
EPA’s theory is that since CAA §307(d)(7)(B) provides that only an issue raised in public comments can be raised on judicial review, a final rule that was never proposed cannot be challenged on judicial review because there were no public comments on that provision. Yep, read on.
EPA argues that parties claiming a final rule was never proposed must instead file administrative petitions for review under CAA §307(d)(7)(B) and wait (usually for a few years, if ever) for EPA to act on those petitions. In the meantime, under EPA’s position, regulatory provisions that were never proposed or foreshadowed must go into full force and effect.
This means that EPA can get away with murder, at least in the adlaw context. Just forget the bedrock principle that an agency can impose and enforce only those rules that have first been proposed. Under EPA’s position, the bedrock is blown away by a Richter 8.8 otherwise known as CAA §307(d)(7)(B).
In the last two years, EPA has managed to convince D.C. Circuit panels to accede to this unfair and baseless approach. See my 2015 ACOEL post discussing these opinions. In a piece I published in Bloomberg BNA in 2014, I showed how the D.C. Circuit had never previously interpreted CAA §307(d)(7)(B) in this fashion , and had on many occasions vacated final rule provisions that had never been proposed.
As explained in the above-cited pieces, the absurdity of EPA’s position is that final rules will go into full force and effect against parties because they failed to object to something they could not object to. This just can’t be right. The en banc CPP panel should do the right thing and declare the three most recent decisions to be wrong.
[Mr. Stoll is not representing any party in the pending D.C. Circuit CPP judicial review proceedings.]
Posted on June 6, 2016
Who knew? On May 19 those wild eyed environmentalists on the Senate Appropriations Committee unanimously (no misprint) passed a FY 2017 agriculture and rural development bill that includes significant funding for conservation work. The bill now goes to the full Senate for a vote and, if it passes, back to the House for reconciliation.
Of particular interest, the bill breathes new life into the moribund Watershed and Flood Prevention Operations Program. This little known program is supposed to fund land and water conservation efforts at the watershed level, but has long gone unfunded and unloved. The new bill would appropriate $150 million, which would be the first appropriation since 2010. Less than the Administration proposed—and not nearly adequate, of course—but nevertheless, new money that could serve important purposes.
Oregon Sen. Jeff Merkley, a member of the Appropriations Committee, sees an opportunity for addressing habitat needs for fish and wildlife, particularly the spotted frog, as well as aiding rural communities. The U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the spotted frog and designated critical habitat in Central Oregon. Indeed, irrigation districts in the area are making plans to compete for the funding to help with irrigation equipment upgrades and replacement of open canals with pipes. Such efficiency and conservation efforts reduce pressure on habitat for the spotted frog and other species.
It will be interesting to see if a sister program, the Land and Water Conservation Fund, established by Congress in 1965, can find a receptive ear as well. As described by the LWCF Coalition:
It was a simple idea: use revenues from the depletion of one natural resource - offshore oil and gas - to support the conservation of another precious resource - our land and water. Every year, $900 million in royalties paid by energy companies drilling for oil and gas on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) are put into this fund. The money is intended to create and protect national parks, areas around rivers and lakes, national forests, and national wildlife refuges from development, and to provide matching grants for state and local parks and recreation projects.
Unfortunately, for many years Congress has diverted the funds for other purposes, leaving a multi-billion dollar backlog in maintenance and enhancement projects. There’s no direct connection between the LWCF and the Watershed and Flood Prevention Operations Program, and no particular reason why funding of one would lead to funding the other. Still, Sen. Merkley, if you are reading, this one might be added to your to-do list!
Posted on June 2, 2016
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) fairly boasts that it lived up to its tag line “Rescuing Liberty from Coast to Coast” by following its 2012 Supreme Court victory in Sackett v. EPA with its May 31, 2016 victory in United States Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc. In both Clean Water Act cases the PLF represented the property owners on appeal, arguing that the particular agency action was final, subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court agreed both times. Some boasting is due.
The particulars of each case flow from disputes about the scope of “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act. Neither case resolved the merits issue. Both cases considered only whether the dispute may be brought to court by challenging a pre-enforcement agency action.
The Sacketts filled in a half acre of their 2/3-acre residential lot near Priest Lake, Idaho with dirt and rock in preparation for building a home. EPA served a compliance order advising the Sacketts that they violated the Clean Water Act by filling in waters of the United States without a Section 404 dredge and fill permit. The Order unilaterally prevented further construction and required the Sacketts to remove the fill material then restore the wetland pursuant to an EPA Restoration Work Plan.
The Sacketts tried to challenge EPA’s order, but were told by EPA, then by the District Court, that they had no right to challenge the order until EPA attempted to enforce it. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, setting the Sacketts squarely on the horns of their dilemma. Disregarding the unilateral compliance order subjected the Sacketts to potential fines of up to $75,000 per day. Complying with the order meant spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to carry out the EPA’s Restoration Work Plan, and never getting to build on their property.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert, and Justice Scalia, authoring the decision concluded that the compliance order met the Bennett two-prong test for reviewability: (1) no adequate remedy other than review under the Administrative Procedures Act, and (2) no statute, in this case the Clean Water Act, precluded that review. Justice Alito, concurring, declared: “The position taken in this case by the Federal Government -- a position that the Court now squarely rejects -- would have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees.” And later: “In a nation that values due process, not to mention private property, such treatment is unthinkable.”
The Hawkes case, four years later, is the same song, second verse. This time the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) issued the offending decision -- a jurisdictional determination (JD) that waters of the United States existed on 530 acres from which Hawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes) and its affiliated companies planned to mine for peat. Hawkes provides peat for golf courses and sports fields, and mining peat on the 530 acres would extend the life of its peat mining business by ten to fifteen years. The USACE concluded that the property was connected by a “relatively permanent water” (a series of culverts and unnamed streams) that flowed into the Middle River and then into the Red River of the North, a “traditional navigable waterway” about 120 miles away. With the USACE determination, Hawkes needed a permit to harvest peat. Moreover, USACE advised that before it issued a permit, it would require additional hydrological and functional resource assessments and an evaluation of upstream potential impacts, the cost of which would exceed $100,000.
Using an analysis, discussed in my colleague’s post Sending a Message on WOTUS, the Court concluded that a JD satisfied both prongs of Bennett, and affirmed the Eighth Circuit, remanding the Hawkes companies to District Court of Minnesota - Minneapolis with the right to litigate the jurisdictional determination, same as the Sacketts. When the Supreme Court ruled favorably on their case the Sacketts were remanded to the Idaho District Court, where their court battle continues. Presumably, the battle will continue with the Hawkes’ companies as well.
At the heart of each battle is whether or not the property actually contains “Waters of the United States.” Following the procedural “yellow brick road” won’t get anyone out of Oz -- not until a clear definition of waters of the United States emerges.
Posted on June 2, 2016
The May 31 decision in Hawkes may be less important for what it says about the reviewability of jurisdictional determinations (JDs) under the Clean Water Act than for what is says about the far more consequential stakes in the pending challenges to EPA’s Clean Water Rule (aka WOTUS), which will undoubtedly find its way to the Court following a decision by the Sixth Circuit which is expected before the end of the year.
Contrary to my prediction the Court did rule (unanimously) that JDs are final agency actions subject to review under the APA. In an opinion penned by Chief Justice Roberts the Court upheld the conclusion of the Eighth Circuit but substituted a different test for finality, one that emerged during oral argument and one that introduces a novel and perhaps questionable rationale. The key question was whether JDs have legal consequences. In roundabout fashion, Roberts concluded they did because a positive finding of jurisdiction meant that the applicant was denied the advantage of a negative determination (or NJD). That had the effect of denying the applicant the benefit of what Roberts called a “safe harbor” provision contained, not in the statute or implementing regulations, but in a 2015 Memorandum of Agreement between by EPA and the Corps. Roberts read the MOA as creating a legal right – similar to a covenant not to sue – binding the government to a five year commitment not to revisit the NJD, an interpretation the government vigorously disputed as pointed out by Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence.
This ruling could have significant practical effects. Since 2008 the Corps and EPA have issued over 400,000 JDs of which approximately 40% were approved JD’s. Under the MOA, the process has become more formal, giving it at least the appearance if not the reality of adjudication. The formality of the process convinced a number of the Justices, particularly Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Kagan, that JDs should be considered final actions under the Abbott Labs test. They emphasized the fact that under the MOA the agencies were not simply giving advice to the public. This raises the question whether the agencies may want to rethink the MOA and consider revising the safe harbor provision to make clear it is not binding. The Solicitor raised this possibility during the oral argument (transcript at p 16 lines 16-25).
Pursuing that route, however, runs the risk of further alienating Justice Kennedy and the government can ill afford to lose his potentially crucial vote if and when the Clean Water Rule reaches the Court. In his concurring opinion, joined not surprisingly by Justices Alito and Thomas, Kennedy went out of his way to take several pot shots at the Clean Water Act and the agencies implementation of it. Referring to “the Act’s ominous reach” Kennedy said it “continues to raise troubling questions regarding the Government’s power to cast doubt on the full use and enjoyment of private property throughout the Nation.” During oral argument Kennedy offered the view that the CWA is “arguably unconstitutionally vague, and certainly harsh in the civil and criminal penalties it puts into practice.”
It is too soon to write the obituary for the Clean Water Rule. But Kennedy’s vote is more in doubt now than when he authored the concurring opinion in Rapanos showing a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of both the values enshrined in the CWA and the constitutional issues it raises. Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, widely accepted as controlling by the lower courts, was the blueprint EPA and the Corps used to write the rule. Given these more recent statements, that may not be enough to win his approval. The fate of the rule may well depend on how soon and by whom the vacancy on the Court is filled.
Posted on June 1, 2016
Since 2010, EPA and other federal agencies have used the Federal Social Cost of Carbon (“FSCC”) to estimate the climate benefits of federal rulemakings. The FSCC is an estimate of the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon dioxide (“CO2”), conventionally one metric ton, in a given year. The FSCC was developed by a group of federal agency representatives known as the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (“IWG”). In developing the FSCC, the IWG relied on three Integrated Assessments Models – the DICE model (“Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy”) developed in 1990 by William Nordhaus, the PAGE model (“Policy Analysis of Greenhouse Effect”) developed in 1992 by Chris Hope, and the FUND model (“Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution) developed by Richard Tol in the early 1990s. The primary virtue of the DICE, PAGE, and FUND integrated assessment models is that all contain simplified representations of economic models, climate models, and impact models that allow integration of climate processes, economic growth, and interaction between climate and economy.
The IWG has described the purpose of the FSCC as allowing federal agencies to incorporate the social benefits of reducing CO2 emission into cost-benefit analyses of regulatory actions that have small or marginal impacts on cumulative global emissions. The purpose of the FSCC process is to ensure that federal agencies are using the best available information and to promote consistency in the way agencies quantify the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions, or costs from increasing emissions, in federal regulatory impact analyses. The issue that is now coming up before some regulatory agencies is whether the FSCC can be employed in site-specific policy decision-making, such as state utility integrated resource planning.
In Responses to Comments issued in 2015, the IWG stated that it has not addressed the use of FSCC outside the federal regulatory context, such as in NEPA analysis, state-leveling resource planning, or “pricing” carbon in the marketplace. The IWG itself has acknowledged the large degree of uncertainty and imprecision in the estimates derived from the use of the integrated assessment models, especially as the time horizon for damage estimates reaches out to the year 2300. The IWG has observed that any such assessment will suffer from uncertainty, speculation, and lack of information about (1) future emissions of greenhouse gases, (2) the effects of past and future emissions on the climate system, (3) the impact of changes in climate on the physical and biological environment, and (4) the translation of these environmental impacts into economic damages. As a result, the IWG has stressed that decision makers should be very cautious in their reliance on the integrated assessment models. The proponents of the FSCC do not dispute the uncertainty and imprecision of the integrated assessment model process but they contend that there is no viable alternative.
Regardless of whether the FSCC is appropriate for federal regulatory impact analysis, it is simply too uncertain and speculative to be used in site-specific resource planning, including in NEPA analysis or utility resource planning. The values generated by the FSCC are highly uncertain and have serious weaknesses. These weaknesses are likely to be more significant in site-specific resource planning where the use of damage estimates demands greater precision than in regulatory impact analysis. This issue has been raised before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (“MPUC”) in a proceeding to establish environmental cost values for carbon dioxide emissions from electric generating units. As Nicholas F. Martin, environmental policy manager for the public utility Xcel Energy, testified, “whether the ‘correct’ value is $12 or $120 matters a great deal in integrated resource planning[, because] these two values could point to dramatically different resource mixes ….”
The Administrative Law Judge hearing the Minnesota case recently recommended the MPUC adopt a modified version of the FSCC. The two modifications involved (1) re-calculating the FSCC to reflect a shortened time horizon extending to the year 2200 (rather than 2300, as set by the IWG), and (2) excluding the value derived from the 95th percentile at a 3 percent discount rate (a value intended by the IWG to account for the high-end of the potential damage range). Both of these modifications were intended to reduce the level of uncertainty and speculation associated with the FSCC estimates. The MPUC is expected hold a hearing to address the ALJ’s report later this year.
Posted on May 31, 2016
In an 85-page decision filled with rebuke, Defenders of Wildlife v. Sally Jewell, the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana found in April that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to withdraw its proposeda listing of the wolverine as “threatened” under the Endangered Species Act was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the ESA’s requirement that decisions be based on the “best available science.”
The court criticized the Service for mischaracterizing scientific consensus as “substantial disagreement,” and for employing an inappropriately high standard of absolute certainty. The court suspected the Service’s sudden loss of confidence in its listing decision resulted not from scientific diligence but, instead, from “immense political pressure” exerted by a handful of western states.
Although the decision is replete with references to wolverine denning statistics, sophisticated snow cover assessments based on satellite imagery, and emerging climate models, the court made clear that the Service changed its decision based on policy considerations, not science. That the wolverine depends on persistent snow cover to reproduce, and “relies on snow for its existence at the most fundamental level,” the court said, was not disputed. That climate change is occurring, and will in the future result in reduced snowpack and loss of denning habitat, within the wolverine’s U.S. range also was not disputed. The western states, however, questioned how reliably the Service could predict either the pace or the foreseeable impacts of climate effects far into the future. The states, and many senior staff within the Service, also questioned whether the ESA is an appropriate or workable tool to address the large-scale effects of climate change on North American ecosystems.
Alaska, for example, linked the wolverine listing decision to what it claimed were equally flawed decisions to list the polar bear and various species of ice seals, based on what it said were dubious models and speculative future climate effects. Idaho questioned whether the Service’s use of models and projections would eventually lead it to list every species in the U.S., based on predictions of widespread and pervasive climate impacts throughout the country. Two of the Service’s own Regional Directors echoed the refrain, saying that demands for listing particular species based on predicted effects of climate change “will become a common source of petitioned actions and threaten the Service’s resources to address priority issues.”
The court dismissed these concerns without hesitation: “It is the undersigned’s view that if there is one thing required of the Service under the ESA, it is to take action at the earliest possible, defensible point in time to protect against the loss of biodiversity within our reach as a nation.”
If the Service reinstates its prior listing decision, the wolverine will join the polar bear, ringed and bearded seals, and other species listed because they rely on snow and ice “for existence at the most fundamental level.” The policy challenges at the core of the Service’s listing decision, however, remain unresolved. Species affected by climate change are not limited to those dependent on snow and ice. If climate trends continue, the list of species affected will grow and grow. The ESA can do nothing to reverse or decelerate those impacts. The Service cannot build an ark to save every species ultimately displaced or threatened. Any realistic hope for slowing the loss of biodiversity in the U.S. must depend, therefore, on comprehensive and lasting reforms to address the underlying causes of climate change, and not the predicted effects of climate change at the species level.
Posted on May 27, 2016
In 1991, Iowa passed a law prohibiting the delivery of yard waste to landfills. It was during a time when there was a general panic that landfills were filling up too fast. Twenty-two states have passed similar laws. They all saw it as a win-win: compost could be created and sold by the city and the landfills would last longer. A couple short decades later, several states have had second thoughts. In 2015, Iowa passed a law that allows certain landfills to start accepting delivery of yard waste. The reasoning is instructive.
Landfills contain a staggering amount of potential energy. The tires, paper products and plastic wastes, when burned for energy recovery, could light up a town. But the cost of getting the BTUs out of the waste doesn’t make economic sense – yet. There are exciting, new processes on the horizon that will have us mining that garbage for the energy sink it actually is, but that is still a ways off. One form of energy recovery that is economically viable, however, is methane recovery. As the garbage breaks down, it gives off methane gas that can be captured and burned. Many landfills across the country do this type of recovery and find it simple and profitable.
To effectively produce methane, however, garbage must degrade. The recycling push of the 80s and 90s took away the really good degradables from the waste stream – boxes, newspapers and yard waste were targeted as prime recyclables. The effect was that the best fuel for garbage degradation (and thus methane creation) was banned. Sure, it went towards the worthy goals of paper recycling and creation of high quality compost, but at what cost?
Iowa decided to look into that question. They considered the cost of producing compost from yard waste and compared it to the cost of recovering additional methane that would be made possible by returning the green gold of yard waste to the landfill degradation process. As it turns out, recycling loses.
The analysis turned on a number of factors:
· The cost of buying, maintaining and fueling the trucks, machinery and facility needed for composting would be eliminated resulting in a yearly savings of $2 million;
· Methane recovery would increase from the equivalent of powering 11,000 homes to powering 18,000 homes;
· According to a study commissioned by the city of Des Moines, annual greenhouse gas emission would be reduced by 11% and the landfilling option would provide more than three times the greenhouse gas benefit presented by composting.
Sierra Club is on record as opposing the trend (Georgia, Arkansas, Florida and Nebraska also now allow landfilling of yard waste) because it will result in landfills reaching capacity sooner. In the case of one Iowa landfill, its estimated life would be reduced from 2054 to 2052. Also, Sierra Club argues that more uncaptured greenhouse gases will be produced, but this seems to ignore the net savings from the other GHG reductions identified in the study.
I don’t have any idea whether returning yard waste to landfills is a net positive for the environment. As counterintuitive as it seems, it appears to hold promise. And if it does, where else might full cost accounting be used to guide environmental legislation? At least some states are asking the question - and I suspect more will follow.
Posted on May 26, 2016
Until recently I thought state water quality agencies with oversight from EPA were in charge of setting water quality standards, establishing mixing zones and similar activities. However, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) has recently served notice that they are the new water quality sheriffs in the Northwest.
It is well known that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is a comprehensive statute designed to protect and recover species that are listed as threatened or endangered by the USFWS and the NMFS (collectively referred to as "Services"). One of the key provisions in the ESA is 16 USC § 1636 (or Section 7) which requires federal agencies to utilize their authority to conserve endangered species and "consult" with the Services whenever any discretionary action by the acting federal agency has the potential to negatively affect listed species. Many no doubt recall the decision in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), in which the Court determined that Section 7 required the acting federal agency to halt construction of an almost completed major federal dam in Tennessee (Tellico Dam) because it would undisputedly eradicate the listed species ("snail darter" or perch), destroy its critical habitat and therefore completion of the dam would clearly violate Section 7.
What constitutes "jeopardy" and destruction of critical habitat under the ESA has come a long way since TVA v. Hill. The ESA gets a lot of play in the Northwest principally because there are large tracts of undeveloped federal land, human population is relatively sparse and pristine waters combine to provide habitat for many listed aquatic species such as various species of salmon. In one of the latest iterations of what constitutes "jeopardy" the Services recently determined in lengthy biological opinions that EPA's approval (some twenty years ago) of Idaho's Water Quality Standards for certain toxic metals would jeopardize the continued existence of listed species and destroy or adversely modify critical habitat.
There is a question whether EPA approval of state water quality standards pursuant to § 303 of the CWA is the type of discretionary action that even triggers ESA consultation. See National Association of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (Section 7 consultation not required when EPA authorizes state to take over the NPDES permit program under § 402 of the CWA). Assuming consultation is required, certainly there had been a lengthy delay in EPA and the Services completing consultation on Idaho Water Quality Standards (over twenty years). This delay gave rise to a lawsuit brought by regional environmental groups to force completion of the consultation. See Northwest Environmental Advocates v. The National Marine Fisheries Service, USDC Idaho, Case No. 1:13-cv-00263-EJL.
But, how can a water quality criteria jeopardize the existence of an endangered species? Water quality standards under the CWA are goals set by each state for state surface waters. NPDES Permits must meet state water quality standards and if a waterbody is not meeting standards then states must adopt pollution control plans (known as "TMDLs") to bring a waterbody into compliance also subject to EPA approval. Adoption of criteria itself cannot jeopardize endangered species or for that matter save a species.
If one has the fortitude to power through the Services lengthy biological opinions, which were not subject to public comment, there is no finding that state standards at or below the current criteria are actually harming any fish in the thousands of miles of streams and rivers affected by the opinions. Rather the Services take exception to the somewhat esoteric process by which EPA develops national recommended water quality criteria (which most states ultimately follow). The Services found EPA should have relied on different laboratory studies in developing and approving criteria. Many of the laboratory studies the Services relied upon do not even involve listed species.
The Services then suggested that EPA must adopt replacement criteria (or force the state to do so) over the next few years via reasonable and prudent alternatives (or RPAs) to avoid the alleged jeopardy. An RPA are measures "suggested" by the Services under Section 7 to the action agency (EPA) to avoid jeopardy which are within the discretion of the action agency and are economically and technically feasible. In the meantime the Services suggested as an interim measure how EPA should regulate point source dischargers into waters containing listed species by meeting certain prescribed mixing zones.
While the Services’ jeopardy determinations on Idaho's standards are a far cry from jeopardy to the snail darter caused by the construction to the Tellico Dam many years ago, the Services’ findings may go unchallenged. It is likely EPA will follow the RPA's (or force the state to do so) for fear of another lawsuit that EPA is violating its obligations under Section 7. Likely the only remedy to question the Services’ jeopardy determinations may be a judicial challenge to the Biological Opinions. However in such a challenge a court would be forced to evaluate the "science" behind the Services’ jeopardy determinations which is an area the courts generally will defer to the expertise of the agency. One would think that EPA or state water quality agencies would be the experts on setting water quality standards and establishing mixing zones, but the Services will no doubt claim they are now the experts. Sometimes it is difficult to figure out who is in charge.
Posted on May 25, 2016
As divisive as Congress is, Members miraculously seem to agree that our chemical management law, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), needs modernizing. On May 6, the key Members of the Senate announced that they had reached agreement on draft TSCA reform legislation; the House is expected also to act soon, perhaps before Memorial Day. This means that TSCA, our chemical control law enacted almost 40 years ago, could be significantly modernized this year -- a goal that has proven to be uniquely elusive. Many believe that TSCA’s greatest failing, and the deficit that most undermined the public’s confidence in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ability to assure chemical safety, is EPA’s limited authority under TSCA to regulate “existing” chemical substances believed to pose risks. Pending TSCA reform legislation that is supported by an unusually broad group of stakeholders would strengthen EPA’s authority and address this failing. Consensus on the contentious issue of preemption has proven especially challenging as many states are aggressively enacting chemical-specific measures, have been for years, and do not wish to cede authority to EPA. Now that the Senate has reached agreement, the hope is the House can also agree quickly as time is running out. TSCA reform is urgently needed. Congress has never been this close to making it happen, and while we are not there yet, Congress seems poised uncharacteristically to make the right choice. Tobacco products will still not be subject to TSCA jurisdiction, but celebrations will be in order if this elusive milestone is finally reached.
Posted on May 24, 2016
The American College of Environmental Lawyers is pleased to announce its first collaboration with the American Law Institute Continuing Legal Education Group (ALI CLE). On June 28, 2016, from 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm EDT, the College and ALI CLE will be presenting an MCLE-accredited telephone seminar: The Clean Power Plan: Issues and Challenges.
The seminar panel will feature ACOEL Fellows Mike Gerrard (Columbia Law School/Sabin Center for Climate Change Law), Pam Giblin (Baker Botts) and Bob Martineau (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation).
The College has provided the planning, faculty and content of the program; ALI CLE is providing the administrative end, including production and CLE accreditation for the 1.5 hour program. (CLE credits range from 1 to 2 depending on state; most are 1.5.) The planning chairs are ACOEL Fellows Ted Garrett (Covington & Burling LLP) and me (Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis LLP).
The ALI CLE web brochure, including details on registration, is posted at: www.ali-cle.org/tsxx04
The seminar topic is an outgrowth of the August 2015 announcement by President Obama and EPA of promulgation of the final Clean Power Plan regulations, the subsequent challenges to the Plan pending before the D.C Circuit Court of Appeals (scheduled for June but now pushed back to September before the full D.C. panel), and the U.S. Supreme Court’s stay of the regulations pending judicial review on whether EPA exceeded its authority under the Clean Air Act.
The ACOEL panelists will provide diverse and thoughtful perspectives on key issues concerning the CPP, including:
• Pending judicial challenges to the regulations
• Compliance issues
• State implementation issues
• Implications for the Paris Agreement
We hope that you will register for this timely and informative seminar.
Thanks much to Mike Gerrard, Pam Giblin and Bob Martineau for agreeing to participate, and to Ted Garrett for his involvement in planning the phone seminar.
Posted on May 23, 2016
On Tuesday, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) ruled that MassDEP had violated the Global Warming Solutions Act by failing
"To promulgate regulations that address multiple sources or categories of sources of greenhouse gas emissions, impose a limit on emissions that may be released, limit the aggregate emissions released from each group of regulated sources or categories of sources, set emissions limits for each year, and set limits that decline on an annual basis."
The SJC gets the final word, so I won’t spend much time explaining why the SJC got it wrong, though I will note that to suggest that the legislature’s use of the phrase “desired level” of GHG emissions unambiguously requires MassDEP to establish hard targets was at best overenthusiastic.
The bigger question at this point is what the decision means. First, it’s clear that MassDEP must establish hard declining emissions limits for more than one, but less than all, categories of GHG emitting sources.
Second, MassDEP must promulgate regulations that limit total emissions – not emission rates.
Third, the regulations must truly control Massachusetts sources. The SJC specifically found that RGGI doesn’t satisfy the GWSA requirement, in part because Massachusetts sources can purchase allowances from out of state facilities.
But where does this leave MassDEP? In a deep hole, for sure. Unless it wants to ditch RGGI, it can’t regulate power generation, because the type of program that the SJC said is required would simply be incompatible with RGGI.
How about mobile sources? They are the largest growing source of GHG emissions. Unfortunately, we come back to the SJC’s injunction that MassDEP must regulate total emissions, not emission rates. You tell me how MassDEP is going to issue regulations setting a cap on mobile source emissions.
The only obvious candidates I see are buildings and industrial sources other than power generation.
I don’t envy MassDEP – and the nature of the task only emphasizes the extent of the SJC’s overreach here – but I said I wouldn’t get into that.
Posted on May 20, 2016
August 25, 2016 is the 100th anniversary of the National Park Service. The many planned celebrations and observances provide an opportunity for everyone to become reacquainted with these great outdoor spaces and reflect on the world around us. As your summer plans take shape, be sure to visit FindYourPark.com and try to visit at least one national park. I invite you to share photos of your travels in the comments section of this post, and perhaps ACOEL can find a place for the collection of images of its members enjoying these national treasures.
As I reflect on the Park Service’s anniversary, I observe that it presents a chance for me – and for all environmental lawyers – to take stock of where we have been as a profession. Why – and how – we do what we do? What challenges will the next 100 years hold?
I issue this charge, in part, to carry on the conservation legacy of Henry L. Diamond. Henry was a founder of my firm, Beveridge & Diamond, and a great environmental lawyer and mentor to many (including myself). Sadly, we lost Henry earlier this year.
Henry and many others like him paved the way for our generation to be stewards of the planet and the environmental laws that govern our interactions with it. We have made progress, but new challenges have emerged. Easy answers, if they ever existed, are fewer and farther between. So what, then, does the future hold for the next generation of environmental lawyers?
Future generations of lawyers would do well to focus on the funding mechanisms that are critical but often overlooked components to achieving our most important environmental and sustainability goals. As an example, we can look to the past. Early in his career, Henry Diamond assisted the Chairman of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Laurance Rockefeller, in editing the Commission’s seminal report, Outdoor Recreation for America, that was delivered to President John F. Kennedy in 1962. Among the Commission’s more significant recommendations was the idea to use revenues from oil and gas leasing to pay for the acquisition and conservation of public lands. Congress took action on this recommendation, creating the Land & Water Conservation Fund in 1965 as the primary funding vehicle for acquiring land for parks and national wildlife refuges. While the fund has been by all accounts a success in achieving its goals, much work remains to be done and the fund is regularly the target of budgetary battles and attempts to reallocate its resources to other priorities. Today, the four federal land management agencies estimate the accumulated backlog of deferred federal acquisition needs is around $30 billion.
I expect climate change will dominate the agenda for the young lawyers of our current era. They will need to tackle challenges not only relating to controlling emissions of greenhouse gases, but also adaptation resulting from climate change. Sea level rise, altered agricultural growing seasons, drought and water management, and other issues will increase in prominence for this next generation.
We can expect our infrastructure needs to continue to evolve – not only replacing aging roads, bridges, tunnels, railroads, ports, and airports, but also the move to urban centers and the redevelopment of former industrial properties. Autonomous vehicles and drones also pose novel environmental and land use issues. These trends will require us to apply “old” environmental tools in new ways, and certainly to innovate. As my colleague Fred Wagner recently observed on his EnviroStructure blog, laws often lag developments, with benefits and detractions. Hopefully the environmental lawyers of the future will not see – or be seen – as a discrete area of practice so much as an integrated resource for planners and other professions. Only in this way can the environmental bar forge new solutions to emerging challenges.
The global production and movement of products creates issues throughout the supply chain, some of which are just coming to the fore. From raw material sourcing through product end-of-life considerations, environmental, natural resource, human rights, and cultural issues necessitate an environmental bar that can nimbly balance progress with protection. As sustainability continues its evolution from an abstract ideal to something that is ever more firmly imbedded in every aspect of business, products, services, construction, policymaking and more, environmental lawyers need to stay with their counterparts in other sectors that are setting new standards and definitions. This area in particular is one in which non-governmental organizations and industry leaders often “set the market,” with major consequences for individuals, businesses, and the planet.
Finally, as technology moves ever faster, so do the tools with which to observe our environment, to share information about potential environmental risks, and to mobilize in response. With limited resources, government enforcers are already taking a page from the playbooks of environmental activists, who themselves are bringing new pressures for disclosures and changes to companies worldwide. With every trend noted above, companies must not underestimate the power of individual consumers in the age of instantaneous global communication, when even one or two individuals can alter the plans and policies of government and industry.
Before Henry Diamond passed away, he penned an eloquent call to action that appeared in the March/April edition of the Environmental Law Institute’s Environmental Forum (“Lessons Learned for Today”). I commend that article to you. It shares the story of the 1965 White House Conference on Natural Beauty and how a diverse and committed group of businesspeople, policymakers, and conservationists (some of whom were all of those things) at that event influenced the evolution of environmental law and regulation for the decades to come. Laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and others have their roots in that Conference. In recognition of his lifetime of leadership, Henry received the ELI Environmental Achievement Award in October 2015. The tribute video shown during the award ceremony underscores Henry’s vision and commitment to advancing environmental law. I hope it may inspire ACOEL members and others to follow Henry’s lead.
These are just a few things I think the future holds for environmental lawyers. What trends do you predict? How should the environmental bar and ACOEL respond?
Posted on May 19, 2016
Three companion decisions in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S. et. al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00056, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, provide insight on the CERCLA statute of limitations, potential pitfalls in pleading CERCLA claims, and the defense of sovereign immunity by an Indian Pueblo in the context of CERCLA and contract claims. The case remains pending.
In the 1940s, when the war was over, the federal government was in the market for uranium concentrate for bombs, and it encouraged private entities to mine and mill uranium for sale to the government at prices set by the government. Much of the country’s uranium reserves were in the Grants Uranium Belt in western New Mexico, an area that includes the Laguna Pueblo.
Uranium was discovered on Laguna Pueblo lands in 1952, and Anaconda Copper Mining Company entered into mining leases with Laguna, which were approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, acting pursuant to its trust responsibility to the Pueblo. Much uranium was mined there from the Jackpile Paguate mine beginning in 1952, and operations continued until 1982. In 1986, the Pueblo and Anaconda’s successor, Atlantic Richfield Co. (“ARCO”), entered into an agreement to terminate the leases and perform remediation. ARCO agreed to pay the Pueblo to perform remediation, and the Pueblo agreed to assume all liability and release ARCO regarding it. The Department of the Interior approved the agreement and, following the preparation of an EIS, BLM and BIA issued a ROD that established requirements for the remediation. ARCO paid $43.6 million to the Pueblo to perform the remediation and release ARCO.
All defendants were involved in varying degrees with the remediation. BIA had responsibility to determine the extent of remediation required and approve key remediation decisions according to a cooperative agreement with the Pueblo. But BIA and the Pueblo saw in ARCO’s $43.6 million payment an economic development opportunity. The Pueblo formed Laguna Construction Company (“LCC”) to conduct the remediation, and BIA ceded certain oversight to the relatively inexperienced LCC as well. Work on the initial remediation ended in 1985. Beginning in 2007 the Pueblo, and then EPA, investigated the adequacy of mine reclamation at the mine site and found problems. In 2012 EPA proposed listing on the NPL, and in 2014 it asserted that ARCO should fund the RI/FS, but EPA has brought no litigation.
ARCO claims that the remediation was mishandled and brought CERCLA claims against the United States, the Pueblo and LCC, seeking cost recovery, contribution, and declaratory relief. The United States moved to dismiss. In detailed decision by Senior United States District Judge, James A. Parker, all of ARCO’s claims against the United States were dismissed. In companion decisions, some claims against the Pueblo and LCC were dismissed and some survived motions to dismiss. Dismissals were based in part on the CERCLA statute of limitations, the court’s determination that the ARCO pleadings were deficient and sovereign immunity.
ARCO sought to recover two categories of response costs: (1) the $43.6 million it paid to the Pueblo in 1986 in exchange for the Pueblo’s agreeing to be responsible for the remediation and to release ARCO from all responsibility for it; and (2) the significant costs ARCO incurred in responding to EPA’s more recent efforts to shift responsibility to ARCO. The Court dismissed ARCO’s claims for cost recovery and contribution for the 1986 settlement payment as time barred. The Court dismissed ARCO’s claim to recover the costs in responding to EPA and associated investigation as inadequately pled to establish that the expenditure constitutes “necessary costs of response.” Claims for contribution under 113(f)(1) (referenced by the court as “post judgment contribution claim”) were dismissed as premature because ARCO had not been sued. Finally, the claims against the United States for declaratory judgement were dismissed; the court ruled that ARCO cannot bring a claim for declaratory relief because it has failed to establish a valid underlying contribution or cost recovery claim.
Claims against the Pueblo and LCC are somewhat more complicated as a result of sovereign immunity defenses they raised. The court considered the sovereign immunity defense asserted by both Laguna Pueblo and LLC, its federally-chartered Tribal Corporation. The Court concluded that both the Pueblo and LCC are entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a bar to ARCO’s CERCLA claims because the language of existing waivers of sovereign immunity was not unequivocal enough to cover CERCLA claims. The Court therefore dismissed those CERCLA claims. However, the court found that the Pueblo and LCC waived sovereign immunity with regard to ARCO’s breach of contract claims. The source of this waiver for the Pueblo is in the 1986 Agreement to Terminate Leases. The court found that this agreement served to waive sovereign immunity from claims brought under that contract. Regarding LCC, the source of the waiver of sovereign immunity for breach of contract claims was in the Articles of Merger associated with the merger of LCC from a New Mexico corporation to a federal LCC formed under 25 USC §477, which may assert sovereign immunity. A motion for reconsideration by LCC is pending.
Although the facts of Atlantic Richfield are unique, its lessons are broader. First, in pleading a CERCLA claim for cost recovery, care should be taken to allege in some detail facts which support all elements of the claim, including facts showing that necessary response costs within CERCLA were incurred. Second, without adequate waiver of sovereign immunity, the settlement and payment in exchange for a release and commitment by a tribe or tribal corporation to assume full responsibility for clean-up may leave the door open for CERCLA liability in the future without recourse through CERCLA-based contribution and cost recovery claims. Finally, although the court’s decision confirmed that the defense of sovereign immunity applies to CERCLA contribution and cost recovery claims brought by private parties against sovereign Indian tribes and their federally chartered corporations, the court’s analysis confirms that under the right circumstances, a tribe may waive its sovereign immunity protections.
Posted on May 17, 2016
On April 20, 2016, the U.S. Senate passed S.2012, the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015, by a vote of 85-12. If enacted, S.2012 would be the first comprehensive energy legislation since the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. This bipartisan bill is intended to expand domestic energy systems, facilitate investment into critical infrastructure and improve the performance of federal agencies while protecting the environment.
S.2012 contains two notable provisions that would impact domestic oil and natural gas production and infrastructure development. First, the Act would designate the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) as the lead agency responsible for coordinating all applicable federal authorizations and National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) review for proposed natural gas projects and facilities. According to the Act, once FERC determines that an application for a project or facility is complete, all required federal authorizations must be issued within the timeframe specified by FERC, which “should” not exceed 90 days. The provision would likely speed the federal approval of interstate pipeline and liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) projects.
Second, the Act creates a Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) pilot program that would allow operators to lease and develop certain mineral interests owned by the federal government without a federal drilling permit. Specifically, the pilot program would include 2,000 spacing units in which the federal government owns 25% or less of the mineral interests and none of the surface estate. BLM would be authorized to waive the requirement that operators obtain a federal drilling permit for the spacing units if BLM determines that the mineral interests are adequately protected by the lease terms or other laws and regulations. The proposed pilot program may lead to permanent programs that ease the restrictions on exploration and production activities affecting mineral interests in which the federal government owns only a minority share.
The White House has previously threatened to veto legislation aimed at speeding the federal authorizations necessary to construct LNG facilities and pipelines. However, no such veto statement has been issued with respect to S.2012. This legislation may not face opposition from the White House because it was developed after numerous listening sessions were held with stakeholders across the country and after weeks of negotiations by many senators seeking common ground for modernizing energy policy. Senator Murkowski (R-Alaska), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, stated that she expects a formal conference with the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee to merge the Senate and House bills, but no timeline for a meeting has been established.
Posted on May 16, 2016
The Tata Mundra “Ultra-Mega” coal-fired power plant on the coast of India north of Mumbai is a behemoth by any measure. Capable of producing over 4,000 megawatts of electricity from five huge boilers, it can consume over 12 million tons of coal per year and requires millions of gallons of seawater a day for its once-through cooling system. Indeed, the plant is so large it requires its own coal port, its own water intake channel (nearly 150 meters wide) and its own outfall that discharges warm water equal to almost half the mean flow of the Potomac River.
For generations, the area where the plant is now located supported a system of small fishing villages where fishing families move from inland locations to the coast for several months each year following the monsoon to catch and dry fish which they sell to traders. This income has supplemented income from agriculture and provided the villages and families with a subsistence living.
The arrival of the Tata Mundra Plant changed all that: construction disrupted access to fishing locations; dredging altered the natural systems and the fish disappeared as water salinity and temperature changed; fresh water supplies dwindled as the plant’s water use led to increased saltwater intrusions into groundwater; and a way of life that had sustained families and villages disappeared.
So what does this story of displacement and disruption half way around the world have to do with environmental law in the U.S.? In today’s world, where it’s clearer day-by-day that everything is connected to everything else, the answer is “more than you might think.”
The Tata Mundra Plant would not have been built without financing from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) based in Washington. The IFC is an organization of member states and part of the World Bank Group. To its credit, the IFC recognized the environmental risks of the project from the outset noting that it had the potential to have “significant adverse social and/or environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or unprecedented.” And, consistent with its lending policies, it put in place as part of its loan agreement social and environmental performance standards and requirements to mitigate these impacts.
It all looked good on paper. But then the plant was built and the IFC looked the other way. We know this because individual villagers who depended on the resources the Tata Mundra Plant destroyed complained through a local fishing union and village government to the IFC’s ombudsman office. That office issued a scathing report criticizing the IFC for its multiple failures to ensure implementation of the protective measures in its loan agreement. The IFC shrugged; the ombudsman’s office has no enforcement powers.
Frustrated with their inability to achieve any meaningful accountability through the IFC, a handful of individual fishers and villagers, a local fishing union, and a village governmental entity filed a complaint against the IFC in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Budha Ismail Jam et al v. IFC, No 15-cv-00612 (JDB), in April of 2015. The IFC moved to dismiss the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds. The IFC is covered by the International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”), which Congress passed in 1945, and is entitled to the “same immunity” in U.S. courts as foreign nations. While the immunity enjoyed by foreign nations has changed significantly since 1945, the IFC asserted that its had not -- and remained near-absolute.
The District Court concluded, in light of longstanding D.C. Circuit precedent dealing with immunity from wage garnishment proceedings for an employee of one of the IFC’s sister international organizations, the Inter-American Development Bank, that it was bound to dismiss the complaint against the IFC on sovereign immunity grounds. Budha Ismail Jam et al v. IFC, No 15-cv-00612 (JDB), Memorandum Opinion (Mar. 24, 2016 D.D.C.).
This outcome raises serious questions about the accountability of international lending organizations like the IFC that finance potentially environmentally destructive project around the world while professing to follow the most stringent lending practices for protecting people and the environment. If we are “all in this together,” a serious failure of accountability on the other side of the world is not something we can just shrug off as someone else’s problem. We live in a global commons – industrial projects built anywhere can affect us all. The most obvious example is the effects on the climate from the dramatic expansion of fossil fuel-based power generation around the world, much of it built with international financial support, often originating in the U.S.
Nor is the law of sovereign immunity as clear or unfavorable to the plaintiffs as the District Court’s decision suggests. First, since 1945, sovereign immunity for foreign states has developed a well-recognized exception for commercial activities, activities that do not enjoy immunity. IFC lending decisions – on which the IFC makes a profit – are nothing if not commercial activity. Second, and maybe more significantly, sticking with an out-dated, circa-1945 version of sovereign immunity actually undermines the credibility of the IFC itself. For the IFC to continue enjoying the financial support of its member states, its commitment to responsible lending must be real and reliable, not illusory. If it continues to finance projects without real environmental accountability, its members may become inclined to withdraw their support because they will not want it lending to their neighbors: environmental harms don’t recognize geo-political boundaries and irresponsible financing for a polluting facility in one country may well harm another.
Because the facts of Budha Ismail Jam et al v. IFC are so stark, because accountability in international finance for major industrial projects is increasingly important both here and abroad in a world facing rapid climate change and its effects, and because the plaintiffs are appealing the District Court’s order of dismissal, this is a case worth watching. It could be the first whisper of a new breeze in accountability for the environmental effects of international lending decisions -- or the last sigh from beneath a suffocating blanket of sovereign immunity.
Posted on May 4, 2016
You do not have to be a football fan to be aware of the legal battles between NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell and the star quarterback, and perpetual winner, Tom Brady arising out of Brady’s use of deflated footballs at a playoff game. Brady won the round in district court where the judge focused on the merits of the factual case. Goodell recently won on appeal where the court of appeals focused on the fact that the NFL Players Association bargained away the right to challenge Goodell’s decisions on the merits. On appeal, it did not matter whether Brady did anything wrong. All that mattered was that Goodell thought Brady did something wrong.
In recent dealings with EPA on its model Administrative Order on Consent (“AOC”) for Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies (“RI/FS”), it seems EPA wants PRPs to make the same mistake the Players Association made: let EPA be judge and jury over any dispute that arises under the AOC. The most troubling language in the model is that EPA’s final decision on the dispute “becomes part of the Order.” While the vast majority of EPA folk I have met are more reasonable than Roger Goodell, RI/FS projects can involve millions of dollars, which sets the table for expensive disputes.
What is a Brady fan to do? First, the model should be changed to allow pre-enforcement review, as pointed out in a recent ACOEL post by Mark Schneider. Second, if the AOC process is otherwise desirable, there are ways to minimize the effect of the model language on at least one category of dispute: work expansion disputes, often the most serious and expensive variety of disputes. A very specific Scope of Work attached to the AOC would minimize the risk of work expansion by EPA through dispute resolution. If a dispute arises that could expand the work, do not invoke dispute resolution. Take the position that the AOC does not apply to EPA’s demand because the demand is beyond the scope of the AOC. If EPA enforces the AOC on this point you can defend without EPA’s position becoming part of the AOC beforehand. Thus, you avoid Brady’s fate—having a good argument and nowhere to go.