The New Mexico Supreme Court Holds that the Copper Mine Remediation Rule is Consistent with the Water Quality Act

Posted on September 24, 2018 by Thomas Hnasko

Since 2013, when the New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission (“WQCC”) enacted the most comprehensive Copper Mine remediation rule in the country, the Attorney General and various NGOs have continued to challenge the rule because it established, on an industry-wide basis instead of through a case-by-case determination, “foreseeable places of [groundwater] withdrawal” at mine sites that are protected from contamination under the New Mexico Water Quality Act.  Initially, the Court of Appeals rejected the Attorney General’s challenges in Gila Resource Information Project v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm’n, 2015-NMCA-076, 355 P.3d 36, holding that the determination of a protectable “place of withdrawal” has always been and remains a matter committed to the Commission’s discretion.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question, and has now reaffirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, but did so focusing on language directly from the Water Quality Act itself, rather than relying on the Commission’s discretion.

In Gila Resources Information Project v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm’n, 2018-NMSC-025, 417 P.3d 369, the Attorney General repeated the argument that the Copper Rule allegedly failed to protect foreseeable places of withdrawal at mine sites because it allowed the placement of monitoring wells – at which water quality standards would be measured – to be located outside of open pits, waste stockpiles, or other active mining units.  According to the Attorney General, this placement of monitoring wells necessarily ignored the existence of protectable groundwater within the confines of those wells.  As such, the Copper Rule violated the Water Quality Act’s proscription against issuing permits for any mining facility that contaminated groundwater at “foreseeable places of withdrawal.”

Not so, said the New Mexico Supreme Court.  If the Water Quality Act prohibited water contaminants in excess of applicable standards at the location of any “discharge,” the Court reasoned that petitioners may be correct.  However, the statute itself provides that groundwater quality “shall be measured” at “foreseeable places of withdrawal.”  The Court accepted respondent’s interpretation as the “most sensible reading” of this requirement, concluding that the “shall be measured” language implies that groundwater must actually be brought to the surface for analysis and measurement.  Of course, the normal method for bringing water to the surface is through samples collected from a monitoring well.  The Court found that the measurement of groundwater quality “at any place of withdrawal” means that the New Mexico Environment Department, when acting on a permit, must select specific locations for the placement of those monitoring wells.  According to the rule, those locations must be as close “as practicable” to the open pits, waste piles and active mine units.

Thus, based on the practical consideration that groundwater quality must be measured for compliance with standards at a monitoring well, the Court relied on statutory construction, rather than on the discretion afforded to the WQCC, to hold that the Copper Rule develops a sensible procedure to protect groundwater at foreseeable places of withdrawal.  In this regard, the Supreme Court’s decision departed from the Court of Appeals’ analysis and upheld a comprehensive copper mine remediation rule that will likely be followed by other copper-producing jurisdictions.

CALIFORNIA, THE JUNGLE, AND CAP-AND-TRADE

Posted on September 21, 2018 by James Holtkamp

On September 14, 2018, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) issued for public comment the proposed California Tropical Forest Standard.  The proposed standard is not an attempt to address a future in which global warming has changed California’s redwood forests into tropical jungles; rather it is intended to allow reductions in carbon emissions from mitigation of rain forest deforestation in tropical countries to be linked with California’s cap-and-trade program. 

California is already well-known for its influence on culture, economics and politics outside its borders. Here in Utah we sometimes feel like we are really just a big county in eastern California.  Even outer space is not insulated from California.  As the Global Climate Action Summit wound down in San Francisco last week, Governor Brown announced that California would send its own satellite into orbit to track and monitor pollutants.  You can’t get more outside of California than that.

The proposed standard consists of detailed criteria for tropical forest credits and is accompanied by a 185-page draft environmental analysis prepared by CARB under the California Environmental Quality Act.  The proposal is issued under CARB’s cap-and-trade program rules, which authorize CARB to consider reductions originating in developing countries or “subnational jurisdictions” (e.g., provinces or states) within those countries.          

The proposed standard would require the jurisdiction seeking to link its emission reduction program with the California program to develop a “sector plan” demonstrating that the program was developed through a robust, transparent, and participatory process.  The sector plan would detail the legal, policy and program tools used to reduce emissions; procedures for monitoring, reporting and verification of reductions; and provisions to avoid double-counting of reductions with any other program.  The proposal also provides for establishing baseline emission levels, avoiding leakage, securing third-party verification, involving and protecting indigenous communities, and other elements designed to ensure that the reductions are robust and permanent.

The proposal does not include a mechanism for linking tropical forest credits to the California system; rather it is simply a proposal for standards for the credits which, after additional rulemaking by CARB, would be eligible for inclusion in the cap-and-trade program.  

Carbon emissions released from tropical forest deforestation and degradation account for about one-fifth of carbon emissions across the globe. The president and Congress have been unwilling to address the issue.  California has stepped into the breach.

Perhaps living in eastern California is not such a bad thing, after all.

We May Not Always Have Paris, But Perhaps We Can Do Better Than Paris

Posted on September 20, 2018 by Seth Jaffe

Last week, the Climate Leadership Council released an analysis demonstrating that the “Baker Shultz Carbon Dividends Plan” would result in greater reductions in greenhouse gas emissions than the US committed to attaining under the 2015 Paris agreement.  (And a shout out to ACOEL fellow Pam Giblin, who is a Senior Policy Advisor at the CLC.) 

I don’t doubt that the CLC analysis is right.  If I had to guess, I’d predict that they probably underestimate the reductions that would be reached with a robust carbon tax.

I understand the difficulty in convincing what passes for the GOP base at this point – and the GOP members of Congress – to endorse the carbon tax.  Oops, I meant dividend.  I’m hopeful that enough members will come around at some point.  My real worry is that the environmental movement will reject the plan because it calls for elimination of current regulations concerning carbon.

Years ago, Gina McCarthy used to say quite freely that the Obama administration would get most of its carbon reductions, not from direct regulation of GHG emissions, but instead from all of the other air regulations it was promulgating, such as the power plant MACT standards.

What environmentalists have to remember is that the reverse is also true – any robust program to reduce carbon emissions will also lower emissions of conventional pollutants.  Indeed, in defending the Clean Power Plan, environmentalists have made that very argument.  Why not acknowledge the same point in connection with a carbon tax and give up on a set of regulations that have always been clunky at best, are nowhere near as efficient a regulatory tool as a carbon tax, and which, as compared to a carbon tax, really benefit no one other than environmental lawyers and consultants?

God, wouldn’t it be a breath of fresh air to see Congress actually get something big done for the American people?  Let’s not screw this one up.

The D.C. Circuit Court Coal Combustion Conclusion: “C” is for Cookie, that’s good enough for me!”

Posted on September 19, 2018 by Kathy Beckett

As our blue friend, The Cookie Monster, looks for words that begin with “c” he immediately settles upon a single favorite, the cookie. There is a bias in the selection by The Cookie Monster, as he prefers only one thing, cookies.  By using one noun and offering no other, we can conclude The Cookie Monster has a bias against other “c” nouns like carrots, cabbage and  cauliflower.  Using The Cookie Monster preferred word “c” methodology as applied to the recent D.C. Circuit decision in Utility Solid Waste Activities Group, et al. v. EPA et al., No. 15-1219 (August 21, 2018), one can find several “c” words selected by the panel of judges, Henderson, Millett, and Pillard that predict the conclusion.  As with The Cookie Monster, early choice of words sends a message.

Beginning with the obvious, the petitions filed by industry and environmental advocates concerned “coal”, “coal residuals” to be precise.  The petitioners challenge the EPA 2015 Final Rule governing the disposal of coal combustion residuals produced by electric utilities and independent power plants.    The Court offers in their Background discussion an opening observation that contaminants that are cancerous are found in coal residuals that are disposed of in concentrated locations that are massive.  These disposal areas are constructed without composite liners sometimes using inadequate clay liners allowing the commingling of water and contaminants.  Background conditions may not be able to be restored.  Catastrophic risks are posed and consequences may be amplified.  A compendium of damage cases has been compiled.  Complete destruction of aquatic ecosystems are identified. 

With the initial “c” analysis as noted above, the casual reader can predict the EPA Coal Residual rule does not fare well with this panel.  A few opinion highlights are offered:

  • Congress’ passage of the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (“WINN Act”) will have to be managed by EPA later.
  • Continued operation of unlined impoundments pursuant to 40 CFR 257.101 is vacated and remanded for consideration.
  • Clay-lined impoundments are not actually lined, so the court vacates 40 CFR 257.71(a)(1)(i).
  • Capricious describes the legacy ponds regulation.
  • Cure for select portions of EPA’s coal residual rule is a remand of (i) the regulation of coal piles; (ii) the Proposed Rule’s notice of Coal Residuals pile regulation; and (iii) the 12,400-ton threshold for beneficial use (and notice thereof).

Concurring, Henderson construes disposal to mean CCR is not curb trash. 

How Much Does Trump Even Care About Deregulation?

Posted on September 13, 2018 by Seth Jaffe

Rick Glick’s September 11 post discusses Judge David Norton’s August 2018 decision to issue a nationwide injunction against the Trump Administration’s “Suspension Rule,” which delayed implementation of the Obama Waters of the United States RuleAs noted in Rick's post, that case was not about the merits of the WOTUS rule.  It was simply about the Trump administration’s failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act in promulgating the Suspension Rule.

Which brings me to the point of this post.

The Administration’s failure to comply seems so obvious that one has to wonder whether the Administration even cared whether the Suspension Rule could survive judicial review.  Indeed, this case seems part of a clear pattern.  The Court noted as much in quoting a summary of such cases from the plaintiffs’ brief:

Clean Air Council v. Pruitt (vacating the EPA’s attempt to temporarily stay a Clean Air Act regulation without “comply[ing] with the … APA”); Open Communities All. v. Carson, (enjoining the defendant agency’s attempt, “without notice and comment or particularized evidentiary findings, … [to] delay[] almost entirely by two years implementation of a rule” adopted by the previous administration); Pennsylvania v. Trump (enjoining two new “Interim Final Rules” based on the defendant agencies’ attempt to “bypass notice and comment rule making”); Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n v. Duke (vacating the defendant agency’s “decision to delay the implementation of an Obama-era immigration rule … without providing notice or soliciting comment from the public”); California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (holding that the defendant agency’s attempt to postpone a regulation’s compliance dates “after the rule’s effective date had already passed … violated the APA’s notice and comment requirements by effectively repealing the [r]ule without engaging in the process for obtaining comment from the public”); Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, (holding that the defendant agency violated the APA in “fail[ing] to give the public an opportunity to weigh in with comments” before attempting to postpone a rule that had already taken effect).

To which the Court added its own footnote:

To this litany of cases, the court adds two more from the last several months— Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. and Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. AzarAs these cases make clear, this court is but the latest in a series to recently find that an agency’s delay of a properly promulgated final rule circumvented the APA.  (My emphasis.)

I find it hard to believe that numerous smart lawyers, across a range of agencies, all suddenly forgot what the APA requires.  Isn’t it more likely that the Administration simply doesn’t care about the outcome?  The government of the most powerful nation on earth, that likes to think that it taught the world about democracy, doesn’t care about governing.  All it cares about is having Twitter material, to feed to its adoring fans and, equally importantly, to bait its many critics.

WOTUS Lives! . . . at Least in Half the States (for Now)

Posted on September 11, 2018 by Rick Glick

On August 16, a federal judge in South Carolina invalidated the Trump Administration’s suspension of the rule defining “waters of the United States” (WOTUS), under the Clean Water Act.  In South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, the court found that the notice-and-comment opportunity supporting the Suspension Rule was too narrow and thus violated the Administrative Procedure Act.  The WOTUS suspension is the latest in a series of attempts by the Administration to stall implementation of Obama era regulations, none of which have met favor with the courts. 

As reported here about one year ago, the Trump Administration announced a two-step process to undo WOTUS.  The first step was to suspend WOTUS for two years, during which a revised WOTUS rule would be developed.  In the meantime, guidance on jurisdictional waters that had been issued in the 1980s by the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers would be reinstated.  The public notice of the Suspension Rule requested comments only on the suspension, but not the substance of either the Obama WOTUS rule or the 1980s guidance.

U. S. District Court Judge David C. Norton, a George H. W. Bush appointee, reasoned that the practical effect of the Suspension Rule is that the WOTUS rule would not apply and instead the 1980s guidance would control.  The court then noted that the definitions in the WOTUS rule and the 1987 guidance are “drastically different” and it is hard to comment on the Suspension Rule without talking about that difference.  That refusal to allow comment on the substantive differences violates the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA:  “An illusory opportunity to comment is no opportunity at all.”  The judge therefore rejected the Trump Suspension Rule, and imposed a nationwide injunction. 

Explaining the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act has flummoxed the federal agencies and courts for decades.  Far from bringing clarity, the Obama WOTUS Rule drew over one million comments and multiple judicial challenges on the merits of the rule.  Initially the question was whether such challenges should be made in the U. S. district courts or the Circuit Courts of Appeal.  The Sixth Circuit held that the appellate courts had original jurisdiction and stayed all of the pending district court actions, but that decision was reversed earlier this year in a unanimous decision of the U. S. Supreme Court.  Thus, those lower court cases can continue.

Judge Norton, in South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, was clear that he was not ruling on the merits of the WOTUS Rule, but just the procedural correctness of the Suspension Rule.  In challenges on the merits, other federal courts have stayed the WOTUS Rule in 24 states.  Striking down the Suspension Rule means that WOTUS remains in effect in the other 26 states. 

At the moment, then, about half the country is subject to the WOTUS Rule, while the other half is not.  What could go wrong?

Brett Kavanaugh: Enemy of Innovation

Posted on September 5, 2018 by Kenneth Kimmell

The confirmation fight over Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh is underway.  Supporters and opponents are drawing battle lines over crucial issues such as abortion, health care, immigration, and whether the President is subject to criminal processes.  But the nominee’s views on the role of federal agencies in protecting public health, safety and the environment deserve our attention as well.

Unlike others before him, Brett Kavanaugh is no “stealth nominee.” As a judge on the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Kavanaugh authored many opinions on the role of federal agencies, and these opinions provide an unusually expansive window into his thinking.

Unfortunately, a careful review of his opinions reveals a disturbing pattern:

Judge Kavanaugh is hostile to innovation by executive branch agencies. He has such rigid and antiquated views of the respective roles of congress and executive agencies that he leaves little room for federal agencies to try new approaches to existing problems or to take on new challenges. This should alarm not just those on the left who would like to see more robust federal response to threats to public health, the environment, worker safety and the like, but conservatives as well, who should also want government to be nimble and able to adjust to new circumstances.

To see this pattern, follow me on a guided tour of his thinking in three key cases.

Interstate air pollution and the “Good Neighbor Rule.”

Air pollution crosses state boundaries, and many states are in the unenviable position of having dirty air even though they are effectively controlling pollution sources within their state. For example, even if Maryland were to shut down every business in its state that emits ozone-causing pollutants, portions of the state would still be in violation of federal ozone standards due to pollution from neighboring upwind states. There is a provision in the federal Clean Air Act, colloquially called “the Good Neighbor” rule, that prevents one state from causing or significantly contributing to another state’s violation of federal air quality standards.

The problem is that it is fiendishly complex to implement the good neighbor rule. Many “upwind” states emit multiple pollutants to many downwind states, many downwind states receive multiple pollutants from multiple upwind states, and some states are both upwind and downwind states. Thus, it is exceedingly difficult to point a finger at any one particular upwind state and say that it is “responsible” for any downwind’s state air quality, and even more difficult to devise a formula to fairly and effectively apportion responsibility.

In 2011, after many false starts, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) crafted an ingenious “Transport Rule” to address the problem. The EPA conducted extensive analysis of the costs of pollution control to determine how expensive it would be, per ton of pollutant reduction, to ensure that upwind states in the aggregate do not cause downwind states’ air quality in the aggregate to exceed federal standards. The EPA then gave each upwind state a pollution “budget” for the state to use to reduce the pollutants that were wafting beyond their borders, based on this “cost per ton” reduction benchmark. In this way, just enough pollution would be reduced so that upwind states would not tip a downwind state into non-compliance, and the amount of each state’s pollution reduction would be based on a common yardstick of cost-effectiveness.

But Judge Kavanaugh struck this plan down. In his view, Congress had not expressly embraced this particular approach, and therefore the EPA was not allowed to implement it. His decision instead required EPA to determine each upwind state’s “proportionate responsibility” for pollution in downwind states and base the required reductions on that (even though the statute does not explicitly require that approach). Judge Kavanaugh’s decision largely ignored the compelling practical difficulty of assigning proportionate responsibility, or the many economic benefits of the EPA’s proposed approach.

As a result, his ruling would have consigned downwind states to many more years of air pollution while the EPA grappled with how to implement it.

Had Judge Kavanaugh’s “proportionate” responsibility approach been required by the law, that would be one thing. But it wasn’t. The Supreme Court, on a 6-2 vote that included Justices Kennedy and Roberts, found that that the statute did not require a proportionate responsibility approach (even assuming one could be fashioned). Instead, they ruled that Congress had vested the EPA with broad discretion to devise an appropriate remedy, and the Transport Rule was both fair and cost effective.

The Clean Power Plan oral argument

This same apparent hostility to agency innovation was on display in Judge Kavanaugh’s comments on the Clean Power Plan during a court hearing. That case involved a challenge to the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, the nation’s first-ever rules to limit carbon pollution from coal and gas fired power plants, one of the largest sources of greenhouse gases in the United States. The Clean Power plan, a measure that received extensive input from Union of Concerned Scientists and many others, relied on an infrequently used provision of the Clean Air Act that allows the EPA to require polluters to use the “best system of emissions reduction” to address pollutants such as greenhouse gases.

After years of review and receipt of over 4 million comments, the EPA issued a final rule in October 2015. The EPA determined that the “best system of emissions reduction” for carbon pollution from power plants included three strategies that are in widespread use today—improving the efficiency of coal plants, switching from coal to gas, and substituting low or no carbon generation, such as wind, solar and nuclear. The EPA quantified the emissions reduction that would be possible using these strategies, and devised a national standard based on this quantification. The rule was intended to cut carbon emissions from power plants by approximately 30 percent by 2030, and formed a key component of the United States’ pledge to reduce its overall emissions as part of the Paris Climate agreement.

Industry and states filed suit to challenge the Clean Power Plan, and the case was heard by the DC Circuit court of appeals. No decision was ever issued on the case, but the court held an all-day oral argument in which Judge Kavanaugh participated. His questions and comments were revealing.

A major point of debate focused on the unusual nature of the regulation. When regulating conventional air pollutants, EPA often sets pollution control standards by focusing on what each plant can do with pollution controls at the source to cut pollution, e.g. a scrubber to lower sulfur dioxide emissions, or a baghouse to collect soot. In the Clean Power Plan, in contrast, EPA established CO2 limits by focusing not on what each individual plant could do to cut CO2, but rather what the system as a whole could do by shifting away from coal-based generation towards gas and renewables.

The opponents contended that this “beyond the fenceline” approach rendered it illegal, because Congress had not specifically authorized it.

Judge Kavanaugh’s questioning at the hearing demonstrated that he bought into this line of thinking. Judge Kavanaugh stressed repeatedly that the rule would have significant economic consequences, that the EPA was using a previously unused provision of the Clean Air Act to implement this approach, and that Congress had not specifically embraced the policy of shifting to low or no carbon generation. Judge Kavanaugh seemed unmoved by the strong counterarguments that: 1) EPA had a mandatory duty under the act to lower carbon pollution from power plants; 2) this was the most cost-effective and tested method of doing so; and 3) it fit the statutory command to deploy “the best system of emissions reduction.”

While the court never issued a ruling, it seemed clear that Judge Kavanaugh was prepared to strike down the rule on this basis, leaving behind no remedy for carbon pollution from power plants.

The Case of the Killer Whale

In 2010, an employee of Sea World was lying on a platform above a pool during a whale training show when a killer whale dragged her into the water, maiming and drowning her. This marked the third death by killer whales in a roughly 30-year period.

The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) responded by requiring the company to ensure minimum distances and physical barriers between a trainer and a whale.

Sea World challenged this order, claiming that OSHA impermissibly extended its authority to regulate the risks of sporting events. Two of the three judges, including Merrick Garland, President Obama’s ill-fated Supreme Court nominee, dispensed with the challenge, ruling that OSHA had the authority to require these commonsense safeguards for workers.

Not so Judge Kavanaugh. His dissenting opinion begins as an elaborate paean to the thrill of sporting events in which physical risks are present. He never actually critiques the solution that OSHA devised on the merits, but rather deploys the familiar lawyer’s trick of a “parade of horribles,” claiming, e.g. that if OSHA can regulate killer whale shows, it can prohibit tackling in football or set speed limits on NASCAR racing (things that OSHA has never done). All of this, according to Kavanaugh, would go well beyond the authority that Congress intended OSHA to have.

As for the physical safety of employees who work with whales—according to Kavanaugh’s logic, that would be up to Congress to legislate.

Common threads

What unites these opinions—and others like them—is that, in each of these cases, Judge Kavanaugh struck down solutions (or appeared poised to do so), when a federal agency responded to an existing problem with a novel approach or sought to address a new problem in a manner we should all value—with creativity, scientific evidence, consideration of costs and benefits, and an eye towards feasibility and practicality. In none of these cases did the agency violate any specific provision of its authorizing statute. But, in all of these cases, Judge Kavanaugh opposed these solutions under the theory that Congress had not specifically blessed the choice the agency had made.

Judge Kavanaugh and his defenders claim that curbing the power of agencies is essential to ensuring that elected leaders in Congress, rather than unelected bureaucrats, make the fundamental policy choices. This seemingly benign principle is either naïve, malevolent, or both.

The fact of the matter is that Congress is largely paralyzed and incapable of passing legislation on virtually any important issue—witness the stalemates on immigration, gun control, climate, health care, and many others. And even when Congress manages to overcome gridlock, as a necessity it legislates in broad generalities, not specifics. This is because Congress does not have a crystal ball to foresee all the possible variations of a problem or all the best solutions to it. That is why Congress wisely delegates implementation to agencies staffed with experts, and why we use a process of notice and comment to ensure that all views are heard before a regulation becomes final.

There is an important role for the courts in this rulemaking process judges must make sure that agencies do not violate the law or disregard sound reasoning and evidence. But Judge Kavanaugh takes the judicial role too far. His insistence that Congress specifically endorse an agency plan that is otherwise scientifically sound and legally within its discretion is a formula for paralysis, and the maintenance of the status quo (which helps explain his appeal to groups such as the Koch Brothersand the US Chamber of Commerce).

All of us will regret it if Judge Kavanagh’s reactionary view becomes the guiding principle of a new Supreme Court majority. With Congress already deadlocked and demonstrating almost daily basis its inability to respond to pressing challenges, we cannot thrive if executive branch agencies are paralyzed as well.

Glider Kits and The Thrill of Defeat

Posted on September 4, 2018 by Samuel I. Gutter

Twice in my career, I’ve had a case cut out from under me, the result of withdrawal of final EPA action that I was prepared to defend.  In the first case, I was in the Office of General Counsel at EPA, working with a DOJ lawyer who was to become my career-long friend and colleague, ACOEL fellow Dave Buente.  We were nearing oral argument to defend EPA’s noise regulation for garbage trucks (a case we would have won!) when EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch revoked the regulation as part of EPA’s dismantling of the noise program. 

The second instance occurred a short time later.  EPA had granted a waiver that would have allowed high levels of methanol to be blended with gasoline.  The waiver was by all indications a political favor for a Utah company that was close to the administration, and was challenged by the major auto companies who feared damage to the rubber gaskets and hoses in car engines.  When Administrator Gorsuch departed EPA, it wasn’t long before the new leadership reversed the waiver decision, summarily ending the litigation.

Having your client reverse course is a jarring experience, but I must admit that there’s something liberating about shutting down your own case.  So I know firsthand how lawyers in OGC and DOJ likely felt last month when EPA reversed Administrator Scott Pruitt’s final action – lifting limits on glider kits – and reinstated the restrictions imposed by the Obama Administration.

For those who haven’t followed this mini-series, here are the basic facts.  A glider kit is a heavy-duty highway truck without an engine.  A company then takes an engine pulled from a wreck or junk yard, rebuilds it, and installs it in the truck.  In general, a rebuilt engine installed in a vehicle only has to meet the emission standards to which it was originally certified.  So, the result is a “new” truck that is less expensive than a current-technology vehicle (including avoidance of costly federal excise taxes), but that pumps out a lot more emissions – 44 to 55 times more, according to a New York Times article published last February.

The Times article included another claim:  that that dominant manufacturer of glider kits, Fitzgerald Glider Kits of Crossville, Tennessee, was run by a family that had powerful connections in Tennessee Republican circles and that had curried favor with Mr. Pruitt and President Trump (displaying, on a Trump campaign visit, baseball caps with the slogan, “Make Trucks Great Again”).

Seeking to limit the number of such rebuilds – estimated to comprise up to 4% of new truck sales – the Obama EPA had imposed a cap of 300 glider kits per year on any one manufacturer, a move that would have effectively shut down Fitzgerald, with annual sales in the thousands.  But on his last day in office, July 6, 2018, Administrator Pruitt issued a “no action assurance,” stating that EPA, in its enforcement discretion, would no longer enforce the cap.

Environmental NGOs and the states pounced, and in a rare and stunning move, the DC Circuit granted an administrative stay of Pruitt’s action on July 18, only one day after petitioners moved for that relief.  Equally remarkable, on July 26 new EPA Administrator Wheeler announced that EPA was reversing Pruitt’s action, reinstating the cap on glider kits.  Finally, on August 22, the DC Circuit dissolved the stay and dismissed the case as moot.

And with that conclusion, a small group of government lawyers got to experience for themselves not “the thrill of victory” or “the agony of defeat,” but rather “the thrill of defeat.”