Posted on April 29, 2016
In January TransCanada sued the Obama Administration over its denial of a permit for the Keystone XL pipeline to cross the US-Canada border. In its lawsuit TransCanada asserts that the President exceeded his executive authority and usurped Congress’ constitutional power to regulate commerce.
The lawsuit, filed in federal court in Houston, Texas, comes after TransCanada spent seven years mired in the administrative process. TransCanada’s complaint recounts the key events of those seven years as follows.
In 2008 TransCanada was granted a border crossing permit for Keystone I, so there is already a Keystone pipeline that crosses the US-Canada border in North Dakota. The State Department raised no objections regarding GHG emissions in connection with that permit. In 2009, then Secretary of State Clinton granted a cross-border permit to Enbridge for its Alberta Clipper pipeline, concluding that GHG emissions were not a basis for denying a border crossing permit.
In 2008, seeking to expand capacity, TransCanada applied for a second US-Canada border crossing permit for the Keystone XL project. The permit application covered a 1.2 mile section of pipe that was part of a broader 1,700-mile pipeline project, most of which was to be located in the United States.
Following this application, the State Department issued a series of draft and final environmental impact statements that found minimal GHG impacts. Nevertheless, in November 2011 the State Department announced it could not make a final determination until an alternative route through Nebraska was selected.
In December 2011 Congress passed an act that required the President to grant the permit to TransCanada within 60 days or report to Congress why the President did not believe the pipeline crossing served the national interest. In January 2012 President Obama directed the Secretary of State to deny the permit on the ground that 60 days was insufficient time. Secretary Clinton denied the permit but indicated that a renewed application would be considered. In May 2012 TransCanada submitted a renewed application.
Following this second application the State Department issued another series of EISs which found that the project would not substantially increase GHG emissions. In early 2015, Congress passed the Keystone Pipeline Approval Act, which authorized the Keystone XL project without any further action or approval by the President. President Obama vetoed the Act and Congress was unable to override the veto.
In November 2015, Secretary Kerry denied the renewed application. The Record of Decision found that the pipeline would advance the national interest by providing added energy security and economic benefits, and furthering the United States’ relationship with Canada. The ROD also found that GHG emissions might actually increase without the pipeline because the crude oil would otherwise be transported by rail and tankers. Nevertheless, the Secretary concluded that the pipeline did not serve the national interest because it “would undermine U.S. climate leadership and thereby have an adverse impact on encouraging other States to combat climate change” in advance of the December 2015 Paris climate negotiations.
It is with the backdrop of these events that TransCanada challenged the President’s authority to regulate international pipeline border crossings.
Where does the President derive the authority to regulate international pipeline crossings, and particularly on the basis of the United States’ symbolic leadership role on climate change? The President relies upon Executive Order 13337, under which the President delegated authority to the Secretary of State to deny border crossings that do not “serve the national interest”. But because the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce, where does the President derive the power to delegate to the Secretary of State in the first place, particularly since Congress has never delegated the authority to regulate such border crossings to the President?
TransCanada’s complaint discusses the various U.S. Supreme Court decisions which address the President’s power to act in areas otherwise reserved to Congress but where Congress has not yet acted. These cases hold that the President does have power to act in such circumstances, but also hold that the President’s authority can be revoked at any time by Congress by simply expressing its contrary will. TransCanada argues that Congress expressed such contrary will when it passed the Keystone Pipeline Approval Act, thereby depriving the President of authority to take further action.
On April 1 the Obama Administration filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the President’s powers over foreign affairs and as Commander-in-Chief provide sufficient independent constitutional authority to regulate pipeline border crossings. In addition, the Administration argues that, because the Keystone Pipeline Approval Act never became law, it provides no basis to challenge the President’s decision. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Friends of the Earth, Texas Environmental Advocacy Services, Community In-Power and Development Association and Center for Biological Diversity recently filed an Amicus Brief.
The outcome of this environmental controversy will depend not on statutory interpretation or common law but on fundamental concepts of separation of powers. The sometimes murky line between Presidential and Congressional authority will be tested here.
Posted on April 28, 2016
In auto racing, the black flag is the ultimate sanction, signaling that a competitor has been disqualified and has to leave the race. That’s what happened to EPA recently, when it withdrew a controversial proposed rule to “clarify” that the Clean Air Act prohibits converting a certified vehicle for racing.
Merits aside, EPA’s start-and-stop performance is an excellent example of notice-and-comment rulemaking gone wrong. The original proposal appeared last July, a brief passage buried in the middle of a 629-page proposed rule on greenhouse gas emissions for medium- and heavy-duty engines and vehicles – hardly the place where one would look for a rule directed at race cars. See 80 Fed.Reg. 40137, 40527, 40552 (July 13, 2016). As should have been expected, EPA’s pronouncement that the Clean Air Act flatly prohibits converting emission-certified vehicles for competition went unnoticed for months. It wasn’t until late December, nearly three months after the close of the comment period, that SEMA (the Specialty Equipment Market Association, the trade group representing the motor vehicle aftermarket industry) discovered the proposed rule.
That’s when the yellow flag came out. SEMA and its members blasted EPA’s interpretation as reversing a decades-old policy that allowed the race-conversion market to flourish, and for hiding the proposal in an inapplicable rule. EPA’s response was to hold to its interpretation and to post SEMA’s comment letter in a “notice of data availability” so that others could comment – not on EPA’s proposal, but on SEMA’s letter. 81 Fed.Reg. 10822 (March 2, 2016).
SEMA stepped up the pressure with a White House petition that quickly garnered more than 150,000 signatures. Then came a letter to EPA from seven state attorneys general, and bills in both the House and Senate (brilliantly named the Recognizing the Protection of Motorsports Act, or “RPM”) to reverse EPA’s interpretation and codify the race exemption in the Clean Air Act.
On April 15, EPA hit the brakes, announcing that it was withdrawing its proposal. www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regs-heavy-duty.htm. EPA stated that it never meant to change its policy towards “dedicated competition vehicles,” but admitted that its “attempt to clarify led to confusion.” EPA voiced its support for “motorsports and its contributions to the American economy and communities all across the country.
The checkered flag came out, but EPA had already pulled into the pits.
Posted on April 27, 2016
This week, the Federal Highway Administration issued a Noticed of Proposed Rulemaking to promulgate performance measures to be used in evaluating federal funding of transportation projects. The requirement for performance measures stems from the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, aka MAP-21. MAP-21 requires the FHWA to establish performance standards in 12 categories, one of which is “on-road mobile source emissions.”
The NPRM addresses this criterion, focusing largely on emissions of criteria pollutants. However, buried in the 423-page NPRM is a six-page section labeled “Consideration of a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Measure.”
And thus the FHWA drops a bomb that could revolutionize federal funding of transportation projects. It’s important to note that this may not happen. If the next President is Republican, it certainly won’t. Even if the FHWA goes forward, there would be legal challenges to its authority to use GHG as part of the performance measures.
If it does go forward though, it really would be revolutionary. As the NPRM states, transportation sources are rapidly increasing as a source of GHG emissions:
GHG emissions from on-road sources represent approximately 23 percent of economy-wide GHGs, but have accounted for more than two-thirds of the net increase in total U.S. GHGs since 1990.
The enormity of both the challenges facing the FHWA in attempting to establish a performance measure for GHG emissions and the potential impact implementation of a GHG performance measure would have is reflected in some of the 13 questions that FHWA posed for comment:
- Should the measure be limited to emissions coming from the tailpipe, or should it consider emissions generated upstream in the life cycle of the vehicle operations?
- Should CO2 emissions performance be estimated based on gasoline and diesel fuel sales, system use (vehicle miles traveled), or other surrogates?
- Would a performance measure on CO2 emissions help to improve transparency and to realign incentives such that State DOTs and MPOs are better positioned to meet national climate change goals?
- How long would it take for transportation agencies to implement such a measure?
Welcome to the brave new world of integrated planning to manage GHG emissions in a critical sector of our economy.
Posted on April 26, 2016
Two legal rules frequently come into play in environmental tort cases that are difficult to reconcile: the rule allowing recovery for emotional distress damages without physical injury if someone is found to be in the “zone of danger,” and the rule not allowing recovery for mere fear of a future injury.
Normally, recovery for emotional distress (sometimes called mental anguish) requires the plaintiff to suffer some actual physical injury, however slight. But one exception allows someone who is in the “zone of danger” to recover despite the lack of any physical injury. Usually, the danger must be an immediate physical injury. For example, one case allowed recovery for emotional distress under a “zone of danger” theory for the driver at whom a gun was pointed, but not for the passenger in the same car. Another case allowed recovery to someone who had to escape his burning home, and then watched it burn to the ground, but not for someone who merely saw his house burning when he returned from work. Yet another case allowed recovery for floodwaters entering a home because the floodwaters were infested with snakes. Presumably, without the snakes, there could have been no recovery for emotional distress for the flood.
How does this “zone of danger” rule square with claims in environmental tort cases? Many courts do not allow recovery for a mere fear of an injury in the future, or so-called “cancerphobia” cases. Despite this rule, can one recover for emotional distress in, for example, an air pollution case, arguing that the plaintiff is in the “zone of danger” despite no present physical injury?
Plaintiffs in environmental tort cases, such as flooding, air pollution, and others, have indeed been asserting “zone of danger” theories to avoid the physical injury rule, and are asking juries to award them emotional distress or mental anguish damages. These claims must walk a fine line, since most courts do not allow recovery for mere fear of future injury. Where is that line drawn in an environmental tort case? For example, since presumably any amount of air pollution is bad for one’s lungs, is mere exposure to air pollution enough to recover for mental anguish for worrying about one’s self or one’s children? Or is this argument simply an end run around the ban on recovery for fear of future injury? Courts will have to draw lines in these environmental tort cases, and the lines they draw may not all be bright or easy to see.
Posted on April 20, 2016
Last month when the Ocean County, NJ challenge to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s (“NJDEP”) authority to implement dunes for shore protection was dismissed, I wrote that the decision could very well be precedential for similar challenges in other New Jersey counties.
And so it was. In a 65-page opinion, Superior Court Judge Julio Mendez also upheld the DEP’s authority to construct dunes in the City of Margate (Atlantic County) as being neither “arbitrary or capricious” nor an “abuse of power.” The opinion recognized the US Army Corps of Engineers’ (“Corps”) 6-year study and the need to be better prepared for coastal storms such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012. With this ruling – absent an appeal – the DEP will proceed to obtain the necessary easements through the eminent domain process (a prior attempt to do so via an administrative order having failed) with the appropriate compensation paid to the affected beachfront owners.
Judge Mendez acknowledged that the dunes on the oceanfront would not resolve flooding concerns to the bayfront properties nor obviate some protection afforded by seawalls and bulkheads. Interestingly, he found that the dunes in the adjacent City of Ventnor had not only protected Ventnor’s beaches but also expanded the beaches in Margate, and that the dunes in Margate would be protective of its coastal properties and was therefore not arbitrary or capricious.
Posted on April 19, 2016
Last month, while New Jersey Superior Court Judge Julio Mendez was considering Margate’s challenge to the authority of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) to condemn City-owned lots on which to build dunes, New Jersey Superior Court Judge Marlene Lynch Ford dismissed a similar challenge by 28 oceanfront property owners in Ocean County, NJ.
In her decision, she ruled that (1) DEP’s condemnation activities were authorized to “protect the state’s fragile coastal system and [afford] public access” and (2) the taking of the requisite coastal acreage to do so was as a lawful use of that authority, provided that the eminent domain process of compensating affected property owner was followed, which she found to be the case in this instance.
Although it would appear likely that this decision should have significant precedential effect on the other pending challenges, it should be pointed out that the theory in other cases includes not only a challenge to DEP’s authority, but the reasonableness of constructing dunes on the beachfront as opposed to other “shore protection projects.” In fact, although she dismissed the challenge to DEP’s authority to condemn, Judge Ford granted a hearing to other homeowners who claim that DEP acted arbitrarily because their sea walls eliminated the need for dunes.
And so, although the authority of DEP to use eminent domain for shore protection would appear to be judicially blessed, the manner in which it is does so remains subject to challenge.
So, as always, stay tuned.
Posted on April 18, 2016
As reported by Seth Jaffe in this space, a federal magistrate judge in Oregon has kept alive the dreams of a group of young plaintiffs—aided by environmental advocacy groups—to compel government action against climate change. Like a similar case brought by the same plaintiffs a few years ago in state court, discussed below, the federal case seeks a declaration that government inaction violates the public trust. But in the federal case, plaintiffs added claims that their constitutional rights to life, liberty and property also are being violated.
The judge denied the government’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the matter is a political question better left to Congress. Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Coffin reasoned that the pleadings were adequate on their face and that the substantive issues raised by the defendants should await motions for summary judgment or trial. Still, the judge gave hope to the plaintiffs, which, I think will be short lived. Climate change is simply too big, diffuse and complex an issue for the courts to try to fashion a remedy around.
This same group of plaintiffs has had mixed success in pursuing its objectives at the state level. In June 2014 I posted about the Oregon Court of Appeals reversing and remanding a trial court’s dismissal of a similar claim against the state. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a determination whether the atmosphere is a public trust resource and whether Oregon state government had breached its fiduciary responsibility by not adequately protecting it. On remand, Lane County Circuit Court Judge Karsten H. Rasmussen granted the state summary judgment and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The case is now again pending before the Court of Appeals.
In his 19-page opinion, Judge Rasmussen concluded that the public trust does not extend to the atmosphere. The contours of the public trust are a matter of state common law, and Oregon law ties the public trust to title and restraints on alienation. The court concluded that there could be no title in the atmosphere and therefore public trust fiduciary obligations do not exist. The court also noted that traditional public trust resources, such as submerged lands, are exhaustible, which under Oregon law confers a fiduciary responsibility on the state. While the atmosphere may be altered or even damaged, the court found that it is not exhaustible.
The court added the following thought, which I think will guide the U.S. District Court when it hears the current case:
The Plaintiffs effectively ask the Court to do away with the Legislature entirely on the issue of GHG emissions on the theory that the Legislature is not doing enough. If "not doing enough" were the standard for judicial action, individual judges would regularly be asked to substitute their individual judgment for the collective judgment of the Legislature, which strikes this Court as a singularly bad and undemocratic idea.
Watch this space for further developments in Oregon state and federal courts.
Posted on April 14, 2016
In the CERCLA world, the low hanging fruit has largely been picked. Long gone are the days of the run-of-the-mill $3M RI/FS leading up to a $30M RD/RA. We are getting to the tough stuff now – the megasites – and all the difficult issues related to PRP involvement in RD/RA (whether via consent decree settlement or compliance with a UAO) are on steroids.
One of those more difficult issues in the context of multi-party megasites relates to financial assurance (“FA”) requirements in RD/RA UAOs and consent decrees. The 29-page April 2015 EPA FA Guidance, while helpful on some levels, is remarkably thin (2 paragraphs) when it comes to dealing with multi-party sites. And in a breathtaking understatement, especially with regard to big-ticket sites, EPA notes in the guidance that “FA matters can get complicated with multi-PRP-led cleanups….”
Recently, added pressure has been placed on the Agency in this area as a result of a March 31, 2016 EPA Inspector General report stating that “[d]ata quality deficiencies and a lack of internal controls prevent the EPA from properly overseeing and managing its financial assurance program for RCRA and CERCLA.” In particular, EPA’s OIG analysis indicates (among other things) that there are 128 CERCLA sites with no (or expired) financial assurance in place and the estimated cleanup costs for those sites is over $3.7B.
As Proposed Plans and RODs continue to roll out from the Agency with billion-dollar-plus price tags – typically related to multi-party contaminated sediment sites – the difficulty of up-front funding of these hugely expensive remedies becomes obvious. PRPs at multi-party sites will have varying abilities and business desires to up-front fund liquid FA mechanisms, and while some entities will prefer (and be able) to provide assurance by a financial test or corporate guarantee, many will not.
And EPA’s willingness to deal with multiple mechanisms (either different mechanisms from multiple parties or multiple mechanisms from a PRP group) is limited. In fact, the use of multiple financial assurance mechanisms is discouraged under the 2015 FA Guidance. Further, the September 2014 Model Remedial Design / Remedial Action Consent Decree along with the September 2015 Model Unilateral Order for Remedial Design / Remedial Action specifically state that while PRPs may use multiple mechanisms, this can only occur with liquid mechanisms – trust funds, surety bonds guaranteeing payment or letters of credit. Interestingly, the 2014 Model CD also allows the use of insurance policies, indicating that the Agency’s thinking about the liquidity of insurance policies has evolved.
The viability of financial assurances is not simply an EPA-driven issue. Given the multi-decade cleanup process and huge stakes involved at CERCLA megasites, and with the overlay of joint and several liability, PRPs need to be thinking carefully about the financial viability of their co-PRPs when entering into CDs or PRP agreements to perform under a UAO. And regardless of how EPA ultimately decides to deal with this issue at megasites, PRPs no doubt will be pushing each other to ensure long-term equitable responsibility for meeting their FA obligations at this new breed of Superfund sites.
Posted on April 13, 2016
Late last week, Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin concluded that the most recent public trust case, which seeks an injunction requiring the United States to take actions to reduce atmospheric CO2 concentrations to 350 parts per million by 2100, should not be dismissed.
The complaint here is similar to, but broader than, others of its ilk. As we noted previously, at least one federal court has already held that there is no public trust in the atmosphere. Perhaps in response to that case, the plaintiffs here appear to have focused their arguments on the government’s public trust responsibilities with respect to various waters of the United States, though the opinion does not make clear precisely what the complaint alleges to be the subject of the public trust obligation.
The plaintiffs not only allege that the United States has violated its public trust obligations, but that that violation in turn constitutes a violation of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. Magistrate Judge Coffin takes pains to make clear that this is only about a motion to dismiss, but I still think he got it wrong.
Indeed, I think that Magistrate Judge Coffin ignored that well known latin maxim: “Oportet te quasi ludens loqui.” (Which is how the on-line translator I used translated “You must be joking.” I hereby disclaim any warranty that this is even close to correct.)
Call me old-fashioned, but I believe in judicial restraint. And that applies to everyone. Traditionally, conservatives have accused liberals of judicial activism. To my totally objective mind, in recent years at least, it is the conservative judges who could more fairly be called activist. For one case, at least, the shoe seems to be back on its original foot. I just cannot see this decision standing. The District Judge should reject Magistrate Judge Coffin’s Findings and Recommendation. If he or she doesn’t, this case is sufficiently novel and important to warrant interlocutory appeal, and the 9th Circuit should reverse. And if that doesn’t happen, it will be up to the eight (oops, I meant nine) members of the Supreme Court to get it right. One of them surely will.
Posted on April 5, 2016
More than 40 years after the Corps and EPA first adopted regulations to define their jurisdiction over the discharge of dredged and fill materials into waters of the United States under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the agencies find themselves mired in litigation over the Clean Water Rule, their most recent attempt at rulemaking on the issue. 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (June 29, 2015). The Clean Water Rule seeks to address issues raised by the Supreme Court’s decision in the Rapanos case. Challenges to the Clean Water Rule have been filed in eight Courts of Appeal and ten District Courts. Not only is there disagreement over the substance of the rule, there is disagreement over which court or courts have jurisdiction to review challenges to the rule. This disagreement pushes the resolution of the substantive issue far to the future.
It is discouraging to have this kind of uncertainty over a major piece of environmental legislation. While some people may see benefit in uncertainty, the lack of clarity on which court has jurisdiction needlessly wastes time and money that could be put to better use. Especially if the eventual ruling is that District Courts have jurisdiction, questions about the validity of the Clean Water Rule will linger for years.
To address the procedural issue, the Congress should pass legislation to specify a single court to hear all challenges to the Clean Water Rule. Under other laws, such as the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, the Congress had the wisdom to specify clearly a single court with authority to review agency regulations--the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia. Similarly, Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act gives the Court of [Appeals for the District of Columbia exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to regulations of national effect. Judicial review using a single court to review all challenges is orderly and efficient. By contrast, the flurry of lawsuits challenging the EPA and Corps new Clean Water Act regulations is costing the parties millions of dollars just to figure out which court (or courts) should review the challenges to the regulations. Is it too much to ask to have the Congress end the procedural jousting and specify a single court for judicial review?
Posted on April 4, 2016
With increasing recognition of the value of water across the globe, in 2008 eight U.S. states and two Canadian provinces established the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Management Agreement, and the states created a parallel compact on the U.S. side approved by the U.S. Congress. The primary purpose of the Agreement and Compact is to prohibit diversions of water outside the basin, with very limited exceptions. The first real application for an exception to the Agreement and Compact is under consideration by the Regional Body created under the Agreement and the Compact Council created under the Compact. This is receiving much attention and close scrutiny in the U.S. and Canada because many feel it will set the course for many future applications.
The city of Waukesha, Wisconsin, sits just outside the basin in Waukesha County, which straddles the basin line. Waukesha has a problem: the aquifer it uses is contaminated with naturally occurring radium, and beyond that, the city has concerns about its capacity to serve future needs. As a result, Waukesha has applied for an exception to the Agreement and Compact to withdraw up to 10.1 million gallons per day from Lake Michigan, which would be used, treated, and returned to the Lake through the Root River.
Communities, like Waukesha, that are located in counties straddling the water divide line can ask for water diversions from the Great Lakes, governed by strict rules. The key provisions of the exception standard under the Compact and Agreement that Waukesha must meet are:
- The Water shall be used solely for the Public Water Supply Purposes of the Community within a Straddling County that is without adequate supplies of potable water;
- There is no reasonable water supply alternative within the basin in which the community is located, including conservation of existing water supplies;
- Caution shall be used in determining whether or not the Proposal meets the conditions for this Exception. This Exception should not be authorized unless it can be shown that it will not endanger the integrity of the Basin Ecosystem;
There is little dispute that the amount of water taken by Waukesha from Lake Michigan will have any impact on the Lake, especially since all of the water not consumed in Waukesha will be returned, with a small supplement of water from outside the basin to replace the consumed water. The concern is over the precedent it would set for straddling communities and counties all around the basin in Canada and the U.S. and the potential cumulative effect. The real question is whether these three portions of the exception standard are met.
The key word in the first standard noted above for review of the application is “Community,” which is defined in the Compact as “any incorporated city, town or the equivalent thereof, that is located outside the Basin but wholly within a County that lies partly within the Basin and that is not a Straddling Community.” Waukesha’s application indicates that the water will go to a “service area” that goes beyond the boundaries of the City to several towns and unincorporated areas in Waukesha County. They add that they are required by State law to provide water to the service area. Opponents of the application assert that a “service area” is not a “community” within the meaning of the Compact and on those grounds alone, should be denied. Waukesha asserts that the Compact contemplated the “service area” as a “community.” A definition this broad would open the door to areas well beyond the intent of the Compact’s limited exception to the prohibition of diversions.
In the second element of the exception standard, the availability of a “reasonable water supply alternative” is another consideration. Waukesha argues that treatment alternatives are not appropriate and that getting water from Lake Michigan is the best alternative. Opponents argue that there are reasonable alternatives, and that the nearby communities of Brookfield and Pewaukee are utilizing treatment for radium successfully now. They add that the standard is “reasonable,” and that it does not need to be the best alternative, even though treatment for radium may well be the best.
The third element of the standard highlighted is that the diversion will not endanger the integrity of the Basin Ecosystem. The return flow from Waukesha to Lake Michigan is through the Root River. Under the terms of the Compact, as well as State and Federal Law, the discharge must meet all the terms of a permit. Waukesha argues that this protects the Root River and will even improve it. Opponents say that the volume and thermal component, as well as unregulated contaminants such as pharmaceuticals, microbeads, phosphorus and others, will jeopardize the integrity of the Root River. In the summer months, the effluent from Waukesha could be up to 80% of the flow of the River.
Beyond the three elements of the exception standard, there is a question of precedent with this being the first application for an exception to the prohibition against diversions under the Compact and Agreement. Waukesha claims that it meets the exception standard, and that only other straddling communities and counties around the basin might benefit from approval. Opponents claim that the exception standard must be applied strictly because there are so many straddling counties and communities across the eight Great Lakes states and two Canadian provinces that could qualify for exceptions. Furthermore, they argue that jurisdictions outside the straddling counties and communities will be watching closely for an opening to broaden the exceptions to the Compact.
The Regional Body of the eight states and two provinces will meet April 21 and 22, 2016 to make a recommendation on the application to the Compact Council consisting of just the eight states, which will meet in June. It will require a unanimous vote of the Compact Council to approve the application. The decision has implications well beyond Waukesha’s application, and could chart the course for future attempts to divert water from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence.